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Abstract 
 
This research sets out to determine whether there is a best way to perform 
aircraft investment analysis.  The question of best practice is found to be 
linked to corporate ownership: world airline shareholding patterns are 
identified and linked to investment analysis practices, and to airline financial 
performance over the last aviation cycle.  
A key weakness identified by surveying airline practice concerns the treatment 
of uncertainty in the financial analysis.  This research critically examines the 
state of practice regarding treatment of uncertainties embedded investment 
valuation assumptions, in airline fleet planning around the world, and 
proposes structured application of advanced analytical techniques to valuation 
in today’s world of volatile and diverse aviation markets.   
The assumptions underlying valuation are embedded in modern financial 
theory, which has been developed and tested over the last century.  The 
validity and usefulness of financial valuation models is examined from both 
theoretical and practical perspectives, and the state of practice regarding 
these models in the airline industry is established, both quantitatively through 
survey research, and qualitatively through aviation executive interviews in the 
field.  This combined approach has allowed the establishment of ‘paradigms’ 
characterizing the concrete application of financial theory to the question of 
aircraft investment. 
Regional patterns of airline shareholding are identified in a detailed analysis of 
ownership structure and business models.  The resulting governance typology 
is analyzed in aggregate, and associated with production, and profitability by 
region.  The tendency of each airline ownership type to use modern financial 
valuation techniques has to some extent been established by applying survey 
results to the different regions. 
The fleet planning process and the positioning of investment valuation within it 
is discussed, and key uncertainties underlying fleet planning assumptions are 
identified and mapped in a risk map framework.  A method for strategic 
analysis of fleet financing alternatives is derived from classical theory, and 
applied to the specifics of the aircraft market. 
The uncertainties surrounding several key modelling assumptions are found to 
be substantial in the minds of today’s fleet planners, and the assessments of 
uncertainty vary substantially between airline fleet planners and third-party 
advisors.  The identified practices in applying classical financial theory are 
found to be strikingly inadequate in treatment of these uncertainties. 
A model is developed for valuing the acquisition of aircraft under uncertainty, 
using extensions of the classical financial framework entailing more advanced 
quantitative techniques.  The model’s application to a specific analytical 
situation analysis show that investment valuations under deterministic models 
are contradicted when applying uncertainty to key uncertainties present in 
today’s markets, and a process that yields insights beyond classical finance is 
proposed.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction and objectives  11 
1. Introduction and objectives 
1.1. Airline fleet planning and investment analysis 
The investment in aircraft is a long-term proposition for airlines around the 
world, involving choices which strongly impact the company's economic 
performance over the years the aircraft is in operation and at the time of 
disposal, in the form of aircraft residual value.  The capital cost of aircraft can 
represent over 15% of airline costs, and represents 37% capital and labour 
inputs, as observed in 2000/2001 (Morrell, 2001).  These costs are incurred 
with limited flexibility over the medium term, based on decisions made in a 
complex fleet planning activity within the airline.   
According to a definitive work on the subject, "fleet planning is a process by 
which an airline acquires and manages appropriate aircraft capacity in order 
to serve anticipated markets over a variety of defined periods of time with a 
view to maximising corporate wealth" (Clark, 2007).  This definition goes 
beyond the decision to acquire or dispose of aircraft, requiring that fleet 
planners effectively manage capacity over time (and economic cycles), to suit 
the needs of anticipated, uncertain, market demand.   
It is a complex and ongoing organizational process involving many functions 
and analytical processes: 
• Strategic, Network and/or Commercial planning for the market potential  
• Marketing to define the cabin product and evaluate revenue potential 
• Flight Operations for aircraft performance 
• Engineering for maintenance capacity planning and costs 
• Finance for the economic assessment 
The investment appraisal 1  is typically performed when a final decision is 
required from an airline's board of directors.  All of the inputs are summarized 
in economic terms (amounts invested, revenue, cost and cash flow 
projections), and the expected profitability of the investment is measured and 
defended to secure a favourable decision.  Various profitability metrics can be 
observed in regular airline use, with their sophistication reflecting both the 
governance and the size and sophistication of the airlines concerned.  These 
decisions, once taken, tend to lock airlines into fixed transport capacity and 
                                                 
1 The terms investment appraisal and analysis will be used interchangeably in this research.  
Both refer to the process of valuing investment plans, often referred to as capital budgeting in 
U.S.   
   
Chapter 1: Introduction and objectives  12 
attendant costs over the medium term.  This research will show that risk 
assessments range from "gut feel" to simple sensitivity analysis, and rarely to 
application of more sophisticated techniques to judge the likelihood of 
potential outcomes and suggest alternative investment paths.   
In addition to the duration of the investment, the complexity of the equipment 
analysed and attendant corporate processes, airline fleet planning is 
characterized by complex relations with the airframe and engine 
manufacturers during the lead-up to the aircraft selection and board approval.  
After a strategic decision has been made to change the airline's capacity by 
replacing and/or adding capacity, a Request for Proposal (RFP) is usually 
issued to alternative suppliers of equipment.  These documents and the 
resulting commercial proposals from manufacturers contain many details 
about the performance, cabin layout, hold baggage and cargo capacity and 
cost characteristics of various airframe/engine combinations, which serve as 
inputs to the airline's investment appraisal.    
The valuation of the investment is often conducted hand-in-hand with the 
process of selecting among competing aircraft types, and the intermediate 
financial results are frequently used as a negotiating tool with suppliers of 
airframes and engines.  The base of the economic analysis is a careful 
comparison of cash operating costs between alternatives.  Cost per seat-
kilometre (seat cost) is balanced against the cost of a flight (trip cost), and 
guarantees are sought for key items such as range, weight, fuel burn and 
maintenance cost.   
Recent examples of the interaction between investment planning and 
negotiations with manufacturers were the protracted and difficult 2002 
campaigns led by Boeing and Airbus to place single-aisle aircraft with Ryanair 
and easyJet in the midst of the 9/11 chill on new orders.  The discussions led 
to repeated "best and final offers" by the manufacturers and leasing 
companies before Ryanair selected the 737-800, while easyJet agreed to 
move from a 737 fleet to highly customized A319s.   
Along with the U.S.' Southwest Airlines, these companies pioneered the low-
cost carrier mega-order that has been popular since.  Both chose to publish 
certain non-confidential terms of Airbus and Boeing's commercial offers in 
prospectuses on their web sites, which have contributed to increased 
transparency in aircraft pricing.  The 2002 Ryanair prospectus stated that the 
deal was proposed at pricing “significantly below” list prices, while easyJet 
(2003) cited “very substantial price concessions,” offering pricing “one third 
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per seat below… the 737-700 aircraft already delivered” by Boeing in a 
previous deal2. 
A third party to the process, operating leasing companies can also play an 
important role in the fleet planning process, most obviously by providing 
available aircraft in contrast to the lead time imposed by the aircraft 
programme development and manufacturing processes.  The major leasing 
companies have significant portfolios of used aircraft, and the strongest 
among them place “speculative” orders allowing them to offer near-term 
delivery positions in the event of strong demand.    
In terms of the investment appraisal, aircraft acquired on operating lease are a 
hybrid between investment and financing, offering the right to "quiet 
enjoyment" of the aircraft during the lease period in exchange for a monthly 
lease payment composed of the aircraft depreciation, and interest charge and 
the equity return required by the operating lessor.  The airline has no risk or 
reward regarding the asset's value at the end of the lease term, leading to 
questions regarding the analytical classification of a lease as an investment or 
financing vehicle.  The second feature of operating leasing relevant to this 
research, much touted by the lessors, is the flexibility to abandon an individual 
aircraft, or even the aircraft type, at the end of the lease period.  This thesis 
will review and propose methodologies for calculating the price of the risk 
transfer to lessors.   
More generally, aircraft financiers in both the private and public sectors can 
play an important role in fleet development, because of the high leverage and 
hunger for capital of airlines around the world, making the bankers a fourth 
potential player in the investment planning process.  This research explores 
the interactions between investment and financing decisions, given the often 
severe funding constraints faced by many airlines seeking to add or renew 
capacity. 
Finally, fleet planning in many airlines is a highly political process, reflecting 
the various airline governance structures and political agendas in the broader 
economy.  A recent a striking example of political interference in the process 
was the September 2007 rejection of Kuwait Airways' proposed $3billion fleet 
renewal plan and order of Boeing 787 and Airbus A320 aircraft by the 
government of Kuwait.  This political imbroglio, deriving ostensibly from a lack 
of legal provisions for financing the deal which involved a local leasing 
company, brought about the resignation of the airline's management team and 
                                                 
2 Extracts from the Ryanair and easyJet prospectuses are reproduced in Appendix 1 
   
Chapter 1: Introduction and objectives  14 
board of directors, which had completed a network and fleet study of many 
months' duration in preparation of the proposed aircraft order3.  
1.1.1. Aircraft investment, airline profitability and uncertainty 
The world’s airlines are continually challenged to deal effectively with 
uncertainty in the transport sector and the inevitable downturns faced by any 
business.  In the 12 months ending August 2008, at least six airlines operating 
large aircraft (Aloha, Skybus, eos, maxJet, Silverjet, Oasis Hong Kong) went 
bankrupt in the wake of dramatically higher fuel costs driven by oil prices over 
$100/bbl. A new business model (low-fare business-class only service) was 
called into question, due to the incipient recession’s impact on premium travel 
and the unprecedented, and unpredicted, price of jet fuel.  At its 2008 Annual 
General Meeting, IATA changed its industry profit forecast for 2008 from its 
previous +$5billion forecast to -$2.3billion "at least" prior to its June AGM, and 
further reduced it to -$5bn by September, stark evidence of the rapidity with 
which the airline cycle can move.  
These cyclical swings can be exacerbated by the periodic need to replace 
older equipment with more modern aircraft.  There is, historically, a distinct 
relationship between the profits of the airline sector, and orders for jet aircraft. 
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Figure 1.1: Airline profits and aircraft orders.  Source: Airline Business4, Airbus 
Recent research testing more narrowly defined parameters has revealed 
closer relationships than airline operating profits and orders.  Hallerström 
                                                 
3  These events were reported in Air Transport Intelligence, 29 August 2007, 9 and 12 
September, 2007 
4 Included in the 2005 industry net loss is the restructuring charge resulting in a net loss of 
$27.7bn by United Airlines, which emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings in that 
year 
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(2000) modelled jet aircraft demand and value as "pent-up relative capacity 
shortage/surplus (PURCS)", a function of the difference between traffic and 
seat growth offered, adjusted for the overall growth trend of air transport.  
Analysing previous forecasts of this relationship, he found that short-term 
swings in PURCS are "basically unpredictable."  Otero (2006, p. 57) found a 
close relationship between airline operating profits (EBITDAR) per seat and 
orders of aircraft in the 1990s.  Figure 1.1 reveals that in the most recent cycle, 
the profit-order relationship is far less pronounced, as the commercial success 
of the Boeing 787 and the continued popularity of single-aisle aircraft 
worldwide fattened manufacturer order books during three successive years 
2005-2007, where orders averages 2,220 aircraft per year, while the Top 150 
airlines achieved significant profits only in 2007.    
Due to the manufacturing lead time needed to produce aircraft once ordered, 
the cycle of aircraft deliveries is often out of sync with airline profits.  Aircraft 
ordered during times of strong growth (at the peak of the PURCS and profit 
cycle) are often delivered when profits are low or negative.  In 2000 as the 
"new economy" began to wind down, the dollar strengthened, fuel prices rose, 
and U.S. pilot wage concessions negotiated in the early-90s downturn expired, 
airline profits fell below 1% of revenue, while nearly 800 jets over 100 seats, 
worth many tens of billions of dollars, were delivered.  As losses mounted to 
total 4% of revenue in 2001, an even greater number of aircraft were delivered 
to operators by Airbus and Boeing.  The precipitating event for the 2001-2004 
downturn, the WTC attacks on 11 September, only exacerbated what was 
already starting as another "basically unpredictable" downward swing in airline 
performance, while manufacturer productions rates slowed only after the 
airline profits declined for two straight years.      
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Figure 1.2: Airline profits and aircraft deliveries.  Source: Airline Business, Airbus 
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Similarly, the financial crisis begun in 2008, coupled with high fuel prices and 
some unwise hedging practices, led to the deepest losses experienced yet by 
the world’s largest airlines.  These losses will certainly be repeated or 
deepened when 2009 results are finalized, and continue into 2010 in most 
regions: meanwhile, Boeing and Airbus delivered 979 large jets between them 
in 2009, and forecast similar deliveries for 2010.  For this research it is 
important to note the fundamentally unpredicted nature of the WTC attacks 
and the present financial crisis (and the first Gulf War before them), which can 
wreak havoc with the best-laid plans of airline planners.    
Added to the cyclicality is the well-known chronic problem of low profitability.  
The operating profits of the world's top 150 airlines occupy a consistently low 
place, when compared to other companies in the aviation supply chain. 
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Figure 1.3: Aviation Supply chain profitability in 2008.  Source: Flight International, Airline Business 
The combination of cyclicality and fundamental difficulty producing profits 
means that the world's airlines have consistent and massive recourse to debt 
markets in order to finance investment in aircraft and other equipment.  This 
financing gap leads to high financial leverage and interest charges, 
exacerbating the profitability problem and putting off private providers of long-
term equity capital.  In addition to its high fixed costs and operating leverage, 
airlines frequently have high financial leverage, with a wide range of capital 
structure in evidence across the business, as shown in Table 1.1. 
   
Chapter 1: Introduction and objectives  17 
Airline 
Debt to Total 
Assets ratio Airline 
Debt to Total 
Assets ratio 
Singapore Airlines -27% Air Berlin 72% 
Vueling 41% TAM 72% 
GOL 49% Thai 74% 
Southwest 52% ANA 75% 
easyJet 54% Lufthansa 75% 
Ryanair 55% Alitalia 78% 
Cathay Pacific 56% LAN Airlines 78% 
Air Asia 56% British Airways 79% 
Aer Lingus 58% Frontier 79% 
Air China 62% JetBlue 80% 
Finnair 64% Air Canada 80% 
Turkish Airlines 65% JAL 81% 
Emirates 65% America West 87% 
Air New Zealand 67% United 84% 
Aeroflot 67% China Eastern 92% 
SAS 68% Continental 97% 
Qantas 68% China Southern 100% 
Air France 69% American 102% 
Iberia 70% Northwest  161% 
Westjet 70% Delta 169% 
Table 1.1: Debt-Equity ratios of selected airlines.  Source: Jacobs Consultancy (2006) 
The variability of capital structure cuts across all of the world’s regions and 
airlines business models.  Some, like Singapore Airlines, had negative debt, 
while at the other end of the spectrum, three U.S. majors (of which two in 
Chapter 11, Delta and Northwest) had debts exceeding the total value of 
assets.  The average debt to total assets ratio across the Jacobs (2006) 
sample was 74%. 
Aircraft financing & investment interactions 
The first and vital source of capital for any business is risk capital or 
shareholders' equity.  In many countries, airlines were historically viewed as 
an infrastructure investment, required to promote economic development and 
growth, with the state providing the equity.  This implies that for governments 
of these countries, the debt portion of airline financing could be viewed as part 
of the state’s overall infrastructure financing.  Further, because of the strategic 
and military background of aviation, many of the world’s airlines were initially 
financed using state funds.  This research will reveal that the state remains 
the largest shareholder in nearly half of the world's major airlines, and will 
explore the consequences of this fact for investment valuation. 
Since the progressive deregulation of airline price and route structures began 
in the U.S. in 1978, many of the world's flag carriers have been privatised.  
This trend is most pronounced in Western Europe, so much so that among 
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western European network carriers, the state held an absolute majority share 
only in Finnair, Olympic and TAP in 2009.   
The wide range of governance structures that characterizes the airline 
business inevitably has a powerful impact on the investment appraisal 
process within the airlines.  Private airline managers should be expected by 
their shareholders to perform rigorous economic and financial analysis to test 
and demonstrate the rationality and viability of investment projects in order to 
obtain board approval.  British Airways and Lufthansa demonstrate valuation 
methods with great transparency in annual reports and other financial 
communications available on their web sites.   
At the other extreme, an airline such as Kuwait Airways which is a department 
of the government shows a very high degree of state interference in decision-
making process. That said, state ownership is no "guarantee" of non-
economically rational behaviour on the part of airlines: Singapore Airlines and 
Emirates are both held (indirectly in SIA's case) by their respective 
governments, and both are industry-leading players in growth (Emirates) and 
profitability (Singapore). Between the extremes lie closely-held companies 
such as Virgin Atlantic and Hainan Airways, which may be expected to 
perform economic analysis very carefully, but are highly secretive about the 
extent and nature of such analysis.   
A final group is airlines majority owned by other airlines.  Often these are 
regional feeder carriers such as Air France's Regional Airlines, and 
American's American Airlines' American Eagle.  In these cases the economic 
rigour of the parent should extend to the subsidiary.  However, in other cases 
such as Brazil's Varig (owned by the low-cost start-up GOL) and China's 
Dragonair (an airline which has changed ownership from Cathay Pacific's 
parent Swire Group and Air China and back in the last few years, may have 
more strategic motives in their planning, rather than strict economic analysis 
of the airline's plans as a stand-alone entity. 
The cyclicality and requirement for fresh capital creates major business 
opportunities for operating lessors and other aircraft financiers.  Airbus reports 
the following sources of finance for the years from 2003 – 2008. 
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Figure 1.4: Sources of financing of Airbus aircraft, 2002-2008.  Source: Airbus 
More evidence of the impact of the airline profitability cycle on financing 
opportunities is clearly evident in Figure 1.4.  In 2003 less than 30% of 
financing came from airline cash and market finance, a figure which rose to 
nearly 50% by 2006, near the peak of the most recent cycle.  Regarding 
operating leasing, we can see from 2004 on a new trend away from "pure" 
operating leases and underlying speculative aircraft orders from 
manufacturers, toward increasing Sale and Leaseback operations where the 
airline orders and specifies the aircraft, cedes the title at delivery, and 
simultaneously signs an operating lease. Of longer duration than traditional 
operating leases, these vehicles demonstrate a very high level of investment-
financing interaction and again raise the question of the analytical nature of an 
operating lease.  Tactically the airline can realise a paper profit on the sale to 
the lessor, while eliminating the residual value risk, at a price which is 
embedded in the lease payment.   
Lastly, the variability of the Export Credit Agency (ECA) proportion in the 
financing mix reflects the airline cycle.  These agencies in industrialized 
countries provide loan guarantees to banks, in order to facilitate the export of 
capital equipment.  The ECAs can be seen providing a financing "cushion" 
during the downturn years of 2003-2004, while their role is reduced when 
commercial financing becomes available during recovery and up-cycle periods 
such as 2005-2007.  The rules governing ECA financing have recently been 
updated to be more inclusive, and to more effectively evaluate and price the 
default risk of such financing.  The former Large Aircraft Sector Understanding 
(LASU), which specified the conditions for government loan guarantees 
available to finance exports of Boeing and Airbus equipment has been 
supplanted by the Aircraft Sector Understanding (ASU).  The new agreement 
covers smaller and shorter-range regional fixed-wing aircraft as well as the 
larger jets.  It also implements an airline credit rating scheme which is to be 
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used, on all sides, to establish the appropriate premium to charge for the 
financing guarantee.  These changes are intended to reduce the financing 
market distortion effect that ECA financing has been accused of in the past5.   
The picture on the other side of the Atlantic is similar, as Figure 1.5, from a 
Boeing FAA briefing presentation.  Boeing clearly anticipated that the financial 
crisis would create an even greater need for ECA financing in 2008 than was 
the case for Airbus. 
Figure 1.5 Sources of Finance for Boeing aircraft.  Source: Boeing 
The ECAs are not the only public-sector financiers of airlines and aircraft.  The 
European Investment Bank (EIB) financed €5,370 million of airline projects 
between 1990 and 2001 (EIB, 2004).  The bank's evaluation report for the 
period noted the volatility of the air transport market, the medium-term nature 
of fleet capacity decisions, and the very wide range of airline management 
and governance impacting decision-making.  While generally positive 
regarding the EIB's performance, the report does point up a certain lack of 
methodology in project selection, and problems with project follow-up during 
the operational phase.  The 10 EIB aviation financing projects analysed show 
a wide range of profitability projections, suggesting that the origination of the 
deals and the motives for the projects, and the loans, are not strictly economic.  
                                                 
5 see, for example, AirFinance Journal (2007) 
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1.2. Thesis aims and objectives 
The world's airlines thus often suffer from low profitability, high financial and 
operating leverage, high market uncertainty, and dependence on debt finance, 
ECA guarantees, and operating leases to support their growth and 
development. 
Airline fleet planning processes are in turn characterized by: 
• Long-term commitment to investments with limited flexibility to exit 
• Complex, ongoing fleet planning processes involving many functional 
areas of the airline 
• Involvement of equipment manufacturers and leasing companies 
• Political interference, both in governance and financing 
The basic research question is derived from these characteristics: given these 
challenges and complex interactions of many players, what is the role of the 
financial valuation, and is it done properly (and indeed, can it be done 
properly) given the theoretical framework and tools at hand?  Beyond the 
question of proper application of theory, the research aims to identify best 
practice in valuation, given different airlines’ geographical reqion, size, 
governanance, and previous aviation track record, establishing a set of 
guidelines for the proper use of financial theory depending on these 
parameters,   
With this central question, there are three research aims of this thesis.  The 
first is to investigate the coherence, clarity and usability of financial valuation 
theory for evaluating aircraft investments, including questions of data 
availability around the world, and to establish the state of airline practice 
regarding financial valuation.  A second aim is to establish an airline 
ownership typology capturing and synthesizing the wide variety of airline 
equity ownership patterns, and to examine the relationship between equity 
ownership and valuation methods used. The research then attempts to 
establish a link between governance, profitability, and aircraft investment 
valuation.  The final aim is to discover if and how application of the most 
recent financial and investment theory to fleet planning processes can 
contribute to an improvement of aircraft investment financial evaluation, which 
could in turn enhance profitability and access to cost-effective private sector 
sources of long-term capital.  The research establishes the state of current 
practice across the world’s regions and airline ownership patterns, identifies 
new approaches beyond simple application of classical finance theory, and 
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provides a methodological framework for applying these extensions to 
investment appraisal in a systematic way. 
Starting with the recognized methods of investment analysis widely used 
within and outside aviation, the research establishes a baseline of valuation 
practice in the general business community and in the airline industry, 
investigating both which techniques are used, and how they fit in planning 
processes.  Given these baseline techniques, the research seeks to identify 
paradigms of practice, given the most recent extensions and variations used 
by the most financially advanced airlines in Europe. 
Finally, the research identifies the key uncertainties facing fleet planners today, 
and proposes methods for most effectively assessing risk over the investment 
horizon, including measuring and modelling the impact of economic cycles 
and demand uncertainty on investment projects.  Methods for reliably and 
transparently pricing the potential risk-transfer inherent (for example) in 
manufacturer options are proposed. 
1.2.1. Research methodology 
The objectives of this thesis require investigation of financial analysis 
techniques used within companies.  The primary difficulty of the present topic 
is that decision processes surrounding fleet acquisition are considered highly 
strategic, and are held confidential in the vast majority of cases.  The goal of 
establishing best practice further requires research into which financial 
analysis techniques are used: additionally, inquiries into the even more 
sensitive topic how they are used to evaluate investments are necessary.  In 
order to surmount these challenges, a broad mix of field research and 
analysis of publicly available data was necessary. 
To determine which techniques are in use, this research uses, compares and 
contrasts three field research items:  
• Executive survey of 249 airlines, to identify and compare airline 
investment valuation practice with the general business community.  
The comparison with the general business community is intended to 
identify,  any unique strengths and weaknesses in the airline business 
• Structured interviews with senior managers of airlines, financial 
institutions, and aircraft manufacturer, to clarify the question of the 
positioning of the investment appraisal within the overall fleet planning 
process 
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• Finally, an expert panel of fleet planning professionals, which was 
queried specifically on the degree and impact of uncertainties 
underlying both fleet planning processes and financial valuations 
To deal with the particularly abstruse nature of some current financial theory 
(such as Real Options), this research developed a stylized illustrative example 
using an aircraft investment valuation model developed by the author - and 
used actively with clients in the field - to the problem of capturing, and valuing, 
uncertainties in investment projects. 
Three cross-sectional analyses of the airline industry worldwide were 
performed for this research: the executive survey mentioned above, analysis 
of airline equity ownership worldwide, and analysis of airline financial 
performance over the 2004 – 2008 period.  In selecting the airlines for survey 
and analysis, the primary principle was to identify a single airline population 
where it was possible to obtain reliable published information for the 
ownership and profitability analyses. 
A second guiding principle in sampling was pragmatism, in the face of many 
firms’ reluctance to disclose their methods of strategic decision-making to 
company outsiders.  The most willing respondents throughout this research 
come from the European region, for at least two reasons.   
The first is the stature of Cranfield University in the European aviation sector, 
cited by several interviewees as encouraging them to co-operate with this 
research.  The second is the fact that since the privatizations beginning with 
British Airways in the 1980s, and led by the practices of British Airways,  
Lufthansa and others, European airlines have developed a management 
culture of financial transparency, as evidenced by the extensive financial 
communication available on the airline web sites. 
This pragmatic approach has clearly produced sample bias into this research, 
which is skewed toward representation of European best practice. The 
research is thus most relevant for those airlines that choose to adopt highly 
transparent communication of investment analysis, whether they be in Europe 
or other regions of the world.  
The specific method used to establish specific samples for each phase of the 
research is described in the relevant chapter.   
The secondary research methods used in this thesis are: 
• Review of the usefulness of the relevant financial theory literature and 
investment analysis techniques available, and the numerous recent 
theoretical advances in the field 
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• Identification of the state of investment appraisal practice in the 
business and communities through literature surveys  
• A stylized "case study" approach to identify and synthesize the state of 
practice.  Three valuation paradigms are proposed, and practices 
combining traditional and advanced valuation techniques are analysed 
and compared. 
1.2.2. Thesis structure 
This thesis first reviews the relevant financial theory, its evolution through 
today.  One of the central debates in modern financial theory is the separation 
of the investment and financing decisions, around the notion that the way a 
firm is financed does not affect its overall market value.  Chapter 2 of this 
thesis surveys the evolution of the relevant investment theory underlying such 
decisions.   
Company and project investment valuation techniques evolved from classical 
economic evaluation pioneered in the 1960s and updated since are discussed 
in Chapter 3.  Application of the techniques in the general business 
community and in aviation is then surveyed, with a specific discussion of the 
treatment of risk in the analysis.    
Classical investment theory was developed primarily with publicly-traded 
shares in mind.  Chapter 4 explores the relevance of valuation theory for the 
airline business today, given the wide range of airline equity ownership 
patterns found in the world's companies and airlines.  The potential and 
pitfalls of classical valuation techniques worldwide are examined in detail.  
Governance patterns are identified for each region, valuation techniques are 
matched with region and governance patterns, and are compared with the 
practice in publicly traded firms.  Growth and profitability by region and by 
ownership pattern from 2004-2008 are analyzed.   
The positioning of the investment appraisal within the airlines' fleet planning 
process is the first subject of Chapter 5, using various European airlines to 
identify and illustrate different approaches.  The influence of manufacturer 
forecasts on fleet planning is discussed, and the ‘neo-classical’ investment 
valuation paradigm is described in detail.  The chapter concludes with the 
expert panel on fleet planning uncertainties, bringing to light the varying 
degree of uncertainties underlying certain fundamental assumptions, and 
suggesting the need to adopt valuation techniques beyond the neo-classical 
approach.    
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Chapter 6 identifies and analyzes two new valuation paradigms in today’s 
airlines, and examines the potential benefits of each in valuing projects, 
negotiating with aircraft suppliers, and managing fleet planning uncertainties.  
The problematic valuation of the residual value risk transfer inherent in 
operating leases is examined, and classical financial theory is extended and 
adapted to this specific valuation question. 
Chapter 7 seeks to advance the usefulness and viability of the most recent 
strategic and investment theories for fleet planners, focusing on options 
pricing and its underlying tool Monte Carlo analysis, with a secondary 
emphasis on recent applications of Game Theory and environmental cost 
modelling to the fleet planning problem.  
Chapter 8 of this research intends to both summarize the research and 
facilitate the adoption of the more advanced techniques.  Profit performance 
of practitioners of financial theory is compared with overall industry 
performance, concrete applications of the advanced techniques are 
recommended, and areas for further research are identified.  
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2. Financial theory and the cost of investment 
The theory of planning and costing investments grew over the twentieth 
century with the rise of publicly held companies issuing equity and debt 
securities on organised security markets; the practices derived from these 
theories are still with us today.  A body of theory and practice regarding 
security analysis by arms-length investors (that is, investors who were not 
necessarily managers or board members of the company concerned) was 
developed and codified in works like Graham and Dodd's comprehensive 
Security Analysis, originally published in 1934 and still in print and widely used 
today in its 5th Edition (updated by three additional authors in 1988, 12 years 
after Benjamin Graham's death).  In the late 1950s and 1960s, theory took a 
major turn from valuing securities using financial statements to more statistical 
and approaches to estimating investment returns and company values.  This 
chapter outlines the evolution of relevant investment theory and its 
implications for airline investment planning. 
2.1. Traditional views of investment costs and returns 
The question of the cost of corporations' investments in real assets – or, 
equivalently, the return to investors and lenders to such corporations - was 
extensively developed in the context early in the last century in articles and 
books such as Graham and Dodd (1934).  This body of practice will be called 
the "traditional view" in this research, and its tenets have been widely debated 
since the second half of the century.  They are still the subject of contention 
among academics and practitioners today.  Graham and Dodd's Security 
Analysis is still in print in its Fifth edition updated by three additional authors 
and published in 1988: it is this edition, referred to as Graham and Dodd 
(1988), which is used to illustrate the concepts in this research. 
Several fundamental constructs underlie this body of practice, which its 
advocates call "value investing".  The first and most important is that a firm's 
intrinsic value, defined by Graham and Dodd as "the value which is justified by 
the firm's assets, earnings, dividends, definite [growth] prospects, and the 
factor of management."  This intrinsic value can be estimated, and it bears an 
uncertain relationship to the market price of the firm's shares at any given time.  
Share values are held to fluctuate around a central tendency, a concept very 
similar to the economist's notion of an equilibrium value between supply and 
demand for the securities.   
This intrinsic value of the firm is best estimated by sound valuation based on 
careful analysis of the company's financial statements.  Discrepancies 
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between market value and intrinsic value give rise to the activity of contrarian 
investing, acquiring shares of firms whose intrinsic values are substantially 
above their current market values.  This gap between these values is known 
as the margin of safety: risk-averse investors will seek deeply discounted 
market valuations in order to “insure” themselves against continued market 
misperception, while the more adventurous will be willing to accept smaller 
value gaps when justified by knowledge of the business or the company's 
management skills. 
Because the relationship between market and intrinsic values is uncertain, 
investors cannot be sure when (or indeed, if) the market will perceive the 
value gap and bid up the shares.  The solution proposed to this conundrum is 
holding a diverse portfolio of such shares, some of which will be re-valued by 
the market earlier than others, an intuition presaging the Markowitz’ more 
formal theory of diversification as a tool to maximize the ratio of return to 
uncertainty.  The notion that shares can be durably under- or overvalued is 
contradictory to the more recent theory of efficient financial markets, where all 
relevant information about a company's condition and prospects is at all times 
embedded in a firm's share price. The margin-of-safety concept is less 
elegant and amenable to broad theorization than efficient markets theory, but 
Warren Buffet, certainly the world's most successful security analyst, made 
his fortune based on these concepts, and Mr. Buffet frequently cites the 
teaching of Benjamin Graham as the main inspiration for his investing 
approach.  This research will make extensive use of the remaining constructs 
in the traditional view, discussed below.   
These other constructs are consistent with subsequent investment valuation 
theory and practice, and underlie its development.  The first of these is the 
existence of a capitalization factor which allows the analyst to relate the firm's 
current and expected profit performance to its share price.  The most common 
and simplest capitalization ratio is the Price-Earnings Ratio (PER), a factor 
relating today's share price P0 to the firm's expected Earnings per share 
(EPS): 
1
0
0 EPS
PPER = ........................................................................................... 2.1 
Easy to measure for both the market as a whole and for individual firms, this 
single-period ratio allows comparison of the optimism of investor's 
expectations among firms and markets.  It is often interpreted as a measure of 
expected growth prospects in a fuzzy way, as it represents the number of 
years' current earnings paid for a share.  Numerous variants of this basic 
equation are in common use, including in the numerator Enterprise Value (EV, 
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the market value of bonds and shares outstanding less cash), and cash flow 
in the denominator: in all the variants, the underlying valuation concept is the 
same.  
Firms' growth prospects are better accounted for in a multi-period dividend 
discounting valuation framework, which in its simplest form calculates today's 
value as a perpetuity function of the next year's expected dividend (DIV1), the 
investor's required annual return (r) and the anticipated growth rate of the 
dividend (g): 
gr
DIVP −=
1
0 ................................................................................................ 2.2 
Since value investing is heavily dependent on estimating the expected future 
earnings of the company, dividends must be derived through an assumed 
percentage of profits paid out as dividends, known as the dividend payout 
ratio.  As Brealey and Myers (1984) pointed out, the relationship with the 
growth expectations implicit in PER can be derived by dividing Equation 2.2 
through by EPS: 
gr
x
EPS
DIV
EPS
P
−=
1
1
1
1
0 ................................................................................ 2.3 
The price earnings ratio can thus be high for any or all of three reasons: the 
payout ratio and/or dividend growth is expected to be high, or investors' 
required returns are low. 
For value investors, projections of earnings necessarily underlying dividend 
forecasts should be based on macro-economic forecasts, broad analysis of 
listed share earnings expectations, sector and finally company analysis.  
Individual company forecasts are held to be highly dependent on the quality of 
management, and easier to perform for companies with a long track record to 
base the forecast on, and/or a dominant position in their industries.  Examples 
of ideal companies for value analysis given by Graham and Dodd (1988) are 
then-dominant firms like McDonald's and General Motors, and Dayton Hudson, 
a remarkably stable retailer of consumer goods. 
To better reflect future prospects, precise dividend forecasts are 
recommended by proponents of value investing, leading to the familiar 
valuation equation in common use today, for both company and real asset 
investment valuation. 
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In this approach, each year's dividend is estimated and discounted over the 
number of years in the investor's horizon (n).  Clearly, the projected future 
dividend estimates are subject to a broad range of uncertainties 
There are two basic analytical approaches to using these dividend discount 
models, which again find echoes in real asset investment analysis: either the 
analyst chooses a discount rate reflecting expected risks of the company and 
solves the equation for the "true value" (today known as target price) of the 
shares, or today's price is used to calculate the implied annual rate of return 
(the internal rate of return, or IRR) in an iterative "trial and error" method.   
Both approaches beg the question of the investment horizon, an issue which 
is avoided in the simpler PER approach and for which there is no absolute 
prescription, and neither deals with companies which do not issue dividends.  
Graham and Dodd, while admitting the choice of investment horizon is 
arbitrary, argue forcefully for a five-ten year investment horizon, in order to 
cover the company's prospects over a complete business cycle (Graham and 
Dodd (1988, p. 514-515)).  This research will return to the critical question of 
cyclicality in later chapters of this research.  The dividend question remained 
unsolved until portfolio pricing techniques were brought into play.  These are 
discussed in section 2.3. 
The final construct used in the traditional view is the intuition of a risk premium 
to be estimated on share markets, raising the cost of share finance over and 
above the cost of debt.  This final construct relates the expected return of 
company shares to overall economic conditions and the returns available for 
alternative, lower-risk investments.  Summarizing the traditional view, the 
expected return on share markets is a function of current and future earnings 
and dividends as discussed above, but also of inflation, interest rates on 
relatively low-risk AAA corporate bonds, and an equity risk premium.  In the 
1988 edition, a numeric example of these elements is given (earnings growth 
prospects 7.5%, expected inflation 5.2%, AAA bonds 8.5%, and equity risk 
premium 2.75%), giving an 11.25% expected share return of which 7.5% 
comes from price appreciation, and implicitly, 3.75% from dividend yield. 
To estimate the required rate of returns, the equity risk premium (presumably 
over the market return) is presented by Graham and Dodd as the "variability 
of expected returns [in individual years] around the trend line returns," based 
on three broad categories of causes: 
1) industry factors, operating and financial leverage, creditworthiness and 
non-financial elements; 
   
Chapter 2: Financial theory and the cost of investment 30 
2) potential growth over and above the trend line from new products and 
markets, as well as economic and social developments; 
3) informed and experienced based appraisal of management ability to cope 
with uncertainty and unpredictable events. 
For traditionalists, the variability of company performance over the economic 
cycle is highly dependent on the quality of the company's management, a 
subjective appreciation which defies quantification.   
To best manage the risk of investments, value investing proponents such as 
Graham and Dodd are starkly conservative.  In this view the ideal securities 
come from companies with a long track record and relatively consistent 
growth and profit performance (and which, ideally, dominate their markets), 
within sectors of "inherently stable character," with analysis to be performed in 
"normal" economic conditions.  Finally, the ideal securities should be relatively 
senior issues protected from earnings variability, such as preferred shares. 
This view, along with the margin of safety concept, essentially means that 
value investors should avoid the combination of risky industries (a category 
which certainly includes the world's airlines), start-up and volatile companies, 
and securities such as common shares.  In short, this traditional investing 
approach seeks to deal with risk by avoiding it, surely very good advice in 
itself but not terribly helpful for research into the airline industry, in which 
earnings are highly volatile.   
The contribution of the traditional approach to this research is the clear 
definition of the fundamental valuation concepts and constructs used in 
security and investment analysis ever since.  The traditional view posited 
valuation constructs such as the risk premium of shares over bonds in an 
intuitive way, but stopped short of providing an explicit method for estimating 
the appropriate discount rate to be used in valuing individual companies and 
their projects, a problem which is still subject of much theoretical and practical 
debate today.  Much of the valuation theory developed in the second part of 
the twentieth century seeks to scientifically estimate the proper discount rates 
for valuation purposes.  The emphasis in the traditional view is on profits, and 
its foundation is a careful examination of a company’s reported financial 
statements: in its quantitative aspect this approach is backward-looking, and 
based on reported profits rather than cash flow.  This is in contrast to the 
valuation methods identified in this research, which use cash flow forecasts to 
more transparently reflect the large up-front investments and long-term 
forecasts required of airline fleet plans.   
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2.2. Capital structure and investment costs 
Traditional valuation theory says little of any precision about the relative 
benefits of debt or equity financing.  The emphasis on earnings per share and 
the price-earnings ratio for company valuation inevitably raised a problem 
which has been central to corporate finance theory and practice ever since, 
the question of capital structure (debt and equity mix).  The so-called financial 
leverage benefits of debt to the company's shareholders are easy to 
demonstrate: for a given level of operating profits, a firm with a higher level of 
debt will generate larger net income per share than a firm fully financed by 
equity, because a greater amount of the capital needed to finance investment 
and growth is provided by the lenders to the company, and because the 
corporate income tax bill is reduced by the deductibility of interest.   
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A much-reproduced and dissected numerical example follows: 
  Firm A Firm B Firm C 
Capital structure  
Debt financing   50m 75m 
Equity financing 100m 50m 25m 
 Total book value 100m 100m 100m 
Profit and loss       
Operating profit 200m 200m 200m 
Interest expense (at 5%) 0.0m 2.5m 3.8m 
Pre-tax profit 200.0m 197.5m 196.3m 
Income tax (40%) 80.0m 79.0m 78.5m 
Net income 120.0m 118.5m 117.8m 
Number of shares 50000 25000 12500 
Earnings per share 2.40 4.74 9.42 
Traditional valuation     
Price earnings ratio (PER) 11.6 12.0 6.0 
Value of shares 1392m 1422m 707m 
Value of debt 0m 50m 75m 
Total value of company 1392m 1472m 782m 
Table 2.1: Effect of financial leverage on profits and returns to shareholders, author example 
As debt is added to the capital structure of Firms "B" and "C", absolute 
earnings decrease, while both per-share earnings and return on shareholders 
equity increase.  Of course, losses attributable to shareholders are equally 
magnified by higher levels of debt, making earnings more volatile for 
leveraged companies.  In the traditional view, share markets will reward firm B 
for having a "reasonable" amount of debt, bidding up the PER to 12.0 
because this firm can "grow faster than A at a given dividend payout ratio [that 
is, by reinvesting higher amounts through additional borrowing], or can pay 
higher dividends at the same growth rate."  
On the other hand, traditionalists and lenders use the debt-equity ratio as a 
key indicator of the company's ability to repay debts as they come due, and 
hence, a potential lender will only advance funds to firms with a "reasonable" 
amount of debt.  Firm C in our example has entered the value investors' 
category of "speculative" firms, and the PER accorded to the firm, reflecting 
the increased riskiness of the firm, is illustrated by Graham and Dodd as 
"about half that of Company A." 
No reliable or quantitative method of estimating the PER as a function of debt 
level is provided, and value investing proponents are also silent about what 
constitutes a reasonable amount of debt, opening the door to decades of 
debate about the existence of an "optimal" capital structure, where the PER 
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and share price would be maximised without doing damage to the company's 
credibility with investors or increasing the cost of borrowed funds.  If such an 
optimum does exist, company managers can increase the total value of the 
company (debt + equity) simply by borrowing up to the "reasonable" amount 
of debt, as in the case of Firm B in our example.  They could, indeed, 
decrease the overall cost of investments by judicious use of debt.  
The most important theoretical challenge to the fuzzy traditional concept of 
optimal capital structure was The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and 
the Theory of Investment (Modigliani and Miller, 1958), in which the authors 
pointed out that the question of "cost of capital" (the new term for investment 
cost) is of interest to both "managerial economists" in charge of investment 
planning (capital budgeting) and corporate finance specialists who seek the 
best financing alternatives.   This article singularly pushed the cost of capital 
debate into the world of probabilistic calculations, while turning the idea of a 
"reasonable" amount of borrowing with little impact on shareholders' expected 
returns on its head.  The article posits and demonstrates that under the 
stylized conditions used, the value of any company derives from the 
productivity and the value of its assets, rather than the way it is financed, a 
proposition today known as the "law of preservation of value"6.  Secondly, the 
authors show that to maximise the value of the firm for investors firms' 
managers should only invest in (real) projects that produce returns higher than 
the cost of capital.  These normative rules have guided the practice of 
investment analysis since its publication.  Its implications for both financial 
economics and normative management practice are tremendous.  
The succeeding pages of the article presented an elegant and highly stylized 
set of answers to the cost of capital question, answers which have fuelled 
both strong debate among the highest level economists ever since - for 
example Durand (1959 and 1989), Stiglitz (1969), and Tirole (2006) - and find 
strong echoes in recommended practices in virtually all college textbooks on 
corporate finance.  The two propositions and derivative theories won the 
Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences (or so-called "Nobel Prize in 
Economics") for Franco Modigliani in 1985.  The concepts and tools 
introduced in this article are fully as relevant today as they were in 1958, and 
are essential to an understanding of investment valuation in any publicly held 
company. 
The highly provocative 1958 article starts by criticizing earlier economic 
theories for assuming that physical investments yield known, certain streams 
of returns similar to those on interest-bearing bonds.   In this "certainty case," 
                                                 
6 See for example, Brealey and Myers (2000), pp. 476-477 
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the conclusion had been that the cost of capital to the owners of a firm is 
precisely equal to the rate of interest on bonds, leading to the conclusion that, 
in a world of sure returns, "the distinction between debt and equity funds 
reduces largely to one of terminology," that is, that the cost of investments are 
equal to the borrowing costs, and any additional profit or cash generated will 
simply accrue to the shareholders.  While this view may be appropriate for 
closely held firms, managers of publicly traded companies cannot limit 
themselves to such an analysis.    
The authors then described economists' attempts to take uncertainty into 
account by superimposition of a vaguely defined "risk premium" on the cost of 
debt financing, just as in Graham and Dodd's seminal work.  Striking at the 
heart of the traditional approach's weakness, the authors state that "no 
satisfactory explanation has yet been provided as to what determines the size 
of the risk [premium]." According to the authors, this tendency in valuation is 
derived from Keynesian macroeconomic analysis, in which "aggregate 
investment is written as a function of the (riskless) rate of interest." The 
adaptation of Keynes' macroeconomic theory to microeconomics is not helpful 
to the financial practitioner analysing and financing risky investments.   
They then moved on to describe more recent theories, the first of which 
postulates profits as a set of mutually exclusive outcomes which "can at best 
be described by a subjective probability distribution", or, "a random variable" 
which defies the notion of "maximizing" these profits at the firm level.  For the 
shareholders, investment and financing decisions can only be ranked based 
on a subjective "utility function" (italics theirs) which weighs the expected yield 
against the probability of success.  In this scenario, the desirability of a given 
investment will be wholly dependent on the taste for risk of the current owners 
of the firm, making theoretical generalization impossible, particularly for widely 
held firms. 
The second theory discussed relies on the notion of market value 
maximization, which is today at the centre of most approaches to value-based 
management discussed in this research.  This approach finesses the above-
mentioned problem by exchanging the closely-held corporation for those with 
widely-held shares, where the "market prices will reflect not only their [the 
current owners'] preferences but those of all potential owners as well."  This 
approach was used to both introduce the concept of cost of financial capital to 
a firm's managers, and to build the postulate that financing decisions (stock vs. 
bond financing) are irrelevant in maximizing the overall value of the firm, 
including both shares and bonds.         
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In order to generalize the concepts, Modigliani and Miller (referred to as 
Modigliani and Miller in the literature and in this research) postulated the 
existence of risk classes of shares: in each individual class, the ratio of 
expected return ( X , the expected value of the random profit distribution) to 
the price paid for the share – in conventional terminology, the expected yield 
on the shares - is the same.  This ratio of earnings to share price is defined as 
ρk, and is the same concept of the capitalization factor (e.g. PER) used by 
Graham and Dodd), but in this case generalized to a class of risk-equivalent 
shares. 
Based on the assumption that all bonds, regardless of the issuer, are 
perceived by traders as having certain returns in a market where all equivalent 
securities are priced identically (a so-called perfect market), the authors 
postulated in Proposition I that the overall market value of the firm Vj is not 
impacted by the relative quantities of shares (Sj) and Bonds (Dj) in its capital 
structure, but is rather entirely described by expected profits and the discount 
factor for its risk class: 
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In this view, managers are unable to create any value for shareholders by 
levering up the firm with debt, because the investors can freely issue bonds to 
create leverage benefits for themselves, while arbitraging away any artificial 
overvaluation or undervaluation of shares with the proceeds of the bonds.   
Many authors have picked away at the unrealistic assumptions of perfectly-
priced financial markets and the unlimited ability of investors to issue risk-free 
debt for themselves.  The value of Modigliani and Miller I for this research is 
not its theoretical impact (which was considerable), but rather its conceptual 
and normative impacts on management practice, including today’s airlines.   
Conceptually, Proposition I introduced the notion of an overall average cost of 
capital to managers of a firm who were previously focussed on the cost of 
debt to estimate financial costs of investments.  The authors state this cost of 
capital as: 
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This formulation had the (perhaps unintended) effect of putting the question of 
the "cost" of shares and debt on a similar footing as sources of financing to 
managers who did not own the company's shares, each having its own cost 
(albeit identical according to Modigliani and Miller I).  In a singular way, the 
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formulation of Modigliani and Miller I clarified managers' paradigm of 
investment costing as much as its content created debate among academics 
and practitioners. 
Normatively, the Modigliani and Miller propositions (particularly Proposition I) 
had a huge impact on business education and corporate finance practice: the 
implication of Proposition I for managers is that focus should be exclusively on 
analyzing the overall profitability and returns of investments in real, productive 
assets, rather than trying to optimize shareholder returns through debt 
financing vehicles.  In the decades following its publication, the practice of 
investment analysis has focused on the investment side of the equation, and 
questions of financing have largely been dealt with separately.  Modigliani and 
Miller I "solve" the riddle of optimal capital structure by stating that such an 
optimum did not exist: the determinant of cost of capital is the company's "risk 
class," which is determined by its operating characteristics rather than 
financing.  
Proposition II, derived directly from Modigliani and Miller I, states that the cost 
of equity (or from investors' viewpoint, the expected yield on a share), denoted 
ij, is a linear function of the capitalization rate of the risk class ρk, to which is 
added a financial risk premium calculated as the Debt/Equity ratio times the 
difference between unlevered yield and cost of debt). 
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Under this proposition, investors require an increased return on the firm's 
shares in the form of the risk premium ρk-r directly proportional to the 
Debt/Equity ratio, from the first dollar of debt added to the balance sheet.  Due 
to the arbitrage mechanism at the heart of the Modigliani and Miller 
proposition, this premium exactly offsets the potential decrease in overall cost 
of capital from the use of lower-cost debt financing. 
The authors pointed out the contrast to what they call the "conventional view", 
in which share valuations will be minimally affected by "moderate" amounts of 
debt in the capital structure.  Their formulation is clearly in contradiction to 
Graham and Dodd, who assert that investors will bid up the shares (i.e., 
require a lower yield for a given earnings stream) in companies who offer 
leverage benefits within a "reasonable" range of debt. 
One specific development of these basic propositions in Modigliani and Miller 
(1958 and 1963) concern this research. Taking into account the tax-
deductibility or interest, Modigliani and Miller postulated an adjusted 
capitalization factor ρkτ in the presence of deductible income taxes, and state 
at the end of the article that "gains can accrue to stockholders from having 
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debt in the capital structure, even when capital markets are perfect."  The 
valuation in the original 1958 article was later corrected by themselves in 
Modigliani and Miller (1963), stating the value of a Levered firm VL with a 
permanent debt (such as a perpetuity or refunded bond) on its balance sheet: 
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The first term is the valuation of the profits of an unlevered firm as in 
Modigliani and Miller I (equation 2.5), on an after-tax basis.  The second term 
increases this valuation by the present value of the tax savings (the corporate 
tax rate τc multiplied by the total interest expense R), capitalized at the 
borrowing rate r.  
This extension of the Modigliani and Miller propositions to include income 
taxes has profound implications for the practice of airline investment 
management (as it has for any capital-intensive business).  At a theoretical 
level, it leads to the conclusion that companies can in fact maximise 
shareholder value by borrowing as much as possible, allowing the firm's 
shareholders to benefit by what is in effect a subsidy on debt, known in the 
jargon as the "tax shield".   
For airlines in particular, a primary requirement to benefit from the tax shield is 
that the firm be generating sufficient operating profits to be shielded from 
income tax.  As has been demonstrated, sustainable profits over the cycle – 
and hence the life of an aircraft financing deal - are far from ensured in the 
low-margin airline sector.  In addition, the airline industry is of course global, 
and the world's airlines are subject to a plethora of tax regimes.  To cite two 
extreme examples, the average Japanese corporate tax rate stood at 39.5% 
in 2006, while there is no corporate income tax in the United Arab Emirates.  
These differences have led to the creation of an segment of the financial 
services industry dedicated to finding profitable companies or individuals 
having "tax capacity" (profits to shield), which they then "lend" to the acquirers 
of aircraft in complex loan and leasing arrangements typical of the aircraft 
market today.    
This impact of taxes was further refined by Miller (1977), to include the effect 
of personal income taxes, stating that in aggregate, higher corporate tax rates 
will encourage firms to increase indebtedness (as in Modigliani and Miller 
1958 and 1963), while higher personal income tax rates will do the opposite, 
as investors look for higher equity returns to compensate.  This "migration" 
between equity and debt financing stops when the two rates of tax are 
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precisely equal.  The study of the corporate-individual income tax rate effects 
on investment is beyond the scope of this research. 
The effect of taxes on capital structure and cost of capital leads to the 
contradictory conclusion that a firm's managers should increase debt as much 
as possible, while maintaining sufficient pre-tax profits to benefit from the tax 
shield.   
The second extension includes the effect of increasing interest rates as 
leverage increases.  Again in contrast to the "conventional view" c.f. Graham 
and Dodd, Modigliani and Miller maintain that the expected yield on the 
shares will increase (and hence their value decrease) as debt is added to the 
balance sheet - although not at a linear rate as in Proposition II – until such a 
point where the higher yield on bonds offsets lower expectations for the firm 
under financial duress, when the expected share yield will begin to fall.  This 
extension of the propositions, we find that because of taxation and the risk of 
bankruptcy (but NOT because of the so-called leverage effect espoused by 
value investors), there is a maximum value to the firm achieved by adding 
debt, as pictured below and taught to thousands of finance students 
worldwide each year. 
 
Figure 2.1: Value maximisation through use of debt   Source: Brealey & Myers (2000) 
The Modigliani and Miller I constant value of the firm regardless of capital 
structure (line Modigliani and Miller in figure 2.1, above) gives way to 
Modigliani and Miller' as tax-deductible debt is added to the capital structure.  
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Modigliani and Miller's intuition that eventually shareholder expected returns 
will decline as the firm nears bankruptcy, and that the benefits of debt will 
disappear as profits approach 0 (line Modigliani and Miller'), has been 
formalized in subsequent work, most notably in  the "trade-off theory" 
balancing optimal capital cost against "costs of financial distress," a balance 
which will vary for different industries.  These difficult to quantify costs give 
rise to the generally accepted form of the curve MV in figure 2.1.   Through the 
continuing debate, the existence of a non-quantified "optimal" or "target" 
capital structure remains the accepted view in practice.  This is view comes 
full circle, harking back to the traditionalist recommendation to add 
“reasonable” amounts of debt to the capital structure to maximize shareholder 
returns. 
The most normative and least-debated conclusion of Modigliani and Miller's 
article begins with the statement of Proposition III, that "the cut-off point for 
investments in the firm will in all cases be ρk and will be completely unaffected 
by the type of security used to finance the investment."  This proposition is 
tested in the case of debt, common stock and earnings and found to hold true 
under the same market assumptions as Proposition I.   
The conclusion of the 1958 article broadened the discussion and opens the 
financing debate to issues of forecasting heuristics and bias, information 
asymmetries and agency issues, which have come to the fore in financial 
economics today.  The article is thus very forward-looking and suggestive of 
current theoretical trends.    
A subsequent major body of theory covering the question of capital structure 
and investment financing choices is "pecking order" theory introduced in 
Myers (1984) and further discussed in (for example) Berens and Cuny (1995).  
The relevance of this theory for airline managers is discussed and surveyed in 
Chapter 7 of this research.   
Today, financial economists are increasingly focused on the governance 
structures, contractual arrangements and management incentives to motivate 
and ensure behaviour consistent with value maximization.  The most 
comprehensive example of this is Tirole (2006).  Governance and incentive 
structures, and their relevance for airline owners and managers, are 
discussed through a detailed analysis of global airline ownership structures in 
Chapter 4. 
The Modigliani and Miller articles are full of assumptions (e.g. capital markets 
with no transaction or bankruptcy costs, uniform risk-free interest rates for 
corporations and investors) that are clearly not applicable in the real world, 
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and yet the postulates are widely taught and practiced as the "right" way to 
estimate cost of capital. 
Similar to the traditional view, one key issue the Modigliani and Miller articles 
do not deal with explicitly is a method for estimating the cost of investment 
capital.  Modigliani and Miller simply postulate the irrelevance of the choice 
between debt and equity financing within the vaguely defined notion of a risk 
class, with only the most basic discussion of debt or equity capitalization rates 
themselves. 
While debt costs are readily available to practitioners working in the financial 
markets or in banks, the work of estimating expected equity returns for widely-
traded firms was left to portfolio theory, discussed in the next section.          
2.3. Portfolio theory and the cost of equity capital 
2.3.1. The foundation: Modigliani and Miller 
Modigliani and Miller posited the capitalization factor for a firm's shares (aka, 
discount rate or cost of equity) as identical for all firms in a given risk class.  
However, they made no claim as to how to estimate this capitalisation factor.  
A second and parallel body of theory, consistent with the Modigliani and Miller 
postulates, completes the picture. 
In Modigliani and Miller (1958), the cost of equity ij is directly proportional to 
the content of debt in the firm's capital structure and the market risk premium 
of company returns over the interest cost r, as in formula 2.7.  Taking 
corporate income taxes into account, the authors specified a capitalization 
rate for after-tax returns ρkτ  and restate the cost of equity in much the same 
terms as before: 
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The existence of an equity capitalization rate specific to after-tax profits 
means that taxes will "prevent the arbitrage process from making the value of 
all firms in a given class proportional to the expected returns generated by 
their physical assets," bringing the distortion of tax-deductible interest to the 
fore, and not incidentally opening the door to a wide variety of aircraft 
financing structures aimed at exploiting this distortion. 
This formulation was corrected by the authors in Modigliani and Miller (1963) 
in a non-trivial adjustment taking into account the deductibility of interest 
charges, an advantage that accrues to the shareholders: 
[ ] jjkkj SDri /)1( −−+= ττ ρτρ  ................................................................ 2.11 
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This correction reduced the risk premium for addition of debt to the capital 
structure (by a factor of 1-τ, the value of the interest deduction to 
shareholders), but did not in any way change the principle of such a risk 
premium, in contrast to the traditional view asserting that "reasonable" 
amounts of debt do not impact shareholder expected returns. 
These formulations still beg the question of concretely estimating the proper 
capitalization rate to value risky investments in company securities.  Indeed, 
the authors clearly state that the propositions bear no relation to investors' risk 
preferences. 
2.3.2. Quantifying the risk-return trade-off: Markowitz 
Shareholders' equity (and equity portfolio) valuation theory has been called "a 
microeconomics of capital markets" by its primary originator, Harry Markowitz 
(1991).  Less monolithic than the Modigliani and Miller's theory of capital 
structure, the theory of optimal selection of security portfolios can be found in 
Markowitz (1952).  This work was later generalized into the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) by Treynor (1961, unpublished), Sharpe (1964) and 
Lintner (1965).  Like the Modigliani and Miller propositions and extensions, 
these theories remain prevalent in practice as a way to estimate shareholder 
expectations from the company's shares, in wide use by firms that seek to 
maximise shareholder returns.   
This 'microeconomics of capital markets' has its basis in utility theory 
developed over the 18th and 19th centuries, completed by the development of 
expected utility theory – the theory of rational decision-making under 
uncertainty – best-known in its formulation by John von Neumann and Oscar 
Morgenstern (1944 and subsequent editions). 
Expected utility is founded on the notions of preference, and subjective 
probabilities.  As codified into von Neumann and Morgenstern's axioms of 
cardinal utility, preferences must be rigorously consistent in order to be 
considered rational: all individuals are able to determine and express clear 
and logically consistent preferences among (potentially) thousands of choices, 
for example, shares of companies available on the market.  In developing 
portfolio theory a further assumption is added: that individuals will always 
prefer more wealth to less, that is, wealth is considered as invariably 
producing utility. 
When combined with rationally expressed preferences (and an absolute 
preference for wealth), subjective probabilities allow us to express the 
expected utility of wealth, (E[U(W)]. 
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Rational investors will seek to maximize their expected total wealth by 
weighing all potential wealth outcomes in the set i of opportunities (U(Wi)) by 
the a priori probability of each outcome pi, and selecting those which produce 
the greatest product.  Many useful economic theories have questionable 
simplifying assumptions at their base, and the notion of a priori knowable 
probabilities is the weakness in expected utility theory.  Discussing his theory 
in 1991, Markowitz said that he was convinced that "a rational agent acting 
under uncertainty would act according to 'probability beliefs' where no 
objective probabilities were known." 
The theory has the practical advantage that individuals' stated utility functions 
can readily be identified through an interviewing approach.  Interviewers 
propose a series of gambles and asking the subjects their preferences 
between a certain sum for sure, versus taking the gamble at a given payoff 
and probability.  A risk-averse investor is one who requires that the actuarial 
(or expected) payoff of a gamble exceed the certain payoff in order to accept 
the risk.  In all subsequent formulations, investors are assumed to be risk-
averse utility maximizers.   
To develop this theory and its derivatives, the preferred measure of risk is 
dispersion around a mean of normally distributed security returns, quantified 
as the standard deviation of returns, commonly denoted σ.  While 
theoreticians point out that using σ as a measure of risk gives equal weight to 
both high and low returns as undesirable, and suggest that other measures 
such as semi-variance are more useful for these investors and for skewed 
return distributions, the computational convenience of the normal distribution, 
with all points on the distribution calculable using the mean and standard 
deviation, pushed strongly in the direction of the normal distribution and σ as 
the appropriate measures of risk and return. 
Markowitz' work concerned itself with the choice among combinations of risky 
assets.  His work sought to establish (or confirm) maxims or rules for the 
rational investor.  His seminal 1952 article asserted that such an investor will 
not simply seek to maximize return (as is implicit in Graham and Dodds' 
Security Analysis and other authors' work), but will instead seek a balance 
between risk and return by combining different shares in "efficient portfolios."  
Markowitz' initial intuition was to apply statistical correlation to measure the 
distribution of pairs of share returns, which are then double-summed to 
estimate overall portfolio variance, his preferred measure of risk. 
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The X terms are the relative proportion of the two shares analysed, while σI,j is 
the covariance, itself the product of each share's standard deviation and the 
correlation coefficient between the returns of the two shares.  As increasing 
number of shares are added to the portfolio, the correlation terms between the 
pairs of shares become increasingly important in the calculations.  Because 
most shares are at least modestly positively correlated with others, the risk 
that can be "diversified away" by adding shares is asymptotic, reaching a 
minimum value which is the risk of the market itself. 
Correspondingly, the indicator of return will be the weighted sum of average 
expected returns µ: 
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Applications of these formulae to share returns lead to a set of possible 
portfolios depicted in two-dimensional space with variance and expected 
return as the Y and X axes respectively.  Markowitz' second major 
contribution is defining the "efficient frontier" of portfolios, whose risk-return 
characteristics are at the "southeast" boundary of these potential return-
variance combinations. 
Markowitz' work was highly normative, asserting that investors not seeking a 
balance or trade-off between return and risk are speculators rather than 
investors.  It is also quite practical, adopting both the convenience of the 
normal distribution, and the pragmatic suggestion that that any calculated 
returns and covariance among shares should be adjusted "on the basis of 
factors or nuances not taken into account by the formal computations." 
 The graphical demonstrations of the concept in the 1952 article are 
somewhat laborious and abstruse, as are his subsequent calculations of the 
efficient frontier, which involve parametric quadratic programming, but 
Markowitz' work set the scene for portfolio valuation in use today.  He codified 
the notion that the "rational" investor is one who seeks to balance risk and 
reward, which we will refer to as a mean-variance investor in this section. 
2.3.3. Firm-specific risk and return in a diversified portfolio: CAPM 
A decade after the original Markowitz article, Jack Treynor, William Sharpe 
and John Lintner separately hit on a way to generalize portfolio selection into 
a general theory of equilibrium for share returns.  This theory opened the door 
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to a pragmatic methodology for estimating company cost of equity capital, in 
wide use today. 
Of the three authors, William F. Sharpe provided the clearest exposition and 
most simply packaged version of what is now know as the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM) in the prestigious Journal of Finance (1964).  The 
theory owes its existence not just to Markowitz but also to James Tobin (1958). 
Markowitz' theory concerned itself solely with holdings of one or more risky 
assets (equity investments), leaving out the alternatives of holding cash and 
lending risk-free in the form of government securities.  Tobin's paper 
dissected mean-variance investor preference for these two categories of 
"investment", thus substantially broadening the scope of the discussion. The 
paper takes as its starting point the Keynesian liquidity preference schedule, 
which posited an inverse relationship between an investor's willingness to 
hold (or hoard) cash, and the interest rate he is offered to invest the cash.  
Tobin questioned the assumptions underlying Keynes' postulate, asking 
himself why an investor should hold "non-interest-bearing obligations of the 
government" (cash) instead of its interest-bearing obligations (treasury bills).  
Clearly, there are "transaction" needs for cash; any other holding of cash must 
be as a compensation for "expectations or fear of loss in other assets."  The 
paper then analysed investors' potential expectations of risk in both the 
interest rate and the potential capital gain or loss on the treasury bill held.   
Considering interest rates first, the investor may expect an upward move in 
interest rates, creating an opportunity cost inherent in any investment at the 
current offered rate.  For the capital gain or loss, since the market value of 
traded debt securities such as treasury bills moves inversely to interest rates, 
the hypothetical investor would experience a loss in the trading value of his 
investment if, for example, the market were flooded with such assets, or if 
interest rates rise according to his expectation, above.  The investor will take 
both risks into account, and will hold cash only if the sum of these 
expectations is less than 0 (in other words, if the capital loss exceeds the 
increased revenue from interest).   
The rest of Tobin (1958) applies Markowitz' concepts of the efficient 
diversification and the efficient portfolio to various classes of debt securities.  
For this research, the key insight of Tobin was to increase the scope of 
portfolio valuation to include risk-free assets.  This set the scene for the 
dramatic simplification of the CAPM, which is often called the "Revolutionary 
Idea in Finance" (e.g., French (2008). 
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Sharpe's 1964 paper formulating CAPM combined Markowitz’ and Tobin’s 
concepts, stating that the choice of investments can be seen as combining a 
risk-free investment in debt securities and a portfolio of equity securities.  
Following Markowitz (and Treynor (1961)), Sharpe was looking for a means of 
estimating the "price of risk" for a mean-variance investor.  Sharpe's paper 
attempted to establish a model of equilibrium for the prices of risky assets, 
consistent with classical economic doctrine of a balance between supply and 
demand for securities.  To do this, he used a single-period investment model 
with normally-distributed returns, very much along Markowitz lines.  Along the 
way, Sharpe mentioned in a footnote the appropriateness of using semi-
variance to capture only the downside of investment variation, but cited the 
"formidable computational problems" standing in the way of this analysis.  
From this point on, upside and downside risk has been considered equally 
desirable in securities and derivatives valuation.  Sharpe's article can be seen 
as a means of simplifying the analysis proposed by Markowitz in 1952.  One 
of the striking features of this article is its agile use of two-dimensional 
geometry to demonstrate concepts and relationships. 
The discussion begins with the Markowitz investment space, where an 
efficient frontier of portfolios dominates all other potential portfolios for mean-
variance investors.  He then demonstrates in a simple two-security example 
the effect covariance has on risk, creating the familiar efficient frontier curve 
reproduced in Figure 2.2. 
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Figure 2.2: the efficient frontier of portfolios, following Markowitz (1952) 
Sharpe pointed out that while the efficient portfolio set is simple conceptually, 
the computation solution which yields the highest potential return per unit of 
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risk is challenging.  This difficulty itself facilitated the solution, since this point 
on the curve must "either linear or increasing at an increasing rate." (that is, 
the square of the derivative with respect to the square of the expected return 
must be positive).  By combining a combined risk-free asset and risky portfolio 
investment, and by postulating a general equilibrium of risky asset prices, 
Sharpe allows practitioners and subsequent theoreticians to adopt the former, 
linear, approach to solving the problem. 
By suggesting (without substantiating) that an investor may hold a 
combination of fixed interest-bearing and risky assets which have a fixed 
return, Sharpe noted that using the standard covariance formulation, the y-
axis coordinate E(σ) reduces to a linear function of the proportion of 
investment in the risky portfolio and its standard deviation.  Given this 
convenient fact, the utility of all such portfolios of risk-free and risky assets will 
be dominated by that described by a line tangent to the efficient frontier, with 
the risk-free rate as its x co-ordinate, as in figure 2.3. 
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Figure 2.3: The dominant combination of risk-free and risky assets, from Sharpe (1964) 
As can readily be observed here, given a partial investment in the risk-free 
asset, there is no potential combination with the efficient risky portfolio further 
"southeast" on the efficient frontier than the tangent.  Sharpe assumed that 
investors can freely borrow as well as lend at the risk free rate, which takes 
the relationship even further: for the portfolios along the solid portion of the 
line the investor lends at the risk-free rate and invests the remainder in the 
efficient portfolio found at point ∅, while on the dotted portion from ∅ to z, the 
investor borrowed funds at the same rate to increase her holdings of the same 
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risky portfolio. This ingenious discovery, theoretically valid while highly 
pragmatic from a computation and validation standpoint, was made and used 
by all three originators of the CAPM (Sharpe, Treynor and Lintner).   
Sharpe alone among the three, however, went on to assert that in equilibrium, 
all investors will seek portfolios along this line from the risk-free rate to z.  He 
achieved this by making the assumption that investors have uniform 
expectations about the returns and variances of investment opportunities.  He 
defends this highly improbable assumption by stating that "the proper test of a 
theory is not the realism of its assumptions but the acceptability of its 
implications."  Sharpe's assumption of homogeneous investor expectations 
will later be relaxed in Lintner (1969). 
Under these conditions, investors with portfolios "west" of this line will 
increase the share of the risky portfolio ∅ until the line is reached.  This will 
cause the price of this portfolio to increase and its yield to decrease, while the 
opposite will happen to alternative risky portfolios "east" of the line.  This 
classical supply-demand adjustment of prices leads in equilibrium to an 
efficient frontier that has "flattened" along the line, as in Figure 2.4.  Portfolios 
A, B and C are each composed of different risky portfolios and risk-free 
investment proportions, but due to the market mechanism, they will all end up 
priced along a single risk-return line, characterised by the risk-free rate, the 
proportions invested in the risk-free and risky portfolios, and the risk-return 
characteristics of each risky portfolio.  
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Figure 2.4: Efficient portfolios in equilibrium, from Sharpe (1964) 
The existence of such a straight line in equilibrium implies that the returns of  
these efficient portfolios are perfectly correlated with each other.  Turning to 
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the returns of individual securities, Sharpe proved in a half-page footnote that 
a portfolio containing any individual risky security must be tangent to the 
efficient market line, implying a relationship between its individual 
characteristics and the efficient portfolio itself.  From this he postulated the 
notion of systematic risk, which cannot be diversified away.  In another 
elegant explanatory graphic, he demonstrates this relationship in terms of 
expected returns of the portfolio and the individual security.    
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Figure 2.5: Relationship of individual security returns to portfolio return, from Sharpe (1964) 
The slope of this line is the systematic element, which cannot be diversified 
away.  The observed returns for the individual security will not lie on this line, 
with the resulting "error terms" being the result of the risk of the individual 
security.  Sharpe concluded his article by suggesting that this framework has 
two advantages.  In terms of methodology, the theory of systematic risk and 
the linear relationship in Figure 2.5 can readily be tested through regression 
analysis, while intuitively and practically, the notion of systematic risk implies 
that there is a bedrock market risk which no amount of diversification can 
eliminate.  Both conclusions will serve a generation of later theoreticians and 
practitioners seeking to estimate expected returns on shares of publicly traded 
companies.    
In a follow-up article, Sharpe (1965) provided evidence for a linear relationship 
between ex post returns of portfolios of shares, while stating that "the 
implications of the theory cannot be tested practically, since […] clearly, actual 
results may diverge considerably from the predictions made by investors at 
the time they purchase assets."  Performing regression analysis on a group of 
34 open-ended mutual funds over the ten-year period 1954 – 1963, he found 
a positive correlation, with R2 of +0.836, demonstrating the relationship 
between return and risk in these funds suggested in Sharpe (1964).  He noted 
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that the sample data does show a certain non-linear tendency toward 
increased risk as higher levels of return are reached.  In spite of this, Sharpe 
asserted that it is "reasonable to assert that for purposes of characterizing the 
general nature of the capital market the relationship between risk and return 
can be assumed to be linear." He further tested the linearity of the efficient 
portfolio line by measuring the correlation of 34 mutual funds with the Dow 
Jones Industrial average, and finds correlations of 29 of the funds to be 
between +0.9 and +0.999, "results [which] certainly appear to be in substantial 
agreement with the theory."  This evidence is reminiscent of the sketchy 
empirical support for their propositions presented in Modigliani and Miller 
(1958).  The CAPM and this article has created what French (2008) called "a 
cottage industry of attempting to substantiate or refute the validity of CAPM as 
a positive economic model."  The theory underlies options pricing, probably its 
most significant extension.  Options pricing and its application to aircraft 
investment is discussed later in this research.  
More rigorous tests have been made since, looking at the evidence for the 
empirical form of CAPM.  In its theoretical form, the expected return on an 
individual share E(Rj) is expressed as:   
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In this formulation, rf is the risk-free interest rate on government borrowings, 
E(rm) is the expected future return on shares in the market (and therefore 
E(rm)- rf is a share market risk premium over the risk-free rate), and beta (ß) is 
the covariance of the firm’s shares with the market divided by the variance of 
market returns. 
In order to test the model, CAPM is usually restated in its "empirical form", as 
an explicitly single-period model, where the portfolio and market returns are 
expressed as the excess over the risk-free rate: 
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In this formulation, the R' term is the excess return of the individual share over 
the risk-free rate, while γ1 is the excess return on a broad range of shares.  
The excess return of a share should be entirely explained by the β term and 
random error (the ε term). 
In order to get round the expectations vs. observed value conundrum, the 
notion of a "fair game" is invoked: in such a game, the observed return over 
time is equal to the expected return.  A coin toss is an example: most people 
expect that over time, there will be an equal number of heads as tails, and 
hence, their expectation is consistent with the long-term average outcome.  As 
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one might expect, there is an extensive literature regarding CAPM, efficient 
markets and fair games. 
If CAPM is valid, the γ0 term should be equal to 0, the resulting equation 
should be linear in β, and γ1 should equal the difference between the market 
portfolio return over the risk-free rate. 
The earliest and still definitive tests of the CAPM were performed in the 1970s, 
at the same time as the development of options pricing model derived from it.  
These tests are found in Blume and Friend (1970, 1973), Black, Jensen and 
Scholes (1972), Miller and Scholes (1972), Blume and Husick (1973), Fama 
and Macbeth (1973), Basu (1977), Reinganum (1981a), Litzenberger and 
Ramaswamy (1979) and Banz (1981). 
The results of these 10 studies are summarized in Copeland and Weston 
(1983 and subsequent editions), as stated below: 
• The γ0 and γ1 terms are significantly different from those predicted, 
suggesting that low-beta shares earn more than CAPM predicts, and 
high-beta shares earn less.   
• The relationship is found to be significantly linear in β: the best fit is 
found using β as the primary measure of risk.   
• Other factors can be found that explain the residual risk (i.e., the error 
term ε is not random).   
This last finding gave rise to a more general Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) 
developed in Ross (1976), which postulates a curvilinear model with various 
factors explaining risk.  APT is more open and flexible than the single-factor 
CAPM, and it in turn can and has been tested, using multiple regression, over 
the years.    
In contrast to Sharpe's very careful and explanatory articles, Jack Treynor, 
primarily a practitioner never bothered to publish his 1961 article, which 
remains in draft form.  Treynor found before Sharpe the key link from 
Markowitz to Tobin (1958), and formulated the CAPM three years before.  In 
addition to deriving the capital market line described entirely by the risk-free 
rate and the covariance of a security with a well-diversified "market portfolio."  
He also provided a proof that this model is consistent with Modigliani and 
Miller I, bringing the analysis full circle. 
Like many financial theories, CAPM has been found to be quite imperfect in 
the predicting market performance, and yet, it remains fundamental to the 
practice of investment analysis, with profound applications for practitioners of 
capital budgeting within and without the airline industry.  Many extensions 
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have enhanced the descriptive power, realism and (especially) the 
mathematical sophistication of the model.  And yet, to quote French (2008): 
"the single-period, discrete-time CAPM has become popular and endured, as 
all great models do, precisely because it is simple and unrealistic.  It is 
realistic enough, apparently, to be coincident with the utility functions of a 
great many agents."    
2.4. Capital structure and Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
The seminal Modigliani and Miller & CAPM theories are both consistent with 
one another and complementary.  CAPM says little about capital structure, 
while the Modigliani and Miller propositions do not claim to estimate cost of 
shareholders' equity to managers of a firm.  The two fit together as two pieces 
of a complex puzzle.  
The final Modigliani and Miller formulation of what is now known as the 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC) from their 1963 "correction" of the 
after-tax Proposition II is: 
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where re is the shareholders’ expected annual return, rd is the annual interest 
rate on borrowing, E is the market value of the firm’s shares, D is the market 
value of the firm’s debt, and V is the total market value of debt and equity.  
That is, the expected returns on equity and the after-tax cost of debt are 
weighted by the market values of equity, and debt in the company's long-
range target capital structure.  Since any new investment will potentially cause 
the firm to change its capital structure, Modigliani and Miller hold that the 
proper mix of debt and equity to use in the capital structure to be used is this 
target capital structure.  
As French said of CAPM, the Modigliani and Miller WACC construct has been 
and remains useful because it is simple. In many ways less rigorous than 
CAPM, it has a certain intuitive logic: investors can duplicate any financing 
arrangements for themselves, and will bid up the expected share returns in 
the presence of corporate debt, removing the advantage of specific capital 
structures set up by corporate managers.  This normative theory provides a 
rule for managers to separate the investment and financing questions in 
capital budgeting... except for the key role of taxation, which remains central 
to aircraft financing.  This research will explore the extent to which investment 
and financing decisions are intermingled in the airline industry. 
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The Modigliani and Miller WACC construct and CAPM can be demonstrated 
to be mathematically consistent, as in Copeland & Weston (1982), under the 
idealised assumption that there is only one interest rate, the risk-free rate, at 
which investors and corporations can borrow (and investors can lend).  This 
consistency is important because Modigliani and Miller make no claim to 
identify corporate "risk classes" in their paper: estimating shareholder 
systematic risk for individual shares is performed by the covariance (β) term.   
The result is a highly cohesive set of tools and maxims which guide 
investment valuation for many firms having shares listed on public exchanges.  
For example, this β term from CAPM can be adjusted to estimate the 
additional risk from adding debt, using the Modigliani and Miller methodology: 
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This simple formulation is used to adjust historic betas in the prospect of 
adding debt to the capital structure.  As it is a prospective adjustment 
occurring over period of time where many other firm-specific risk variables 
may change as well, empirical tests have been relatively rare in the literature.  
As with CAPM and WACC, it is used because it is practical and simple to 
explain, notwithstanding a lack of firm scientific validation. 
2.5. Conclusions 
The various research threads discussed in this chapter result in a theoretically 
justified – if not fully empirically validated - and above all practical 
methodology for firms to estimate the cost of investments in financial assets, 
which is extended to investments in real assets such as aircraft in the next 
chapter. 
The work of Graham and Dodd, Modigliani and Miller, and Markowitz, Sharpe 
et al. is essentially normative rather than positive economics.  Graham and 
Dodd is not economics at all, being rather a practitioner’s manual, very much 
in current use and cited by successful investors as the basis for their 
investment practice.  The other building blocks are more theoretical in nature, 
but are based on sound precepts of rational behaviour on the part of investors 
in financial assets. 
The traditional and classical emphases and views are summarized in Table 
2.2. 
Aspect of the theory Traditional view Classical view 
Primary intended user Outside investors Company managers 
Primary objective  Calculate investor returns for security selection 
Calculate company cost of 
capital for investment 
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valuation 
Source of data for 
analysis Profits and dividends Share price and dividends 
Source of estimates 
and expectations about 
the future 
Expectations based on current 
profit performance and growth 
prospects, macroeconomic and 
industry analysis 
Expectations based on a 
priori probability estimates, 
usually estimated using 
historical data 
Impact of leverage Increases return on equity Increases firm value through tax savings 
View of capital structure 
Reasonable amount of debt 
does not impact share price 
negatively 
Optimal capital structure 
balances tax benefits 
against risk of default 
Treatment of 
uncertainty 
Uncertainty not quantified, 
“margin of safety” sought  
Uncertainty central, normal 
distribution used to quantify 
Valuation frequency 
and adjustment cycle 
Static, bound to firms’ financial 
statement cycles 
Dynamic, statistical 
adjustments made based on 
market movements 
View of market 
behaviour 
Inefficient: substantial 
under/overvaluations can persist 
over time 
Efficient: investors optimize 
risk-reward through 
diversification 
 Table 2.2: comparison of traditional and classical valuation approaches 
The classical approach can be viewed as an alternative to the traditional 
earnings-based valuation but also as an extension of it.  The classical view is 
more statistical, but not more quantitative (financial statements can be quite 
complex in themselves).  This research argues that while the underlying 
maths of the classical view are more sophisticated and the theoretical reach 
greater, company managers have adopted classical valuation methods for 
investment largely because it is intended for their use, because it is 
prospective rather than retrospective in nature, and because it has been 
simplified sufficiently, making “heroic assumptions” along the way, to make it 
both theoretically defensible and usable by practitioners with a modicum of 
statistical skills.   
The most fundamental problems in application arise for firms trading in 
markets with smaller or less-liquid capital markets, certainly the case in many 
of the world’s airline regions.  A second concern with classical theory 
concerns the application of classical valuation to the investment-financing 
interactions clearly present in aircraft markets.  The implications of broad 
diversity in the world’s capital markets and airline equity ownership patterns, 
and the consequent implications for airline investment planners in both 
developed and emerging markets, are central to this research.  
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3. Classical theory and aircraft investment analysis 
This chapter establishes the link between purely financial theory – whether 
traditional or classical – and the practice of establishing and approving 
investments for assets such as aircraft in today's airlines.  The link between 
the CAPM theory of financial asset prices and real asset valuation is first 
established.  Second, a survey of practices in the general business 
community from the 1960s to the present day is provided, to establish whether 
the classical approach of Modigliani and Miller/WACC (late 1950s) and CAPM 
(early 1960s) have been adopted. The final step is to compare the most 
current practices in the general business community with those practiced by 
financial managers in the airline business.   
This chapter, then, sets a baseline of practice, used in later chapters to shed 
light on the applicability of more recent theoretical advances.  From this point 
on in the research, the term "traditional" will refer to the earnings/PER 
approach of Graham and Dodd, while "classical" will refer to the Modigliani 
and Miller/CAPM approach, with its emphasis on cash returns to creditors and 
investors and statistical risk pricing. 
3.1. From portfolio theory to corporate capital budgeting 
Of the three seminal articles postulating the CAPM method for estimating the 
cost of investment capital, Lintner (1965) went furthest toward extending the 
model's principles to the practice of corporate capital budgeting, with a set of 
normative rules for managers.  Published in the Review of Economics and 
Statistics, Lintner's article gave the most elaborately quantitative of the three 
definitions of CAPM; it also most clearly described the assumptions and 
conditions under which the CAPM holds, and extended Sharpe's original 
formulation to include short selling of shares.  The article suggested that "the 
identity of probability distributions over outcomes [which underlie portfolio 
theory and CAPM] covers corporate management as well as investors, and 
includes potential corporate investments in the capital budget as well as 
assets currently held by the company."  With this statement, Lintner 
recommended that managers directly apply the notions of CAPM to real asset 
investment decisions. 
To make the transition to capital budgeting, Lintner suggested that the 
corporations can borrow or lend at the same risk-free rate as investors, using 
the problematic assumption that "corporate management, ex ante, assigns 
probability zero to default on its corporate debt, and investors also treat 
corporate debt as a riskless asset."  This assumption allowed Lintner to both 
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confirm the Modigliani and Miller proposition that investors are indifferent to 
company financing decisions and to directly apply CAPM to company 
investment analysis.  If company managers can borrow and lend risk-free as 
investors are held to do under CAPM, their risky investments in real assets 
can be made strictly on the basis of covariance with the market portfolio, as is 
the case with portfolio investments in financial assets. 
Lintner's definition of CAPM postulated that managers can increase the value 
of the company's equity by investing in projects that increase expected 
company cash returns over and above the market price of the risk of these 
investments.  This extension of Sharpe and Treynor's definition has become 
canon in capital budgeting textbooks and practice such as “value based 
management” (VBM).  He demonstrated this by expressing returns and 
variances as changes from the firm's existing returns, and showing that one 
can multiply the estimated variances in cash flow of a project times the slope 
of the security market line (Sharpe's β, or γ in Lintner's formulation) to 
establish the cash price of the additional risk incurred.  The value of a firm will 
be increased if the incremental cash return Hi is greater than the price-of-risk 
coefficient times the variance of those incremental returns Hii , i.e., if the 
following inequality is met. 
iii HH ∆>∆ γ ............................................................................................. 3.1      
This postulate is a straightforward extension of the CAPM variance/covariance 
concept to cash returns on projects.  A simple numerical example reveals both 
the simplicity and usefulness of this normative rule, and its fundamental 
weakness.  Say a firm invests in an aircraft expected to increase its cash flow 
by a $100m on average.  The firm's shares have an estimated  β (or γ) of 1.25, 
while the statistical variance of these incremental cash flows is estimated at 
±$50m.  The price of the risk is the product 1.25x50 or $62.5m, so the 
project’s expected return more than justifies the risk and it should be accepted.  
The weakness is that the price-of-risk coefficient must include the riskiness of 
the project at hand (or the riskiness of the project must be identical to the 
overall firm's risk), and is therefore very difficult to estimate in practice:  this 
estimation difficulty has dogged practitioners ever since.  Still, the implications 
of this extension are many.  It added a project-portfolio dimension to the 
implementation of CAPM absent in earlier publications, leading to four 
normative conclusions for managers.   
First, managers seeking to increase shareholder's wealth should actively seek 
real asset investment projects that improve the company's risk-return profile 
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from its current situation, by finding lower-risk and/or or higher-return projects 
compared with those currently present in the company's business.   
Second, Lintner carried the project-portfolio logic to its extreme mathematical 
conclusion, stating that projects should be analysed not only in terms of their 
returns, but also in terms of their correlation with existing business, going as 
far as to suggest that in extreme cases, even negative-return projects should 
be accepted if the they reduce the variance of the firm's returns as a whole 
through negative correlations.  This "business portfolio" reasoning became 
very popular in the 1950s and 1960s, as many firms (the most famous 
example being ITT) sought to diversify business risk by investing in new 
business unrelated to its core activity (telecommunications in the case of ITT.  
Though success stories tend to be rare, the logic remains popular today.  In 
the aviation business, the best example is General Electric, which prior to the 
financial crisis of 2008 was owner of a television network, medical instruments 
and plastics fabrication divisions, a finance and insurance arm, as well as its 
"core" power generation businesses including jet engines.  This particular 
implication of Lintner’s version of CAPM is not further addressed in this 
research, but one can note the strong influence of financial theory on business 
practice in these examples. 
Third and most significant for this research,  Lintner pointed out that the risk-
return framework of investors require that managers must introduce 
"appropriate risk variables explicitly into the analytical framework used in the 
analysis, and that these risk variables will be an essential component of any 
optimal decision rules developed."  The framework developed by Lintner 
specifies statistical analysis of cash flows to estimate, and price, variances 
which may impact the project.  For Lintner, this requirement is inherent in the 
use of CAPM by company managers.  This research will show that in practice, 
risk estimation and valuation are more subjective than mathematically 
rigorous. 
The fourth implication of Lintner's framework is that the company cost of 
capital "is not the appropriate discount rate to use in accept-reject decisions 
on individual projects for capital budgeting."  This follows both naturally and 
mathematically from the search for projects with different risk-return 
characteristics than the firm's existing business.  On the other hand, it poses 
clearly the discount-rate estimation problem, which must be dealt with by 
practitioners without a well-defined framework.  As we discovered in the field 
research, this tends to lead in practice to the use of vaguely-defined heuristic 
rules and subjective adjustments to cost of capital with little empirical 
grounding. 
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Lintner was also the most frank of the CAPM authors, as toward the end of 
the article he points up the "rather heroic set of simplifying assumptions which 
were made" to establish these rules, admitting freely that "too many factors 
that matter very significantly have been left out (or assumed away)."  However 
he then concluded the article somewhat ambiguously, first suggesting that 
"the above conclusions will still hold under more realistic (complex) 
conditions," and then asserting that the simplifying assumptions concerning 
lending and borrowing rates, taxation, and investors' common probability 
assessments of future returns play havoc with the postulates and calculations 
of CAPM.  Even further, Lintner goes on to state that the existence of limited 
liability corporations and "market risk" in debt markets "are sufficient to make 
the optimal project mix in the capital budget conditional on the finance mix,"  
in direct contradiction to the Modigliani and Miller propositions.   
This was a provocative conclusion to an article which labours mightily over 25 
formula-strewn pages to confirm the coherence of these same theories.  Thus 
the precepts of returns independent of capital structure and the linear 
relationship between individual share returns and overall market returns are 
held to be useful and necessary normative rules in spite of "heroic 
assumptions" and serious methodological gaps between theory and practice.  
One finds this sort of ambiguous conclusion in many authors on the subject 
through the present day, which leads to an interesting chicken-and-egg 
question in financial economics:  is financial theory used because it has been 
proved correct in empirical testing, or do its postulates tend toward verifiable 
results because of consistent application in the field?  
The remainder of this chapter covers field research in the general business 
community and our field research in the aviation business, to determine the 
state of practice regarding investment analysis and capital budget approval 
criteria.  The goal is test the degree and nature of application of the financial 
theories discussed, in order to establish the consistency of financial theory 
with today’s practice. 
3.2. Practices identified in the literature 
The academic literature survey focuses on articles which attempt to establish 
the trends in capital budgeting and investment valuation practices over the 
last thirty years, in the context of the broad and deep body of theoretical 
recommendations for managers discussed above.  The literature reveals a 
sharp distinction in the field between accounting-based measures inspired by 
the traditional view, and the statistically-oriented and classical, which focus on 
cash investment returns rather than financial statement data.  Most of these 
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surveys were performed in the United States, which presents a very large 
sample size, without barriers of language to confuse surveying efforts. 
3.2.1. Investment valuation techniques used in the business community 
The first major field research into the topic was published in the Journal of 
Finance by James C.T. Mao (1970).  Mao found “wide disparities between the 
theory and practice of capital budgeting.”  The article tests hypotheses 
regarding the objectives of investment and the treatment of uncertainty, by 
means of executive interviews.   Following both Modigliani and Miller and 
Lintner’s postulate that the managers should apply investment criteria that 
maximise the market value of the firm’s common shares, Mao postulated that 
the price of a share is a function of expected future earnings (profits), and a 
cost of capital including the “pure rate of interest,” and the "price of risk".  The 
hypothetical investment criteria are those which maximise the firm’s 
accounting profits per share, which should cause investors to bid up the share 
price through the Price-Earning Ratio (PER) mechanism.  Mao's formulation 
of the capital budgeting decision was thus an amalgamation of the traditional 
approach with its emphasis on reported earnings, and the classical approach 
with the focus on a price of investment capital and associated risk, expressed 
as an annual percentage rate. 
In his interviews with eight companies in electronics, aerospace, petroleum, 
household equipment, and office equipment, Mao found that the share price 
maximisation objective is “translated into the operating targets of growth and 
stability in the earnings stream,” consistent with the view that earnings per 
share (EPS) is an appropriate measure of investment performance.  EPS is 
not a cash-flow based measure, since earnings are adjusted for depreciation 
of assets.  For companies such as airlines that make enormous up-front 
investments that produce results over time, the differences between cash-flow 
and profit performance are enormous.  The “pure” EPS approach identified in 
Mao (1970) lacks a specific focus on valuing investments over time. 
The second study identifying investment analysis practice is Schall et al. 
(1978), also published in the Journal of Finance.  The research method was 
statistical analysis of surveys, as opposed to Mao’s interview-based approach.  
A sample of 424 U.S. firms was selected, and 189 firms (46.4%) responded.  
Responding firms tended to be larger companies with more stable 
shareholder rates of return than non-respondents.  A primary objective of the 
study was to identify the use of Accounting Rate of Return (ARR), Payback 
period (PBK), Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and Net Present Value (NPV) by 
U.S. companies.  Definitions and a brief discussion of each method follow. 
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ARR reflects the traditional view, based as it is on accounting rules and 
financial statements.  It is calculated by dividing the average accounting 
profits over the investment horizon, by the average investment in fixed assets 
over the same horizon.  ARR is very similar to the well-known Return on 
Investment (ROI) measure of corporate profitability.  Clearly not a cash-based 
measure, ARR results are conditioned by accounting policies, and specifically, 
depreciation method and period.  Depreciation methods vary widely in the 
global airline industry, as they are determined by government policies and 
regulation, tax codes, and national or international accounting standards.  
ARR can produce results distorted by accounting standards and company 
policies, but go beyond the pure earnings approach identified by Mao, in that 
they explicitly measure profits in relation to the investment in fixed assets such 
as aircraft.   
NPV reflects the classical view of valuation.  It is a cash-based measure that 
reflects the classical approach to investment valuation's emphasis on cash 
and risk pricing.   
The formula for NPV is: 
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where T is the investment horizon, CF are the expected cash flows in period t, 
and r is the cost of capital.  IRR is a complementary measure, being the 
discount rate which produces a breakeven NPV of 0.  Many practitioners hold 
that IRR is easier to grasp than NPV, because it is directly comparable to an 
interest rate return.  NPV on the other hand requires a separate assessment 
of the project's cost of capital, which as we have seen, is not fully elucidated 
in the theoretical literature.  NPV and IRR are clearly not distorted by 
depreciation policies, and are therefore viewed by financial economists as 
more adequate measures of investment value. 
PBK is certainly the oldest and most intuitive of all measures, being the 
number of periods (months or years) required to recover the initial investment.  
For example, an investment of $20m that produces cash returns of $1.5m per 
period would have a payback of 13.33 years.  Usually given short shrift in 
academic articles and textbooks, PBK is cash-based measure, but ignores the 
time value of money that is captured in the discount rate in NPV/IRR.  This 
research shows a strong renewal of interest in this measure, both as a 
measure of risk and, potentially, an approximation of more sophisticated 
valuation techniques. 
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Schall et al. discover in their survey that the overwhelming majority of 
companies use a combination of these measures, a recurring theme in this 
research.  For example, PBK was used by the greatest number of 
respondents (74%), but that only 2% use only this technique to evaluate 
investments.  This pattern is confirmed in Table 3.1. 
Methods used Percent using Percent using ONLY 
PBK 74% 2% 
IRR 65% 6% 
ARR 58% 4% 
NPV 56% 2% 
Table 3.1: Methods used by US companies in 1978 survey (Schall et al.) 
Cross-tabulating the survey responses, the authors found that over 86% of 
companies were found to use one cash-based method or another while on the 
other hand, only 16% use either IRR or NPV without recourse to ARR or PBK, 
reflecting a mix of traditional and classical measures.  Clearly, the responding 
financial managers preferred to take a balanced view of the profitability of 
investments, and well over half consider that reported profits (as measured by 
ARR) should be taken into account.  The survey thus implies a higher level of 
adoption of cash-based measures compared to Mao’s interview-based 
findings, while retaining the notion that projected earnings are significant 
criteria for investments in real assets. 
The authors also established that 41% of firms used these techniques to 
evaluate all investments, while the remaining 59% use them to evaluate 
“certain types of investment.”  Finally, this early survey identified the indirect 
method of calculating cash flow as the preference for 62% of the 135 firms 
responding to the question.  In this method, the firm first estimates the profits 
from the project, then adjust this for non-cash items such as depreciation.  
Only 18% reported calculating cash-flow directly (that is, excluding 
depreciation from the calculation, while only 7% reported using net income, 
and 13% used ‘various different methods.’  While not hugely significant, it 
does tend to suggest that managers at this time were reasoning from profits 
as a starting point before moving to cash flow, rather than estimating cash 
flow directly.   
A third major survey was published in 1980 by Oblak and Helm, who found in 
a survey of 226 of the Fortune 500 largest US firms that fully 90% of projects 
were evaluated using the investment analysis techniques outlined above.  
Interestingly, they also found that 85% of companies that formally evaluated 
projects reported an acceptance rate for the projects of 75% or more.  Such a 
high rate of successful projects suggests that formal evaluation techniques 
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are used in an iterative budgeting process which tends to raise projects to 
acceptable levels of profitability, as opposed being subjected to a one-time 
"go/no-go evaluation process. 
Table 3.2 summarizes the primary and ancillary methods used to evaluate 
investments. 
Methods used Primary use of the method Ancillary use of the method
IRR 60% 21% 
ARR 14% 33% 
NPV/Profitability Index 14%/2% 36/12% 
PBK 12% 74% 
Table 3.2: Methods used by US companies in 1980 survey (Oblak and Helm) 
Oblak and Helm distinguished between “primary” and “ancillary” use of the 
techniques, and found that cash-based measures are prevalent, with IRR 
being the preferred primary method.  ARR, NPV and particularly PBK are less 
commonly used as primary methods, but have significant perceived value as 
complementary (or ancillary) measures. 
The most widely used ancillary method was NPV, which is used nearly half 
the time, either by itself (36%) or in combination with the Profitability Index, 
the ratio of NPV to initial investment (12%).  The Profitability Index is a 
common capital rationing technique, which shows the amount of value 
creation per dollar of invested capital.  
The Oblak and Helm study confirmed earlier research suggesting that a 
variety of different measures are used to test the viability of investment 
projects, while showing a distinct trend away from traditional and toward 
classical valuation methods by 1980. 
Trahan and Gitman (1995) was written as an attempt to identify gaps between 
theory and practice in corporate finance, in response to "recent indictments of 
business education" identified by the American Assembly of Collegiate 
Schools of Business (AACSB) in 1991, confirmed by the Financial 
Management Association in their 1992 annual meeting.  For this research, the 
article offered an interesting perspective as well as an update from the earlier 
studies showing a trend toward classical– that is, cash and time-based - 
valuation methods.  The authors cite Ramirez, Waldman and Lasser (1991) 
who found that financial research was out of touch with practice in fields such 
as regulation, corporate ownership (today the widely discussed field of 
corporate governance), as well as both short-term and long-term financing.  
Trahan and Gitman's article went into far more detail with a survey of 700 
financial managers, or which 84 (12%) were returned from, 58 from members 
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of the Fortune 500 largest firms, and 26 from (generally smaller) Forbes 200 
firms.   
The questions covered five specific areas: 
1. the usefulness of academic research  
2. capital budgeting and risk methods 
3. impact of financial decisions on stock price 
4. international financial management 
5. areas where managers would like further information 
In each area managers were asked whether they understood the methods, 
whether they used them, and whether they would like more information about 
them. 
Capital budgeting methods used were broadly consistent with earlier surveys, 
with some differences found between the larger Fortune 500 and smaller 
Forbes 200 firms responding.  This research focuses on the overall result of 
all respondents.   
 Understand method Use method Need more information 
PBK 86.9% 66.7% 1.2% 
ARR 84.5% 59.5% 6.0% 
NPV 94.1% 81.0% 7.1% 
IRR 91.7% 79.8% 8.3% 
Table 3.3: Methods used by Fortune 500 and Forbes 200 companies in Trahan and Gitman (1995) 
The results confirmed the “market penetration” of the classical valuation 
techniques in the mid-nineties, these being both substantially better 
understood and more frequently used than the traditional methods.  NPV is 
clearly ascendant compared to Oblak and Helm (1980), with the highest 
"score" of all, over 4/5ths of managers using the technique.  
The primary differences found between larger and smaller firms are two: more 
large-company managers cite all the methods more frequently, and they also 
have a slightly higher use of IRR over NPV, contrary to the smaller firms' quite 
significant preference for NPV.  An echo of this distinction was found in the 
airline survey discussed in section 3.3.  
Two categories of more advanced techniques were advanced by the authors.  
The first is MIRR, a more prudent form of IRR where intermediate positive 
cash flows are formulaically "reinvested" at a lower rate than the company 
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cost of capital.  The intuition is that the company is not necessarily able to 
achieve the cost-of-capital rates of return on any positive intermediate cash 
flows.  Commonly stated in terms of NPV, the formula is: 
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 The survey respondents showed indifference to this method, with only 15.5% 
saying that they used the method, even if 39.3% claimed to understand it.  
The authors also inquired about the profitability index method as did Oblak 
and Help, and obtained very similar responses to that for MIRR.  Over 20% of 
managers did cite the need for further information on these more advanced 
techniques, but in terms of common practice, the very "pure" forms of 
classical theory dominated U.S. capital budget valuation by the mid 1990s7. 
3.2.2. Cost of capital estimation – evolution of practice 
Most of the traditional and classical capital budgeting techniques in use today 
require an estimate of the required return on investment, calculated as a 
percentage, to which the investment return of the project is compared in the 
investment appraisal process.  In the case of ARR, the percentage is 
calculated as profits over average investment, while NPV calculates the cash 
value created over the project, using an explicitly calculated cost of capital to 
deduct the required rate of return in each period.  The output of IRR is a rate 
of return, which can be compared to a required rate (often referred to in 
practice as the ‘hurdle rate’) for investment returns. 
The other two techniques discussed in this chapter, PER and PBK, do not 
require this type of estimate.  PER focuses on accounting profits (specifically 
EPS) and growth projections as a driver of share price, reflecting the 
traditional approach to investment analysis.  PBK measures the time required 
to recover the invested capital, an extraordinarily simple and intuitive metric 
which does not, however, estimate the size of the returns or profits garnered 
by the project. 
The classical method for estimation of cost of capital is derived directly from 
Modigliani and Miller's propositions and portfolio theory.  The method is 
intuitively logical and seems as if it should be easy to apply.  This section of 
the research explores on the one hand the evolving state of practice, and on 
                                                 
7 The author’s field experience in the airline industry has revealed that Lufthansa has fully 
adopted Qualified Internal Rate of Return (QIRR), identical to MIRR, as an investment 
decision criterion 
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the other the difficulties practitioners face in using theoretically validated 
methods to estimate the cost of investing in real assets.  
Not all companies find the need to explicitly estimate a cost of capital or 
hurdle rate.  Mao (1970) discovered that the managers interviewed implicitly 
use a PER valuation approach, by selecting projects that meet operational 
targets of growth and stability in profits.  Under this valuation method, growth 
will incite investors to bid up the share price by increasing the PER they are 
willing to pay, while stability shows the effectiveness of risk management.  
Graham and Harvey (2001) found that the growth-oriented PER method was 
still quite commonly cited (nearly 39% of managers use it), with a significant 
preference for the method in firms where the CEO was older than 59 years. 
Schall et al. (1978) discovered that PBK was the most commonly-cited 
measure of investment performance (74% of 189 respondents).  The use of 
PBK remained high in the other surveys performed, either as a primary or 
ancillary technique.  Graham and Harvey found that over 86% of executives 
cited basic or discounted PBK in current use, implying that the more ‘modern’ 
techniques of NPV/IRR are still complemented by this old favourite.  The 
literature increasingly identifies PBK as a risk measurement and management 
tool, as discussed in the Chapters 6 and 8. 
The first of the field surveys to specifically discuss the methods used to 
estimate cost of capital was Schall et al. (1978).  The most common method 
cited (46%) to calculate the cost of capital or discount rate was the weighted-
average cost of capital (WACC), as formulated by Modigliani and Miller in 
equation 2.16.  
The pure cost of debt was the second most popular discount rate used, by 
17% of firms, while the cost of equity capital was used in fewer than 10% of 
the responding firms.  This figure rises to 17% if one adds the "risk-free return 
plus a premium" method which is essentially a CAPM approach to estimating 
the cost of share capital. 
 Cost of capital estimates Percent using the method 
Cost of debt 17% 
Cost of equity 9% 
WACC 46% 
Risk-free return plus a premium associated with 
the risk class of the investment 
8% 
Subjective estimates  
Measure based on past experience 20% 
Expectations with respect to growth & dividends 17% 
Table 3.4: Cost of capital estimation methods in Schall et al. (1978) 
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Schall et al. also found significant use of subjective measures of the cost of 
capital, finding that executives often prefer to use a combination of objective 
and subjective methods to estimate cost of capital.  The wide use of 
subjective methods is somewhat surprising given the breadth and depth of 
capital markets in the U.S.  Firms in this market have access to plentiful and 
statistically reliable data on historically observed (objective) returns, which are 
readily used as a basis for estimating expected returns in the future (with the 
usual caveats about forecasting using the past as a guideline for the future).  
The implications of such subjective estimates are discussed in Chapter 6 of 
this research. 
Regarding the treatment of corporate income tax, Schall et al. discovered that 
the overwhelming majority (88%) of firms cited using after-tax discount rate 
applied to after-tax cash flows. 
The discount rates cited by the 69 respondents that use an after-tax discount 
rate showed the following pattern. 
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Figure 3.1: After-tax discount rates used by firms in Schall et al. (1978) 
This pattern shows clear central tendency at 10%, with smaller peaks at 12% 
and 15%, yielding a distribution skewed toward the higher side of the mode.  
Oblak and Helm (1980) reported practices broadly similar to the findings of 
Schall et. al, with 54% of respondents using WACC, while 22% use either cost 
of debt or cost of equity alone.  The major difference from Schall et al. is that 
Oblak and Help report that only 21% of firms use subjective measures, 
compared to 37% reported in the earlier survey.  The findings of the two 
articles were quite consistent with one another, and revealed substantial 
consensus around the use of classical analytical techniques and cost of 
capital estimation methods. 
Bruner et al. (1998) went a step further than earlier research: it was at once 
an update on the state of practice and a close examination of the ambiguities 
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and pitfalls of the WACC method of estimating cost of capital.  The authors 
found that fully 85% of the 27 firms interviewed by telephone (and identified by 
name in the survey) use a "combination of capital cost to determine a WACC."   
The authors chose a small sample of firms selected by their peers for their 
excellent financial management in an earlier 1992 study.  In this way they 
identified practice in a rather selective and normative way, identifying 
practices of the "best" financial managers.  Going further, the authors 
interviewed 10 investment advisors, and consulted seven books (four finance 
textbooks and three trade books), to round out the survey.  This pedagogical 
approach is quite typical of the Financial Practice and Education (now Journal 
of Applied Financial Management, published by the Financial Management 
Association) where the article was published.   
This research will concern itself with the responses from the corporate 
financial managers.  Consistent with the authors goal of elucidating pitfalls in 
applying the theory, the telephone survey technique allowed the authors to 
best explore "the areas where finance theory is silent or ambiguous," 
exploring the hazards of application as well as identifying techniques. 
Broadly speaking, Bruner et al. found that practice by 1998 was fully 
consistent with classical financial theory, which had apparently been 
successfully "coded" into corporate finance text books, lectures and case 
studies used in graduate business programmes.  Discounted Cash Flow (DCF, 
a general term for cash-based analysis using metrics such as NPV and/or IRR 
as decision criteria) is the dominant valuation technique, CAPM was dominant 
in cost of equity estimation, and WACC was used in a theoretically correct 
way by the great majority of practitioners responding. 
The balance of the article is a dissection of components of CAPM.  The 
authors examined the terms one by one, identifying theoretical gaps and 
issues both from the literature and with the survey respondents.  One of the 
strengths of CAPM is precisely that it can easily be decomposed into a series 
of component terms, which can be separately analysed and estimated.  Each 
component (interest rates, market returns, risk coefficient for individual 
company) makes intuitive sense to the finance practitioner, but as Bruner et al. 
revealed, the devil is in the details for users of the theory.   The following 
sections combines Bruner et al.’s discussion with the author’s observations on 
difficulties met in practice. 
3.2.3. Pitfalls in cost of capital estimation 
The most common formulation CAPM (Formula 2.14) is repeated for 
convenience: [ ]))()( fmjfj rrErRE −+= β . 
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Pitfall #1 – the risk-free rate 
The risk free rate in CAPM is implicitly a short-term rate because the model is 
single-period: textbooks usually recommend using a 90-day Treasury Bill (T-
bill) yield to estimate the rate.  However, using short-term rates to evaluate 
investment over many years represents a serious mismatch of maturities 
(many financial firms taken down in the current financial crisis would have 
done well to remember this basic match-funding principle in finance).  In 
practice, the authors found that corporate managers choose between a 90-
day rate and a long-term bond, with 70% of the "best-practice managers" 
using a maturity 10 years or greater, and "many" specifically matched the 
investment horizon to the tenor of the bonds used to estimate the risk-free 
interest rate.  This contrasts sharply with the 43% of textbooks recommending 
90-day T-bill rates vs. 29% for long-term Treasury bond yields, reflecting a 
preference for the pure interpretation of CAPM in the academic community. 
Pitfall #2 – estimating Beta (β)   
The second problematic element of CAPM is the slope of the Security Market 
Line, the Beta (β) coefficient.  On one hand, it is hard to overstate the 
significance of the intuition of this coefficient both for the theory and practice 
of finance.  For practitioners, the insight that investors can and do hold 
combinations of the risk-free and risky portfolios of assets allowed the use of a 
single linear coefficient to estimate expected market returns of a single share 
within an optimized portfolio, in place of the problematic, curvilinear "efficient 
frontier" of Markowitz.  For finance theory, the intuitions and methodology of 
the CAPM have served as the basis for more advance valuation techniques 
such as arbitrage pricing and financial options pricing.     
A cottage industry of academics continues to dedicate itself to testing the beta 
formula using historical market returns.  The nature of the beta formulation in 
the field lends itself to this type of test.  The coefficient is strictly defined terms 
of statistical calculations, specifically the covariance of the market portfolio 
return Rm and the return of the share in question, Ri, normalized by dividing it 
by the market portfolio's variance: 
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The empirical evidence testing retrospective beta is ambiguous, as discussed 
in Chapter 2.  However, this is not the greatest practical problem with using 
the coefficient:  Bruner et al. pointed out that theory states that beta must be 
forward looking, while most information providers use linear regression on 
historical share returns to estimate company betas.  Additionally to this future 
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vs. past conundrum (present everywhere in business planning and finance, 
quite different to science and engineering), theory is silent on several other 
methodological pitfalls in using beta.  A trade-off must be made between the 
freshness of the data and statistical validity (which argue for measuring 
weekly or even daily returns over the most recent period, yielding a large 
recent sample size) and the long-term nature of the investments being 
analysed with the cost of capital, which (as with the risk-free rate) argue for a 
long-term analysis of company betas.   
Another estimating problem concerns the "market portfolio" used to calculate 
market returns, the independent variable for the regression analysis.  While 
theoretical the market portfolio should be composed of all risky assets, a 
"minimum" sample size and composition of the market portfolio is not 
established.  Out of expediency, Beta providers tend to opt for returns on 
market indices, claiming that the indices provide a representative sample of 
market returns.    
The default parameters for three major online sources of Betas values are 
cited by the authors, as summarized in Table 3.4. 
 Bloomberg Value Line S&P 
Time interval Weekly Weekly Monthly 
Sample size 102 (2 yrs) 260  (5 years) 60 (5 years) 
Market index S&P 500 NYSE Composite S&P 500 
Average Betas 1.03 1.24 1.18 
 Table 3.5: Beta estimation parameters identified in Bruner et al. (1998) 
Alone among the three services, Bloomberg allows the user to vary the 
estimation parameters according to the terms of the specific study, providing 
at least a sort of sensitivity analysis to provide the analyst with perspective, in 
partial response to the statistical estimation problem.   
The greater gap between theory and practice and challenge to practitioners 
lies in determining a "forward-looking" beta as demanded by theory.  In the 
rush to statistical expedience (and profit-making provision of information), 
information providers and many practitioners seem to forget that the returns in 
portfolio theory and CAPM – both market and individual share returns - are 
expected returns as defined in relation to utility theory.  Even more, Sharpe's 
original formulation calls for uniform investor expectations of returns, an 
assumption later relaxed without damaging the CAPM's theoretical coherence.  
The analytics group Barra (now MSCI Barra) is the only major information 
provider which takes this into account in their methodology.  In Barra founder 
Barr Rosenberg (1985), beta "should forecast the future response of the stock 
return to the market portfolio return."  To reach what he considers an intrinsic 
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or equilibrium value for beta, Rosenberg suggests using a factor between 0 
and 1 as an adjustment to smooth short-term swings, drawing the beta 
estimate toward its average value.  This approach allows Barra to constantly 
re-calibrate beta estimates based on their predictive ability by using long-run 
averages.  These are held to be equilibrium betas, termed "fundamental" beta 
by Rosenberg.   
The second methodological improvement in Rosenberg (1985) was to 
integrate the intuition that different industries have specific risk characteristics 
into the analysis.  Many analysts today calculate the systematic risk inherent 
in industries using industry betas.  This approach again shows how amenable 
Sharpe's formulation is to statistical analysis.  A portfolio beta is simply the 
weighted average of individual company betas.  Using weights presumably 
based on the market capitalization of each company, Campbell Harvey (1995) 
calculated betas of 1.8 for air transport, 1.3 for aerospace, and 0.6 for energy, 
a wide range of betas that reflects the differing investor risks for each industry.  
Barra's approach to including industry-specific items in beta estimates is more 
subtle (and unpublished). 
The third innovation is the logical extension of Barra's use of more than one 
factor to estimate systematic risk.  In their model, the estimated beta is made 
up of a number of coefficients and descriptors, including size, earnings 
volatility, technical analysis indicators such as market momentum of the share 
price, and "value factors" from traditional security analysis such as dividend 
payout and debt ratios.  Unlike the multiple regression approach of Ross' 
Arbitrage Pricing Theory, Barra's model retains the single-factor beta 
coefficient, adjusting the beta coefficient to arrive at a predictive beta by a 
series of adjustment terms: 
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Where  
In is the industry effect on company n 
c1…cn are the coefficients for prediction rule 
D1…Dn are the descriptors 
Rosenberg (1985) did not describe the specific methodologies used to arrive 
at the coefficients and descriptors, but the article did compare his 
methodology with the retrospective approach to beta estimation, and finds that 
his model is "1.67 times more predictive than simple historic beta as a 
predictor of future betas."  More modestly, Rosenberg reports the following 
predictive power of historic vs. Barra betas, by calculating the R2 over the 
period 1976 – March 1984: 
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 Historical beta R2 Barra beta R2 
Jan '76 – Dec '80 .29 .45 
Apr '79 – Mar-84 .25 .46 
Table 3.6: Explanatory power of historical and Barra betas in Rosenberg (1985) 
In Rosenberg's analysis, 45-46% (one might add, only 45-46%) of the 
variation in company beta over the periods studied was predicted by the Barra 
model, compared with less than 30% using purely historical data to predict 
future betas.  The Barra information service results estimating airline betas 
were compared with other providers, as well as further methodological 
alternatives and issues in airline beta estimation, were covered in Turner and 
Morrell (2003), and discussed in section 3.3 of this research. 
The survey respondents in Bruner et al. indicated a wide variety of 
approaches to beta estimation.  Queried about the source of beta estimates, 
52% of respondents used a published source, with another 30% calculating 
beta themselves.  Only 3% sought an estimate from a financial advisor, while 
the remaining 15% did not use CAPM to estimate cost of capital.  With 85% of 
respondents using it, the authors again found that (at least in this selective 
group), CAPM has been strongly adopted, in spite of its methodological 
difficulties.  When asked how CAPM was used, respondents indicated a 
tendency to look at a variety of beta sources: of the four qualitative responses 
cited, two used more than one data source, while the other two "adjust" the 
beta values.  Of the other two, one uses management judgement to adjust 
beta if the published source seems too high, while the other uses the common 
approach of estimating betas for different divisions, based on comparable 
"pure play" listed companies.   
Pitfall #3 – the equity risk premium 
The final element of CAPM discussed in Bruner et al. is the equity market risk 
premium, Rm – Rf.  In addition to the same risk-free rate selection, sample size, 
periodicity, investor horizon and "future=past" methodological problems of 
beta estimation using historical data, another problematic estimation issue for 
the risk premium is the proper kind of average to calculate, geometric or 
arithmetic.  Sharpe's original single-period model naturally was silent on the 
question of measuring multi-period returns on investments.  Arithmetic means 
therefore best reflect the original CAPM, because they make no "buy-and-
hold' assumptions about investor behaviour, as would a compound return 
(geometric average) approach.  Arithmetic means are also consistent with the 
efficient markets framework underlying classical portfolio theory and CAPM, in 
that returns from one period to the next are held to be completely independent 
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of one another, that is, there is no positive or negative autocorrelation 
between what are held to be normally distributed returns.  A final advantage is 
that individual year returns as a basis for average return calculations allows 
the complementary calculation of measures of dispersion such as standard 
deviation.  Arithmetic means require the analyst to individually measure each 
year's returns, and are calculated very simply, as follows: 
n
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On the other hand, geometric means better capture the returns experience of 
"buy and hold" long-term investors, and by their nature take into account any 
momentum-based positive or negative autocorrelations, making no 
assumption whatever about the pattern of individual annual returns in relation 
to other periods.  A further convenience is that the analyst can calculate 
geometric returns with just two data points, the first and last portfolio value in 
the series over n years, as follows: 
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.  Arithmetic mean calculations thus best measure variance of returns and 
more closely reflect classical finance valuation theory than geometric means: 
in practice, both are in current use. 
To demonstrate the range of possible estimates using the same historical data, 
Bruner et al. calculated the range of possible risk premia using data from 1926 
– 1995.  As with testing of the explanatory power of beta, estimation of market 
returns and risk premia has become a major industry among information 
providers and academics.  Probably the best known, and certainly the most 
comprehensive recent study of returns and premia is Dimson, March and 
Staunton (2002), which examines 101 years of returns in global financial 
markets.   The results for the U.S. study in Dimson et al. (results in bold 
italics) with the 1998 study of Bruner et al. are compared in Table 3.7. 
 Short-term Rf 
(T-bill returns)
Long-term Rf 
(T-bond returns) 
Arithmetic mean 8.5% / 7.7% 7.0% / 7.0% 
Geometric mean 6.5% /  5.8% 5.4% / 5.0% 
Table 3.7: Historical estimates of equity market risk premia in Bruner et al. (1998), Dimson et al. (2002) 
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In all cases, the geometric mean is less than the arithmetic mean due to the 
compounding effect, and the risk premium over short-term T-bills is higher 
than that over long-term bond returns, reflecting the "normal" positive term 
structure of interest rates over time.  The calculated risk premia over long-
term bonds is quite a bit more consistent between the two studies' results than 
that for short-term premia, whether for historical or methodological reasons. 
The textbooks consulted by Bruner et al. tended to recommend using an 
arithmetic mean over t-bills, more consistent with Sharpe's CAPM formulation 
(but out of line with the long-term nature of capital budgets).  The financial 
advisor practitioners in Bruner et al. also tended to recommend arithmetic 
mean over t-bill, but were more evenly divided than the textbooks.  Overall, 
the risk premium in these published sources is between 5% and 8.5%, a wide 
spread which can have significant influence on capital budget evaluations.  
Corporate practitioners revealed an even wider disparity of estimates for 
market premia.  Deliberately asked the question in an open-ended way, 
managers stated the following range of practices: 
  Percent responding 
Use fixed rate of 4-4.5% 11% 
Use fixed rate of 5-6% 37% 
Use 'geometric mean' 4% 
Use 'arithmetic mean' 4% 
Use average of historical an implied 4% 
Use financial advisor's estimate 15% 
Use 'premium over treasuries' 7% 
Use Value line estimate 3% 
No response 15% 
Table 3.8: Practitioner estimates of equity market risk premia in Bruner et al. (1998)  
When queried on specifics, the best-practice companies revealed a very wide 
range of methodological choices: self-estimation, averaging polled financial 
experts, direct use of published sources, Monte Carlo (MC) simulation, 
dividend discount, and 'smoothing techniques' were all cited by the CFOs. 
3.2.4. Cost of capital estimation – summary and conclusions 
To summarize the impact of the various parameter choices, Bruner et al. 
calculated minimum and maximum WACCs resulting from the choice of 
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different CAPM parameters for two of their best-practice companies.  Using 
three "clusters of practice," they found WACCs of 8.5%-12.8% for Black & 
Decker, and 9.3%-11.6% for McDonald's, spreads of 430 and 230 basis 
points respectively.  The "clusters of practice" used for the cost of equity 
estimates were: 
1) short-term risk free rate (90-day T-bill), arithmetic mean risk premium 
from Ibbotson (information provider) 
2) long-term risk-free rate (30-year T-bill), financial advisor modal risk 
premium of 7.2%  
3) long-term risk free rate, corporate CFO modal risk premium of 5.5% 
The authors pointed out that as the yield curve was quite flat in the mid 1990s, 
most of the variation is explained by beta and the risk premium used.  In fact, 
the use of a common cost of debt tends to reduce the overall range due to the 
WACC calculation.  The true spread of values is best viewed by calculating 
cost of equity under varying beta values, for each of the three clusters of 
practice, which the authors did: 
Cluster 1     
90-day t-bill yield: 5.36%   
Equity premium 8.50%   
   (Ibbotson arithmetic average since 1926) 
Bloomberg 1.06 14.4%
Value Line 1.65 19.4%
S&P 1.78 20.5%
  Range: 6.1%
Cluster 2     
30-year T-bond yield: 6.26%   
Equity premium 7.20%   
   (Modal recommendation of final advisors) 
Bloomberg 1.06 13.9%
Value Line 1.65 18.1%
S&P 1.78 19.1%
  Range: 5.2%
Cluster 3     
30-year T-bond yield: 6.26%   
Equity premium 5.50%   
   (Modal practice of company CFOs) 
Bloomberg 1.06 12.1%
Value Line 1.65 15.3%
S&P 1.78 16.1%
  Range: 4.0%
Table 3.9 Black and Decker cost of equity values in Bruner et al. (1998)  
With this range of values, it is not surprising that responding best-practice 
company managers took the beta estimates with a grain of salt, whether by 
   
Chapter 3: Classical theory and aircraft investment analysis 74 
adopting an average value for the information providers, estimating beta 
themselves, or adjust the provided betas using subjective management 
judgement. 
From the study, the authors draw several conclusions about best practice in 
U.S. companies that is relevant for this research: 
1) Classical financial theory was in wide use in best-practice companies 
2) CAPM was preferred for cost of equity estimation 
3) Beta values provided were frequently adjusted by management, and long-
term data sources are preferred (they do not substantiate this last point) 
4) Risk-free rate should match the tenor of the cash flows being valued, using 
the appropriate T-bond yield.   
5) A striking variety of risk-premia are in use, reflecting controversy on 
methodology.  Managers tend to use a premium of 6% or less, while 
advisers and textbooks recommend higher figures. 
Though they state that managers can get no closer to a true WACC than 
±1.5%, the authors close with axiomatic recommendations; that managers not 
"throw the baby out with the bath water" by rejecting theory out of hand, and 
that "even a blunt axe is better than nothing." 
The evidence from Bruner et al.'s open-ended survey approach is to sum 
extent anecdotal and limited to practice within a selected set of "best-practice" 
U.S. companies.  Still, it is the closest examination of theory-practice gaps 
found in the general literature, and will be compared to airline-specific 
research including previous articles, as well as the airline CFO survey and 
interviews performed as part of this research.     
3.3. Airline investment analysis practice 
With this research as background, this the most current state of practice in 
both the general business community and the airline industry is now identified.  
For the state of practice in the general business community, the research of 
John Graham and Campbell Harvey carried out in 2000, and published in the 
Journal of Financial Economics in 2001, is used as the baseline of business 
practice in U.S. companies.   The comparison of airline practice with this 
research has several advantages: it is quite recent, exhaustive in its scope of 
inquiry, and benefits from a very large sample size. 
3.3.1. Research methodology 
This research designed and carried out an airline CFO survey designed to be 
directly comparable with Graham and Harvey, while addressing specific 
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issues of known concern in aviation finance, the most apparent being the 
large sunk-cost problem of committing to aircraft types, the well-established 
volatility of airline financial performance, and the inherently long-term nature 
of aircraft investments, and the apparent existence of strong links between 
investment and financing decisions ("outlawed" under the normative 
conclusion and interpretation of the Modigliani & Miller propositions).  The 
results of this survey, referred to as Gibson and Morrell (2005) are discussed 
in the relevant chapters throughout the remainder of this research.  
The following specific research questions were identified, covering the 
research areas of investment valuation methods, interactions between 
investment and financing decisions, and risk management: 
Valuation techniques 
Do airlines use techniques consistent with classical financial theory in 
forecasting investment returns and evaluating capital projects?   
1. What are the valuation metrics used to evaluate (ARR, NPV, IRR, 
PBK…)? 
2. For what size or type of project, and for what purpose, are such 
techniques used? 
3. How often do they evaluate project performance? 
4. How is the airline's cost of capital estimated, if it is needed for the 
analysis? 
5. Do airlines use more advanced techniques such as Adjusted Present 
Value (APV), Real Options Analysis (ROA), or Economic Value Added 
(EVA)? 
6. Questions of calculation methodologies: are income taxes included in 
the analysis, as strongly suggested by theoreticians?  Is accounting 
profit + depreciation the basis for the cash-flow calculation, or do 
companies calculate cash-flow directly? 
Investment - Financing interactions  
7. Is there a "pecking order" in project financing decisions, i.e., a 
preference for internal funds, debt, equity? 
8. Do executives prefer debt, equity, or internal funds to finance aircraft 
investments? 
9. Are valuation techniques used to evaluate financing decisions (such as 
operating leasing vs. purchasing and borrowing)? 
10. Is the firm focused on debt or equity project returns, or both? 
Risk management 
   
Chapter 3: Classical theory and aircraft investment analysis 76 
11. Is the cost of equity capital used in the investment analysis based on 
quantitative analysis or heuristics? 
12. How do airlines estimate risks in investments? 
13. How does the perceived risk of the investment influence financing 
decisions?  
14. What methods do they use to adjust the valuation for risk? 
Among the survey topics, the primary focus of the current chapter is valuation 
techniques, including cost of capital estimation.  Chapter 5 returns to the 
survey in the context of fleet planning investment-financing interactions, while 
the current theory and practice of investment risk management is discussed in 
Chapters 7 and 8. 
The questions were designed to measure the strength of preferences for the 
different approaches to valuation.  Airline managers were asked whether they 
Never use (score of 0), Sometimes use (1), or Always use (2) a given 
technique.  The preferences thus expressed are comparable to preferences 
expressed in Graham and Harvey (2001).  The complete survey form and 
results are presented in Appendix A of this thesis. 
Sample and response to the survey 
This research seeks to identify best practice among leading airlines around 
the world, and to provide a consistent body analysis of airlines surveyed and 
the governance and financial performance analysis performed.  For these 
reasons, the airline surveyed were drawn from the world’s largest airlines 
present in both in the Air Transport Intelligence database of airline ownership, 
and the Airline Business annual survey of financial performance.  249 surveys 
- with a cover letter addressed to the CFO by name - were posted, with a 
follow-up fax ten days before the due date.  These 249 airlines are the same 
as those whose ownership patterns and financial performance in analysed in 
this research, lending continuity to the various analyses performed.    
To establish characteristics of the respondents, the author asked firms to 
identify for their company: 
1. ICAO region 
2. Fleet size 
3. Fleet diversity (number of aircraft types) 
4. Total assets 
5. Total revenue 
6. Revenue growth 
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7. Majority ownership (govt, private, subsidiary, listed company) 
Table 3.10 shows the regional composition of the sample and the response 
characteristics. 
Regions 
Airline CFOs 
surveyed Responses
Response 
rate 
Sample 
composition 
Response 
composition
Africa 7 4 57% 3% 11% 
Asia 58 4 7% 23% 11% 
Europe 85 20 24% 34% 54% 
Middle East 22 4 18% 9% 11% 
North America 58 5 9% 23% 14% 
South America 19 0 0% 8% 0% 
Totals 249 37 15% 100% 100% 
Table 3.10: Airline CFOs surveyed and responses by ICAO region 
The authors received responses from airlines in all ICAO regions except 
South America. The greatest response in absolute terms came from European 
carriers, who returned 20 completed surveys, perhaps reflecting familiarity 
with Cranfield University in European aviation circles.  In percentage terms 
European, African and Middle Eastern airlines responded above the overall 
15% response rate.  The overall rate compares favourably with Graham and 
Harvey (2001), who experienced a 10% response rate in their survey of 4,087 
companies in the U.S.  Responses from South America were nil, while only 
9% of North American and 7% of Asian airlines responded. 
The responding companies tended to be mature or moderate -growth, with 
41% reporting annual revenue growth rates between 6% and 15%, and 
another 30% reporting 3 to 5% growth.  Over two thirds of the respondents 
operate between 10 and 50 aircraft, and six major airlines with 75 or more 
aircraft responded.  In spite of our offer of confidentiality, many airlines 
responded on their company letterhead, and several asked to receive the 
survey results. 
Graham and Harvey (2001) pointed out that 8-10% is a usual response rate to 
surveys about company financial practices, which in many cultures is quite 
sensitive.  The 15% response rate of the present research yielded 37 
respondents.  While we can see relations between individual airlines 
characteristics (size, growth etc.) and their preferences for various techniques, 
the relatively small total number of airlines in the world (and the 15% response 
rate) preclude the use of correlation of preferences against the airline 
characteristics as was performed in the Graham and Harvey research.  
Response bias is clearly present given the disproportionate responses of 
European carriers.  Additional response bias could be present, since the 
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respondents quite probably represent more sophisticated and/or financially 
transparent airlines, also typical of financial communication with listed share 
ownership, notably in Europe and the United States. A second bias is the 
number of aircraft operated by respondent airlines, which differed from the 
population of 249 airlines: 78% of respondents operated fewer than 50 aircraft, 
compared to  65% percent  in the large-airline population.  The survey 
responses are thus biased toward European airlines with relatively small fleets 
compared to the population, and the conclusions are most relevant for these 
groups.     
The survey results are thus limited in describing the overall population.  The 
37 responses allow only broad conclusions about global airline preferences, 
particularly descriptive of European carriers, predominately those operating 
fewer than 50 aircraft.   
3.3.2. Current investment valuation practices 
Graham and Harvey (2001) sent questionnaires to all Fortune 500 companies, 
as well as 4,400 members of the Financial Executives Institute, a professional 
association.  Since there was some overlap in the two groups, a total of 4,087 
surveys were sent.  A team of 10 MBA students at Duke University followed 
up with telephone and faxes to maximise the response rate, which came in at 
392 completed surveys, a 10% response rate.  The authors pointed out that a 
major shortcoming of such surveys is that they reflect beliefs rather than 
proving practices.  On the other hand, the high number or responses allowed 
a high degree of statistical reliability in the testing of several hypotheses and 
correlations.   
The authors cited earlier surveys reviewed in this research, which tended to 
confirm that the vast majority of U.S. firms use some sort of cash-flow analysis 
to evaluate investment projects.  The Graham and Harvey survey goes 
beyond these and the earlier surveys discussed in this research, to inquire 
about the use of additional techniques for calculating returns:  Adjusted 
Present Value (APV) is discussed extensively in this research and in Gibson 
and Morrell (2004). Additionally, they ask managers about use of the 
traditional price-earnings (PER) approach, where forecasted per-share 
earnings are divided by current EPS to determine the implicit price earnings 
ratio.   
The authors also question managers about the use of advanced techniques 
used to capture risk, such as Monte Carlo simulation, Real Options Analysis 
and Value at Risk.  These results are discussed and contrasted with airline 
practice in Chapter 7.   
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Graham and Harvey’s survey results showed a clear preference for classical 
metrics, with IRR and NPV being the dominant metrics used, followed by PER.  
Slightly over 20% of executives in the survey use Accounting Rate of Return 
(ARR), far lower than the 58% found by Schall et al. in 1978.  More common 
is the use of the PER method, which relies on a somewhat mixed bag 
accounting data and share market metrics.  Consistent with the earlier studies, 
the authors found a clear tendency to use more than one method to evaluate 
projects.  NPV has pulled nearly even with IRR among cash-based measures, 
presumably facilitated by advances in the knowledge of techniques to 
estimate cost of capital.   
The large sample size allows the authors to test the use of various techniques 
against several CFO and firm characteristics.  They assigned a “preference 
rank” for each technique.  The survey allowed choices of never use, 
sometimes use and always use, on a scale of 0 to 4.  Scores above three 
indicate a very common use of the method.  The differences between scores 
are tested at a 1%, 5% and 10% significance level.  Grouping IRR/NPV as 
Cash-based, PBK and PER as Accounting-based, the following pattern 
emerged at the 1% significance level. 
Methods preferred Cash-based Accounting-based 
Large firms X  
Leveraged firms (high level of debt) X  
Firms that pay dividends X  
Manufacturing firms X  
Management ownership low X  
CEO older than 59 years old  X 
CEO tenure long  X 
Regulated X  
CEO holds MBA X  
Widely-held corporation X  
Foreign sales X  
Table 3.11: Type of companies using cash vs. non-cash measures in 1999 survey (Graham and Harvey) 
The authors found that firms with older, longer-tenured CEOs showed a 
preference for accounting measures, implying that the cash-based techniques 
taught in MBA programmes are more up-to-date.  These preferences do not 
indicate that the firms preferring cash-based measures don’t use the 
accounting-based measures as well, but rather, that they more commonly use 
cash than accounting-based calculations.  It is worth noting that ARR received 
scores of less than 1.5 in all categories, while PBK and PER tended to score 
above 2.5: clearly, ARR has become much less frequently cited by U.S. 
financial executives, since the 1978 Schall et al. survey. 
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Among the control variables, the most relevant for our research into airlines 
are the ownership structure, level of debt, and degree of regulation.  Airlines – 
particularly those in emerging markets - are often state-owned (see Gibson 
and Morrell 2004), often highly indebted, and the sector is heavily regulated 
compared to other service industries.  If the airline sector follows the patterns 
identified by Graham and Harvey, we would expect to observe a preference 
for cash-based measures. 
3.3.3. Valuation techniques in airlines 
In the first survey performed for this research, airline CFOs were asked to 
state which techniques were used to analyse investments, choosing from a list 
of six common metrics (PBK, ARR, IRR, NPV, APV, ROA, as well as 
Economic Value Added (EVA), a corporate profit performance measure that 
multiplies the firm’s assets by WACC to establish an acceptable level of profits 
produced. 
They were asked to state preferences for the various techniques as never use, 
sometimes use and always use, assigning scores of 0, 1, and 2 to each 
respective preference.   
A score of 1.5 indicates a strong preference for the method; while any score 
under .5 indicates a method that is rarely used.  Graham and Harvey (2001) 
used a five-point 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, with 2 as the midpoint.  These responses were 
divided by two to be placed on the same scale.  The choice of a simpler three-
point scale in this research resulted from a desire to not overwhelm the 
potential respondents with choices, which a five-point scale would have 
tended to do. 
Strong preferences were found for two metrics in each case, but the two were 
not the same ones. 
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Graham and Harvey found strong preferences for the NPV and IRR measures, 
and relatively little preference for the other "standard" measures, PBK and 
especially ARR.  NPV and IRR are best viewed as complementary measures, 
usually consistent with one another.  Each has its methodological pitfalls: NPV 
requires the cost of capital as an input to the calculation, raising all the 
estimation conundrums discussed in the previous section, and is less intuitive 
to grasp than the simple percentage return, which can be compared to a bond 
or bank account return.   
IRR calculation does not require an a priori cost of capital, but has several 
pitfalls of its own.  It can produce results contrary to NPV, is not useful in 
capital rationing because it doesn't adjust for project size, and finally, yields 
multiple solutions complex projects in which cash flows change sign more 
than once over the life of the project.  For these reasons, finance textbooks 
tend to strongly favour NPV.  
 Graham and Harvey's findings of nearly even preference echo more recent 
surveys such as Trahan and Gitman, in contrast to the earlier Schall et al. and 
Oblak and Helm surveys, which for their part found a marked preference for 
IRR among executives.  
Airline preferences were sharply different in three respects.  First, the 
respondent airlines indicated a stronger preference for Net Present Value 
compared to IRR than found by Graham and Harvey.  Response bias may 
exist, as over half the respondents come from Europe, where the trend toward 
full listing of company shares has been very pronounced over recent decades: 
British Airways, Iberia, and Lufthansa are very prominent examples of airlines 
whose entire shareholding is listed on respective national bourses.  Full listing 
of shares facilitates estimation of cost of equity capital, compared to closely 
held or state-owned carriers dominant in many regions.  International airline 
ownership and investment appraisal patterns are discussed in the next 
chapter.   
Second, the airline CFOs showed a substantially higher preference for PBK 
than their U.S. general business community peers.  The use of PBK has 
recently been "revitalized" by authors who liken PBK to a simplified form of 
real options analysis to capture risk.  Indeed, this time-to-repayment measure 
is a very primitive form of what investment bankers call duration, that is, 
average time to repayment of capital.    
The third major difference in findings between Graham and Harvey (2001) and 
Gibson and Morrell (2005) is the greater preference expressed by airlines 
CFOs for the traditional Accounting Rate of Return method of investment 
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valuation.  Practice in the field shows that indeed, the range of valuation 
metrics is extremely varied in aviation worldwide, and ARR is apparently in 
some common use to value investments.   
In Figure 3.3 below, we complete the comparison, showing the strongest 
possible "always use" (2 out of 2) for airline CFOs with the less-definitive 
"almost always or always use" (3 or 4 out of 4) of Graham and Harvey (this 
being their only published response).  On the red outlined and lightly shaded 
bar, we add "sometimes" (1 of 2) to the airlines' "always" responses.   
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Figure 3.3: Frequency of valuation technique use in Graham & Harvey (2001), Gibson & Morrell (2005) 
Even in the weaker "always" form for the airlines, we see the predominance of 
NPV (nearly 60% always use), vs. slightly over 30% for IRR, reaching 80% 
when the "sometimes" response is included.   
Payback is always used by half of the executives: when "sometimes use" is 
added in, the figure reaches 95%, the highest frequency of use for any of the 
techniques listed. 
 ARR shows a use pattern just a bit under 1/3 of the time, compared to 1/5 for 
U.S. CFOs.  This figure jumps to 62% frequency of use when "sometimes" is 
added in.   
There is a slightly different pattern when looking at Real Options Analysis  
(ROA) and Adjusted Present Value (APV).  While each is always used by 
fewer than 10% of the time by our responding airlines, adding "sometimes" 
brings the figure closer to Graham and Harvey's.  Use of APV, potentially 
useful for valuing tax benefits of different financing vehicles, may actually 
exceed the use frequency of the general business community. 
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On the other hand, Real Options has reached substantially more acceptance 
among U.S. CFOs than among the responding airline CFOs, as only 21% said 
they used ROA even "sometimes", compared to the 25% found to being using 
it "nearly always or always" by Graham and Harvey.  This last finding was 
somewhat surprising, given aircraft manufacturers’ extensive use of aircraft 
purchase rights, delivery options and aircraft family conversion options in 
selling their products.  Adjusted Present Value as applied to fleet investment 
valuations, and Real Options valuation of aircraft options, are discussed in 
Chapters 6 and 7 respectively.   
Airline financial managers were found to prefer using more than one 
technique to analyse investments.  Responding airline managers use between 
two and six different valuation techniques.  The central tendency (mode) is 
four techniques used, and only 9 of our 37 respondents use fewer than three 
techniques.  This confirms the earlier research showing that financial 
managers prefer to balance techniques against one another to get a complete 
picture of investment dynamics. 
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 Figure 3.4: Number of different valuation techniques used to evaluate airline investments 
Looking deeper at the use of multiple techniques, airline managers indicated 
that fully 43% always use both NPV and PBK, and another 32% sometimes 
use both metrics, representing an overall 75% preference for using these 
methods in tandem.  Interestingly, the cash flow pattern of PBK and NPV can 
be represented on a single graph.  An example of cash flow patterns for an 
investment in a single-aisle aircraft operating in Europe and sold at the end of 
year six of operation is depicted below. 
Airline financial managers use a number of different techniques to 
evaluate investments: the mode is four different methods used 
   
Chapter 3: Classical theory and aircraft investment analysis 84 
NPV and payback period compared
€34.8
-€60
-€40
-€20
€0
€20
€40
€60
€80
€100
Yr0 Yr1 Yr2 Yr3 Yr4 Yr5 Yr6
Project years
C
um
ul
at
iv
e 
C
as
h 
flo
w
/N
PV
 (€
m
)
Cumulative cash flow Cumulative NPV
 
Figure 3.5: NPV and PBK depicted graphically, showing the difference in breakeven points 
The graph reveals that payback is achieved during year four, when the 
company recovers its cash invested in the aircraft, while the NPV reaches its 
total of €34.8million at the end of the project, after turning positive in year five.  
This time to reach a zero NPV is often known as discounted payback.  These 
complementary measures can be seen as measuring the risk (PBK-how long 
is the cumulative cash position negative) and the return (NPV) in a common 
visual framework.  McDonald (1998) and Alesii (2003) suggest that heuristic 
measures such as PBK may in fact approximate the conclusions of valuations 
using more sophisticated techniques such as Real Options Analysis. 
Looking briefly at regional preferences, the found the strongest preference for 
NPV in the Middle East and Asia (1.75 of a possible 2.00 preference ranking).  
Airlines in these regions showed an equally strong preference for PBK.  NPV 
showed slightly lower preferences in North America (1.67) and Europe (1.61).  
IRR is still in common use in the Middle East (1.75), where share markets are 
less developed than in other regions and statistical cost of capital estimation is 
difficult.  In the other regions of the world, IRR showed a preference ranking of 
only 0.98.  Consistent with the existence of broad and deep share markets 
and the corresponding ease of estimating the cost of capital for NPV 
calculations, U.S. respondents showed the lowest preference for IRR, at only 
0.75. 
The other questions regarding project analysis practices yielded the following 
patterns.  A majority (60%) of airline managers perform investment analysis 
for all investment projects, while an additional 30% analyse projects with over 
a certain size, frequently $100,000, thus including all aircraft investments.  
Only three responding managers indicated that they analyse projects 
according to risk class. 
Payback  Positive 
NPV
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A common criticism of NPV is that joint revenues and costs of different aircraft 
operating on the same routes, and the specific cash-based accounting 
required, make it difficult to follow up on results after the project is launched.  
Among our airline respondents, a large majority (81%) follow up to measure 
project results in some way, with a full 65% looking at results at least annually.  
Another 18% measure results at the end of the project. 
68% of airline financial managers prefer to calculate cash flow directly, rather 
than begin with profit and add back depreciation as in Schall et al. (1978).   A 
less clear preference was cited for after-tax analysis recommended by 
analysts and academics.  Finally, 35% of airline managers report using after-
tax analysis, while 32% do the analysis pre-tax, and the rest declined to 
respond. 
3.3.4. Airline cost of capital estimation 
Companies financing themselves in mature markets such as the U.S. and 
Europe have the advantage of large public securities markets for listing 
company shares and debt obligations on open exchanges.  In these markets, 
statistical estimation methods based on historical data can readily be used to 
estimate an acceptable financial return – or cost of capital - for investment 
projects.  On the other hand, there is significant doubt as to the usefulness of 
these purely statistical approaches for firms which are thinly traded, or closely 
held by governments, other companies or families, which often characterise 
airline shareholding.  As with investment valuation techniques, the literature 
reveals that executives prefer to use a combination of different approaches to 
arrive at a proper cost of capital.  These include both objective/market-based 
and subjective/heuristic methods.   
In addition to inquiring on the use of the WACC methodology, the Campbell 
and Harvey survey asked whether firms use the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) to estimate the cost of equity capital.  Campbell and Harvey find that 
73.5% of respondents use CAPM to estimate cost of capital, another 39.41% 
used average share market returns (i.e., without adjusting for the systematic 
risk of their company), while 34.29% used the "dividend discount model," an 
IRR calculation using expected future dividends and today's market share 
price, to estimate cost of capital.  They discovered a very strong preference 
for CAPM among large firms which, in the U.S., tend to be listed on major 
share exchanges.  Similar to the findings earlier in this research, the use of 
multiple techniques suggests that managers prefer to weigh up several 
alternative measures to arrive at an appropriate cost of equity.  In this section, 
we open the question of whether statistical methodologies such as CAPM 
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should be applied to airlines, and present the state of practice among our 37 
respondent airline CFOs. 
Turner & Morrell (2003) examined both the variety of published betas for 
airlines, and seeks to identify methodological pitfalls and disparities (along the 
lines of those discussed in section 3.5) which may account for the variety of 
published betas in the marketplace.  They focus on "pitfall #2," that is 
estimation of beta. 
To do this, the authors analyzed 10 airline beta values, revealing several 
pitfalls of CAPM for calculating expected returns.  The authors begin with the 
observation that different financial information services report substantially 
different betas for the same airline on the same date.  Further, the two of the 
three services report an average beta of less than 1.0 for the airlines 
examined, suggesting that these airline shares are less volatile than the 
market as a whole.  This runs counter to the view that airlines are subject to 
both highly cyclical demand (particularly in high-margin business class), and 
broad volatility in input prices, notably jet fuel, and hence should generally 
have beta values significantly higher than 1.0 (see for example, Morrell 
(1997)).  The published-source values are presented in Figure 3.5, and served 
to establish that different methodologies must be in use by the three providers 
(unless one or more is making calculations in error!).  The forward-looking 
superiority claimed for the Barra methodology in Rosenberg (1985) based on 
superior goodness-of-fit was not verifiable by the authors, as Barra apparently 
did not provide the relevant R2 calculations for its estimates.  Of those that did 
provide them, the estimates are extremely low for Bloomberg (for all but 
Lufthansa and to a lesser degree British Airways), and almost suspiciously 
high for Datastream, keeping in mind that in Rosenberg (1985), values 
between .25 for the historical estimation method, and .46 for the 'forward-
looking' Barra estimates were found. 
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Table 3.12: Variability in Beta estimation among service providers, from Turner and Morrell (2003) 
Having established the disparity, the authors re-calculated the same airline 
betas using under four different calculation methodologies: 
• Method 1 calculates annual returns over a 60 month rolling period, 
adding the annual dividend yield to the percentage change in share 
price  
• Method 2 calculates monthly returns, adding an averaged 12-month 
dividend yield to the share price change 
• Method 3 calculates monthly returns, adding the cash dividend to the 
final share price before calculating the percentage return 
• Method 4 calculates daily returns, adding a dividend yield averaged 
over the number of trading days in the year 
One of the stickier problems identified by these methods is the treatment of 
the dividend yield.  In order to demonstrate the variety of results from different 
methods, in Methods 1, 2 and 4 the authors calculate the dividend in terms of 
a percentage yield and add it to the annual/monthly/daily percentage change 
in share price, corresponding to the period of the specific method used. 
Another approach to this problem is simply to add the cash dividends 
distributed to the ending share price before calculating the percent return 
(used in Turner and Morrell's Method 3).  As the timing of dividends is 
important to determine yields, this method should be more accurate the more 
frequent the sample is made.  This measurement issue can be added to the 
list of CAPM pitfalls outlined in Section 3.5.  As mentioned above, Brunel et al. 
cited weekly frequency for two of the three providers, and monthly for the third, 
with horizons between two and five years.  This is the method adopted by 
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Turner and Morrell for their Method 3.  After calculating the beta coefficient for 
each of the ten airlines, they performed a regression analysis on four different 
methods of calculating airline betas, to determine goodness of fit of CAPM, 
using R2 as the measure of fit.   
In most cases, the methods of calculating annual returns calculated month-to-
month over the past 60 months (Method 1), and daily returns over the past 
year (Method 4), yield better fits than other methods.  However, the authors 
pointed out, R2 varies from a minimum of .001 for Southwest Airlines, to a 
maximum of .870 for Singapore Airlines under the former method, and 
from .0125 for SAS to .401 for Singapore in the latter.  CAPM statistical 
validity was widely variable in the airline industry, during the years 1996 – 
2002, as Table 3.13 from their article shows.  This suggests that at least at 
certain points in time, the yield of a share (Southwest is the most striking 
example), the return on a share is strongly conditioned by factors other than 
its systematic risk, as measured by covariance with the market. 
 
Table 3.13: Variability in Beta estimation for airlines, from Turner and Morrell (2003) 
The authors concluded that the cost of equity, a key input to the WACC 
calculation and hence to NPV calculation (or hurdle rate determination), is 
itself subject to broad variation, and that CAPM generates results which are, 
for many airlines, of doubtful statistical validity.  
In an approach similar to Brunel et al., the authors then calculated the 
resulting cost of equity under the various published and calculated beta 
results, presented in Figure 3.6.  The spread among the different cost of 
equity estimates is even more dramatic than that found in the previous article, 
leading to serious questions about the usefulness of CAPM in the airline 
industry. 
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Figure 3.6: range of cost of equity estimates in Turner and Morrell (2002) 
The WACC and CAPM methods of calculating cost of capital are widely used 
in U.S. industry, with its broad and deep securities markets and tradition of 
public listing of company shares on open exchanges.  On the other hand, 
there is significant doubt as to the usefulness of these purely statistical 
approaches for firms which are thinly traded, or closely held by governments, 
other companies or families, which often characterise airline shareholding.  
Listing the percentage of shares listed and the daily share turnover for each 
company, Turner and Morrell conclude that closer examination of airline 
shareholding, governance and international market behaviour may provide 
additional insights into airline cost of capital and airline investment behaviour.   
As with investment valuation techniques, the literature reveals that executives 
prefer to use a combination of different approaches to arrive at a proper cost 
of capital.  These approaches include both objective/market-based and 
subjective/heuristic methods. 
The airline managers were asked about preferences among four methods of 
setting the discount rate, cost of debt, cost of equity, WACC, and a rate based 
on the project financing.  Overall, the managers expressed a distinct 
preference for WACC as a discount rate, followed by cost of debt.  The former 
indicates a balanced view between shareholder and lender expected returns, 
while use of cost of debt may indicate that NPV analysis is used to justify 
projects to banks, that the cost of equity is considered nil because the 
company is a public service owned by the state, or both of these.  As Figure 
3.6 shows, the preference for cost of debt is nearly 1.5 in the Middle East, with 
lower but still significant preferences for this measure elsewhere.  The 
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preference for using the (higher) cost of equity finance is very low among 
these respondents.  On the other hand, companies in the Middle East , Asia 
and Africa sometimes or often set a discount rate directly related to the 
project’s financing, pointing toward significant investment-financing 
interactions, discussed in Chapter 6 of this research.    
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Figure 3.7: Airline preferences for cost of capital estimation, author survey 
Cost of equity is an important input to a WACC calculation, and yet airline 
managers did not express a strong preference for any estimation method, as 
shown in Figure 3.8, whereas Graham and Harvey clearly identified CAPM as 
the preferred method, reflecting U.S. financing market practice.  Our global 
airlines respondents expressed moderate preference for this method, and 
equal preference for measures based on “experience,” or heuristic methods, a 
method not surveyed by Graham and Harvey. 
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Figure 3.8: Airline preferences for cost of equity estimation 
The strongest use of experience-based measures is in the Middle East, where 
no use of CAPM was reported.  Government requirements and regulations for 
returns to investors, the primary method used during the days of airline 
regulation, apparently has an impact only on the Asian respondents, and 
there only weakly.  Consistent with Graham and Harvey’s findings, preference 
for CAPM is very strong in the United States, and weaker but still significant in 
Europe and Africa.  These results are detailed in Figure 3.9, below. 
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Figure 3.9: Regional preferences for cost of equity estimation 
3.4. Conclusions 
Since the advent of corporate finance and portfolio theory in the 1950s and 
1960s, there has been a steady increase in the adoption of classical financial 
valuation methods for capital budgeting purposes.  These methods are based 
on cash flow rather than accounting results, and attempt to find market values 
of risk and returns. 
The most commonly recommended valuation techniques, NPV and IRR, are 
nearly equal in preference among financial managers today, in spite of major 
methodological gaps between theory and practice, reviewed in this chapter.  
Portfolio theory has not resolved the problem of estimating future expectations 
based on historical results: if anything, the business of supplying company 
and industry beta information supports the inherent weakness of classical 
theory. 
In the airline industry, the trend toward classical valuation is also clear, but 
somewhat less pronounced: traditional valuation methods based on financial 
statements also remain common.  In the aviation field there is a very clear 
preference for using a balance of methods to evaluate investments, including 
the theoretically primitive payback method. 
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Within the airline industry, there appear to be dramatic regional differences in 
techniques used both to value investments, and to estimate the cost of 
investment capital. 
Finally, airline financial managers, like their counterparts in the general 
business community, often use subjective methods of estimating of cost of 
capital, in the absence of perfectly reliable methods of quantifying investor 
expectations whether through lack of historic data, or because historical 
returns are not considered reliable estimators of future expectations. 
These findings suggest strongly that the models and constructs  of classical 
finance theory have taken hold, especially CAPM & WACC for cost of capital 
estimation, and the cash-based NPV/IRR metrics for investment approval.  At 
the same time, a firm foundation for the “science” of statistical expected-return 
estimation remains problematic even in developed markets, and may be even 
more problematic in the developing world’s markets.  
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4. Financial markets, airline ownership and investment 
analysis 
The research thus far shows clear signs of progressive, though not rapid, 
adoption of investment valuation theory by financial managers in corporations, 
revealed by research performed largely in the United States.  The classical 
theory of capital structure from Modigliani and Miller was published in 1958, 
while the three CAPM articles were written between 1962 and 1965.  Mao 
(1970) found that these theories had largely not been adopted by practitioners.  
It wasn’t until the end of the 1970s, 15-20 years after the classical theories, 
that they found wide application in the practice of investment analysis.   
The research also reveals that the theories are in common use by airlines in 
advanced economies such as the U.S. and Europe, in spite of major 
theoretical and methodological pitfalls.  The 39 large airline CFOs surveyed 
confirm preferences for NPV and IRR. 
This chapter extends the research beyond the confines of the U.S. and 
Europe, and examines the relevance of purely classical financial theory to 
airline financial managers around the world.  The theory is based in a western 
governance and equity financing model marked by three salient 
characteristics.  The first is the presence of large quantities of publicly 
available financial market data facilitating estimation of the CAPM and WACC 
parameters.  A second and related requirement is for broad and deep markets 
offering publicly traded financial instruments, to guarantee wide availability of 
the investment vehicles underlying the CAPM concept, to wit, risk-free 
interest-bearing securities and equity shares.  Lastly, the theories best fit a 
capitalistic model with corporate governance based on separation of 
ownership and control: in this model of governance, a formal investment 
appraisal using classical finance techniques provides the economic 
justification for a given project to representatives of the widely-held firm's 
shareholders.  One could add a fourth underlying characteristic, perhaps too 
often taken for granted in discussing airline financial management: the profit 
motive, and more specifically shareholder value creation by the company, are 
assumed to be the primary objectives for any firm adopting classical valuation 
techniques. 
Each of these three characteristics underlying classical theory is examined in 
turn in this chapter, in order to identify gaps where the “pure” valuation theory 
popular in the west may not be applicable elsewhere in the world, and 
specifically in the airline industry.  A bottom-up airline equity ownership study 
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is performed and an airline governance typology is established for each of the 
world’s aviation regions, and this typology is associated with investment 
analysis techniques identified through the airline CFO survey. 
4.1. Investment returns and the information revolution 
The most commonly used techniques for estimating the CAPM and WACC 
parameters use historical capital market data on share returns and interest 
rates.  Increasing availability of reliable statistical data and news information 
concerning investment returns worldwide would support the adoption of 
classical financial theory, notably facilitating historically-driven cost of equity 
and WACC calculations. 
The internet, with its public-domain financial news sites (e.g., Yahoo Finance, 
which reports beta values for listed companies) and file-sharing capabilities 
has spurred a huge expansion of information available to current and potential 
shareholders, in the form of annual reports, investor day presentations, 
business plans and the like.  The airline industry has definitely followed this 
trend, having gone in some regions from one of the world's most financially 
secretive to a highly transparent business, driven by privatization and 
requirements following the listing of shares, but also by the hunger for capital 
in light of low profitability and the multi-billion dollar investment requirements 
of successive generations of jet aircraft.  The private European majors, but 
also the “big three” PRC airlines (Air China, China Eastern, China Southern), 
government-owned companies such as Emirates, start-ups such as Gol and 
privately-controlled LAN Airlines in Latin America, are a few examples of 
airlines offering a wealth of financial data available for download.  Even more 
striking for the depth of information were the aircraft acquisition prospectuses 
from Ryanair and easyJet cited in Chapter 1, and the successive, detailed 
business plans published by Alitalia on its website as the company faced 
bankruptcy and sought private investors in 2004 and 2005. 
4.1.1. The definitive study: Triumph of the Optimists 
The amount and regional scope of financial information available to 
practitioners and researchers, as well as further evidence of estimation pitfalls 
in applying financial theory, was brought to the fore in Dimson, Marsh and 
Staunton (2002), a book of 339 pages covering 101 years of returns to 
investors in sixteen countries around the world over the 20th century.  That 
Dimson et al. were able to reconstruct these 101 years of returns is a 
testament to the increasing availability of financial information in advanced 
countries.  Of interest to this research is its international coverage, as well as 
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methodological questions regarding the usefulness of such information for 
cost of capital estimation.   
4.1.2. Data scope and corrections for statistical biases 
The primary significance of Dimson et al. for this research is the detailed 
discussion of possible biases in the historical record and attendant sampling 
methods, which may cause users to under- or over-estimate past returns.  
Secondarily, the authors speculate about the conundrum of using historical 
data to estimate future investors expectations, and suggest a method for 
adapting their research to classical financial theory. 
Figure 4.1 illustrates demonstrate the scope of the research done by Dimson 
et al., showing nominal equity returns and standard deviations of markets in 
the 16 countries selected for research, over the century from 1900-2000.  The 
blue columns are the average returns, measured on the left-hand scale, while 
the red thatched columns are the standard deviations of returns over the 
period, measured on the right-hand scale. 
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   Figure 4.1: 101-year equity investor returns in 16 countries in Dimson et al. (2002) 
In addition to equity returns, the authors explored government bill and bond 
returns.  The investment returns studied are in fact precisely those needed for 
cost of equity estimates under CAPM and WACC.  The authors measured 
both real and nominal returns using country-specific inflation rates.  Each type 
of return was further calculated as both arithmetic and geometric average, and 
standard deviations were calculated for each one.  Figure 4.1, for example, 
presents nominal, geometric average equity returns in each country over the 
20th century, with the geometric returns reflecting ‘buy-and-hold’ investment 
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strategies.  Additionally, exchange rates were examined over the period, 
showing changes in real exchange rates and testing purchasing power parity 
along the way.   
All of this makes for an unprecedented compendium of data, graphs and 
analysis, proof of the extraordinary access researchers have to information in 
today's world of global transport and communications.  As their research 
proceeded, the authors identified and discussed methodological errors with 
earlier studies and providers, of which the best-known is Ibbotson, one of the 
providers studied in Bruner et al. (1998).   
The most serious previous measurement errors corrected for by Dimson et al. 
were various types of sample bias present in simpler approaches that use 
changes in equity share prices, and bond yields, as proxies for returns in 
those markets.  The authors attempted to capture total returns, including 
dividends and bond price changes, the goal being to "maximize the extent to 
which comparisons can be made across national boundaries." 
The fundamental data element used to study equity returns was the market 
index for the country’s primary share markets.  The most critical bias Dimson 
et al. identified in using this index, critiqued other studies for ignoring, and 
corrected for in their study, is survivorship bias, in which failed or de-listed 
companies are excluded from the sample because by definition, their security 
prices were not available at the time the index was launched.  Ignoring the 
effect of such companies clearly places an upward bias on the returns 
calculated for any share market observed.   
A second related bias is success bias.  Companies selected for index 
membership are invariably among the largest and best-known in the market, 
creating another upward bias in historical return estimates.  Both of these 
biases are caused by the methodological error of selecting the companies to 
be observed in hindsight, as members of a published index at the time the 
study is done, which are by definition survivors, and are usually quite 
successful blue-chip shares, large and successful enough to be included in 
the index in the first place. 
Thirdly, the authors cite Roden (1983), who showed that commonly-used S&P 
and FTSE Actuaries All Share indexes use approximations of dividend yields 
rather than raw dividend data to calculate returns.  The 101-year study of the 
U.K. and U.S. markets were entirely free from such errors, as Dimson et al. 
used share-market data "underpinned by scholarly research based on original 
stock-level price and dividend data", for example, the University of Chicago's 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database and system, all of 
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which are presumably corrected for survivorship bias (the authors do not say 
how), while at the same time using the broadest available index data to 
minimize success bias.   
The authors are thus quite sure of the data quality for the U.S. and U.K. 
markets.  Data for many other countries was not quite so easily available, 
particularly for the early part of the century, and Dimson et al. were forced to 
use published dividend yields (as opposed to actual monetary amounts 
divided by opening share prices) in combination with index returns, to 
calculate overall share returns for the country.  The study contains a chapter 
discussing estimation issues for each of the 16 countries analysed.  
The most serious potential bias, ever-present in economics research, is “easy-
data” bias, the error of extrapolating based on the simple availability of data in 
one market, and generalizing the analysis to markets not studied.  One could 
say that nearly all financial research (including this research) is subject to this, 
because the U.S. market tends to be used as a primary source of data for 
both academic and field research.  This tendency reflects a sort of inherent 
success bias due to the size of U.S. markets, which according to Dimson et al., 
represented 46% of world stock market capitalization and 47% of world bond 
market value at the start of 2000.  The next-largest stock and bond markets 
(both in Japan) represented 12.6% and 18.3% respectively.  By its nature, the 
methodology of Dimson et al. to some extent escaped this particular bias, 
because each national market is studied irrespective of movements in other 
countries. 
Easy data bias finds other reflections in the commercial sources cited and 
criticized by Dimson et al., including many related to the survivorship and 
success biases already discussed.  These include the tendency to use more 
recent market returns, where data is easier to obtain and returns have been 
better than during the balance of the 20th century.  The authors cite six 
commercial sources of data for the 16 countries studied, and calculate 
overestimates of annual equity returns on the part of these sources ranging 
from 0.3%/0.7% for the Japanese and U.S. markets, to highs of 8.5%/9.8% for 
Italy and Ireland respectively.  From their perspective, the reason for these 
estimation errors is that the start date for the prior studies was 1978 for Italy, 
and 1988 for the Irish market, reflecting a period of relative prosperity and 
health of financial markets compared to the turbulent early- and mid-century.   
Easy data bias is, according to the authors, evidenced by the avoidance of 
times when data are difficult to obtain, as for example during wartime.  They 
cited the convenient choice of common post-war start dates in previous 
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studies – U.K. 1918, Netherlands 1947, Germany 1952, Japan in 1971 – as 
examples of such bias. 
To summarize the biases, the authors compared their research with the mid-
century U.K. return study published by de Zoete and Gorton (1955).  Dimson 
et al. suggest that de Zoete overestimated 1919-1954 returns in the U.K. by 
3.49% compared with their own research.  They concluded that in this 
particular case, survivorship biases led to the largest overestimate or returns 
(+1.57%), while the easy-data bias of excluding the First World War was  
(+1.12%) compared with their century-long study.  Success bias was not 
explicitly cited by the authors, as it is difficult to separate from the other two.  
For the practitioner of investment valuation, a difference of nearly 3.5% in 
equity return estimates is significant and confounding. 
4.1.3. Estimates of the equity risk premium 
The portion of the research in Dimson et al. concerned with estimating the 
equity risk premium, the most problematic input to the CAPM calculation, is 
significant both for what is presented and for what is missing.  The authors' 
ability to obtain data and calculate with precision what they considered to be 
reliable returns information from 16 advanced economies around world over 
100 years demonstrates a world of market information available to 
practitioners.  The underlying data (not made available by the authors) can be 
used for any of these countries to make history-based estimates of returns 
under CAPM.  On the other hand, of course, the majority of the world's 
countries are excluded from the analysis, implying that in the world's most 
populous countries and key emerging markets such as Brazil and Russia, 
such market benchmarks are either unavailable or hidden from the 
researcher’s eye, a serious drawback for practitioners in a global business 
such as air transport.  This shortcoming comes in addition to the “bias” of 
assuming that public markets are the most reliable way to determine 
investment returns throughout the world, in issue discussed in Turner and 
Morrell (2003).   
The authors calculate the equity risk premium in the following way: 
1
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As is conventional, government debt returns were used as a proxy for the risk-
free rate.  Because it is a ratio of equity returns to government debt returns, 
this risk premium "has no obvious numeraire in terms of currency", and can be 
compared internationally without any regard to nominal vs. real rates of return 
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or currency values.  Dimson et al. calculated an average risk premium for 
each year in this way, and used these annual figures to calculate the 
arithmetic average premium over the century.   
Their findings for the countries studied are in Figure 4.2, below, including the 
U.S. premium of 5.8% (geometric) or 7.7% (arithmetic), which can be 
compared with the range from 5.5% (CFO practice) to 7.2% (financial 
advisors) from Bruner et al. (1998), and the more recent 7.3% cited from 
Ibbotson (2000).   Looking around the world, one notes relatively high risk 
premia among the protagonists (and particularly the losers) of World War II, 
which reflect the relatively high variance of returns experienced in those 
countries.  Dimson et al. claimed that the existence of relatively high premia in 
many regions of the world argue against the survivorship and success bias 
claims often mentioned by analysts, who insist that risk premium estimate for 
U.S. and U.K. are too high.  They also reminded the reader that at 5.8% and 
4.8%, their estimates of the U.S. and U.K geometric average risk premia are 
"around 1.5% lower than those that have been reported in previous studies." 
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Figure 4.2: 101-year equity risk premia in 16 countries in Dimson et al. (2002) 
 
Dimson et al.'s attempts to bridge the historical-expected gap in risk premium 
estimation took several forms.  The first point made is that arithmetic risk 
premia are the best for forward-looking analysis, because they better reflect 
volatility (dispersion of returns over time), taking into account negative as well 
as positive individual-year returns during the period under study.  An 
understanding of historical volatility allows the application of ex post 
probabilities to future estimates (while not escaping the historical vs. expected 
return dilemma).  The impact of differing measurement methods can readily 
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be seen looking at the red-shaded arithmetic means in Figure 4.2, where the 
defeated countries in World War II show far higher arithmetic risk premia than 
the other 13 countries.   
The authors recognized that statistically speaking, using this ex post data for 
future estimates is not particularly reliable, even using 101 years of returns.  
The Standard Errors of the historic risk premium range from 1.7% to 3.5% 
worldwide.  Taking the example of the U.S., the authors are only two thirds 
confident that the true premium is 7.7% ±  2%, again casting doubt on the 
usefulness of historical data. 
Dimson et al.’s discussion of bases to estimate forward-looking risk premia is 
summarized in Figure 4.3.   
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Figure 4.3: Estimates of future risk premia  in Dimson et al. (2002) 
The first three columns represent Ibbotson’s analysis of U.S. market data from 
1926-1998, yielding an 8.8% equity risk premium over bills.  Ibbotson is widely 
considered as a benchmark for such estimates.  Finance textbook 
recommendation of 8.5% is stated next.  As the authors point out, Ibbotson’s 
research and widely-published recommendations in textbooks are highly 
influential “from the classroom, to the boardroom, to the dealing room, to the 
courtroom.”  Finally, the authors discuss the forecasts in Welch (2000), 
obtained by surveying 226 financial economists.  The consensus found by 
Welch suggests to the authors that the survey and textbook estimates may be 
too high, by 1.4% to 1.7%. 
With these estimates and benchmarks as background, the authors begin their 
own estimation of future risk premia with the 7.7% U.S. arithmetic premium 
depicted in Figure 4.2.  They adjust this historic risk premium by triangulation:  
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historic U.S. share returns depicted in Figure 4.1 demonstrated a standard 
deviation of 20% over the 20th century.  The authors set the expected volatility 
of returns at 16%, substantially lower than the historic volatility of any 
individual market.  Not surprisingly, they arrived at estimates lower than the 
historic risk premia for all countries (7.1% for the U.S.): what is a bit 
disappointing is the alacrity with which the authors assumed lower market 
volatility than in the past, without seeming to justify their decision to do so.  
Presumably they are basing the 16% on more recent share market data, but 
they declined to state with any precision the basis of their volatility estimate, 
mentioning simply "current projections of early 21st century volatility."  One 
wonders whether these volatility projections might not be slightly higher in the 
midst of the current financial crisis. 
The final method and estimate proposed by Dimson et al. was qualitative.  
Beginning with the observation that risk premia from 1950-2000 were far 
higher than those in the preceding 50 years because of booming share 
markets, they posited two secular, fundamental factors which call for 
downward adjustments of the historic record.   
The first was for productivity increases and relative calm of the post-WWII 
period, for which dividend growth was used as a proxy.  The second was for 
an accompanying fall in required risk premium, measured by the authors as 
an increase in the share price / dividend ratio (the reciprocal of the dividend 
yield).  In the U.K., for example, this ratio has increased from 23 in 1901 to 42 
a century later, presumably reflecting expectations of higher growth, as well 
as more appetite for risk and hence, a lower premium.  The U.S. T-bill 
premium thus falls from the historic 5.8% to 4.1%, while the U.K. equivalent 
drops from 4.8% to 2.4%, reaching an intermediate 3.0% for world equity 
markets.  Reading this section of Dimson et al., one is tempted to conclude 
that with the proper set of assumptions, nearly any projected figure could be 
reached, which would leading to questions of incentives and agency conflicts 
of interest, problems addressed later in this research. 
The exhaustive nature of Dimson et al. is an example of the plethora of 
financial information available today.  Their work shows the usefulness and 
highlights remaining pitfalls in light of this wealth of data available, and does in 
addition highlight the lack of visibility into many emerging economies which 
will lead aviation growth in the 21st century.   
The authors' approach was rigorous, and fully consistent with financial theory, 
and yet firm results are elusive.  This is certainly not stopping the ever-
increasing flow of information.  Leading information provider Morgan Stanley 
Capital International (MSCI), now MSCI-Barra after the tie-up with Barra is 
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now producing market returns data for 67 countries - 22 advanced economies 
with data dating from 1970 and 45 emerging economies beginning in 1988 - 
using well-defined methodologies, similar to those used by Dimson et al.   
Developed markets indices Emerging markets indices 
AUSTRALIA ARGENTINA MAURITIUS 
AUSTRIA BAHRAIN MEXICO 
BELGIUM BRAZIL MOROCCO 
DENMARK BULGARIA NIGERIA 
FINLAND CHILE OMAN 
FRANCE CHINA PERU 
GERMANY COLOMBIA PHILIPPINES 
GREECE CROATIA POLAND 
HONG KONG CZECH REPUBLIC QATAR 
IRELAND EGYPT ROMANIA 
ITALY ESTONIA RUSSIA 
JAPAN HUNGARY SERBIA 
NETHERLANDS INDIA SLOVENIA 
NEW ZEALAND INDONESIA SOUTH AFRICA 
NORWAY ISRAEL SRI LANKA 
PORTUGAL JORDAN TAIWAN 
SINGAPORE KAZAKHSTAN THAILAND 
SPAIN KENYA TUNISIA 
SWEDEN KOREA TURKEY 
SWITZERLAND KUWAIT UKRAINE 
UNITED KINGDOM LEBANON UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 
 LITHUANIA VIETNAM 
 MALAYSIA  
 Table 4.1: List of countries covered by MSCI indexes 
These data are market rather than company-specific, and so are insufficient in 
themselves to estimate company beta and cost of capital.  Still, they represent 
benchmark market returns that can be helpful to managers in understanding 
investor returns from a historical perspective.  Many other analysts, including 
Barra, but also Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (beginning in 1995 & 1996), are 
building estimates for "country betas" based on this data and classical 
methodologies, which are in turn integrated into information services such as 
Bloomberg, one of the providers discussed in Turner and Morrell (2003).   
A selection of airline WACCs provided by Bloomberg in May of 2007 is 
presented in Table 4.2. 
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May 2007 Airline WACC 
Airline Cost of equity
Cost of 
Debt Debt ratio WACC 
Iberia  9.66% 5.30% 26.83% 8.49% 
BA 9.36% 7.34% 36.94% 8.61% 
easyJet 9.69% 5.12% 14.50% 9.03% 
Ryanair 8.85% 5.19% 17.40% 8.21% 
Air France-KLM 9.30% 4.89% 51.79% 7.02% 
Lufthansa 9.01% 3.65% 23.79% 7.73% 
Alitalia 8.73% 5.81% 59.79% 6.98% 
GOL 12.35% 4.50% 9.91% 11.57% 
LAN Airlines 12.05% 5.36% 25.42% 10.35% 
China Eastern 11.21% 5.06% 89.62% 5.70% 
China Southern 10.69% 3.19% 78.02% 4.84% 
Air Asia 12.39% 3.39% 23.03% 10.32% 
Qantas 9.59% 4.77% 49.95% 7.18% 
Singapore Airlines 9.61% 3.11% 10.18% 8.95% 
Southwest 9.04% 3.38% 12.78% 8.32% 
American Airlines 12.80% 3.45% 63.53% 6.86% 
 Table 4.2: Bloomberg sample cost of capital estimates for world airlines, May 9, 2007 
These estimates reveal some of the major pitfalls of the WACC approach, 
most notably, the reduced cost of capital resulting from high levels of debt 
(Alitalia, the Chinese majors), a problem still largely without a quantitative 
solution in financial theory.  Also, these estimates are only available for 
companies with listed shares, an issue for airline analysis elucidated in the 
next section.  Finally, the news service uses market values for equity (market 
cap), while debt values are derived from balance sheets for companies 
without outstanding bonds.  Still, they are available at a mouse click to paid 
subscribers to the relevant services, and are clearly in use around the world8.  
The information revolution is clearly removing the structural impediments to 
calculating returns and cost of capital around the world.  Though the 
necessary information is not available for all markets of the world, it is 
increasingly so.  The methodological difficulties of estimating risk premia and 
equity raised in Chapter 3 were confirmed in the most recent comprehensive 
research.  Notwithstanding, a lack of financial market information is certainly 
not itself a block to adopting classical financial techniques around the world.  
                                                 
8 These data were kindly provided by Airbus, which is a subscriber to the service 
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4.2. Airline ownership and financing patterns 
The second premise of classical financial theory is widely-held shareholding, 
which implies a strong separation of ownership and control.  In this section the 
constraints to equity capital flows in airline financial regulations are examined, 
and the shareholding patterns found in airlines around the world are identified, 
resulting in a governance typology for the aviation sector.  The propensity of 
the different governance types to use classical financial techniques is 
identified, using the results of the airline CFO survey from this research.   
4.2.1. Political and legal restrictions to capital flows 
Deregulation of airline markets – in the sense of allowing free choice of which 
air services to offer and liberalized fare-setting - has been gathered pace 
since it began in the U.S. with the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978.  Williams 
(2002) traced the evolution of market deregulations, finding that Canada, 
China, Taiwan, and Chile deregulated domestic markets during the 1980s, 
followed by another 20 countries in the 1990s.  The results of this deregulation 
have been spectacular growth in capacity offered in countries such as China, 
Taiwan, Chile, Turkey, and Thailand, while growth was more modest in the 
USA, and negative in Canada and Venezuela, owing to airline failures in 
those countries.  Williams also showed that the impact on number of routes 
operated has been far less uniformly positive, as 17 out of the 30 countries 
studied operated fewer routes in 2000 than in 1989, reflecting closure of 
unprofitable routes and the rise of the hub and spoke system of operations.  
On the other hand, emerging market countries such as Turkey and China 
showed increases around 150% in routes operated.   
Concerning international services, Williams found that both seats-offered and 
routes-operated growth has been more uniformly positive since 1989: all thirty 
countries studied increased seat capacity between 112% and 585%, while 
route growth ranged from 93% to 400%, in spite of the fact that most 
international markets remain governed by restrictive treaties among 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) member states.   
Under the near-universal interpretation of the ICAO Conference in 1944 
(commonly known as the Chicago Convention after the host city), which 
established the legal framework for establishing international airline services, 
airlines must be "substantially owned and effectively controlled" by nationals 
of the country in which they are based, in order to benefit from the bilateral Air 
Service Agreements (ASAs) negotiated between countries.   
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The framework of these agreements is embodied in the "Five Freedoms" of 
international operations, defined as part of the Chicago accords.  Each 
succeeding "freedom" grants a nation the following cumulative rights: 
1)  to fly over the territory of a foreign nation 
2)  to land on the territory of a foreign nation for refuelling or repairs 
3)  to unload passengers and cargo in a foreign nation 
4)  to load passengers and cargo in a foreign nation for travel to the home 
nation 
5)  to carry passengers and cargo from one foreign nation to another, given a 
route origination or destination in the home country 
To this original list three more have been added: 
6)  carry passengers and cargo between foreign countries by connecting in 
the home country 
7)  carry passengers and cargo between two foreign countries, without 
connecting in the home country 
8)  carry passengers and cargo wholly within a foreign country 
The eighth Freedom, known commonly as cabotage, is extremely rare in 
practice, though the 2008 services agreement between the U.S. and the 
European Union does grant U.S. carriers the right to transport passengers 
within the European Union.  European airlines certainly hope that the E.U. 
transport officials will achieve similar treatment within the U.S., in the next 
round of negotiations. 
Within this framework, the ASAs simultaneously open and restrict operations 
between countries, specifying routes, designating carriers and their allowed 
capacity, and tariffs in more or less restrictive forms, calling either for each 
state to approve fares, or for both states to disapprove them.  
The complex web of bilateral agreements worldwide severely restricts airline 
opportunities to grow and generate cash flows for their projects.  The 
ownership and effective control provision is often interpreted as the 
requirement that 50% or more of voting shares be held by nationals of the 
home country.  This restriction alone creates a substantial barrier to free flow 
of capital among the world's airline finance markets.  In addition, many 
national governments place further legal limits on foreign shareholdings of 
airlines.  Chang and Williams (2001 and 2004) analyse the reasons for this, 
the difficulties it poses, and evolution and potential for further change.  Chang 
and Williams (2004) present an extensive list of ownership restrictions in 
effect reproduced in Table 4.3, below. 
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Country Maximum percent foreign ownership 
Australia 49% for international airlines 
100% for domestic airlines 
Brazil 20% of voting equity 
Canada 25% of voting equity 
Chile No limitation 
China 35% 
Colombia 40% 
India 26% for Air India 
40% for domestic carriers 
Israel 34% 
Japan 33.33% 
Kenya 49% 
South Korea 50% 
Malaysia 49%, 20% for any single foreign entity 
Mauritius 40% 
New Zealand 49% for international airlines 
100% for domestic airlines 
Peru 49% 
Philippines 40% 
Singapore None 
Taiwan 33.33% 
Thailand 30% 
U.S. 25% of voting equity 
Table 4.3: National airline equity ownership restrictions in Chang and Williams (2004) 
One example of the potential effect of ASA restrictions can be seen in the 
49% foreign investment limitation on international airlines in effect in Australia 
and New Zealand, where by contrast, purely domestic airlines have no 
restrictions to ownership.  Many of the most restrictive laws are seen in 
countries such as the U.S., Canada, and Japan, where capital markets are 
highly developed.  Airlines in these countries have extensive access public 
equity markets, and may and do use classical financial theory to establish the 
viability of investments.  Morrell (2007) indicated that 41 of the top-150 
revenue airlines had listed shares, and that the market appetite for airline 
Initial Public Offerings has been substantial in the most recent decade, with 13 
airlines – most using low-fare business models – had successfully offered 
shares in no less than 12 different share markets around the world. 
The regulation and restrictions of share ownership in airlines around the world 
do not themselves constitute an obstacle to listing shares, or to using classical 
valuation techniques to justify investments to Boards of Directors representing 
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holders of listed shares.  They can however prevent airline companies from 
fully benefiting from the depth and size of more advanced share markets to 
finance their growth and investments.   
Chang and Williams (2001) reviewed several cases on international 
investments in airlines, discussing the benefits and opportunities, as well as 
the risks and dangers of opening airline capital internationally.  An update of 
these cases since the dramatic events of 2001 reveals more the latter than 
the former, showing how the effective control provisions can hinder the 
effective management of international airlines.  The authors cite the 
adventures of SAir Group with a 49.5% stake in Sabena, and 20% in TAP Air 
Portugal, to which were added minority shares in Air Outre Mer (AOM), Air 
Littoral, Air Liberté (through AOM), LOT, and South African Airways.  One 
very plausible line of argument is that the over-extension and eventual 
collapse of SAir Group in 2001 was largely caused by the inability of the 
minority shareholder to manage these companies as part of a clear overall 
strategy to gain access to markets, notably on a European level.  An irony of 
the SAir saga is that were Switzerland part of the E.U., absolute majority 
ownership stakes in foreign airlines would be largely permissible under 
today's evolving ASA agreements at E.U. level, as has been see with the 
acquisition of 100% of British Midland by Lufthansa, as well as its takeover of 
Austrian Airways and of Swiss.  One failed minority venture was the 25% 
stake that British Airways held in U.S. Airways the 1990s, subsequently 
written off by the British carrier.  A similar ongoing struggle by a British 
company to enter the U.S. air transport market is the ongoing Virgin U.S. saga, 
with its 25% share regularly challenged by competitors and U.S. regulatory 
authorities.  Another current example of muddled management control with a 
minority share is the 49% stake of SAS in Spanair, which has for several 
years faced the prospect of bankruptcy, a situation now exacerbated by the 
crash on take-off of a MD-80 in Madrid in the fall of 2008 under questionable 
safety procedures.  More successful was BA’s 25% stake in Qantas, which 
allowed the two companies to strengthen their alliance and co-operate in 
systems development, before BA sold the share.     
Even holding majority shares of foreign airlines or outright mergers is no 
guarantee of success, as witnessed by the meltdown of the very confusing Air 
New Zealand / Ansett Australia merger in the wake of the 2001-2003 airline 
recession, resulting in the renationalization of ANZ and the outright demise of 
Ansett in 2002.  Several of the partial acquisitions cited by Chang and 
Williams and updated above were allowed by the national governments to 
improve the market prospects of national carriers (Sabena, LOT, the French 
regionals) or simply to allow domestic airlines access to international capital.        
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Although not directly related to this research, it should be noted that the most 
serious economic disadvantage of the current ASA system is the structural 
impediment to international consolidation, contributing to the lack of economic 
rationalisation which negatively impacts industry profitability.  Airlines have 
resorted to forming Alliance groupings – usually without equity participations – 
to compete globally, offer travellers a more seamless alternative to the old 
IATA interlining system, improve procurement conditions with suppliers, and 
rationalize maintenance operations.  Across the North Atlantic, anti-trust 
immunity is routinely sought by Alliance groupings who seek to go a step 
further, fully coordinating the carriers' schedules.  These moves do little or 
nothing to improve the member carriers' access to capital markets.   
Europe has gone furthest to eliminate such structural impediments among E.U. 
member states, creating a very dynamic environment where consolidation has 
become a reality, and where new carriers can obtain capital in various 
European share markets.  Of the 12 national equity markets tapped for IPOs 
and cited by Morrell (2007), half are in Europe, and all but two (London, 
Warsaw) took place in the Euro area.   
Chang and Williams (2001) argued that one of the strongest impetuses to the 
1990s wave of minority stake acquisitions was the objective of obtaining 
access to air travel markets in neighbouring countries, citing moves in this 
direction by British Airways, KLM, Lufthansa, and SAS.  The first major-airline 
successor these somewhat tentative movements on a European scale was 
brought about with the groundbreaking Air France-KLM merger of 2004.  This 
carefully-worded merger bridged the way to today's more liberal environment, 
leaving majority voting control for KLM in the hands of Dutch shareholders 
while creating a combined holding company which holds the "economic rights" 
to the KLM's cash flows.  This merger has led the way to many other such 
proposed and consummated groupings, including the Austrian Airways and 
British Midland acquisitions cited above, as well as the ongoing saga of a 
perspective merger between British Airways and Iberia.  The 2008 Air 
Services Agreement between the U.S. and the European Union (E.U.) 
reinforced the notion of a European carrier, effectively granting any E.U. 
carriers "unrestricted" access to landing rights – though not cabotage – in the 
U.S.  The successful Air France-KLM tie-up and the new precedent-setting 
ASA between the E.U. and the U.S. have opened the door to more 
straightforward international mergers within the E.U., although in the spring of 
2010, the Russian authorities challenged the landing rights of Austrian Airlines 
based on the Russia-Austria bilateral, “violated” by Lufthansa’s outright 
ownership of Austrian. 
   
Chapter 4: Financial markets, airline ownership and investment analysis 109
Chang and Williams (2004) reviewed and discussed recent international 
agreements that may reduce the ownership requirements, if adopted in future 
ASAs between countries or regions.  They began by reviewing the 
fundamentals of the many "Open Skies" agreements signed following the 
1992 U.S. Open Skies initiative adopted by the U.S. Department of Transport: 
20 "Open Skies" agreements were signed with European countries (one notes 
the conspicuous absence of the U.K., which long remained an effective 
duopoly), 12 in Africa, 13 in Latin America, 8 in the Middle East, though only 6 
in the vast and fast-growing Asia-Pacific region.  These agreements 
principally eliminate the former restrictions on capacity (seats), flight 
frequency and route operating rights, while leaving entirely intact the principle 
of "effective ownership and control" of the respective airlines, and refusing any 
form of cabotage on U.S. soil.  One reason for this somewhat peculiar 
protectionism in the U.S. is the requirement that airlines provide capacity for 
military purposes during both peace and wartime: under this logic, foreign-
owned airlines could not necessarily be relied on to perform this function.  The 
authors stated flatly that the Open Skies policy was intended to divide Europe, 
and indeed, only sixteen year later in 2008 was this policy revised regarding 
European airlines. 
The authors also examined significant progress made outside the large and 
contentious North Atlantic and U.S. markets. The ICAO Worldwide Air 
Transport Conference of 2003 produced a suggested "model" airline 
designation clause for future ASAs, which separates the notion of ownership 
from that of effective control.  ICAO retained a strict definition of regulatory 
control (as opposed to management control), particularly regarding Safety and 
Security, its traditional purview.  Rather than ownership, on the other hand, 
the suggested clause is that the airline "has its principal place of business 
(and permanent residence) in the territory of the designating [country]."  A 
footnote defining criteria for "principal place of business" includes local 
incorporation, base of operations and capital investment in facilities, tax, 
aircraft registration, and employment of nationals.  In this definition, capital 
could flow internationally as it can in other businesses.  The Organization of 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) "all-cargo" proposal of 
2002 took a similar approach,  as did the 2001 Agreement within the Asia 
Pacific Economic Council (APEC), where Brunei, Chile, New Zealand, 
Singapore and the U.S. agreed to strike the ownership provision among 
carriers in these five states.  These agreements are limited in scope, and to 
date, a level playing field for airline access to capital has yet to be achieved. 
Clearly, progress is being made to grant airlines more liberal access to capital 
they need to develop their businesses, but the impediments identified by 
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ICAO in 2001, and cited in Chang and Williams (2004), will be difficult to 
completely overcome.  Using a points scale, the member states were asked 
the reasons for imposing national ownership and control (note that they 
ownership and control were not separated).  In descending order, the most 
significant  reasons given were: 
Order Issue Points 
1 National development/economic interests 107 
2 Conformity with international agreements 103 
3 Economic interests of national airlines 88 
4 Trade and tourism needs 82 
5 Aviation safety 81 
6 Job creation and preservation 74 
7 National security 58 
8 Foreign exchange earnings 46 
Table 4.4: Reasons cited for imposing national ownership regulations in Chang & Williams (2004) 
The priorities and the nature of items in the list demonstrate the tangle of 
interests in the world's airlines, and the difficulty of finding solutions which 
satisfy all.  Items one, four, and six are standard arguments advanced by 
developing countries, and go along way to explain why each country in the 
world has at least one airline.  Since 2001, several national governments have 
chosen to dissociate the national carrier from economic development: 
Kuwait's creation of competitors to Kuwait Airways (Jazeera, Wataniya), the 
creation of AirAsia with substantial funding from the Persian Gulf, GOL's 
creation and listing on the NYSE and eventual acquisition of Varig, are 
examples of political and economic development without protection of the 
“national champion” airline.   
The second item points up the self-perpetuating nature of capital restrictions, 
which are held to be necessary in light of current ASAs:  it would take at least 
one complete "generation" of ASAs around the world to remove this item from 
the list.   
The third reason given is outright protectionism of the kind highly disfavoured 
under World Trade Organization multi-lateral accords as well as many and 
bilateral "most-favoured-nation" trade agreements.  Item seven is the standard 
argument in the U.S., and is not without a certain legitimacy in a world where 
wars can and do break out suddenly (the allied bombing of Serbia, 9/11 and 
subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq).  I 
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Item five is probably the most legitimate concern of all, fully addressed in 
ICAO’s suggested new ASA clause, as well as in the OECD and APEC 
agreements cited by Chang and Williams.   
In contrast to the dubious third and fourth economic arguments, item eight is a 
powerful economic argument for mandating national ownership of airlines: 
indeed, the cash flows from international traffic accrue directly to the national 
carrier and hence the home country's reserves.  It is certainly relevant in 
countries such as Egypt (for example), which are net importers of food and 
clothing and highly dependent on in-bound tourist revenue.  Then again, the 
Egyptian government is showing an increasing willingness to allow third-party 
airline start-ups such as Air Cairo to compete with the national carrier.  As in 
Kuwait and Brazil, this tolerance implies a policy-maker calculation that the 
on-the ground expenditure of the marginal inbound traffic created by new 
carriers is more important than the foreign-exchange revenue lost by EgyptAir 
for these same travellers. 
The inevitable inertia created by a web of bilateral agreements, confusion of 
economic interests, national security and aviation safety concerns  combine to 
create a unique set of legal and financial gymnastics required to reduce 
severe impediments to smooth international capital flows to airlines.  In this 
rigid context, airlines in countries with broad and deep financial markets and 
widely-held shares are expected to more carefully follow capital budgeting 
procedures consistent with financial theory to justify investments, while 
countries without such markets certainly display more diverse approaches to 
the question of economic justification.  In practice, given the global nature of 
the business, this research identifies substantial diversity in airline 
shareholding from one region to the next. 
4.2.2. International financial markets and financing opportunities 
Recent studies in the financial literature raise questions about the use of 
classical financial analysis techniques in less-developed regions of the world.  
Both the governance models of emerging markets and the financing patterns 
and opportunities are held to influence the investment decisions of companies 
in these markets. 
Pinches and Lander (1997) suggested that the whole question of appropriate 
capital budgeting techniques should be re-opened when looking at “newly 
industrialised and developing countries” such as South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, and India.  The authors conducted thirty formal interviews with 
company managers, as well as informal interviews with “government officials, 
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development officials, and professors knowledgeable and interested in capital 
budgeting.” 
They found that NPV is not used by the companies, although the managers 
interviewed are familiar with the technique.  Rather, they appear to prefer PBK 
and ARR to NPV, citing the difficulties in the process of estimating cash flows 
as a primary source of concern with NPV. 
In addition to methodological concerns, the authors identified four broad 
reasons for the rejection of NPV 
• Firms are pursuing strategic goals such as seizing “now-or-never 
opportunities,” building market share, or substituting capital for labour 
override preclude a purely financial evaluation, and this in markets 
which are higher-growth and more volatile than more mature markets 
such as the U.S.; 
• Government incentives for investments, such as tax credits, cheap 
financing, and land grants can override market-driven economics; 
• Banks are very influential in the decision to invest or not, and 
commonly “the initial standards used by firms in all these countries 
were dictated by the banks”; 
• Company founders tend to make decisions more intuitively, relying less 
on formal analysis and quantification of results, and are less risk-
averse than professional managers. 
The authors suggested that in these markets, more dynamic methods of 
investment appraisal such as Monte Carlo and Real Options Analysis are 
appropriate tools than ‘static NPV.’ 
These business practices suggest that the appropriate investment appraisal 
techniques in these markets are very much subject to governance questions 
such as government and bank influence, as well as the ownership of the 
company and the attitudes of company founders and managers pursuing long-
term strategic goals, overriding rigorous financial analysis.   In countries 
where the ownership of companies is widely held, such governance questions 
are addressed in financial terms by properly estimating the cost of capital. 
The work of Booth et al. (2001) also suggests that financing patterns in 
developing countries may influence the way firms analyse investments.  They 
investigate capital structures in ten developing countries for clues as to why 
this might be so, and discover major differences from developed countries.  In 
developing Asian countries such as India, Malaysia and Pakistan, companies 
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rely much more on short-term debt than in developed countries, including 
South Korea, the U.K. and the U.S. 
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Figure 4.4: Short- and long-term debt in company capital structures in Booth et al., 2001 
Figure 4.4 shows the emerging-markets in the same region as Pinches and 
Lander study, for comparison: Booth et al. find that in countries such as 
Mexico and Brazil, the reliance on short-term borrowing is even more 
pronounced.  While this difference does not in itself prove that WACC is not a 
valid measure of the company’s cost of capital, it does point up the possibility 
that financing arrangements can significantly alter their investment valuations.  
Under WACC, the debt in the capital structure is long-term debt, used to 
finance long-term investment projects.  If firms cannot or do not raise 
significant long-term borrowing, WACC may well be considered an 
inappropriate measure of the firm’s true cost of capital. 
LaPorta et al. (1999) observed the 20 largest firms in each of 27 ‘wealthy’ 
countries, and group ownership structures into three broad categories, widely 
held (traded on bourses), Family controlled, and State controlled.  Looking (for 
comparison to the other studies surveyed) at countries in Asia, broad 
differences in control, defined as a minimum 20% shareholding by one group, 
are found. 
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Figure 4.5: Company ownership structures in LaPorta et al., 1999 
While in the U.K., the U.S. and Japan broad share ownership is the rule, 
families control significant numbers of large companies in Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea and the U.S.  Pinches and Lander found that 
founder-controlled firms use more intuitive techniques to evaluate investments, 
and are less averse to risk than professional managers. 
LaPorta et al. found a significant positive relationship between the number of 
widely held firms and the level of minority shareholder protection under the 
legal systems of the various countries. 
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Figure 4.6: Company ownership structures in LaPorta et al., 1999 
The authors found a pattern of family and state ownership in countries where 
small shareholders are not well-protected (including Hong Kong and 
Singapore), and a majority of firms widely held in countries where minority 
shareholder protection is strong.  
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Both of these studies raise substantial questions about the use of classical 
financial analysis techniques in emerging markets.  In the next section, 
governance patterns that may strongly influence the investment analysis 
process are identified for the world’s airlines. 
Against this backdrop of the unique regulatory restrictions faced by airlines, as 
well as substantial difference in financial market practice and governance 
patterns around the world, the research now examines in detail the ownership 
patterns found in the world’s major airline companies. 
4.2.3. Regional patterns of airline shareholding 
Gibson and Morrell (2005) compared the shareholding pattern found among 
149 international airlines cited in the 2001 Airline Business Alliance Survey - 
hereafter AB (2001) - with the respondents to our survey of airline capital 
budgeting techniques.  This annual survey is one of the few trade publications 
where one can find consistent and relatively comprehensive information about 
the shareholding of international airlines.  The authors identified the largest 
shareholder in each company, and totalled each category to compare with our 
Airline CFO survey respondents, who were asked to identify "the largest 
shareholder in the company.”  
 
Figure 4.7: Majority ownership of the world’s airline alliance members (left), and airline survey (right) in 
Gibson and Morrell (2005) 
There were marked differences between the two samples, at least partially 
reflecting the fact that 54% of survey respondents were European airlines.  
Respondents were substantially more frequently in private hands, 32% only 
had the state as the largest shareholder, compared to the AB (2001) sample 
which was 45% state-owned.  Relative to AB 2001, the private shareholding of 
our respondents was rather evenly spread among the categories: +3% were 
held in the form of publicly traded shares ("Bourse" in the article), +4% 
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privately held (aka closely held), +6% majority owned.  That is, the shape of 
the pie-chart in Figure 4.7 is not dramatically different from AB (2001): our 
airline respondents were more private, but the pattern is roughly similar to the 
broader AB (2001) sample. 
This research now examines in substantially greater detail the airline 
population, using the following definitions: 
• Listed company – widely traded on a public stock exchange 
• Governments – held by national, regional or municipal authorities  
• Other airline – held by another airline or airline group 
• Closely held – held by private investors 
• Institutional investors – held by financial institutions, broadly defined 
• Management – held by employees or managers of the company 
The sources of the data used are the Reed Air Transport Intelligence online 
service, Airline Business, Air Transport World, and Flight International.   
The sources of the airline ownership data are diverse and somewhat 
anecdotal.  Precise shareholder information is considered confidential in many 
countries, making disclosure uneven and in many cases fragmented among 
the different sources.  Similarly, significant shareholdings can also exist even 
when shares are listed, with sometimes patchy reporting of such blocks of 
shares in ATI.  Finally, the nature of private investors with large stakes can be 
masked by a corporate identity of the investor which does not indicate the 
extent or nature of the investor's role in the management of the company and 
hence, its role in capital budgeting.  In spite of these difficulties, this research 
argues that clarity on the nature of the shareholding and associated 
governance bodies is useful to understand and predict how airlines will 
approach fleet and investment planning processes.  
The airlines included in this analysis are the largest 200 passenger airlines in 
the world in 2007, measured by Revenue Passenger Kilometers (RPK), as 
well as the largest 150 in terms of Revenue in 2007, which adds to the sample 
cargo operators such as Fed Ex, UPS, DHL and others.  Added to this are the 
airlines analysed in the sample from AB (2001) and not part of the 200/150 
largest airline group: they were included in AB 2001 because they are Alliance 
members, regardless of size.  The airline data compiled in this research is 
presented in Appendix B. 
Capacity and financial performance is measured over the five-year period 
from 2004 – 2008.  The data source for the airline capacity, revenue and profit 
figures is the annual Airline Business survey, published in August of each year.  
Eliminated from the sample were the nine airlines for which no reliable 
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shareholding data was available from ATI, Airline Business' 2007 Alliance 
survey, or a web search by the author. 
The resulting sample of 249 airlines covers all regions of the world, allowing 
the linking of ownership with performance data in terms of production 
(passengers, RPK), capacity (fleet size) and financial performance (revenue, 
profits) for those airlines included in the annual Airline Business surveys.  
Regionally, Europe has the largest number of airlines in this group (97), 
followed by Asia-Pacific with 61 and North America with 55.  Twenty Middle-
Eastern airlines are within the group, 13 from Latin America, while only three 
African airlines are large enough to be in the sample. 
 The results of this analysis are summarized in aggregate, and the specific 
characteristics of each group are then discussed.  Table 4.5 below 
summarizes the results for each region, showing the percentage of airlines 
having each shareholder type as the largest single group. 
 Largest shareholder type, 2009 Africa Asia-Pacific Europe Middle East
North 
America
South 
America Totals
Listed 33% 13% 14% 5% 44% 8% 20%
Government 67% 33% 23% 85% 2% 0% 25%
Other airline 0% 21% 22% 0% 25% 31% 21%
Closely held 0% 31% 32% 5% 24% 62% 29%
Institutionals 0% 2% 8% 5% 5% 0% 5%
Management 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Totals 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Number of airlines 3 61 97 20 55 13 249  
Table 4.5: Majority ownership of 249 large airlines in 2009, by region 
In total, the results show wide diversity of airline shareholder types around the 
world, as well as consistency with the respondents in Gibson and Morrell 
(2005).  The main divergence from the CFO survey is that the Government-
owned group is smaller (25% vs. 32%), while the Listed-share group is six 
percentage points greater.  The other categories are largely consistent with 
the earlier study, keeping in mind that an "institutional" group is added to the 
current analysis, which must be added to "Closely held" to compare with 
Gibson and Morrell (2005). 
Looking at regional ownership patterns Africa and particularly the Middle East 
show a strong propensity to government ownership of the largest share of 
equity.  Asia-Pacific has a more muted – but still relative majority - propensity 
to government ownership, with diverse types of private shareholding and 
relatively few listed companies.  On the other hand, North America has no 
government-owned airlines: 44% of airlines are listed, with a near-equal 
25/24% of companies captive subsidiaries of other airlines or held by 
individual investors.  South American carriers tend to be closely held, mostly 
by private investors but also by other airlines.   
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The differences in shareholding pattern among the regions are more sharply 
drawn when a measure of capacity is used to distinguish among the groups, 
especially when a distance-weighted production indicator such as Revenue 
Passenger Kilometres (RPK) is used, as in Table 4.6. 
 Largest shareholder and RPK distribution, 2004-2008 Africa Asia-Pacific Europe Middle East North America South America Totals
Listed 19% 30% 54% 0% 83% 13% 51%
Government 81% 46% 14% 93% 0% 0% 23%
Other airline 0% 4% 9% 0% 6% 19% 7%
Closely held 0% 20% 21% 0% 9% 68% 17%
Institutionals 0% 0% 1% 7% 1% 0% 2%
Management 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Totals 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  
Table 4.6: Majority ownership of 249 airlines, weighted by 2004-2008 RPK production 
In total, listed airlines were the largest producer of RPKs over the five-year 
period from 2004-2008, producing just over half of the world’s large airline 
revenue passenger kilometres.  Middle East RPK production even is even 
more strongly government-owned than the simple count of airlines, reinforcing 
the dominant position of this ownership model in the region.  The successive 
privatizations of Europe's major international carriers make listed carriers the 
largest segment, followed at a substantial distance by closely-held and 
government owned airlines.  Fully 87% of North American capacity comes 
from listed carriers: the numerous airline subsidiaries operating as feeders, 
and smaller closely-owned companies total only 13% of total capacity.  
Closely-held ownership is confirmed as dominant pattern in South America.  
None of the numerous government-owned carriers in this highly-fragmented 
region is large enough to be in the top 249.  The family-owned TAM, TACA 
and LAN are far and away the largest producers in the region.   Finally, the 
diversity seen in Asia-Pacific airline ownership gives way to a more 
concentrated landscape when viewed in terms of production.  Government-
owned carriers produce a relative-majority 46% of capacity, followed by listed 
carriers at 30%, against 20% for closely-held airlines.  Asia-Pacific is far and 
away the largest and most diverse region, including both Oceania with its 
British-style governance models, and the PRC, where majority ownership is in 
the hands of the central government.  These results would tend to suggest 
that "pure" classical financial theory – with valuation metrics based on widely-
held, liquid share markets - would be applied more commonly in Europe and 
North America than in the rest of the world, which shows greater diversity of 
governance.   
4.2.4. Airline ownership and financial performance 
The wave of major airline privatizations led by British Airways in the 1980s, 
followed by Lufthansa, Air France, Iberia and other carriers, both reflected and 
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created an airline industry dogma holding that private airline ownership should 
lead to superior financial performance and resistance to cyclical downturns.  
As these airlines all trade in relatively large and deep capital markets, the 
logical investor base was and is broad public shareholding.  These companies 
have been found in this research to be consistent practitioners of classical 
financial techniques, as will be discussed in subsequent chapters.  This 
section identifies the dominant ownership patterns in the world’s regions, with 
profit (rather than production) as the weighting factor.   
Measuring airline profits worldwide on a like-to-like basis raises the 
methodological issue of exchange rates.  Airline revenue streams in different 
currencies are unique to each company.  Cost currencies are equally variable, 
conditioned by the airline’s geographical scope, national procurement 
regulations, and make-vs.-buy policy.  The key commodity input, fuel, has its 
basis in global oil prices, currently denominated in USD: however, fuel is sold 
to airlines in domestic currency in most developing countries, at widely varying 
prices.  The purchase and sale of aircraft and engines is transacted in USD, 
and loans against aircraft offered by international banks are usually 
denominated in that currency as well.  Similarly, third-party maintenance, and 
operating leases are most commonly denominated in the U.S. currency.  
However, in preparing accounts, all airlines translate USD amounts at current 
exchange rates for both balance sheet and income statement preparation, 
creating wide variations in asset, liability, revenue, and cost valuations.   
To examine financial performance, this research will focus on operating profits 
reported in the Airline Business annual surveys.  Operating profit (and not 
cash flow) is the performance metric used in the Value Based Management 
approach derived from classical theory, discussed below in the context of 
European airline financial management.  Both top-line revenue and profits are 
translated at average exchange rates in these surveys, an approach which at 
allows broad comparison.  This research examines 2007, the most recent 
peak year for airline profits in spite of a high and increasing fuel price, as well 
as the five-year period 2004-2008, a period of recovery (2004-2007), and 
steep decline in 2008.      
Examining the profit distribution of the world's 150 largest producers of 
revenue worldwide in 2007, the picture is markedly different from the 
production picture, in most regions.   
In order to be consistent in comparing profit with RPK distribution, the 
contents of Table 4.6a below is revised to include only the passenger carriers 
among the top 150 airlines in terms of revenue generation.  Keeping in mind 
that the top 150 airlines include cargo airlines (and by definition, only include 
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the largest 150 airlines), the shares in each sample are broadly consistent.  
The exception is Europe, which has many airline subsidiaries that produce 
substantial RPKs, but with revenue not large enough to be included in the 
Airline Business Top 150 by Revenue.  
Largest shareholder and 
RPK distribution Africa Asia-Pacific Europe Middle East North America
South 
America Totals
Listed 20% 28% 52% 0% 83% 16% 51%
Government 80% 46% 13% 93% 0% 0% 23%
Other airline 0% 6% 10% 0% 7% 9% 7%
Closely held 0% 20% 22% 1% 9% 75% 17%
Institutionals 0% 0% 2% 6% 1% 0% 2%
Management 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0%  
Table 4.6a: 2007 RPK distribution of 150 largest revenue producing airlines 
Airline operating profits for each shareholder type, as a percentage of the 
regional total, is shown in Table 4.7. 
Largest shareholder and  
Operating Profit 
distribution, 2007
Africa Asia-Pacific Europe Middle East North America
South 
America Totals
Listed 82% 43% 89% 0% 90% -2% 62%
Government 18% 41% 5% 100% 0% 0% 19%
Other airline 0% 0% -2% 0% 5% 0% 1%
Closely held 0% 16% 8% 0% 6% 102% 17%
Institutionals 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 1%
Management 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Totals 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%  
Table 4.7: 2007 profit distribution of 150 largest revenue producing airlines 
In the very limited sample of Africa, the government-owned airlines (Ethiopian 
and South African) produced 80% of the RPKs, whereas listed carrier Kenya 
Airways produced 82% of the profits.  In Asia-Pacific, listed airlines produced 
the highest profits are quite consistent with RPK shares, with listed carriers 
producing profits out of proportion with their production shares.  Government-
owned airlines produced slightly less profits than the listed carriers, and 
substantially less profit than production of RPKs.  As La Porta et al. (1999) 
intimate, this growth region has a strong government and privately held 
corporate ownership pattern, reflected in the airline population 
In Europe, the listed carriers dominate the profits with 89%, compared with 
only 52% of the RPK production.  Particularly poor performers were the airline 
subsidiaries, where profits were negative in a boom year, and state-owned 
carriers which, thanks to Alitalia's $427m operating loss, earned practically no 
profits as a group in 2007.  The overall ownership landscape of the major 
airlines is today very similar between Europe and North America.  
Performance over the cycle could not however be more different between 
these two high-production regions, as discussed in the conclusion to this 
chapter.   
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The Middle East region is dominated by government-owned airlines, both in 
terms of production and profits.  In this it is similar to large portions of the 
highly diverse Asia-Pacific region.  In these regions, government ownership 
did not preclude profit-making among large airlines. 
South America shows a unique pattern, with the family-held airlines earning 
profits out of proportion to their production of RPKs, and the listed carriers 
earning less.     
Almost totally missing from the ranks of owners worldwide (Russia's 
Transaero is the exception) is the category of inside managers.  This is quite 
significant for this research, for it means that there is effective separation of 
ownership and control of the world's airlines (with some notable exceptions, 
such as Virgin Atlantic, but not more recent entrants such as Ryanair, which is 
only 4.5% owned by Michael O'Leary or AirAsia, in which Tony Fernandes’ 
Tune Air owns 30.9%).  In both theoretical and practical senses, the absence 
of management in majority shareholding necessitates highly formal processes 
for justifying investments, prepared by inside managers and presented to the 
governance body of the airline.  These processes are precisely the type 
specified under classical financial theory, with capital budgeting practices 
presented in finance textbooks.  On the other hand, the diversity of dominant 
shareholder types in all regions save Europe and North America gives rise to 
varying shareholder incentives and criteria for accepting investment projects 
in the world's airlines.  Growth and profitability of the different shareholder 
models over the 2004-2008 period will be examined in the last section of this 
chapter.  
In order to discuss the implications for management decision-making, it is 
important to look at the size and potential dominance of these largest 
shareholdings at the individual airline level: notably, the size of these "largest" 
shareholdings will help determine whether they are in fact dominant in 
decision-making.   
Figure 4.8 shows the number of different types of shareholders among the 
large airlines analyzed in this research.  A full 57% of the world's largest 
airlines (143 in number) have a single shareholder type, that is, they are 100% 
listed, or 100% government-owned, etc.  Another 27% have two shareholder 
types, while the remaining 16% have three or four different types of 
shareholders, each of which may have a differing agenda regarding the firm's 
investment management.   
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Figure 4.8: Number of different shareholder types among 249 largest airlines 
The world's largest airlines tend to have a small number of different types of 
shareholders, with over half showing a single shareholder type and ¾ one or 
two types.  Figure 4.7, supported by the airline-by-airline analysis below, 
shows that airline companies tend to be either tightly controlled by a single 
dominant group of investors, or on the contrary show the highly diffuse 
ownership characterizing the traditional western-style listed-company 
governance pattern, with its accompanying strong separation of ownership 
and control. 
The following sections analyse the categories of shareholding characterizing 
the world's regions in detail, working from the individual airlines that make up 
each type of shareholder to develop a comprehensive governance typology of 
the world's airlines.  Results of the field research regarding investment 
valuation techniques are then examined for each individual category. 
The criterion for "type of shareholding" for each group is that the type of 
shareholder makes up the largest single shareholder group in the company's 
equity.  In very many cases, the largest shareholder group is also an absolute 
majority shareholder: relative-majority shareholdings, more problematic in 
terms of management control of the airline's investments, are found to be 
relatively uncommon worldwide.  Exceptions to this are discussed in each 
section. 
4.2.5. Listed carrier equity finance and investment analysis 
Asia-Pacific 
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Listed airlines represent only 13% of large airlines in Asia-Pacific in number, 
but they produce over twice that proportion of RPKs.  Among the eight airlines 
present in Table 4.8, three types of shareholding pattern can be identified.  
Airline Government Listed
Institutional 
investors Closely held Employees
Other 
airline N.S.
Japan Airlines Corporation 100.00% 0.00%
Qantas 100.00% 0.00%
ANA Group 80.02% 19.98% 0.00%
Shandong Airlines 77.20% 22.80% 0.00%
Korean Air 61.14% 21.49% 12.13% 5.24% 0.00%
Shanghai Airlines 40.66% 44.69% 14.65% 0.00%
spiceJet 44.00% 17.72% 35.00% 3.28%
AirAsia 43.50% 21.60% 30.90% 4.00% 0.00%  
Table 4.8: Airlines with largest listed shareholders in Asia-Pacific 
The first group is airlines in relatively advanced economies, which have 
broadly-listed shares along western lines: JAL, ANA, Qantas, and Korean 
Airlines.  Compared to JAL, ANA has an institutional shareholding of nearly 
20% in total, but the largest individual investor has only 4% shareholding.9   
The second group, spiceJet and AirAsia, have only relative majorities listed, 
while private investors hold shares of over 30%, giving them a substantial 
voice in management, with additional equity financing provided by shares 
raised from institutional investors.  This pattern – a significant privately-held 
block often owned by the founder, and share listing supplemented by private 
placement - is common among the start-up airlines in the group. 
The exception to many rules in airline governance, the two Chinese airlines 
listed have large listed shareholdings, but are largely ruled under the tight-knit 
Chinese government/civil aviation regime, with 40.66% of Shanghai owned by 
the government (with another 14.65% owned by the Bank of China), and 
22.8% of Shandong owned by Air China, its largest shareholder.  Thus, three 
of the eight airlines – four if we include Shandong – are significantly controlled 
by blocks of minority shareholders.   
Europe 
                                                 
9 Analysis regarding detailed shareholdings in this section are based on ATI information on 
the airlines' shareholders.  This industry-standard information can be considered reliable 
because it is in such common use in the industry, examined by the parties concerned, and 
updated frequently. 
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Listed carriers in Europe provide 54% of the region’s RPK capacity from 2004-
2008.  Europe includes the largest number of national carriers privatized since 
the era of deregulation began, British Airways, Lufthansa, Air France-KLM, 
Iberia, and THY Turkish Airlines, to which one could add the "oddity" of SAS, 
which has 50% - one share controlled by the governments of Sweden (21.4%), 
Denmark and Norway 514.3% each).  Among these airlines, BA and LH are 
shown in this research to consistently and rigorously apply the techniques of 
classical finance theory to corporate financial management and investment 
appraisal. 
Airline Government Listed
Institutional 
investors Closely held Employees
Other 
airline N.S.
Icelandair 100.00% 0.00%
Norwegian 100.00% 0.00%
FlyGlobespan.com 100.00% 0.00%
British Airways 100.00% 0.00%
Lufthansa Group 89.44% 10.56% 0.00%
Air France-KLM Group 18.70% 81.30% 0.00%
Ryanair 81.24% 14.26% 4.50% 0.00%
Iberia 72.40% 17.60% 10.00% 0.00%
SkyEurope Airlines 71.90% 28.10% 0.00%
Austrian Airlines 58.50% 41.46% 0.04%
THY Turkish Airlines 48.25% 51.75% 0.00%
Vueling Airlines 50.90% 37.80% 11.30% 0.00%
SAS Group 49.99% 50.01% 0.00%
Air Berlin 44.62% 44.00% 11.38% 0.00%  
Table 4.9: Airlines with largest listed shareholders in Europe 
A second group is the start-up no-frills carriers Ryanair, Skyeurope, Vueling, 
and Air Berlin.  As in the case of the Asian start-ups, they have significant 
blocks of shares held by institutionals and/or private investors, with more 
participation from institutionals than in the Asian population.  Ryanair exhibits 
an extreme case of the founder-owner pattern, with Michael O'Leary holding a 
stake now worth only 4.5%, which with his personal force of character is 
enough to ensure effective control of the company.  Vueling is one of very few 
airlines worldwide with significant employee shareholding, with the balance of 
the private shares held by Catalan institutions.  In 2009, the company agreed 
to merge with ClickAir, and Iberia offshoot which had been competing fiercely 
for Barcelona low-cost traffic.  SkyEurope and Air Berlin represent classic 
venture capital start-up-IPO plays, with institutionals financing the start-up 
then selling a large stake to the markets (Vueling also exhibits this pattern). 
North America 
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The North American airline community predominantly accesses the 
continent's wide and deep public share markets, as 83% of RPKs are 
provided by listed carriers.  The continent's largest carriers are by and large 
100% free-float, freestanding companies, although this is not true of the 
smaller, regional feeder airlines examined later in this section.  Also 
conspicuously absent in this group is Air Canada, which became privately-
held after its 2002 bankruptcy.  The North American group is also 
distinguished by five additional Chapter 11 bankruptcies since 2001 – United 
(2002-2005), Atlas Air (2004-2007), Polar Air Cargo (2004), Delta and 
Northwest (2005 – 2008).  All five emerged in the years indicated, but a sixth, 
Aloha Airlines, will certainly result in that airlines' liquidation. 
Airline Government Listed
Institutional 
investors Closely held Employees
Other 
airline
ABX Air 100.00%
Atlas Air 100.00%
FedEx 100.00%
Aloha Airlines 100.00%
Allegiant Air 100.00%
Pinnacle Airlines 100.00%
Mesa Airlines 100.00%
Hawaiian Airlines 100.00%
Frontier Airlines 100.00%
ExpressJet 100.00%
WestJet Airlines 100.00%
AirTran Airways 100.00%
Alaska Airlines 100.00%
US Airways Group 100.00%
Southwest Airlines 100.00%
Northwest Airlines 100.00%
Continental Airlines 100.00%
United Airlines 100.00%
AMR Corporation 100.00%
Delta Air Lines 89.30% 10.70%
Republic Airlines 60.85% 39.15%
Polar Air Cargo 51.00% 49.00%
JetBlue Airways 49.00% 15.00% 17.00% 19.00%  
Table 4.10: Airlines with largest listed shareholders in North America 
Only the last four of the listed airlines in Table 4.10 are under 100% free-
floating, with JetBlue exhibiting once again the classic start-up 
founder/institutional/IPO pattern, albeit with a lower "cash-out" share sold to 
the public than Europe's carriers (and somewhat more than Asia's).  The 
closely-held shares are owned by George Soros, whereas Lufthansa stepped 
in to take a 19% stake in the airline 2008.  Here, as with the other start-ups, 
significant blocks of shares remain closely-held, whether by individuals, 
institutions, or other airlines. 
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Other regions 
Of the world's other regions, each has exactly one airline for which the largest 
shareholder type is a public share market. 
 
Airline Government Listed
Institutional 
investors Closely held Employees
Other 
airline N.S.
Jazeera 70.00% 30.00% 0.00%
GOL Transportes Aéreos 100.00% 0.00%
Kenya Airways 22.00% 32.50% 4.36% 26.00% 15.14%  
Table 4.11: Airlines with largest listed shareholders in the Middle East, South America, and Africa 
Kuwait's Jazeera is, as stated above, a clear distancing of the Kuwaiti civil 
aviation community from its national flag carrier, and is 70% listed on one of 
the only significant organized exchanges in the Arab Middle East.  The 
Kuwaiti Boodai family controls the 30% closely-held share, easily enough to 
ensure management control of a widely-held company. 
GOL is one of the few start-ups globally in which 100% of shares were floated 
in its 2004 IPO.  Finally, Kenya Airways is the only African airline that 
managed to sell a relative majority stake to its domestic share exchange, 
leaving the government with 22%.  KLM owns the largest individual stake at 
26%, and is commonly viewed as having a close eye on the airlines 
operations (particularly maintenance), while not managing the company's fleet 
planning. 
Having adopted western financing model of widely-held shareholding, these 
majority-listed airlines should be expected to use classical financial 
techniques to analyse fleet investments.  The airline survey respondents from 
this research showed a pattern consistent with this intuition.  
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Percentage of Airline CFOs using techniques
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Figure 4.9: Valuation technique use by all airlines vs. majority listed airlines, Gibson & Morrell (2005) 
All of the listed-majority respondents – two from European airlines, two from 
North America, one from Asia-Pacific use both NPV and PBK to evaluation 
investments, higher than the overall frequency in the airline sample.  Fewer 
use IRR, which is consistent with the availability of cost of capital estimation 
data for their shares.  Indeed, four of the five (the exception being the Asia-
Pacific airline) use both WACC and CAPM to estimate the company's cost of 
capital. 
Of less significance, four out of the five airlines also use Accounting Rate of 
Return (ARR) to evaluate investments, and two of the five also use Adjusted 
Present Value.  Only one of these airlines uses Real Options Analysis (ROA).  
The CFOs of listed carriers responding to our survey have fully adopted 
classical financial valuation techniques.   
4.2.6. Value-based management in listed carriers 
One of the more widely-accepted applications of classical financial theory is 
Value Based Management (VBM), which has company cost of capital, defined 
as WACC, as one of its primary inputs.  Two European carriers, British 
Airways and Lufthansa, have adopted VBM in corporate financial 
management.  There are various forms and metrics for VBM, but they all 
share the same conceptual framework, which is a combination of classical 
financial theory and accounting expediency: the company's investments 
(variously defined) are charged with an investment cost by multiplying the 
investment by WACC, and this implicit investment cost is compared with 
various measure of cash flow or profits, to determine whether the company's 
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managers are creating value by earning above investment costs, or 
destroying it by earning below such costs. 
Since the introduction of the trade-marked Economic Value Added concept by 
the consulting Stern Stewart & Co, the most popular VBM metrics in the airline 
industry is Cash Value Added (CVA), adopted at the end of the 1990s by two 
major European carriers, British Airways (BA) and Lufthansa (LH).  
Scandinavian carrier SAS uses the related Cash Flow Return on Investment 
(CFROI) calculation.  The methodology and issues surrounding these 
applications are discussed in detail in Morrell (2003).  Of particular concern in 
Morrell's study was the valuation of assets, and the author found a wide 
diversity of methods: the airlines studied use methods ranging from simple 
historic cost with or without adjustment for inflation, to estimation of 
replacement cost of assets based on actuarial or current market value 
appraisal methodologies.  All the airlines studied by Morrell use an estimate of 
the value of assets including the implied investment in operating leased 
aircraft: the treatment of leasing for investment valuation purposes is 
considered later in this research. 
Classical financial theory is used in two specific calculations within CVA.  First 
is the estimation of an "economic depreciation" to be deducted from operating 
cash flow (the usual proxy being Earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, 
amortization and rentals or EBITDAR). While depreciation is a fundamental 
concept necessary for any asset-based valuation, CVA substitutes a WACC-
based calculation for simplistic accounting methods, be they linear or 
accelerated, purporting thus to calculate depreciation in a way consistent with 
financial market valuations (hence the "Cash" in CVA).  A common approach 
to estimating economic depreciation is to find an annuity which discounts to 
the replacement cost of the firm's assets, a method requiring an estimate of 
the company's WACC or other appropriate discount rate.  For this research, 
the range of approaches to estimating the parameters necessary to calculate 
airline cost of capital is relevant. 
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Table 4.12 is a comparison of the parameters used, and resulting calculation, 
for BA (reproduced from Morrell (2003)), and LH (from company annual 
reports). 
Comparison of WACC parameters British Airways LH 2001 LH 2008 
Target debt/total capital ratio 50% 61% 61% 45% 50% 
Cost of debt 5.3% 4.8% 4.8% 6.3% 5.4% 
Risk-free rate 5.3% 5.3% 5.3% 5.1% 4.2% 
Beta 1.25 1.35 1.5 1.05 1.1 
Equity risk premium 6.6% 4.0% 2.5% 5.7% 5.7% 
Cost of Equity (calculated) 13.6% 10.7% 9.1% 11.1% 10.5% 
Cost of Equity (stated) 13.6% 12.5% 11.0% 11.1% 10.5% 
WACC (nominal calculated) 9.5% 7.8% 7.2% 8.9% 8.0% 
WACC (nominal - stated) 9.5% 7.8% 7.2% 8.9% 7.9% 
WACC (real -stated) 7.0% 5.4% 4.8%     
WACC (real - calculated) 6.8% 5.2% 4.6%     
    Table 4.12: Cost of capital parameters & results: BA & SAS from Morrell (2003), LH from annual 
reports 
While BA and LH apparently calculate cost of equity and WACC broadly in 
line with classical theory, several methodological choices reveal divergences.  
BA calculated WACC under three scenarios, with the first column in Table 
4.12 reflecting their base case WACC.  In this scenario, the airline used the 
same risk-free rate as the company cost of debt, an expediency not consistent 
with the notion that corporate debt is not truly risk-free, though it does reflect 
Lintner's (1965) assertion that company managers tend to view their own debt 
ask risk free.   
In the other two scenarios, BA is presumably demonstrating the conservatism 
of their calculation.  The cost of equity estimation shows the wide divergence 
in estimating the equity risk premium, as their estimates range as low as 2.5%, 
certainly below any estimates identified in this research.  On the other hand, 
the company uses substantially higher betas of 1.35 and 1.5.  This substantial 
range finds an echo in the dispersion of estimates from professional providers 
- betas from 1.27 to 1.857 in the case BA - found in Turner and Morrell (2003).  
Using these parameters, BA calculates equity costs substantially lower than 
the 13.6% used in the base case analysis.  These wide-ranging parameter 
estimates demonstrate the lack of methodological certainty faced by 
practitioners attempting to put CAPM into practice. 
Concerning that WACC sensitivity analysis, BA used an after-tax 4.8% for the 
company cost of debt, resulting in the questionable (but theoretically not 
impossible) estimation that BA's after-tax cost of debt is lower than the risk-
free rate, which is by definition tax free.  Again demonstrating the 
"conservatism" of the base case, they use equity costs of 12.5% and 11%, but 
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this is countered by a higher 61% gearing and the lower cost of debt used.  
These scenarios appear geared to demonstrate that BA's cost of capital 
estimates are "realistic" or conservative, but to the researcher they are more 
revealing of methodological difficulties faced by practitioners. 
The comparison with LH's estimates in 2001 and 2008 reveals many 
differences, most of which should reflect capital market and operational 
differences between the two countries.  The two most striking differences are 
the substantially lower beta used by LH, consistent with the 2003 Turner and 
Morrell study, which found provider estimates of 1.12 to 1.19 for LH, both 
lower and in a narrower range than that of BA.  LH also used a lower equity 
risk premium than BA's base case, which at 5.7% is very close to the "CFO 
practice" 5.5% reported by Bruner et al. (1998), a full percentage point lower 
than the 101-year German geometric average risk premium reported in 
Dimson et al. (2002), though again close to the forward-looking 5.9% "world" 
premium suggested by those authors.  Not much can be said of the SAS 
methodology reported in Morrell (2003), as the company only provides the 
barest of information.  
4.2.7. Government-owned carrier equity finance & investment analysis 
Asia Pacific 
This research identified 20 large, government-controlled carriers in Asia-
Pacific, a vast region stretching from China to New Zealand, and including 
India as well.  The airlines in this group produce 50% of the region's RPKs, 
and their shareholding patterns reflect the region's size and diversity of 
financial markets and cultures.  Also distinctive is the fact that the government 
share is in no case less than 50%, a legacy of the rigidities inherent in ASA's. 
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Airline Government Listed
Institutional 
investors Closely held Employees
Other 
airline N.S.
Air India 100.00% 0.00%
Biman Bangladesh Airlines 100.00% 0.00%
Garuda Indonesia 100.00% 0.00%
Royal Brunei Airlines 100.00% 0.00%
Vietnam Airlines 100.00% 0.00%
Air Madagascar 90.60% 3.10% 6.30%
Pakistan International Airlines 87.00% 13.00% 0.00%
Air New Zealand 76.50% 12.90% 4.20% 6.30% 0.10%
Malaysia Airlines 72.05% 5.69% 10.72% 11.54%
China Airlines 70.05% 29.95%
Air Tahiti Nui 64.42% 8.61% 19.92% 7.05% 0.00%
Air China 55.80% 24.20% 20.00% 0.00%
Singapore Airlines Group 54.70% 45.30% 0.00%
Thai Airways 53.76% 46.24% 0.00%
Air Mauritius 52.87% 15.50% 31.64% -0.01%
SriLankan Airlines 51.05% 5.32% 43.63% 0.00%
China Eastern Airlines 50.30% 38.38% 11.32% 0.00%
China Southern Airlines 50.30% 49.70% 0.00%
Air Calédonie International 50.28% 43.31% 4.32% 2.09% 0.00%
Air Pacific 50.00% 49.97% 0.03%  
    Table 4.13: Airlines with largest government shareholders in Asia-Pacific 
Five of these airlines are under 100% government control, found mostly in 
South Asia.  With the notable exception of Air India, these airlines are found in 
countries without large public share markets.  Air India, Garuda and Biman 
are part of a substantial group of airlines whose government shareholders 
have several times announced their intention to privatize the airline, 
processes which clearly have not as yet found the combination of political will 
and private interest which would allow them to open their capital.  Air India, 
the largest of these companies and ranked 35 in worldwide revenue 
generation, was merged with Indian Airlines in 2007.  
Singapore, Malaysia, and Thai show a mix of a substantial majority 
government stake and institutional investment.  These countries do have 
substantial share markets, but the control of these national airlines is firmly in 
the hands of companies controlled their respective governments, while 
allowing them to benefit from additional institutional financing capacity.  
Seven of the government-owned airlines have minority shares held by major 
airlines, giving them access to a certain amount of management expertise 
from their airline shareholders, while providing the shareholding airline with 
inside information on these government-controlled carriers. Three of these 
airline shareholdings are small stakes held by Air France in the airlines of 
former French colonies and Territoires d'Outre Mer (TOM): Air Madagascar 
(Air France 3.1%), Air Tahiti Nui (Air France 7.05%), Air Calédonie (Air France 
2.09%).  Air Mauritius has a more complex airline stakeholder group (B.A. 
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13.24%, Air France 9.58%, Air India 8.82%), reflecting its own colonial and 
historic ties to the Indian mainland.  Emirates' 43.63% share of Sri Lankan's 
equity and concomitant management agreement gave the Dubai carrier a 
substantial say in Sri Lankan's management and fleet decisions.  Similarly, Air 
Pacific can be considered highly controlled by (Qantas 46.3% and Air New 
Zealand's 3.67%).  The final airline with a minority stakeholder is Air New 
Zealand (Singapore 6.3%), reflecting both ANZ's see-saw performance in the 
early years of this decade and the continuous flirtation of Singapore Airlines 
with stakes in carriers in Austria and New Zealand.  Given the absolute 
government-held majority in all cases, none of these airline shares represents 
a controlling stake, but we can assume a certain amount of information-
sharing and 'advice' from the outside airline regarding fleet decisions, 
particular in the case of the larger shares (Sri Lankan, Air New Zealand) 
China's "big three" airlines have significant listed capital, while remaining 
majority controlled by the government. China Southern was the first of the 
three to privatize in 1997, and has a mix of Hong Kong listed shares (26.84%) 
denominated in HK$, and Shenzhen-listed denominated "A" shares (22.86%) 
denominated in CNY.  China Eastern privatized the same year, but raised a 
smaller stake (H shareholders 32.2%, A shareholders 6.18%).  Finally, the 
highly complex Air China has a 24.2% listed stake since its IPO in 2004, in 
addition to cross-shareholding with Cathay, giving the Hong Kong carrier a 
20% stake (Air China owns 10% of Cathay's shares).  The Chinese 
government's two-step aircraft procurement process through the China 
Aviation Services Group Company (CASGC) ensures that fleet decisions 
among these carriers will be complex, and highly subject to the overall 
procurement and industrial development policies and plans of the central 
government. 
Europe  
Europe's government-owned airlines number 22 (two more than in Asia-
Pacific), but only account for 14% of the region's RPKs as a group vs. 50% in 
the Asia-Pacific region.   Eight of the 22 are 100%-owned by the respective 
governments, and are found primarily in the former-communist countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe as well as Russia, as are an additional eight of 
the 22 airlines with less than 100% state ownership.  The closely-held stakes 
of Croatia, Adria, LOT, Ukraine, CSA Czech, Aeroflot and KrasAir are typical 
of the unclear communication of the nature of private ownership found in this 
region.  All of these airlines have experienced rapid growth over the last ten 
years, and all are included in the Airline Business top 200 airlines worldwide: 
TAROM, LOT, CSA Czech and Aeroflot, but also Air Astana and KrasAir are 
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now within the top 150 revenue producing airlines, whereas in 2002 (for 
example), only LOT, CSA Czech and Aeroflot were in this group.    
Airline Government Listed
Institutional 
investors Closely held Employees
Other 
airline N.S.
Azerbaijan Airlines 100.00% 0.00%
Jat Airways 100.00% 0.00%
Olympic Airlines 100.00% 0.00%
Rossiya Airlines 100.00% 0.00%
SATA International 100.00% 0.00%
TAP Portugal 100.00% 0.00%
TAROM 100.00% 0.00%
Uzbekistan Airways 100.00% 0.00%
Air Malta 98.00% 2.00% 0.00%
Croatia Airlines 96.30% 2.20% 1.50% 0.00%
Adria Airways 76.00% 8.00% 13.00% 3.00% 0.00%
Cyprus Airways 69.62% 30.38% 0.00%
LOT Polish Airlines 67.97% 25.10% 6.93% 0.00%
Ukraine International Airlines 61.60% 15.90% 22.50% 0.00%
CSA Czech Airlines 61.08% 4.33% 34.59% 0.00%
Finnair 57.04% 22.83% 20.13% 0.00%
airBaltic 52.80% 47.20% 0.00%
Aeroflot Russian Airlines 51.17% 27.00% 19.00% 2.83%
Air Astana 51.00% 49.00%
KrasAir 51.00% 49.00% 0.00%
Alitalia 49.90% 12.41% 35.69% 2.00% 0.00%
Aer Lingus 28.82% 28.29% 16.76% 25.22% 0.91%  
Table 4.14: Airlines with largest government shareholders in Europe 
With these former eastern-block airlines clearly under state tutelage as the 
largest group of the government-owned airlines in Europe, there are two 
exceptions that do not fit one particular pattern.  Latvia's airBaltic is 47% 
owned by its employees, making it a rarity in the airline world.  Air Astana was 
the result of an interesting approach in Kazakhstan: rather than try to reform 
Air Kazakhstan, the former flag carrier was disbanded, in favour of a joint 
venture between the government and BAE Systems.  
Three Western European airlines in the group are the "remains" of the wave 
of privatization that has swept the E.U. in the last 25 years, a trend started by  
British Airways.  Finnair is a typical partially-privatized carrier, with nearly 43% 
of the airline privately owned, around half of this in the hands of institutional 
investors.  TAP Air Portugal and Olympic remain 100% in state hands10.  None 
seems likely to participate in the current wave of consolidation sweeping the 
continent, even if TAP is a Star Alliance member and Finnair is trying to be the 
eastern wing of the oneworld alliance by focussing on Asian destinations 
through Helsinki. 
                                                 
10 Olympic was sold to private investors at the end of 2009 
   
Chapter 4: Financial markets, airline ownership and investment analysis 134
Aer Lingus and Alitalia, on the other hand, were in 2007 takeover targets, and 
Aer Lingus is still so today, with over 25% of the company's shares held by 
Ryanair.  The 2% of Alitalia held by Air France after its 50.1% privatization in 
January 2007 has now become 25%, with 75% held by "CAI", a group of 
Italian investors, in what seems like a face-saving deal destined to leave the 
carrier under the control of Air France-KLM in coming years. 
Middle East 
The other significant region of the world with large swathes of government 
ownership is the Middle East, where state-owned carriers produce 93% of the 
region's RPKs, and 98% of its profits.   
Airline Government Listed
Institutional 
investors Closely held Employees
Other 
airline N.S.
Air Algérie 100.00% 0.00%
Atlas Blue 100.00% 0.00%
Egyptair 100.00% 0.00%
Emirates 100.00% 0.00%
Etihad Airways 100.00% 0.00%
Gulf Air 100.00% 0.00%
Iran Air 100.00% 0.00%
Iran Aseman Airlines 100.00% 0.00%
Kuwait Airways 100.00% 0.00%
Royal Jordanian Airlines 100.00% 0.00%
Saudi Arabian Airlines 100.00% 0.00%
Middle East Airlines (MEA) 99.37% 0.63%
Royal Air Maroc 95.39% 3.82% 0.79%
Oman Air 80.00% 20.00% 0.00%
Tunisair 74.42% 20.00% 5.58% 0.00%
Air Arabia 51.00% 49.00% 0.00%
Qatar Airways 50.01% 49.99% 0.00%
Ethiopian Airlines 100.00% 0.00%
South African Airways 98.20% 1.80% 0.00%
Air Jamaica 100.00% 0.00%  
Table 4.15: Airlines with largest government shareholders in the Middle East, Africa, and North America 
Eleven of the 17 airlines are 100% owned by their governments, but within 
these 11, there are two distinct management cases.  First are the "traditional" 
state-owned airlines, founded practically at the same time as the country itself: 
Air Algérie, Egyptair, Iran Air, Kuwait Airways, Royal Jordanian, and Saudia.  
These airlines fill the traditional role of the state-owned carrier, serving 
destinations based on a mix of economic and political agendas, a mix that 
often confounds any management attempts to make sustained profits. 
A second case among the state-owned carriers is the more recent and far 
more dynamic "start-up" carriers such as Atlas Blue (a Royal Air Maroc 
offshoot serving secondary destinations in Europe and Morocco),  Gulf Air, a 
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former "pan-Arab" carrier now the property of the state of Bahrein, Iran 
Aseman, and two of the three sixth-freedom mega-hub carriers of the group, 
Emirates and Etihad.  Within the former group of staid airlines, Royal 
Jordanian and more recently Egyptair stand out as more dynamic, having 
joined global alliances (oneworld and Star respectively), largely to boost  
efficiency and modernize management, as well as to extend their networks 
facing the threats from the Gulf.  One would like to add Middle East Airlines 
(MEA) to the dynamic group, but the airline has borne the brunt of hostilities 
between Arabs and Israelis in the years since 9/11.   
The remaining Middle Eastern airlines fit the same two moulds, but have sold 
shares to some mix of different investor types:  Royal Air Maroc fits the  
"tutelage" model previously seen in the South Asian carriers, with stakes held 
by Air France (2.87%), Iberia (0.95%).  Tunisair also has a 5.58% share in the 
hands of Air France, and as well has the dubious benefit of having listed 20% 
of its shares on the languishing Tunis Stock Exchange. 
The United Arab Emirates' no-frills carrier Air Arabia is 49% privately owned, 
with "substantial free float" according to ATI, while Qatar Airlines, the third 
sixth-freedom carrier channelling Europe-Asia traffic through the Gulf while 
building the Doha's attractiveness for business and leisure, is 50% minus one 
share privately owned.  The salient characteristic of these "private" shares, 
and the funding model of the Gulf airlines in general, is substantial opacity 
regarding the exact nature of the shares and their owners.  In the Gulf 
particularly, public and private ownership structures are not so easily 
distinguished. 
In the interest of completeness Ethiopian and South African, and Air Jamaica 
are included in Table 4.15.  SAA is known in the trade to be quite business-
oriented and has a small employee-owned share.  No other particular 
governance characteristics stand out in these three.    
Twelve state-owned carriers responded to the airline CFO survey, one from 
Asia-Pacific, three from Europe, four from the Middle East and from Africa.  As 
a group, they are less likely to use the classical techniques of IRR and NPV 
than the listed group.  They in fact use ALL the techniques less than the listed 
group, reflecting the mixed agenda government ownership often brings to air 
transport. 
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Percentage of Airline CFOs using techniques
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
IRR
NPV
PBK
ARR
ROA
APV
Sometimes or always use (all responding) Sometimes or always use (Gov't)
 
Figure 4.10: Frequency of valuation technique use by all airlines & majority government airlines 
Within the averages there are large regional disparities: the four Middle-
Eastern respondents show an analysis pattern nearly the same as the listed 
group, in that they all use IRR, NPV and PBK, and three out of the four use 
ARR as well.  On the other hand, the Middle Eastern group does not use the 
more sophisticated ROA and APV techniques at all.   
The Asia-Pacific respondent uses all the listed techniques, while the three 
European carriers are a mixed bag: all use PBK, and two out of three use 
NPV, whereas only one uses IRR. 
Excluding Africa from the list of government-owned carriers, a picture of the 
analysis techniques in use by the responding state-owned carriers is similar to 
that found among the listed population, although they are less likely to adopt 
advanced techniques than listed carriers. 
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Figure 4.10a: Frequency of valuation techniques used by all airlines & majority government airlines ex-Africa 
 
This adoption of classical financial techniques in the absence of market-based 
shareholding and governance by professional managers accountable to profit-
oriented shareholders leads to questions of methodology (e.g., for cost of 
capital estimation in the absence of traded shares), which are discussed in 
this research.   
4.2.8. Closely-held carrier equity finance & investment analysis 
Asia Pacific 
Of the 19 Asian airlines with the largest blocks closely-held, 17 show a clear 
absolute majority of this category of shareholders, and can be said to be 
wholly controlled by these blocks.  They are certainly not the largest 
producers of RPK in the region, with only 20%, but they are the second most 
numerous group of airlines in the region, after state-owned carriers.  
Producing together 66% of Asian airline RPKs, the government and closely-
held patterns of shareholding are dominant in the region, in sharp contrast to 
Europe and North America, but consistent with the findings concerning Asian 
shareholding patterns in LaPorta et al (1999).  With the exception of Nippon 
Cargo Airlines (owned by Japanese shipping firm NYK Line), the 100% 
Closely-held airlines show a strong pattern of the “family”, or individual, 
shareholding described in the LaPorta article, as do the larger Philippines 
Airlines (controlled by Lucio Tan), and Jet (by N. Goyal).  Several have started 
operations within the last ten years (GoAir, IndiGo, Juneyao, Kingfisher, Lion, 
Skymark), and are largely run by their founders (although Kingfisher, in 
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difficulty, may be edging closer to Jet).  This is precisely the type of airline 
shareholding which Pinches and Lander suggested use “more intuitive” 
investment planning, with lower risk-aversion than publicly held firms.      
Airline Government Listed
Institutional 
investors Closely held Employees
Other 
airline N.S.
Bangkok Airways 100.00% 0.00%
Cebu Pacific Air 100.00% 0.00%
GoAir 100.00% 0.00%
IndiGo Airlines 100.00% 0.00%
Juneyao Airlines 100.00% 0.00%
Kingfisher Airlines** 100.00% 0.00%
Lion Airlines 100.00% 0.00%
Nippon Cargo Airlines 100.00% 0.00%
Skymark Airlines 100.00% 0.00%
Asiana Airlines 9.63% 90.37% 0.00%
Air Macau 5.00% 5.00% 90.00% 0.00%
Philippine Airlines 4.26% 88.87% 2.75% 4.12%
Jet Airways 20.00% 80.00% 0.00%
Hainan Airlines 12.72% 78.36% 8.92%
Virgin Blue 74.74% 25.26% 0.00%
EVA Air 28.00% 72.00% 0.00%
Skynet Asia Airways 3.30% 24.20% 57.60% 14.90% 0.00%
Cathay Pacific 25.00% 24.84% 40.00% 10.16% 0.00%
Air Austral 26.30% 37.72% 35.98%  
Table 4.16: Airlines with largest closely-held shareholders in Asia 
Three carriers have a significant block held by another airline, and fall into two 
categories.  First are the start-ups at the behest of a parent airline, with 
Virgin’s 25.26% share in Virgin Blue and All Nippon’s nearly 15% of Skynet 
Asia.  Second, and of course unique worldwide, is Cathay Pacific, with its 
cross-shareholding of 10.16% with Air China and the continuing controlling 
block held by the Swire Group providing consistent profit-driven management 
practices.  Finally, EVA Air and Asiana are controlled by diversified holding 
companies (“Evergreen” for the former, and Korea’s Kumho Construction for 
the latter).  Airlines belonging to diversified groups are thus quite rare in the 
region.  This suggests that the potential conflicts of interest identified later in 
this research in the diversified-group shareholding patterns many authors 
consider endemic to the region11 would not logically be a significant problem in 
the Asian airline world.  
Europe 
In Europe, the closely-held pattern is very different, with 12 of the 31 closely-
held airlines (39%) controlled by travel groups.  These airlines are italicized in 
                                                 
11 The most obvious examples are the Japanese Zaibatsu and the South Korean Chaebol 
groups, another being the Hong Kong conglomerate Hutchinson Whampoa. 
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Table 4.17.  The aircraft utilisation pattern (highly seasonal) business model 
and investment priorities of travel groups are significantly different from those 
of scheduled carriers.  All of the travel-group held airlines are 100% 
subsidiaries (save Tuifly in which Air Berlin holds a 19.9% stake), giving the 
owners complete control over all capital budgeting decisions.  
 
Airline Government Listed
Institutional 
investors Closely held Employees
Other 
airline N.S.
Air Europa 100,00% 0,00%
Corsairfly 100,00% 0,00%
Futura International Airways 100,00% 0,00%
Hello 100,00% 0,00%
Iberworld Airlines 100,00% 0,00%
Livingston 100,00% 0,00%
Monarch Airlines 100,00% 0,00%
MyTravel Airways 100,00% 0,00%
Novair 100,00% 0,00%
Onur Air 100,00% 0,00%
Silverjet 100,00% 0,00%
Sterling Airlines 100,00% 0,00%
Thomas Cook Airlines (UK) 100,00% 0,00%
Thomsonfly 100,00% 0,00%
XL Airways France 100,00% 0,00%
XL Airways UK 100,00% 0,00%
Air One 99,00% 1,00%
Meridiana 84,00% 16,00% 0,00%
TUIfly 80,10% 19,90% 0,00%
Clickair 80,00% 20,00% 0,00%
AeroSvit Airlines 22,00% 78,00% 0,00%
Aegean Airlines 23,60% 76,00% 0,40%
Virgin Blue 74,74% 25,26% 0,00%
S7 Airlines 25,50% 74,50% 0,00%
Ural Airlines 19,50% 14,50% 66,00% 0,00%
Brussels Airlines 55,00% 45,00% 0,00%
Eurowings 51,00% 49,00% 0,00%
Virgin Atlantic Airways 51,00% 49,00% 0,00%
Malév 49,00% 51,00% 0,00%
easyJet 49,90% 50,10% 0,00%
bmi 50,01% 49,99% 0,00%
flybe 50,00% 15,00% 35,00%  
Table 4.17 Airlines with largest closely-held shareholders in Europe 
The second type of European closely-held carrier consists of seven airlines 
(including Tuifly) that have a substantial block of shares controlled by another 
airline, Iberia for ClickAir, Lufthansa for Brussels Airlines (a greatly pared-
down Sabena) and for Eurowings, SIA for Virgin Atlantic, Lufthansa and SAS 
for bmi (soon to be 100% LH), and British Airways for Flybe.  This pattern 
largely confirms the assertion in Chang and Williams (2001) that the moves 
have been intended to gain access (notably slots) in neighbouring countries, 
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with a second group (flybe, Eurowings) part of the major carriers’ on and off 
flirtation with new business models run separately from the mainline carrier. 
There are entrepreneurial start-ups of the kind identified in Asia above, 
including easyJet, Aegean Airlines, AirOne (now merging with Alitalia), and 
Meridiana, and the late Silverjet.  A significant difference from their Asian 
peers is that the majority of successful European start-ups were put into IPOs 
and are no longer closely-held after there start-up phase: this group includes 
Ryanair, SkyEurope (bankrupt in September 2009), Vueling, and Air Berlin.  
The start-up/IPO/listed western entrepreneurial pattern is more consistent with 
classical valuation (including corporate valuation) and hence closer to 
classical financial theory. 
A final significant group comprises eastern European and Russian airlines, 
either started up or rescued from the wreckage of the Russian aviation 
meltdown after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989.  Airlines such as 
AeroSvit, S7, Ural Airlines and Malev tend to have a rather murky disclosure 
of shareholdings, which include diverse groups including government, listed, 
and institutional investors.  This governance pattern suggests rather tortuous 
capital budgeting procedures and attendant management practices.     
North America 
Closely-held airlines in North America produce only 9% of the regions RPKs.  
Among the group in Table 4.18, 84% of the group’s RPKs are produce by 
four: Aeroméxico, Air Transat, Mexicana and Air Canada.   
Airline Government Listed
Institutional 
investors Closely held Employees
Other 
airline N.S.
Aeroméxico 100.00% 0.00%
Air Transat 100.00% 0.00%
Air Wisconsin 100.00% 0.00%
Aviacsa 100.00% 0.00%
Evergreen International Airlines 100.00% 0.00%
GoJet 100.00% 0.00%
Kalitta Air 100.00% 0.00%
Mexicana 100.00% 0.00%
Omni Air International 100.00% 0.00%
Trans States Airlines 100.00% 0.00%
USA 3000 Airlines 100.00% 0.00%
Air Caraibes 85.00% 15.00%
Air Canada 25.00% 75.00% 0.00%  
Table 4.18: Airlines with largest closely-held shareholders in North America 
Mexicana is since 2005 owned by travel group Posada after the failed “Cintra 
Group” combination with Aeroméxico, while the latter is now controlled by 
entrepreneur Jose Luis Barrazza.  Air Transat is a North Atlantic charter 
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carrier serving tourist markets.  By far the largest of the four, Air Canada has 
been through a lengthy restructuring since the bankruptcy in the wake of 9/11, 
and is currently controlled by investor group BCE Holdings.  The rest of these 
airlines are niche carriers, largely held by individuals or small groups of private 
investors.   
South America 
South America RPKs are 68% provided by closely held companies, making 
this governance pattern the dominant one in the region.  Further, the closely 
held shareholdings are in most cases strongly dominant over other types of 
shareholders, as Table 4.19 shows.   
Airline Government Listed
Institutional 
investors Closely held Employees
Other 
airline N.S.
Avianca 100.00% 0.00%
Grupo TACA 100.00% 0.00%
OceanAir 100.00% 0.00%
TAM Linhas Aéreas 100.00% 0.00%
BRA Transportes Aéreos 20.00% 80.00% 0.00%
Aerolíneas Argentinas 20.00% 77.00% 3.00% 0.00%
LAN Airlines 26.80% 73.20% 0.00%
Copa Airlines 51.00% 10.00% 39.00%  
Table 4.19: Airlines with largest closely-held shareholders in South America 
The largest airline in the group, TAM Linhas Aéreas, is controlled by Brazil’s 
Amaro family (with 54%), while LAN Airlines, the second largest, is controlled 
by an informal consortium of the Piñera and Cueto families (28% and 27% 
respectively), and completed by the Eblen Group with 17%.  LAN’s free-float 
of 26.8%, listed on the Santiago and New York stock exchanges makes it the 
most transparent of these closely-held companies, with extensive annual 
reports providing insight into the company’s management and accounts 
prepared under both Chilean and U.S. accounting standards.   Panama’s 
Copa is only major South American carrier with a significant share held by 
another airline, with 10% held by Continental of the U.S.   The chronically 
unprofitable Aerolineas Argentinas was controlled in 2001 by Iberia, a stake 
then sold to Spanish travel company Grupo Marsans.  By 2007, the Argentine 
government had re-taken a 20% shareholding, and subsequently announced 
in October 2008 its intention to re-nationalize the airline.  Aérolineas is thus 
the exception in a South American region which shows a clear pattern toward 
closely-held ownership, and with the emergence of strong international 
players leading consolidation in the region. 
Institutional investor-controlled airlines worldwide 
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This research distinguishes institutional investor control from other closely-
held airlines.  Institutional investors are defined as banks, mutual funds, 
insurance companies, which play no direct role in the airline management, 
while seeking investor returns valued in the classical manner.  This is the 
most challenging group to identify among worldwide airlines, because the 
disclosure of such shareholding varies from region to region and country to 
country.   Using ATI as a uniform source, the companies in Table 4.20 were 
clearly identified as majority owned by institutions, and the airlines’ country 
and region are included.    
Airline Country Region
Governme
nt Listed
Institutional 
investors Closely held Employees
Other 
airline
Air Do Japan Asia-Pacific 96,07% 3,93%
Air Nostrum (Iberia Regional) Spain Europe 97,50% 3,00%
Volga-Dnepr Airlines Russia Europe 84,00% 16,00%
UTair Aviation Russia Europe 24,31% 75,69%
VIM Airlines Russia Europe 25,00% 75,00%
Blue Panorama Airlines Italy Europe 66,60% 33,40%
Astraeus UK Europe 51,00% 49,00%
Hamburg International Germany Europe 50,01% 49,99%
Luxair Luxembourg Europe 23,10% 38,60% 13,00%
El Al Israel Middle East 21,97% 31,36% 39,50% 8,12%
North American Airlines USA North America 100,00%
Sun Country Airlines USA North America 100,00%
Spirit Airlines USA North America 51,00% 49,00%   
Table 4.20: Airlines with largest institutional investors worldwide 
The most striking feature of this group is that for the most part, the majority 
institutional shareholding is held by a single institution.  Japan’s Mizuho Asset 
Ltd., part of the Mizuho investment bank, owned the 96.07% share in 
Japanese start-up Air Do in 2007, making the airline a “pure” institutional 
investor play.  The majority of the airlines disclosing institutional majority 
ownership are in Europe.  Air Nostrum, a significant player in Iberia’s strategic 
move to build a hub in Madrid, and also had a single dominant investor, 
NEFINSA S.A., which owned 75.5%.  S 
Similar patterns exist at  Blue Panorama (Distal & Itr Group 66.6%), Astraeus 
(Northern Lights 51%), North American (part of Global Air Logistics in turn 
controlled by MaitlinPatterson), Sun Country (Petters Group, currently in 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, and Spirit Airlines (Oaktree Capital, 51%).   
The major exceptions to this single-institution pattern were largely in Russia, 
whose three airlines in Table 4.20 are controlled by a long list of institutional 
investors whose nature and shareholding are very difficult to determine 
through public-domain sources, another indication of the opacity of the 
Russian financing environment.  
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Another exception was El Al, in which investor group Knafaim-Aria Holdings 
only held 39.5%, making it the largest minority shareholder in one of the 
world’s most politically-charged airlines.  
In this research, privately-held airlines showed a tendency to use the classical 
financial valuation techniques consistent with the survey results as a whole.  
Gibson and Morrell (2005) found that the 13 airlines stating their majority 
shareholder as “private” (closely-held) exhibited strong tendency to use NPV 
and PBK, somewhat less pronounced than the listed carriers.  The preference 
for NPV over IRR is similar to that found in airlines worldwide.  Only slightly 
more than half of these 13 carriers used accounting measures of profitability 
(ARR), showing that these techniques were quite a bit less popular than 
among listed carriers.  Similarly, they were less likely to use APV and ROA 
than their listed counterparts, and indeed, less likely to use these advanced 
techniques than the total sample of airlines responding to the survey.  
Percentage of Airline CFOs using techniques
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
IRR
NPV
PBK
ARR
ROA
APV
Sometimes or always use (all responding) Sometimes or always use (listed)
Sometimes or always use (Closely held)  
Figure 4.11: Frequency of valuation techniques used by all airlines, listed airlines & majority closely-held 
airlines 
4.2.9. Other airline-owned carrier equity finance and investment analysis 
The final type of equity ownership analysed in this research is large airlines 
owned by other airlines.  This type of ownership is present in Asia, Europe, 
and North America, and quite distinctly absent in the Middle East, Africa and 
South America.  This group is striking in two ways.  First, airlines do not share 
ownership of subsidiaries: in all cases, there is a single airline parent of the 
majority share.  Second, the ownership share of the parent airlines is near or 
at 100% in 40 of the 52 companies majority-owned by other airlines.  These 
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two features give the parent companies complete control over the 
management of these captive subsidiaries, which has major considerations 
regarding strategic management decisions, investment analysis, and the 
application of classical financial analysis techniques at the level of the 
subsidiary. 
In Asia-Pacific, several patterns emerge.   
Airline Government Listed
Institutional 
investors Closely held Employees
Other 
airline
China Eastern Airlines Wuhan 100,00%
Continental Micronesia 100,00%
Deccan 100,00%
Dragon Air 100,00%
JetLite 100,00%
Jetstar 100,00%
QantasLink 100,00%
SilkAir 100,00%
Japan TransOcean Air 12,90% 17,00% 70,10%
China Xinhua Airlines 40,00% 60,00%
Xiamen Airlines 40,00% 60,00%
Sichuan Airlines 41,00% 59,00%   
Table 4.21: Airlines with largest other-airline ownership in Asia-Pacific 
Dragon Air and Silk Air are clear strategic plays by their parent companies, 
respectively Cathay Pacific and Singapore Airlines.  The first was a successful 
attempt to open Hong-Kong-Beijing (and other mainland China) destinations, 
while Silk Air allowed Singapore Airlines to experiment with a lower-cost 
operating model to open extensive short and medium-range services in its 
immediate vicinity, primarily Malaysia and Indonesia.  In a very similar vein, 
Jetstar was started by Qantas to serve regional markets using a low-cost 
business model, with management and labour agreements separate from that 
of the parent.  The reasons behind this model – i.e., market access - are quite 
similar to those identified in Chang and Williams (2001) in a European context, 
with the difference that the parent control is absolute.  The absolute control 
implies limitations of network patterns to the first four freedoms of the air, with 
fifth freedom rights dependent on the bilateral service agreements in place.  
The full advantages of point-to-point service to optimize aircraft utilisation are 
limited for these carriers. 
A second group reflects the ongoing consolidation in the fast-growing and 
highly dynamic Indian market, comprising Deccan (taken over by Kingfisher) 
and JetLite (formerly Sahara, taken over by Jet).  Again, the airlines are 100% 
subsidiaries of the parent companies. 
   
Chapter 4: Financial markets, airline ownership and investment analysis 145
The third and largest group of four airline subsidiaries is in China, which once 
again shows equity financing pattern distinct from the other countries of the 
world.  First of all, the ownership is less than 100%, except for the anomaly of 
China Eastern Wuhan Airlines: though the airline continues to report results 
separately, the airline should be consolidated under China Eastern following 
the consolidation of Chinese airlines into the “big three.”  China Xinhua is 60% 
owned by Hainan Airlines, the first privately-owned airline in the P.R.C.  The 
China Xinhua brand will probably “swallow” the parent airline brand, reflecting 
the ambition to go beyond the traditional Hainan/tourist-based operations of 
the airlines. 
Xiamen Airlines is 60% owned by China Southern, while Sichuan is the only 
airline showing a mixed ownership (China Southern 39%, Shanghai and 
Shandong 10% each).   Neither Xiamen nor Sichuan was started by its current 
parent airline, with identities and operations closely affiliated with their 
regional governments.  Operations and the brands are currently completely 
separate from that of China Southern, though one must assume that growth, 
air services and frequency decisions are strongly influenced by the 
Guangzhou-based carrier.  In both cases, the airline parent shares are 
complemented by closely held blocks associated with their regional roots. 
The remaining airlines (Continental Micronesia, Qantaslink, Japan 
TransOcean Air are far less significant than the others, fundamentally 
representing air service connections to thinly-populated islands in the 
respective catchment areas. 
Europe 
The ongoing European airline consolidation, as described in Chang and 
Williams (2001 & 2004), is fully reflected in the other-airline owned category in 
the region.   
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Airline operation
Government 
share
Listed 
share
Institutional 
investors 
share
Closely held 
share
Employees 
share
Other airline 
share
Austrian Arrows 100.00%
Blue1 100.00%
bmibaby 100.00%
Brit Air 100.00%
CityJet 100.00%
Condor Flugdienst 100.00%
Edelweiss Air 100.00%
GB Airways 100.00%
germanwings 100.00%
Martinair 100.00%
Monarch Scheduled 100.00%
Régional 100.00%
SunExpress 100.00%
Swiss 100.00%
Swiss European Air Lines 100.00%
Thomas Cook Airlines Belgium 100.00%
Transavia Airlines 100.00%
Spanair 5.10% 94.90%
Travel Service Airlines 34.00% 66.00%
Eurofly 15.74% 38.16% 46.10%
Cargolux Airlines International 34.00% 31.10% 34.90%  
 
 
Table 4.22: Airlines with largest other-airline ownership in Europe 
The tendency toward 100% equity ownership of these airlines heralds a new 
approach compared to the minority-share strategy which led to the SAir Group 
debacle of 2001.  These more clear ownership patterns have been made 
possible by internal European open skies policies and Europe-wide ownership 
rules codified in the 2008 “Open Skies” agreement with the U.S.   
Of the 21 airlines in this group, fully eight involve Lufthansa’s extensive 
subsidiary strategy recent airline acquisitions:  Austrian Arrows, bmibaby, 
Condor, Edelweiss, germanwings, SunExpress, Swiss, and Swiss European 
are all either direct (Condor, SunExpress and Swiss) or indirect subsidiaries of 
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Lufthansa, a group of wholly-controlled subsidiaries soon to fully include 
Austrian, Brussels Airlines, and bmi.   
An additional five wholly-owned subsidiaries – BritAir, CityJet, MartinAir, 
Regional, and Transavia – are part of Air France-KLM’s European 
consolidation and regional expansion strategy.  Regional Airlines has been 
part of the French group’s hub development strategy for many years, BritAir 
and CityJet are inroads into the U.K. market, while Martin-Air and Transavia 
were inherited with the Air France KLM merger. 
A third much smaller group of strategic plays includes’ SAS’ Blue1 and 
Spanair, bringing the total of major-owned airlines in this group to 15 of the 21.  
The other airlines are composed of indirect travel group control - Eurofly 
(46.1% owned by Meridiana), Thomas Cook Belgium, smaller airline 
subsidiaries - Travel Service Airlines (Icelandair), Cargolux (Luxair), and GB 
Airways (easyJet), and the anomaly “Monarch Scheduled”, part of Monarch 
Airlines. 
Wholly airline-owned equity in North America reflects trends strikingly similar 
to those in Europe.     
Airline Government Listed
Institutional 
investors Closely held Employees
Other 
airline
Air Canada Jazz 100.00%
American Eagle Airlines 100.00%
ATA Airlines 100.00%
Atlantic Southeast Airlines 100.00%
Chautauqua Airlines 100.00%
Click Mexicana 100.00%
Comair 100.00%
Freedom Airlines 100.00%
Horizon Air 100.00%
Midwest Airlines 100.00%
Shuttle America 100.00%
SkyWest Airlines 100.00%
US Airways Express 100.00%
World Airways 100.00%
Varig 100.00%
AeroRepública 99.90%
Austral Lineas Aereas 5.00% 95.00%
SAM Colombia 6.00% 94.00%   
Table 4.23: Airlines with largest other-airline ownership in the Americas 
While consolidation is underway – one might say, finally underway - the 
reasons for holding airline subsidiaries are quite different than in Europe, 
since the U.S. never suffered from internal “bilateral” restrictions on domestic 
consolidation across the states.  American Eagle, Comair and Midwest belong 
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to American, Delta and Northwest (now Delta), and operate as hub feeders for 
their respective carriers.   
Many of the point-to-point, low-fare airline ventures started by North American 
majors (including Delta Express and United’s short-lived division ted, for 
example) have ceased operation over the years.  Air Canada Jazz, US 
Airways Express, and Click Mexicana continued today to represent this model 
of subsidiary. 
Airline consolidation in the U.S. is typified by the five relatively small airlines 
owned by larger, purely domestic U.S. carriers, including Atlantic Southeast 
(SkyWest), Chautauqua and Shuttle America (Republic), Freedom Airlines 
(Mesa Group), and Horizon Air (Alaska Air).  ATA and World Airways have a 
mixed government-private transport business model, and are owned by 
Global Aero Logistics, which could justifiably be considered either an airline or 
a private investor group.  
South America 
In South America, other airline ownership is the exception rather than the 
rule12.  As shown above, dominant and most successful ownership model in 
the region is closely-held (largely family) ownership and control.  The 
exceptions prove the rule.  Brazil’s former second carrier Varig is now owned 
by GOL, an operation the very successful low-fare carrier has yet to turn 
around.  The Colombian market has been in near-chaos since the collapse of 
ACES and Avianca in 2001.  SAM Colombia, including what remains of these 
two merged in 2002 into SAM, is now the country’s second producer of RPKs 
to AeroRepublica, owned by Panama’s closely-held Copa.   Finally Austral 
Lineas Aéreas, a domestic subsidiary of Aérolineas Argentinas, is bound up in 
the parent company’s governance struggle between Grupo Marsans and the 
Argentine government. 
Given the dominance of the parent company’s strategy and the difficulties of 
consolidation, these airlines’ managers have their “hands tied,” to a large 
extent unable to apply the financial analysis techniques used by stand-alone 
carriers.  The responses from the six airline CFOs from this group of airline 
subsidiaries definitely confirm this intuition.   
                                                 
12 This may be changing with the recently-announced TACA/Avianca airline group, purported 
to encompass nine airlines in total 
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Percentage of Airline CFOs using techniques
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Figure 4.12: Frequency of valuation techniques used by all airlines, listed airlines & other airline-owned 
airlines 
Of the analytical techniques in wide use elsewhere in the industry, none was 
stated as used even sometimes by a majority of CFOs.  PBK was the most 
commonly used, while the classical techniques found use in fewer than three 
responding airlines.  IRR was slightly more frequently used than NPV, as 
would be appropriate for a firm without its own cost of capital.  
As a whole, this group of companies was found to be by far the least likely to 
use classical financial analysis techniques, less even than the government-
owned carrier respondents, allowing the inference that their fleet decisions are 
largely made for them by parent companies.  
4.2.10. Conclusions 
Due to the information revolution, historical financial market information is 
increasingly and readily available to airline managers worldwide.  Banking and 
capital markets are similarly developing in most regions, and the existence 
listed airlines in all of the world’s regions – with the notably exception of the 
Middle East - shows that capital-market equity is available for the airlines with 
investor-friendly business models.  Regarding access to debt financing, 
aircraft deliveries worldwide show that airlines can access long-term funding 
for the acquisition of aircraft, even if many require Export Credit Agency-
guaranteed finance to access long-term financing.  The worldwide availability 
of aircraft finance is distinctly true in the aviation industry, even in countries 
where the predominant debt financing pattern may be short-term funding.  The 
increasing availability of market information, and the accessibility of market-
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based financing that marks the airline industry, both indicate that there is no 
reason airlines worldwide cannot use classical financial valuation methods to 
justify aircraft investments, if managers are directed to do so. 
On the other hand, the governance models displayed around the world are 
not uniformly based on the western-style diffuse ownership/capital market 
funding approach and management-ownership split that underpins classical 
financial theory.  The detailed analysis of airline governance in this chapter 
reveals many different equity finance & governance patterns among the 
world’s regions.  These differences are summarized in Table 4.24 on the next 
page.  The shaded square denotes the largest producer of the RPKs in the 
region.  Listing is “only” dominant in Europe and North America.  The majority 
of RPKs in Asia Pacific, Middle East and Africa are produced by government-
owned airlines.   Latin America production is strongly dominated by family 
groups.  The text in each box summarizes the dominant airline business 
models with accompanying equity finance and governance characteristics.   
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 Africa* Asia Pacific Europe Middle East North America 
South 
America 
Listed on 
public share 
markets 
• Kenya Airways 
early alliance 
with KLM 
• Majors 
• Entrepreneurial start-
ups 
• Mixed ownership 
(China) 
• All successful 
majors 
• LCC start-up / IPO 
plays 
• Start-ups only 
 
• All majors 
• LCC start-up 
/ IPO plays 
• Start-ups 
only  
 
Government 
owned 
• Traditional flag 
carriers 
 
• Mature network 
carriers 
• Emerging majors 
(China, Viet Nam) 
• Growth economies 
in Southern and 
Eastern Europe 
• “Remains” of the 
privatization wave  
• Traditional 
flag carriers 
• Sixth-
freedom 
carriers 
• None in large 
airline group 
• None in 
large 
airline 
group 
Closely or 
institutionally 
owned 
• None in large 
airline group 
• Families dominant 
• Group control minor 
• Travel groups 
dominant 
• Entrepreneurial 
start-ups 
• None in large 
airline group 
•  • Families 
dominant 
Other airline 
owned 
• None in large 
airline group 
• Market access plays 
• Indian and Chinese 
consolidation 
• Driven by 
consolidation 
• Feeder airline 
control 
• LCC start-ups 
• None in large 
airline group 
• Driven by 
consolidation 
• Feeder 
airline control 
• LCC start-
ups 
• None in 
large 
airline 
group 
Table 4.24: Summary of production-dominant governance model and equity investment patterns by region
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The analysis in this chapter shows that the world’s airlines tend to have a 
strongly dominant type of governance (government, private, listed, other airline).  
Each region has a set of ownership patterns, as discussed and summarized 
above in Table 4.24.  The airline business as a whole grew RPKs by 6.9% over 
the five year period, and produced an aggregate 2.2% operating profit margin, 
as depicted in 4.13.  In aggregate over the 2004-2008 period, all save the 
largest North American regions exceeded these averages, in varying degrees.  
Both operating profit margins and the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 
RPKs have been highest in the Middle East (dominated by government 
ownership) and South America (dominated by family-owned airlines), compared 
with the larger and more mature markets of the northern hemisphere.   
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Figure 4.13: Profits and growth in the world’s aviation regions, 2004-2008 
The ownership model selected or imposed by ASA agreements and national 
authorities, and the attendant incentives to management, have been shown to 
influence the adoption and use of classical financial valuation techniques 
worldwide.  As 4.14 below shows, growth strategies have been pursued most 
strongly in growth markets by closely-held and government-owned airlines.  
The closely-held group (led by South American carriers) is the only ownership 
pattern showing above-average profit margins, while the government-owned 
airlines have equalled the industry average over the period. 
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Figure 4.14: Profits, growth and largest share ownership, 2004-2008 
Listed airlines in aggregate achieved the industry average profit levels, while 
growing at substantially lower rates.  These aggregate figures are somewhat 
distorted by the disastrous performance of North American carriers, marked by 
Chapter 11 bankruptcies among three of the four largest airlines in the U.S. and 
the world (United, Delta, and Northwest).  When the North American region is 
excluded, the listed carrier profit margins led the industry, with a 4.3% margin 
over the period.  This performance has been led by the listed European carriers, 
which have opened a clear path toward airline consolidation and profit-oriented 
management, including the application of Value-Based Management 
techniques derived from classical financial theory.  The lowest-growth/lowest-
profit ‘other airline’-owned group has been shown in this chapter to be the least 
likely to employ classical valuation techniques. 
The 37 Airline CFOs responding to the survey in this research – from airlines 
representing all ownership patterns - revealed substantial use of the “basic” 
NPV/PBK valuation methods.  Estimation of the all-important discount rate 
parameter has shown to be challenging even for listed companies, implying that 
listing and statistical techniques such as CAPM are not in themselves sufficient 
to capture project risks.  This research now turns to the questions of estimating 
these risks, most of which are embedded in the fleet planning assumptions and 
process, and the potential and practiced methods to value them in the 
investment appraisal. 
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5. Fleet planning and investment appraisal 
Selection, acquisition and disposal the aircraft fleet are major strategic 
projects for airline managers: a robust investment valuation should fully 
incorporate the risk of such projects.  This chapter aims to reveal the sources 
of uncertainty inherent in the planning process and the underlying 
assumptions about future economic conditions, as well as specific airline and 
aircraft performance.   
First, the evolution of the fleet planning strategic drivers and techniques is 
reviewed, beginning in the regulated period of the 1970s and continuing to the 
present day.  The key strategic decision parameters are identified, and 
contributions from the academic literature are reviewed.   
Second, the influence of manufacturer product decisions and information 
provided to airlines worldwide is discussed in this chapter.  Aircraft investment 
decisions commit the company to aircraft manufacturers and types over many 
years, and create a long-term and deep relationship between airlines and 
makers of aircraft, regarding deliveries, entry into service support including 
spare parts provisioning & crew training, product support over the time the 
aircraft is in operation, and potentially, disposal of the aircraft.     
Common to all fleet planning processes is a set of assumptions concerning 
the economic environment, traffic patterns at the both market and airline 
levels, and aircraft characteristics.  These uncertain assumptions are 
identified, and analysed with responses from a panel of fleet planning 
practitioners. 
Finally, the interactions between fleet planning processes and decisions and 
the investment appraisal process are analysed beginning in this chapter.  
Each airline organizes the planning processes differently, even if the 
departments involved follow the general pattern outlined in Chapter One of 
this research.  This research seeks to establish the positioning of the 
investment appraisal within the fleet planning process, the relevance of 
classical financial metrics such as NPV, and its importance (or irrelevance) in 
fleet decisions.  The place and importance of investment appraisal are 
established by a series of interviews of fleet planning managers from airlines, 
and fleet finance experts from financial firms.  The interviews revealed three 
distinct approaches to the fleet planning process, the first of which is 
discussed in this chapter. 
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The importance accorded to the investment valuation prepares and conditions 
the application of risk valuation methods to the airline investment problem are 
discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 of this research. 
5.1. Strategic issues in fleet planning 
5.1.1. Strategic drivers of long-haul route development 
Underlying fleet decisions are company strategies for route development.  
Weber and Williams (2001) made a sweeping survey of the drivers of long-
haul route development, citing five major areas of relevance to fleet planners 
and to this research.  Geography favours economic development in 
concentrated urban areas, some of which become “gateway” cities and 
“world” cities for transportation.  These cities are characterised by dominant 
economic positions in their own regions, strong economic connections to 
activities in other such hubs, and an inherent attractiveness to travellers.  This 
last condition is very important for fleet development, because it implies a dual 
purpose for such gateways: as a hub for connecting traffic, and as a 
destination in its own right.  Powerful examples of such cities are London and 
New York.   To see the difference between hub and gateway, San Francisco 
or Miami can be compared to New York or Los Angeles: while both are very 
important hubs, with a combined total 75m passengers a year, they do not 
compare with the New York or Los Angeles total of 67m each.  In Europe, the 
gateway of London with 97m passengers (LHR and LGW combined) dwarfs 
even major hubs such as Paris CDG with 48m and Frankfurt with 49m.  The 
picture in Asia is more balanced, with Hong Kong’s 30m passengers 
comparable to Singapore’s 28m or Bangkok’s 23m13.    
Weber and Williams discussed the geographic “inertia” or “lock-in” that tends 
to keep gateway cities in their dominant positions, in spite of subsequent 
economic movements in their regions.  They suggest that with the current 
state of jet aircraft passenger load/range capabilities, intermediate stops are 
only a necessity in the rarest of circumstances (London to Auckland, for 
example), a fact that implies that these gateway cities now serve two distinct 
and dissociable functions, which can be isolated by planners: first is that of 
gathering ‘behind’ traffic and dispatching ‘beyond’ traffic through the hub, 
connecting and transporting that traffic over the long haul.  The second is that 
of transporting passengers directly and only to or from the gateway city itself.  
Interviews with airline executives performed as part of this research show the 
importance of these two roles for airlines operating in such gateway cities. 
                                                 
13 Airport traffic figures are from Oum and Yu (2004) 
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Regulation was cited by the authors as a second major driver, and rigidities 
created by the bilateral ASAs have been discussed in this research.  For fleet 
planners, a further feature of the Chicago Convention (beyond landing rights) 
is the right of each ICAO state to control access to its own airspace.  This 
creates a set of artificial requirements and economic consequences to route 
planning and aircraft evaluation.  The most apparent example of this is the 
Russian airspace overflight fee which survived the collapse of the U.S.S.R. 
and remains in force today (despite a previous “commitment” to abandon the 
fee in 2012).   
Another key driver is the manufacturers and their product strategies.  Weber 
and Williams discussed and evaluated Boeing’s view that the evolution toward 
more multilateral and/or less restricted air service agreements (the latest of 
which is the EU-US accord reached in 2008), held to encourage fragmentation 
of markets, reducing the role of the gateway cities and expanding point-to-
point travel opportunities.  The influence of manufacturer product decisions 
and forecasts on fleet planning information, and potential strategic 
uncertainties they induce, are discussed below. 
Negative passenger reaction to long-haul direct service had been expected by 
many observers to limit the development of long-haul hub-to-hub.  Weber and 
Williams discussed the negative medical and psychological effects of long-
haul travel, both in the air (DVT, mild dehydration, boredom, anxiety) and on 
the ground (jet lag and temporal disorientation, especially on eastbound 
travel).  However, they found that these effects have proven not to be 
deterrents to long haul direct service, particularly on business routes, where 
O-D time remains the predominant driver of itinerary choice.  In support of this 
position, the authors cite the success of direct New York-Tokyo service 
enabled by the 747SP and later the 747-400’s enabling of Los Angeles-
Sydney services by United and Qantas. 
Finally, airline choices of services were found to favour the strengthening of 
gateways such as Los Angeles, where traffic growth was found to be much 
greater than that of “primary hubs” such as Atlanta, and “secondary” hubs 
such as Denver.  Analysing the London-Beijing route, Weber and Williams 
developed and calibrated a Competitiveness of Service Index (CSI) model, 
and found that weekly frequency, O-D travel time, stopovers (with or without 
aircraft changes), and additional “service-related factors” related to non-stop 
and direct service were highly predictive of observed market shares in this 
market.   
Aircraft adoption is not of course limited to serving long-haul markets.  The 
fundamental choices airlines must make prior to adopting fleet solutions were 
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outlined by Maurice Pollack in 1982, in a framework he dubbed Route-
Frequency (R-F) planning.  Pollack argues that R-F planning is the necessary 
starting point for any coherent fleet plan.  The heart of this approach is a set of 
service-level trade-offs to be resolved by management, each of which has 
profound implications for the airlines’ fleet plan.  Most of these trade-offs are 
still hotly debated in airline planning departments today: 
1. Connecting flights vs. direct service 
2. Frequency of service vs. aircraft size and layout  
3. Frequency of service and premium pricing vs. achieved load factor 
4. Longer-range vs. shorter-range aircraft requiring stops 
5. Non-stop vs. one-stop vs. multi-stop as a service attribute 
Common to all of these trade-offs is the need to arbitrate between the size of 
the aircraft operated vs. the number of flights required to offer competitive 
advantage in deregulated airline markets. 
5.1.2. Aircraft size and service frequency 
Fleet development in the wake of deregulation – and specifically the size of 
aircraft needed to serve deregulated markets – has been a constant source of 
debate from the 1970s to the present day.  Douglas and Miller’s 1974 book 
Economic Regulation of Domestic Air Transport (hereafter D&M 1974) was 
highly influential in the subsequent deregulation of U.S. aviation markets.  In it, 
the authors developed the thesis that because prices were highly regulated by 
route, airlines were forced to compete by offering greater flight frequency.   
In Brown’s (1992) interpretation and test of D&M 1974 and subsequent fleet 
developments, the D&M model implied that airlines in a deregulated 
environment would drop this frequency-based strategy, adopt larger aircraft 
with lower seat costs, and compete based on fares, supported by the lower 
unit costs of larger shells.  Airlines would drop thin routes, and concentrate 
capacity on the denser routes, served by larger aircraft.  Success in the 
market would thus gravitate to the lowest-cost airlines, i.e., those with the 
most modern and lowest seat-cost aircraft.  Brown (1992) carried this 
interpretation of D&M 1974 to an extreme, inferring that larger aircraft should 
serve dense routes, long-haul routes, and tourist routes where connection 
time is not an issue: in short, aircraft should get larger following the 1978 
deregulation14.    
                                                 
14 Brown noted in his article that a referee criticized the “over-simplification” of D&M 1974, but 
defended his interpretation as a “simple extrapolation” of earlier work on the subject.  
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In his econometric test of the inference, Brown performed a multiple 
regression of pre- and post-deregulation of U.S. carrier fleet composition from 
1970-1989, as a function of hub size (using the FAA’s categorisation of large, 
medium and small hubs), number of passengers, and stage length, along with 
the conventional constant and error terms.  In the first test, Brown found no 
significant relation of aircraft size to the regression variables (R2 of 0.0444) in 
the post-regulation period.  Aircraft utilisation defined as trips per aircraft in the 
fleet was shown to bear a weak 0.288 R2 on the negative relationship to large 
and medium hubs and to stage length, as well as a very small positive relation 
to passenger numbers: frequency did decrease slightly at larger hubs, as the 
hub-and-spoke model took hold in the 1980s. 
When Brown examined the relationships between the network size and shape 
and aircraft types, findings confirmed his earlier fleet-side analysis, but also 
revealed two flaws in his study.  He finds airlines strongly adopting the 727, 
737 and DC9 at large hubs, less strongly adopting the newer twins (A300, 757 
and 767), moving away from the DC10 and L1011, with a moderate adoption 
of the 747.  From this Brown concludes that airlines did not move to larger 
aircraft as deregulation proceeded, stating that “regulation did not distort 
airline choices of aircraft so much that airlines had to drastically alter their 
fleets in the deregulated environment.”   
During the early period of airline de-regulation, major changes in aircraft 
technology were introduced.  For example, the introduction of the B737 in 
1984 began its ascendancy as a workhorse, and 651 737s had been 
delivered by 1989.  Douglas only delivered 42 DC-10s in the 1980s, compared 
to 236 A300s, and 283 B 757s15.  These successes had more to do with 
technological advances, notably improvements in engine performance and the 
accompanying rejection of tri-jets, than with deregulation per se.  Aircraft are 
not just about size. 
Adrangi et al. (1999) attempted to deal with technological advances while 
using an econometric model very similar to Brown’s.  The authors tested the 
adoption of twin-engine wide-bodied aircraft (i.e., A300 and 767) by nine U.S. 
carriers from 1978 to 1990.  The regression variables used to explain adoption 
of twins were airline profits, and the 8-firm concentration ratio (CR).  This latter 
is the sum of the market shares of the largest eight airlines in the market.  
Adrangi et al. found that the CR in the U.S. moved up from 72% in 1978 to 
91% in 1990, i.e., the industry was already concentrated pre-deregulation, and 
                                                 
15 The delivery figures used throughout this chapter come from Airbus.  A complete table of 
deliveries is provided in Appendix D. 
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became more so post-deregulation16.  The regression analysis revealed an R2 
of 0.622, with both airline profits and the industry CR reliable predictors of the 
adoption of wide-body twins over the deregulated period.  As always with 
econometric estimations (and regression more generally), one is left without 
certainty of cause and effect between the dependent and independent 
variables: do airlines adopt twins because they are profitable, or were they 
profitable because they adopted twins?  The same conundrum clearly applies 
to airline industry concentration.  Be that as it may, the authors concur with 
Brown (1992) that “adoption of technologically advanced aircraft has not 
changed significantly since deregulation.”  Airlines do adopt recent technology, 
but this was not found to be driven by deregulation. 
These purely statistical studies do not provide much insight for practitioners of 
forward-looking fleet planning and investment appraisal, as they are based on 
historical data: more concrete context is needed.  Of greater interest are a 
series of articles by Wei and Hansen (2003, 2005), in which the authors built 
demand and cost functions, to demonstrate how airlines may view the trade-
off between aircraft size and frequency in strategic planning.  They pointed out 
several times during the series of articles that previous research did not 
examine the aircraft sizing question central to airline fleet planning.   
The market share model in Wei and Hansen (2005) is based on a two-level 
demand model. The upper level models the binary choice between air travel 
and alternative forms of travel in a utility framework, driven largely by income 
levels in the origin and destination.  The lower level models the utility of 
travellers who choose to fly on airline j as Vjm, as an elasticity function of four 
attributes: 
)ln()ln()ln()ln( jmjmjmjmjm FaretyAvailabiliSizeFrequencyV γηβα +++= ..... 5.1 
The log-linear form is used to allow linear regression of data from the U.S. 
market.  The model was then adapted to a market-share form between two 
airlines, in order to test passenger choice as conditioned by flight frequency, 
aircraft size, the availability of seats for point-to-point travel, and the fare.   
The authors tested the model on non-stop markets dominated by two carriers.  
To identify these markets, they used data from the U.S. Department of 
Transportation, including both market-level data reported by airlines and a 
10% sample of boarding passes issued to passengers, in quarterly time 
increments.  The authors analysed markets dominated by two carriers, where 
                                                 
16 Airline concentration with its potential reduction of competitive pressures is a constant 
source of concern to U.S. aviation regulators, witness the persistent travails of airlines 
seeking antitrust immunity over the North Atlantic 
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both origination and destination was a hub airport for at least one of the 
competing carriers, and where each carrier offered at least one daily 
frequency.    
The 13 markets chosen included just one mega-hub, Atlanta, with the other 
cities representing medium-sized continental U.S. hubs.  Southwest was a 
competing airline in six of the 13 markets.  The other carriers were Delta, 
TWA, Northwest, U.S. Airways, and now-defunct Hawaiian Pacific). The 
choice of markets and airlines implies a test of the service and demand 
dynamics of network carriers compared to point-to-point airlines such as 
Southwest.  In this regard, the availability term in the model is interesting, as it 
measured the number of seats left empty at the passenger’s origination, in the 
case of connecting service through a hub.  After an initial test showed that 
passenger utility was not affected by different combinations of aircraft size and 
available seats on a flight-by-flight basis, a second model was run in which 
these variables were combined as the product of availability and size denoted 
Seats.  This approach does capture one potentially disutility of choosing a 
connecting service, while at the same time clouds the issue of aircraft size 
slightly: the authors’ definition of Seats is not the same attribute as the 
absolute size of the aircraft. 
Wei and Hansen found the four service attributes to be highly predictive of 
market share between the pairs of airlines analysed, with an R2 of 0.9582.  
They found strong confirmation of the positive effect on market share of 
offering additional frequency, with a market share coefficient for frequency 
over twice as large as the effect of offering more seats in a larger aircraft.  The 
elasticity coefficient of 1.093 for frequency implies that market share gains 
from greater frequency are indeed disproportionate to share of flights offered.  
The authors were troubled by the weakness of the fare elasticity coefficient (-
0.004).  They speculated that this lack of elasticity could be due to the 
relatively crude measure of using overall fare levels rather than disaggregate 
fare data from RM systems, and service quality differences which can reduce 
fare sensitivity.  The authors concluded that the competitive advantage of 
frequency means that “airlines have an incentive to use aircraft smaller than 
the least-cost aircraft.” 
These studies tended to confirm that (contrary to D&M 1974’s expectations) 
deregulation encourages airlines to increase frequencies into hubs, while 
reducing the size of aircraft feeding these hubs.  These trends in fleet 
developments have been observed in the major deregulated markets in North 
America and Europe.   
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One feature of Brown (1992), Adrangi et al (1999) and other studies of the 
impacts of aviation deregulation (see for example, Baltagi et al. 1995, 
Boresnstein (1989, 1990, 1992)), is that progress made in aircraft design, and 
the crucial aircraft programme decisions made by aircraft manufacturers are 
exogenous to fleet development in the U.S. aviation market.  The second 
strain of literature on aircraft size and its relationship to network development 
comes via the manufacturers, notably Airbus and Boeing, who combine air 
transport demand forecasting with economic studies of current and future 
aircraft, to demonstrate the viability of new aircraft product strategies.  These 
analyses are widely used (albeit with a substantial grain of salt) by airline 
managers, who are today faced with different visions of the future of air traffic 
development.   
5.1.3. Manufacturer influence on fleet development strategies 
Underlying the question of 21st century fleet development is a debate which  
has been growing in amplitude in recent years, as the manufacturers’ product 
lines develop, airport congestion increases, fuel price volatility increases, and 
environment becomes a major concern.  
Known in manufacturer jargon as consolidation (travel over hubs) vs. 
fragmentation (hub bypass), and more commonly in the trade press as the 
hub-and-spoke vs. point-to-point business model, there is a great deal of 
literature underlying this debate.  For the individual airline, this is an important 
driver of the Route-Frequency (R-F) problem framed in Pollack (1982).  And 
yet it is not an identical question:  any airline must resolve the R-F trade-off as 
a basic element of its strategy; on the other hand, the hub-and-spoke vs. 
point-to-point question varies in its nature and importance between short-haul 
and long-haul carriers.    
For short-haul airlines, “hubs” (simplistically defined as areas where a large 
proportion of an airline’s flights originate) can simply be the locations where 
the aircraft are parked overnight, with no intention to concentrate connecting 
traffic in the hub airport or the local catchment area.  For example, easyJet 
originates a great number of its point-to-point flights from Luton, Gatwick, and 
Stansted airports, but in no way is any of the three – nor is London more 
generally – a “hub” intended to concentrate connecting traffic.  In this model, 
the network shape is constrained by the necessity of a base for parking and 
certain maintenance activities, but not formed by a connecting strategy.   
When the hub definition is extended to include the strategic option to serve 
connecting traffic, the hub-and-spoke vs. point-to-point question is critical in 
strategic network design only to the largest carriers with the ambition to 
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concentrate relatively nearby traffic and connect it onto a long-haul network.  It 
is these “mega-carriers” to which the majority of the “consolidation vs. 
fragmentation” literature is addressed.  There are very few countries with 
populations large enough to support true hub and spoke airlines in purely 
short- and medium-haul operations, and few airlines have been successful 
doing so.   
This research suggests that when airlines have resolved both of these 
questions in their strategic outlook, the fleet planning process becomes to a 
great extent and exercise in aircraft evaluation.  The most recent research in 
the consolidation-fragmentation debate is reviewed below.   
Aircraft and engine manufacturers analyse passenger and freight traffic at a 
detailed level, and translates the impact into a 20-year forecast of the jet fleet 
in widely distributed tomes updated every year or two depending on 
conditions: particularly influential are the Boeing Current Market Outlook and 
the Airbus Global Market Forecast.  Aviation executives interviewed as part of 
this research affirmed that these studies are quite influential in fleet planning 
circles.   
The two current large jet manufacturers’ latest forecasts, both released in the 
second half of 2009, have as their basis a remarkably similar view of 
passenger demand growth: 4.9% from 2009-2028 for Boeing, 5.2% for Airbus.  
However, the consensus ends here, as the overall aircraft delivery forecasts 
produced by the two manufacturers in Figure 5.1 shows.  The two fleet 
forecasts are notoriously difficult to compare, notably in the area of smaller 
planes due to the inclusion of propjet aircraft by Airbus, and different size 
categories used by each.  For this research, we used the 100+ seat count for 
Airbus and 90+ for Boeing to make the single-aisle comparisons: other 
product segments are more easily comparable.  The twin-aisle market is 
largely dominated by each manufacturer’s twinjets, while Very Large Aircraft 
(VLA) segment include only the 747-8 and the A380.   
The Airbus forecast shows 10% fewer deliveries of aircraft overall, made up of 
13% fewer deliveries in each of the Single- and Twin-aisle market, and a Very 
Large Aircraft (VLA) forecast 78% higher than that of Boeing, reflecting the 
manufacturer’s multi-billion dollar bet on the future of the A380.   
   
Chapter 5: Fleet planning and investment appraisal 163 
16,977 19,460
5,802
6,700
1,318 740
0
4,000
8,000
12,000
16,000
20,000
Single-aisle Twin-aisle Very large
aircraft (VLA)
Airbus GMF Boeing CMO
 
Figure 5.1: Forecasts of aircraft deliveries 2009 – 2028 from Airbus Global Market Forecast (GMF) & 
Boeing Current Market Outlook (CMO), 2009 editions from each manufacturer 
In the long range market overall, Airbus delivery forecast is 4% lower than 
Boeing’s, though on a seat-count basis the forecasts must be quite similar.  
This is difficult to verify as the companies don’t reveal this level of detail; 
however, a rough calculation of the seats to be delivered reduces the 
difference between Airbus and Boeing to a mere 2% in the long-haul market: 
a very small difference indeed, over a 20 year forecasting horizon.   
Such relatively small percentage differences belie the enormous stakes each 
manufacturer has in the forecasts being accepted by the audience of fleet 
planners.  The differences between Airbus and Boeing forecast jet deliveries 
in the world’s regions reveal strikingly different views of fleet development in 
the world’s aircraft markets.  Table 5.1 shows the divergence between the 
Airbus and Boeing view of fleet development region by region, in units of 
aircraft to be delivered over the next twenty years.  Positive numbers indicate 
a greater need for types identified by Airbus, while negative figures indicate a 
greater unit delivery forecasted by Boeing.  The GMF and CMO data used in 
this analysis is presented in Appendix C. 
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Region 
Single-
aisle
Twin-
aisle VLA
Total 
Twin+VLA 
Total 
Deliveries 
Asia Pacific -1 042 -187 381 194 -848 
North America -1 066 -307 24 -283 -1 349 
Europe -729 -274 81 -193 -922 
Middle East -119 -182 59 -123 -242 
Latin America 80 9 9 18 98 
Russia & Central Asia 123 -16 -6 -22 101 
Africa 270 59 30 89 359 
Totals -2 483 -898 578 -320 -2 803 
Table 5.1: Delivery forecasts comparison: Airbus forecast higher (+) or lower (-) than Boeing 
The disparity of these views can be inferred for each region: 
• Asia Pacific is seen by Airbus to be both more long-haul and consolidated 
around hubs, requiring a large number of VLA to serve the “gateway” cities 
of Asia 
• Airbus sees North America and Europe as lower-growth overall, and is 
particularly bearish on North American traffic development using large jets, 
probably due to the recent trend toward RJ use in fleet development.   
• Airbus “concedes” that VLA growth in North America will be less than that 
in Europe with its very dense air traffic space, and the Middle East with its 
sixth-freedom hubs.  
• Airbus is across-the-board more optimistic about Latin America and Africa, 
particularly as concerns intra-regional development. 
• Internal and intra-regional growth in Russia and Central Asia requiring 
single-aisle aircraft is viewed with greater optimism, while the need for 
larger jets is significantly less, as development takes place in the shadow 
of mega-hubs located in Western Europe and the Middle East. 
The Airbus view of fleet development strongly supports the consolidation 
(hub-and-spoke) view of the future for fleet planners’ consumption.  The 378 
VLA delivery delta between the Airbus and Boeing fleet forecasts represents 
well over US$150billion in business for the manufacturers over the next 20 
years.  Putting this difference in opinion in commercial perspective, the 
difference in opinion represents over 20% of Airbus’ total revenue in 2009.  
The commercial logic underlying the analysis is undeniable.    
Since the advent and passing of the Sonic Cruiser and the phenomenally 
successful commercialization of the B787, Boeing has consistently promoted 
the fragmentation view of future network and fleet development.  To 
demonstrate this, Chief Economics for Marketing William Swan (2007) used 
historic data to show that aircraft size has been in constant, gradual decline 
since 1990, as shown in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2: average seats per airplane from Swan (2007) 
The reasons Swan gave for this major reversal of trend beginning in 1990 are 
related to negative characteristics of larger aircraft: 
• Large aircraft turn around more slowly 
• Value is created by new frequencies 
• Reduced airport noise 
The size argumentation has been accompanied by strong rhetoric advising 
airlines to embrace a high-frequency, fragmented view of market development, 
as illustrated by the table below, from a presentation by Dr. Swan. 
• Plan for growth: 
70%-100% of it in added frequencies 
• Plan for flexibility: 
Long-term commitments should not hang on one specific future 
• Plan to have more routes: 
Growth will include new nonstop markets 
• Plan to have more frequencies: 
Growth will include more flights at more times of day 
• Plan to face competition: 
Competitors will by-pass your hub 
• Plan to discuss history: 
Leaders may imagine growth patterns different from history 
Table 5.2: Conclusions to Swan (2002), from Cyberswans.com, routenetworkhistory.ppt 
The consistent commercial argumentation of decreasing aircraft size has 
bedevilled Boeing’s competitors and impressed airline fleet planners for the 
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ten years since Boeing adopted a smaller twinjet product strategy for the early 
21st century.  However, the use of simple average seats in the market masks 
two major trends in aircraft deliveries since 1985 (the year when, according to 
Swan, seat counts began their downward trend).   
These trends become clear when a more forward-looking examination of 
aircraft deliveries (as opposed to aircraft in service, which reflects past 
choices).  The first trend is toward greater numbers of short-haul aircraft 
deliveries in terms of seats, at the “expense” of long-haul machines, over the 
last 24 years.  The second is the strong current trend toward increasing seat-
counts in long-haul aircraft.   The deliveries data for this analysis is provided in 
Appendix D. 
To examine these two trends, aircraft seats delivered into the market are 
examined.  The representative seat counts for in-production aircraft in Swan 
and Adler (2006) are used: 
Short-haul configurations  Nominal Two-class 
A318  117 107 
737-600  122 110 
737-700  140 126 
A319  138 126 
A320  160 150 
737-800  175 162 
737-900  189 177 
A321  202 183 
757-200  217 200 
757-300  258 243 
   
Long-haul configurations    
767-200  238 163 
767-300  280 200 
767-400  315 229 
A330-2  355 233 
A330-3  379 268 
777-200  415 308 
777-300  510 385 
747-400  553 429 
Table 5.3: Aircraft seat counts used for cost estimation in Swan and Adler (2006) 
To these data, the following representative seat counts from aircraft 
manufacturers are added: 
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Short-haul configurations  Nominal Two-class 
737 classic 170 148 
MD80 series 155 143 
   
Long-haul configurations    
DC-10 380 250 
MD-11 410 285 
L-1011 400 270 
A300 298 266 
A310 247 240 
747-100/200/300 490 374 
340-200 300 261 
340-300 335 295 
340-500 359 313 
340-600 419 380 
Table 5.3b: Aircraft seat counts used for delivery trend analysis (Source: Airbus, Boeing) 
The non-shaded area of each table contains the seat counts used for the 
present analysis.  The two-class seat counts are used for long-haul aircraft, 
because all-economy layouts are rare in newly-delivered long-haul planes, 
and second because as can be seen above, some of the “nominal” seat 
counts from Dr. Swan’s earlier paper and from manufacturer commercial data 
seem rather high (553 seats in a 74-4!).  Nominal or single-class seat counts 
are used for the short-haul, due to the strong trend toward either single-class 
or quick-change seat layouts in short-haul markets. 
Multiplying these seat counts by the number of aircraft deliveries of each type 
tracked by Airbus, short-haul seat deliveries as a percentage of total seats 
delivered in each year is depicted in Figure 5.3.  
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Figure 5.3: average seats per airplane from Swan (2007) and percentage of total seats delivered in 
short-haul aircraft 
Average seat count in Swan (2007) was an identical 185 seats in 1985 and 
1997, after which the decline in average seats was observed.  1997 saw the 
deliveries of the first three 737-700 aircraft.  In an unprecedented ramp-up, 
Boeing delivered 165, 278, and 279 737NGs in the three succeeding years, 
while Airbus delivered an equally impressive 758 A320 family aircraft between 
1997 and 2000.  Both of these ascensions were driven by excellent products, 
ageing 737 classic and 757 fleets, strong lessor appetite for single-aisle 
aircraft, and the then-nascent globalization of the low cost airline business 
model.  The capacity build-up left each manufacturer hungry for orders during 
the years after 9/11, leading to savage discounting and a continued climb of 
deliveries since.  All of these factors drove short-haul aircraft seats (and of 
course, smaller aircraft) delivered from a low of 49% of all seats in 1997, to 
62% in 2004.  The trend has continued, as short-haul aircraft seat deliveries 
reached 65% of seats delivered in 2007.   
The second major trend through the 1990s and 2000s is a substantial 
increase in long-haul aircraft seat counts in the 1990s.  To illustrate this and 
compare the results with Swan (2007), seat count trends are depicted as 
indexes in Figure 5.4.  
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Figure 5.4: trend in average aircraft seat count, Swan (2007) and deliveries, 1985-2007 
In broad terms, this analysis agrees with Swan (2007): the overall average 
size of aircraft delivered has decreased from 1985 to the present day.  
However, the long-haul and short-haul segments show opposing trends: 
average seats in long-haul aircraft deliveries increased over 20% from 1985 to 
the peak size in 1998, from an average size of 251 seats to 307.  In 1985 the 
long-range aircraft being delivered were the A300-600, A310-200, the 767-
200 (joined by the 767-300 in 1986), and the remnants of the DC-10 and L-
1011 programmes, with a simple average of 231 seats.  The 374-seat 747-
100/200/300 aircraft represented only one quarter of long-haul deliveries in 
1985.   
By the mid nineties, the picture had completely changed, with the introduction 
of the 777-200 (1995 introduction) and 340-300 (1993), each with around 300 
seats, joined in 1998 by the 385-seat 777-300.  Seat deliveries of these types 
dwarfed the 200-seat 767 series and 266-seat A300-600.  Additionally, the 
747-400 delivered 471 units in the 1990s.  The programme’s decline has 
accelerated since the commercial launch of the A380 in December 1999, but 
the size of long-haul aircraft delivered remains 24% over the 1985 size.   
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In the short-haul segment, the opposite phenomenon is observed, with the 
decline in average seat count delivered from 173 in 1985, to 157 in 2004 and 
161 in 2007, a 7% seat count reduction.  In the 1980s, the MD-80, 737 classic 
and especially the 757-200 with average nominal seat count of 181 seats 
were the aircraft being delivered.  The success of the A320 family and 737NG 
has driven the decline in seat counts.  There has been a small uptick in seat 
count since 2004, due to the increased success of larger A321 and the 737-
800.  
Thus, the decline in aircraft size in recent history has been driven by an 
increasing share of deliveries of smaller single-aisle jets.  The two trends point 
up the fact that that size of aircraft is bundled with the range of the aircraft.  
The comparison of this analysis with the assertions about aircraft size in Swan 
(2007) is an example of the uncertainty fleet planners face when using 
academic and/or manufacturer data to establish their long-term fleet plans, as 
well as demonstrating the dangers of using simple averages as parameters 
for modelling.  The analysis looks at larger jet deliveries from Airbus, Boeing, 
Lockheed, and McDonnell-Douglas: given the success of Embraer and 
Bombardier jets, the average seats delivered in short-haul aircraft would show 
an even more important decrease in recent years were seats delivered in their 
products included.  This analysis tends to lend credence to a conclusion of 
Swan (2007), “a forecast (sic) is a trend where you know the reasons why 
things went the way they did.”   
The attractive power of frequency and total travel time have been revealed to 
be of lasting importance in air transport markets since the regulated period, 
notwithstanding the predictions of D&M 1974.  The two forces are in many 
ways in tension with one another in long-haul fleet development: frequency 
implies smaller aircraft to serve gateways, such as the 767 and 330, while 
achieving direct service to distant gateways implies the use of larger aircraft, 
where range is coupled (or “bundled”) with capacity in larger planes such as 
the 777-200LR and 340-500/600 offerings.  This curious feature of long-haul 
markets has fuelled the fragmentation vs. consolidation debate. 
The future visions of aircraft manufacturers cannot be taken lightly by fleet 
planners, if for no other reason than aircraft availability depends utterly on the 
viability of aircraft programmes promoted in their literature.  The billion-dollar 
bets on the future of aviation made by airframers and engine manufacturers 
create substantial strategic uncertainty among planners.  This research 
identified one strain of fleet development strategy that implicitly takes such 
uncertainty into account when valuing investments: this approach is discussed 
in Chapter Six. 
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5.1.4. Fleet development modelling literature 
The literature on airline fleet planning techniques has evolved in several 
directions, the most prevalent of which are applications of Operations 
Research (OR) techniques, and initially, linear programming (LP) in particular.  
Operations researchers have long attempted to optimise fleet sizes using of 
linear programming optimisation techniques, although such attempts are 
fewer in recent years, notably due to the modelling problems discussed below.  
Early recommendations for LP fleet planning models are found in Miller (1963 
- linear programming), Burger and Rice (1966 – integer linear programming), 
Larson (1968 - dynamic programming).  Another approach was to establish 
heuristic schemes, a set of descriptive rules about fleet sizes which can be 
applied to expected market conditions (Gunn 1964, Howard and Eberhardt 
1967, Jessiman et al., 1970). 
Aircraft manufacturers joined in the search for optimal fleet plans using LP.  
The most complete application was provided by Douglas Aircraft’s Schick and 
Stroup (1981), who tested a set of models developed at the company to 
optimise fleets.  The core “Multi-Year” model was built to optimise based on 
one of three planning objectives: 
1. Minimization of direct operating cost 
2. Minimization of amount spent for new equipment 
3. Minimization of the sum of (1) and (2), above. 
The authors ran the model over a six year horizon, for a European airline 
initially operating 46 aircraft in international markets, incorporating existing 
fleet as well as already-made decisions on future fleet disposals, 6% traffic 
growth and a 61.5% planning load factor.  Overall, the LP model reduced the 
number of aircraft to 43 while meeting the demand growth, however, the 
pattern of sales and purchases showed a rather unrealistic pattern (eg.,10.5 
DC-9S sold in year 3, and 11.55 of the same type purchased the following 
year).  The authors recognize several problems with using such models in 
airline fleet planning processes, the most serious of which is the fact that 
schedule development and fleet planning were “manual processes” that did 
not use linear programming as an underlying tool, and associated 
“philosophical differences” from the “bottom-up” (route-by-route) approach 
used at airlines.     
A comprehensive statement of the problems encountered using this type of 
optimisation model for fleet planning was provided in Pollack (1976).  Linear 
programming runs into problems with faced with one or more market realities.  
The first is the airline requirement that aircraft schedule frequencies be 
expressed as integers rather than fractional figures, although this can be 
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solved at the expense of more complex computation using the integer linear 
programming: computing power was a concern at the time that has largely 
dissipated today.  A second more serious problem is the assumption of 
constant traffic flows, when demand airline traffic is both highly seasonal and 
time-bound (day of week, time of day).  The linear programming options would 
be to plan capacity for peak demand (generating excess fleet), or for average 
demand as in Schick and Stroup (generating capacity insufficient to meet the 
airline schedule at peak).  Similarly, such models did not follow the physical 
location of aircraft in the system, and hence, do not consider isolated aircraft, 
which can be unavailable for maintenance or even for service requirements.   
The most serious problems identified by Pollack concern passenger 
preference, notably regarding fare level and flight schedule. Linear 
programming models do not do well when faced with market-level service 
requirements such as minimum weekly frequency, non-stop service between 
city-pairs, or the potential passenger preference for aircraft sizes.  The 
problem of passenger preference and city-pair flow was absent from the 
models reviewed.  Station constraints such as slots and curfews are well-
handled as LP, but since they vary around the airline’s service area, they 
create a need to model the system in a substantial level of detail, making 
general-purpose models fit for all airlines elusive in practice. 
Another problem with LP models concerns the nature of the output: given the 
need for continuity in cabin product offering and fleet plans (see the rapid-fire 
DC-9S sell-buy, above).  Selection of aircraft for a given objective(s) is by 
definition based on current period conditions (traffic, growth, fleet availability).  
Such models are to a great extent “memory-less,” without regard for continuity 
in fleet development beyond the constraints manually entered into the model, 
i.e., current fleet, already-planned acquisition and disposal dates. 
The final challenge to LP usage for fleet planning concerns modelling revenue 
streams.  As in Schick and Stroup (1981), linear programming solutions at this 
time focused primarily on cost optimization, with little consideration for 
passenger utility and resultant revenue characteristics.  Pollack pointed up the 
problem by stating “at best, revenues can be approximated with piece-wise 
linear functions,” including a constant and intercept to estimate fare based on 
distance.  Any such general function for revenue could only be used on an 
average-fare basis, ignoring differences in competitive levels, potential fare 
subsidies, and open-jaw type routing where the distance travelled is greater 
than the passenger’s origination-destination (O-D) fare would imply.  The 
magnitude of such problems have only grown since the period following fare 
deregulation, as airline pricing has become increasingly non-linear, following 
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the implementation of O-D pricing, fare classes and accompanying revenue 
management systems intended to maximise overall system revenue, as well 
as the low cost carrier business model with its dramatic disruption of legacy 
carrier pricing schemes. 
Costs can also behave in non-linear or inconsistent fashion: fuel prices vary, 
cycle-driven maintenance (engine, landing gear) do not vary with distance, 
station fees, spares requirements, special maintenance arrangements 
between airlines (pooling) and engineering labour rates all vary internationally, 
making linear modelling problematic.    
LP has found far greater acceptance in the area of airline network design and 
fleet assignment to routes (as noted above, both BA and Air France place 
Network and Fleet Planning within the same organisational units).   
Network design in the R-F approach is one of the “manual” processes 
mentioned by Schick and Stroup, using both commercial and technical 
considerations to define the proper service mix to serve the airlines’ markets. 
Etschmaier and Rothstein (1974) identified six international airlines (Japan 
Airlines, Air France, Air Canada, Lufthansa, Qantas, United) that tried or used 
linear programming to define the airlines’ route-frequency (R-F) plans.  All of 
these attempts were documented in proceedings of the Airline Group of 
International Federation of Operational Research Societies (AGIFORS). 
The Air Canada method cited is illustrative of the use of LP in network design: 
1. Identify a flyable network of city-pair connections 
2. Estimate passenger demand between each city pair 
3. Use an LP model to assign frequencies to each leg of the network 
4. Low weekly frequencies are eliminated from the schedule as undesirable 
5. Round the non-integer frequencies 
Successful use of the LP model in step 3 requires that both the available fleet 
and the service-level constraints identified in Pollack (1982) be entered as 
constraints to the LP model, which then produces a frequency programme to 
maximize the expected profits.  For this research, it must be noted that the 
problems of estimating cost and revenue as linear functions are not eliminated 
by this more modest use of LP.  While these models apparently produced 
insightful approximations of potential service propositions, the financial 
projections of such models are limited at best.  In order to go from a frequency 
plan to a reasonable accurate financial projection, at least a rudimentary flight 
schedule would be very useful. 
In a second paper from 1974, Maurice Pollack concluded that scheduling is 
indeed a largely heuristic and “manual” process.  Beginning from a daily (time-
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of-day) or weekly (day of week) set of frequencies, the scheduler attempting 
to use LP finds that “no optimal solution to this problem [i.e., the problem 
scheduling and determining the minimum number of aircraft for a given set of 
frequencies] is known; the solution procedure presented is heuristic in nature.”  
He proposes setting flight departures at desirable times for service quality, 
and linking departures to arrivals at each city on a first-in-first-out basis.  Since 
no flight departure can be re-timed, a significant number of unlinked flights will 
remain after this first step.  An iterative process in which the desired departure 
times are allowed to shift within acceptable ranges to suit prior and 
subsequent aircraft movements allows the linking of all flights, at the expense 
of schedule convenience for connecting passengers on some flights.  When 
all flights are linked in acceptable ways, the schedule is validated using a 
cycle diagram, with aircraft tail numbers on one axis, and the 24-hour day on 
the other.  Each city-pair flight is charted with its flight time between origin and 
destination and the related ground time.  The cycle diagram allows a clear 
view of the aircraft utilization, and naturally allows both a clear check on 
utilisation and viability of the schedule, and, for the financial projection, a clear 
set of fleet assignments for each route, necessary for revenue and cost 
calculations.   
One can imagine the time and complexity of producing a cycle diagram with 
300 aircraft on its vertical axis.  Clearly, this view of schedule definition owes 
as much to art as to science, and is indeed highly “manual”: in this view, the 
potential use of modelling is limited to the strategic definition of a frequency 
programme, which is itself subject to many qualitative heuristics needed to 
define an R-F strategy based as much on experience and intuition as hard 
data. 
Since these seminal investigations, the academic literature has evolved on the 
one hand to provide integer LP solutions to fleet planning problems, and on 
the other, to account for uncertainty in operators’ environments.  Abara (1989) 
developed a workable integer LP model for aircraft fleet assignment to a fixed 
schedule, which was extended by Hane et al. (1995) relaxing the fixed 
scheduling constraints.  This work was in turn extended by Clarke et al. (1996), 
who added maintenance and crew scheduling constraints to the model.  
Further strains of fleet assignment modelling were proposed by Desaulnier et 
al (1997) and Barnhart et al. (2002), complemented by Lohatepanont and 
Barnhart (2004). 
The introduction of uncertainty in the form of stochastic fleet assignment 
modelling for air transport was first introduced by Mulevy and Ruszczynski 
(1995), followed by List et al (2002) and Yan et al (2008).  The models attempt 
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to achieve “robust optimization,” defined as a fleet assignment solution that 
meets objectives (cost and service quality) under a variety of as-yet unknown 
situations.  The uncertain situation analysed in List et al. (2002) concerns a 
three-node transportation network served by a single vehicle type.  Demand is 
uncertain, with a coefficient of variability (standard deviation divided by 
sample mean, aka “K Factor”) of 0.4, a figure often used for airline spill 
modelling.  In List et al., there is a cost due to delayed shipments caused by 
spill due to demand fluctuations.  List et al.’s approach uses a semi-variance 
calculation to estimate the effect of peaks in demand, putting aside the effect 
of troughs, in order to capture the (negative) effects of spill.  Their stochastic 
model generates required fleet size in order to minimise cost and penalties 
that is nearly twice as large as the fleet requirement estimated without 
uncertainty (!).  Of course, the model may be calibrated to account for a lower 
aversion to risk (e.g., using a lower delayed shipment penalty cost) than in the 
base case.  The complexity of calculations (especially given the very simple 
network and fleet) is rather daunting, and the article leaves the reader with a 
“black box” feel, a typical reaction to stochastic modelling among business 
managers.  Finally, one seriously doubts that this model would be scalable to 
reflect the complexity of real-world aircraft operations. 
In summary, the OR/LP approach to fleet planning achieved moderate 
success helping airlines to define frequency programmes in combination with 
heuristic methods such as Pollack’s R-F design trade-offs cited above.  
Further elaborations and evolutions have solved certain technical problems 
and more recently, introduced the problem of demand uncertainty on very 
simple networks and fleets.   
Increasingly, the literature applications of LP-type techniques concerns 
scheduling and demand allocation rather than fleet or investment planning per 
se.  As Etschmaier and Rothstein point out, LP has found more lasting 
applications in critical areas such as crew scheduling, spares provisioning, 
maintenance planning.  As easily-accessible computing power and 
programming tools have evolved, more detailed and mathematically advanced 
models have been developed as proprietary tools by the network carriers, but 
the process remains a complex mix of management judgement and modelling, 
witness the academic and practitioners’ literature, and the executive 
interviews performed during this research and discussed in subsequent 
sections.  This research does show that LP techniques are strongly influential 
in what will be called the “neo-classical” fleet planning and valuation approach.  
On the other hand, stochastic modelling is found to be used only in the 
valuation phase, and then only under specific circumstances.     
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5.2. Fleet planning and airline planning processes 
While there are numerous books on airline and aircraft economics to guide 
planners, the literature on fleet planning and its place in airline planning 
processes is far more limited.   Generalization on planning processes is 
difficult, for at least three reasons.  First, airline planning is distinctly related to 
organization structure and objectives, which vary by governance, business 
model, and geography.  Boumrene and Flavell (1980) suggest a “typical” 
airline organisation structure in their article on airline corporate planning, with 
all functions reporting the General Manager:  
• Flight operations 
• Engineering and maintenance 
• Programme and scheduling 
• Marketing 
• Finance 
• Personnel and General Administration    
While this type of organization is found in many airlines today, exceptions are 
as common.  For example, Clark (2007) presents the British Airways 
organization with the classical Engineering/Flight Operations departments, but 
with Network and Fleet Planning, as well as Revenue Management within a 
“Commercial Planning” directorate.   This reflects an organizational philosophy 
which network and fleet planning are within a single commercially-oriented 
directorate, separate from the operational divisions: this tight interrelation of 
network development and fleet planning characterizes the literature on the 
subject of fleet selection as well.   
Secondly, fleet planning in particular is considered highly strategic and 
confidential, often the domain of the highest-level strategies and negotiations 
between airline and manufacturer executives 17 .  This lends an air of 
uniqueness to many fleet development campaigns, characterized by ego-
driven bargaining and brinksmanship that defies easy categorization.  Lastly, 
fleet planning it is inherently multi-disciplinary, giving it a company-wide 
importance which defies simple positioning in one or the other phases of 
company planning.  The complexity of the airline business necessitates strong 
cross-functional cooperation.     
Bouamrene and Flavell (1980) posited a 10-stage planning process for 
airlines.  The first five stages are focussed on two areas: establishing the 
airline’s objectives and resources on the one hand, and analysing the market 
                                                 
17 Many colourful and well-documented examples of this can be found in John Newhouse’s 
The Sporty Game (1982)and Boeing vs. Airbus (2008)  
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and operating environment on the other.  Stages five and six involve what 
most would refer to as fleet planning, and again evidence the proximity of 
network and fleet planning in airline development: 
• Identification of competitive aircraft 
• Network structure and development 
• Procurement / retirement policies 
• Aircraft/route performance analysis 
• Economic analysis (including cost, revenue, economies of scale and 
benefits of fleet standardization) 
The investment plan preparation and appraisal form the next two processes, 
which in turn give way to what the authors refer to as “Corporate Plans”, 
essentially short and long term budgets.  Fleet planning is positioned after the 
company’s determination of market and strategic goals, while the investment 
appraisal is in turn positioned at the end of the fleet planning process. 
An example of the importance of the airline network shape and development 
to airline business plans was the save-the-company plan developed by Alitalia 
in 2004 and 2005, and posted on the company web site.  The network shape 
was depicted graphically by Alitalia as presented in Figure 5.5 
 Figure 5.5: Alitalia network shape from Business Plan (source: Alitalia.com) 
In this plan, the company’s new business model turns away from the “global 
mega-carrier” network shape, positioning the network and resultant future fleet 
requirements as a hub-and-spoke operator serving “natural” flows centred 
around Europe and the Mediterranean.  This obviously has profound 
2004 business plan 2005 business plan
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implications for the company’s fleet requirements, and as such, is precedes 
both the fleet plan and the investment appraisal. 
In lectures given at AirBusiness Academy and elsewhere between 2003 and 
2006, Paul Clark suggested a quite similar view of planning processes, with 
rather more detail on the fleet plan.  In Clark’s view, the fleet plan is directed 
by and subsidiary to the company’s business plan.  The investment appraisal 
is positioned at the end of the fleet planning process, and is a monetary 
quantification of the fleet plan.  The investment appraisal has the highest-level 
consideration, as the primary document which goes to the CEO and 
eventually to the Board of Directors for consideration and approval, following 
the flow chart depicted in Figure 5.6.  
 
Figure 5.6: Position of fleet planning and investment appraisal, lectures by Professor Paul Clark  
This view positions the investment appraisal and valuation as the ‘arbiter’ of 
the fleet plan’s validity. 
For the analytical phase of the fleet plan, Clark (2007) suggests that airlines 
should combine a top-down approach to defining capacity requirements at a 
market-by-market level, with a micro analysis.  The top-down approach is 
simpler and useful for the long range picture, giving planners an overall feel 
for the market dynamics expected over the planning horizon, and has the 
added potential advantage of benefiting from historic data for demand 
projections.   
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The micro analysis is of course far more complex, although still not carried out 
on a flight-by-flight basis.  In Clark’s view, a detailed schedule is not feasible 
or needed for long-term fleet planning: the R-F plan with its overall allocation 
of aircraft to markets is sufficient in his view.  His recommended steps for the 
micro analysis includes the following  
1. Market segmentation and underlying demand and yield forecast for each 
cabin class 
2. Demand allocation to aircraft types based on the overall demand forecast, 
supplemented by S-curve modelling and/or, Quality of Service Index (QSI) 
modelling to account for competitive conditions 
3. Spill analysis taking into account variations in demand by reason for travel, 
by season, by day of week, and by time of day 
4. Network simulation which generates capacity, traffic and load factors for 
each type of aircraft on an annual basis 
Step four serves as a pivot to an iterative process until supply and demand 
are properly matched.  This micro analysis provides the capacity and traffic 
inputs to the investment appraisal, defined in a very classical way in Clark’s 
work, which is more focussed on the performance and cost aspects of aircraft 
comparison than on revenue or cost forecasting at the fleet level.  Once again, 
the investment appraisal itself is seen as a translation of all preceding analysis, 
including the fleet sizing and network simulation.  
Another example of the positioning of the investment appraisal is provided in 
Weber and Williams (2001), where the authors use a diagram from J.P. 
Morgan Securities graphic as an illustration of airlines’ “product development” 
process, including both the steps in the process and the departments involved.  
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Figure 5.7: The product development process, adapted from Weber and Williams (2001) 
This process is focussed on planning the airline’s cabin product rather than 
corporate planning, but the positioning of the financial analysis is identical to 
the views expressed by Bouamrene and Flavell and Clark: the financial 
assessment or investment appraisal positioned at the end of the process, as a 
quantification of the project’s market, revenue and cost characteristics, its 
output a sort of arbiter of the project’s viability. 
In the third edition of his definitive text on airline finance, Morrell (2007) 
discussed the investment appraisal process as part of airline financial 
processes.  His emphasis is on the cash flow forecasting and evaluation, 
focussing on discounted cash flow techniques using classical methodologies 
discussed in this research.  No overall scheme of airline planning is presented 
here, rather, investment appraisal is positioned as a central part of financial 
planning, and discussed as a means of comparing aircraft and assessing the 
risk of alternative projects, a subject addressed in Chapter Six of this research.  
The low cost airline revolution has spawned many recent offerings on start-up 
airline business planning.  Boeing created Start-up Boeing in 2006, proposing 
a “roadmap” for planning: 
Product design 
Product development 
Cabin services 
Cabin size 
optimisation 
Network management 
Aircraft configurations 
Engineering 
Product development 
Revenue analysis – 
by route and cabin 
Cabin development 
Cabin services 
Cost analysis – one 
time and operating 
Product development 
Finance 
Financial assessment 
ROI/IRR 
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Figure 5.8: The Boeing’s business planning “roadmap” (2006) 
The steps in Boeing’s roadmap are strikingly consistent with Bouamrene and 
Flavell (1980), and again show the financial model development near the end 
of the process.  In both views, business planning is an iterative process, with 
the financial analysis serving as a pivot point, its calculations giving rise to 
successive revisions of the plan. 
These views of airline planning processes are largely consistent with business 
planning practices in other industries.  The interest for this research is the 
clear positioning of the financial plan, specifying investment appraisal as a 
quantification of the plan’s consequences in financial terms.  This positioning 
implies that uncertainties in fleet and network development assumptions could 
flow from deterministic fleet planning models into the financial figures, and the 
results presented with undue certitude regarding the projected outcome.  This 
problem is exacerbated by the fact that finance departments and skills are 
quite distinct from those of network and fleet planning:  for example, one 
would be hard-pressed to find a finance manager expert in LP techniques, 
where OR professionals are commonly found in fleet planning departments.  
Airline practice regarding the treatment of such uncertainties in assumptions is 
discussed in Chapter Six of this research.   
A second implication is that the use of the investment appraisal as a final 
rationale or justification of the project for the company’s top-level governance 
bodies is subject to the strategic goals of a company, which in turn is 
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conditioned by the ownership structure and resulting governance, as 
examined in Chapter Four.   
5.3. Executive views on fleet planning & investment appraisal 
Twelve senior managers were interviewed for this research, in order to identify 
common practices in fleet planning and investment appraisal.  These 
managers are working in European airlines, aircraft manufacturers, and 
financial institutions, using broadly the same set of questions for each 
manager, to allow comparison and contrast of views on the topics raised.   
The airline managers represented both network and point-to-point low-fare 
carriers.  The selection of the managers was based on three criteria.  The first 
was broad industry coverage – from operators and manufacturers to 
financiers -  in order to discuss the issues from a variety of perspectives.  This 
was done in order to give a comprehensive view of the issues raised, given 
the fact (discussed in Chapter 1) that airline fleet planning and investment 
analysis entails extensive collaboration with a wide variety of players, each 
having a significant influence on the investment valuation. 
The second criteria was a pragmatic approach to identifying senior managers 
who would both have sufficient knowledge of company strategy, and be willing 
to discuss these sensitive issues with the author: indeed, all of the managers 
were known to the author and most had worked with him on various projects 
prior to this research.  The third criterion was again pragmatic, and related to 
the second: this research has been carried out without external funding, and 
the face-to-face interviews were conducted with managers known to the 
author, and were based in Europe.   
Therefore, as with the CFO survey, the sample is clearly biased toward 
European perspectives, whether they be in operators or suppliers.  All of the 
company managers were working for companies with shares listed, either 
their own or a parent companies.  This bias reflects both the predominance of 
listed airlines in Europe and the clear propensity toward use of classical 
financial valuation techniques among such listed airlines, as discussed in the 
previous chapter.  All of the managers were very experienced with the use, 
and the difficulties, of classical valuation techniques.   
These interviews are best seen as representing the most current views on the 
application and extension of classical financial valuation theory in today’s 
aviation market.   The executives were quite willing to discuss valuation 
methods, in spite of the confidentiality of many topics raised.  Senior airline 
managers in particular expressed the wish to see more rational valuation 
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methods adopted worldwide in an industry many see as lacking financial 
discipline.  Based on the forthcoming attitude, this research has been able to 
identify three modern “paradigms” for aircraft investment appraisal and 
treatment of uncertainty. 
The interviews covered a list of 40 questions, in three broad areas: 
1) Positioning and use of financial evaluation in the fleet planning process 
2) Parameter estimation and decision-making processes 
3) Treatment of uncertainty in the analysis 
An additional set of questions, specifically posed to the financial managers 
from airlines and financial institutions, explored the interactions between 
investing and financing decisions. 
5.3.1. Three paradigms of economic valuation 
Through the interviews and the author’s field experience, three very distinct 
approaches to fleet investment valuation have been identified.  The first is a 
highly quantified, OR-influenced approach to modelling operations, combined 
with a classical use of NPV for project justification.  The revenue and cost 
estimation methods are based on company records and (to a much lesser 
extent) data provided by manufacturers.  This approach is called the neo-
classical method.  A second approach, dubbed risk-quantitative, places risk 
assessment and cash-flow volatility at the heart of the analysis.  Finally, we 
discovered a revolutionary approach to investment appraisal, in which aircraft 
are viewed as a commodity-like variable input to operations, embedding 
financing into airline strategy to obviate the need for classical valuation.   
Adhesion to these paradigms was not necessarily specific to individual 
airlines: rather, we found aspects of each paradigm expressed by managers 
of the different airlines and financial institutions interviewed.  This suggests 
that the valuation approaches are not immutable doctrines within companies, 
but rather form the basis for an on-going debate informing strategic and 
tactical choices among the various valuation options available,, depending on 
the company’s situation and evolving business strategy.  In this section, we 
review the neo-classical method, which clearly reflects the methodologies – 
both for fleet planning and for investment valuation - identified in this chapter.  
The other two approaches integrate risk as a fundamental element of the 
valuation, and will be discussed in Chapter Six. 
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5.3.2. Neo-classical fleet planning: NPV as project justification 
Central to this paradigm is a broad strategic view of market segments in terms 
of O-D traffic: are passengers coming to our hub, or travelling over it to some 
final destination?  The fragmentation-consolidation debate is central to fleet 
planning under this paradigm. 
In the neo-classical model, the network is segmented by specific origin and 
destination, and each segment is analysed in terms of the profit potential for 
the airline: 
• Short haul to short haul (SH:SH): passengers connecting from one 
short flight of around three hours to another 
• Short haul to long haul (SH:LH): locally originating passengers 
travelling over our hub to a more distant area 
• Long haul to short haul (LH:SH): distant travellers seeking a destination 
within around three hours of our hub 
• Finally, the two segments of long-haul (LH) and short-haul (SH) 
passengers originating or completing their passage at our hub 
This is clearly the model of a network carrier.  The specific insight here is that 
that the desirability of the airlines service depends essentially on the specific 
origin and destination of the traveller.  That is, short-haul to long haul is 
viewed as a segment distinct from long haul to short-haul.  A further 
segmentation is made according to cabin class, and in the most detailed case, 
to fare class under a revenue management policy.  The neo-classic paradigm 
thus selects the most desirable traffic to capture, based on market strategy. 
 Luxury  
(First) 
Corporate  
(Business) 
Small business/ 
upscale leisure 
(Premium economy) 
Leisure / VFR 
(Economy ) 
SH:SH     
SH:LH     
LH:SH     
LH     
SH     
Figure 5.9: Market segmentation by specific origination and destination 
This concept has been extended in recent years by “sixth freedom” carriers 
such as Emirates, which add LH:LH traffic over the local hub, re-directing 
traditional traffic flows (notably Europe-Asia, but also North America-Asia) 
through small home-market hubs in a rather dramatic way.  Implicitly then, 
fleet planners take a market by market approach in modelling the network. 
 
Profit potential of each segment determined on a 
strategic (long-term) basis 
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Once profitable markets have been selected, the competitiveness of our 
airline and thus the traffic we capture is seen as a function of the QSI, similar 
to that used by Weber and Williams (2001).  A recent study of Asian carriers 
was published on the web by Karvy Global Services (2006).  Each target 
market is quantitatively analysed in terms of competing airlines’ attributes, 
according to the familiar QSI equation.  The Karvy Formulation is: 
.................................. 5.9 
In this formulation, competitive advantages are captured in individual indices 
n =  Total number of O-D services offered on the route 
Freq = Frequency offered on each route 
Cap  = Capacity offered 
Rank = a service quality rating such as SkyTrax (airlinequality.com) 
Time = total O-D travel time 
Dist = Trip distance 
Fare = O-D passenger fare 
CT = Connection type: direct or connecting 
DT = Desirability of departure time 
This competitive model is remarkably comprehensive, capturing connection 
and total distance variables as well as the standard frequency, capacity and 
quality measures. The neo-classical model is characterized by a highly 
quantitative approach to competitive performance on the routes selected for 
analysis.  In mature markets, a portion of the network can be modelled and 
the model’s parameters calibrated using historical traffic patterns available 
from reservations systems providers such as Sabre, or from the IATA PaxIS 
system. 18    
The output of such a study is projected O-D market share over the network 
under consideration, an extremely useful set of data points which then can be 
applied to traffic estimates to generate revenue for the cash flow study.  
However, the calculation is fraught with complexity and potential errors.  In 
addition to tremendous complexity of such a market-by-market analysis and 
the challenges of estimating the QSI market parameters, the Garvy (2006) 
calculation requires a specific schedule and capacity (i.e. fleet assignment to 
                                                 
18 As the Karvy study points out, in many of the world’s markets, such data is either scarce or 
non-existent today.  This kind of number-crunching requires data only available in advanced 
markets such as Europe. 
   
Chapter 5: Fleet planning and investment appraisal 186 
routes) as an input.  This leads to an iterative process matching various fleet 
alternatives to projected airline schedule, with the twin objectives of 
minimising spill of the most desirable segment of passengers, and minimising 
the number and cost of fleet in operation for the study.  To reduce the 
complexity, firms often study one portion of the network at a time, but today 
the more ambitious are using programmes capable of modelling the entire 
network, including the SH&E Network and Share Analysis (NSA) system, and 
Sabre’s Fleet Assignment Model in the iterative framework depicted in Figure 
5.10. 
 
Figure 5.10: Modelling in the neo-classical paradigm.  Source: Richard Wyatt 
The bulk of the analytical effort in the neo-classical approach is applied to this 
competitive market and fleet assignment analysis.  When the complex 
iterations have reached a satisfactory balance of capture, spill and investment 
requirements, the fleet and schedule are used to generate cash flows for the 
years under consideration.  The analysis is a point-in-time, rather than time 
series, view.  The model is run for several years over the investment horizon, 
and the resulting cash flows interpolated for the in-between years to form a 
time-series view of revenue, costs, and cash flow. 
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The QSI market share calculation requires estimation of many competitive 
parameters.  One key uncertainty concerns the evolution of services to be 
offered over the investment horizon by competitors on each route: do we use 
current conditions, and if not, how to estimate service offerings from new 
entrants to the market?  Managers interviewed tend to use current conditions, 
for the very good reason that hard data can be used to validate the 
parameters.  This methodology, however, may not perform well predicting 
competitive positions with the emergence of new business models, such as 
point-to-point or sixth-freedom carriers.  These airlines have dramatically 
changed the shape of air traffic networks over the last few years.  Their 
continued success, as well as the emergence of single-class point-to-point 
long haul carriers appears set to further alter the game in the near future. 
Costs tend to be estimated using internal historical data, where available.  For 
new aircraft types, most managers “listen politely” to the claims of aircraft and 
engine manufacturers regarding cost behaviour, and then develop their own 
view of the expected unit costs, extrapolating from current performance and 
manufacturer performance data such as block time and fuel burn.  
In the neo-classical paradigm, aircraft residual value (RV) estimates come 
from third-party providers such as appraisal firms.  A common approach of 
appraisers is to develop “hard” and “soft” values using statistical estimates of 
historical second-hand aircraft price volatility.  Prudent managers include the 
soft values in sensitivity analysis, to avoid excessively optimistic views. 
The up-front investment requirements (aircraft price and entry into service 
(EIS) costs) are the great equaliser: as the cost is borne at the outset of a 
project, an unsatisfactory NPV can be made possible with a suitably reduced 
aircraft price.  The initial price offer from manufacturers is often used as the 
input to the cash flow, and represents a starting point for negotiations. 
Policy issues 
Selection of an appropriate investment horizon strongly conditions the 
attractiveness of investments under NPV rules; the horizon also dramatically 
affects the importance of the RV assumption in the overall valuation.  Large 
civil aircraft design lives are around 25 years, but the market values of used 
aircraft show dramatically different patterns, depending on the success of the 
aircraft type around the world.  As Figure 5.11 illustrates, in a stylized 
valuation for a European single aisle operation, the present value of aircraft 
RV can represent nearly 45% of the total value creation for a 7-year study, 
decreasing to 18% if the horizon is extended to 15 years. 
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Figure 5.11: Impact of Residual Value on Net Present Value for differing investment horizons: analysis 
of a typical short-range project bv author 
Airlines using very short investment horizons might ask themselves whether 
they are primarily in the business of operating aircraft, or trading them.  
Depending on the fleet under consideration, companies using the neo-
classical paradigm tend to adopt 10-15 year investment horizons, implying 
that the airline will renew its fleet sometime toward the end of this horizon.  
For an airline using a 10 year investment horizon, the RV assumption can 
“make or break” an investment justification. 
The other major policy input to the decision is the discount rate or cost of 
capital.  Very much in line with traditional valuation theory, the neo-classical 
paradigm uses the weighted-average cost of capital (WACC) as the cost of 
capital.  Managers interviewed stressed the importance of using target 
(presumably lower than current) debt ratios to avoid under-estimating the cost 
of capital by over-weighting the cheaper cost of debt in the calculation, 
relevant advice to the highly-leveraged airline industry.  Secondly, they tend to 
look to other industries’ shareholder returns to estimate equity investors’ 
expected returns, rather than use historic, often low or negative, airline returns.  
Finally, the WACC is adjusted upward to reflect the specific risk of the project, 
based on a subjective estimate.  These practices imply that there is a great 
deal of subjectivity in the WACC estimation, confirming the analysis in 
Chapter Four of this research. 
Decision-making 
In this paradigm, various fleet alternatives are always compared with the “do-
nothing” scenario of continuing with the current fleet.  This has the advantage 
of using hard revenue and cost data from existing operations as a benchmark 
to which alternatives can be compared.  Preliminary decisions are made by 
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committee made up of Commercial, Network Planning, Operations Planning, 
and Engineering departments.   
The final calculation of cash flow and NPV is often done by a group of 
financial analysts embedded in the Fleet Planning department, raising 
interesting questions about asymmetries of information between Fleet 
Planning and Finance.  Several managers stated that they often discovered 
errors in this analysis.   The analysis is then typically reviewed and discussed 
with Finance, whose primary concerns include the marketability and thus the 
“bankability” of the aircraft.  The details of the analysis are rarely examined by 
the Finance group, which is mainly responsible for treasury, business planning, 
and financing of the aircraft.  A board paper is prepared, including a business 
rationale and key investment analysis results including both NPV and payback, 
and presented to the board of directors. 
Financing arrangements for the aircraft eventually approved for acquisition are 
kept strictly separate in this paradigm, consistent with classical finance theory.  
Managers expressed the opinion that fleet financing is rather tactical and 
pragmatic than strategic, based on concrete concerns such as availability and 
cost of financing alternatives, which may change dramatically based on 
market conditions and airline performance as deliveries approach.  Further, 
fleet financing decisions combine quantification (comparing NPV of term 
sheets) with qualitative judgement and intuition.  The judgement and 
experience comes into play particularly in the area of choosing between fixed 
and floating-rate debt, because interest-rate movements are rarely amenable 
to quantitative forecasting techniques in the medium-term. 
In sum, the neo-classical paradigm is a reflection of analytical methods 
developed and recommended in the fleet planning and financial literature.  All 
of the airline executives interviewed use some form of these methods.  The 
positioning of the investment appraisal is found to be at the end of the 
analytical phase, and it does serve as a justification of the projects to the 
highest levels of the airline’s governance structures.   
The ‘engineering’ models used are sophisticated, and they are deterministic 
rather than stochastic.  A key methodological question planners face is the 
level of detail for analysis, and the most sophisticated airline is found to go to 
the O-D city pair level, to look at individual markets for air travel.  
In the interview of executives practicing this paradigm, the cash flow 
calculation itself appears almost an afterthought: the heart of the approach is 
in the network model.  Uncertainties in the assumptions underlying these 
models will inevitably impact the investment valuation, and because the Fleet 
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Planning and Finance functions are separate both organizationally and in 
terms of expertise, these uncertainties may be missed, and their quantification 
ignored.  The variety and extent of such fleet planning uncertainties are 
identified with an expert panel in the next section. 
5.4. Uncertainties in fleet planning assumptions 
5.4.1. Panel composition and overall results 
A panel of nine fleet planning experts was queried in four areas of potential 
uncertainty in fleet planning assumptions.  The sampling objective was again 
a mix of global coverage and pragmatism.  Three experts were fleet planning 
managers from European legacy airlines, in order to establish expert opinion 
with specific carriers in mind.  The other six were independent (non airline-
employee) advisors with worldwide experience helping airlines to develop fleet 
plans, and validate the investment analysis with the airlines’ top management.  
This dual panel has a broad range of fleet planning project experience, 
including concrete, single-carrier experience for the airline planners, as well 
as independent perspectives over a large geographical range of advisory 
projects for specific airlines, predominantly in North America, Europe, and the 
Middle East, with a lesser experience in Asia.    
The sample was a fortiori limited to experts known to the author, and as in the 
earlier studies, is biased toward legacy carriers and is somewhat Eurocentric.  
Geographically biased similar to the CFO survey and the executive interviews, 
the panel was broader in the range of experience, due to the predominance of 
independent analysts. 
This breadth was borne out in the results of the panel, where marked 
differences were found between the opinions of the European airline 
managers, and the independent experts.    Consultants tend to be used by 
companies rather smaller than the legacy carriers interviewed, due to these 
airlines lack of internal resources and expertise.  Their work is also focused on 
emerging aviation markets.  This sampling bias, and dual population goes a 
long way to explaining the broad range of opinions resulting from the panel. 
The panel was proposed a list of 35 assumptions that may be subject to 
uncertainty.  These assumptions were grouped within five broad areas: 
• Corporate strategy (3 assumptions) 
• Network and demand evolution (12) 
• Aircraft performance: reliability of manufacturer data (6) 
• Operating cost evolutions  (10) 
• Environmental cost evolution (3)     
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For each assumption underlying airline fleet plans, experts were asked to 
think about the degree of uncertainty fleet planners face, when planning over 
a horizon of 7-10 years.  For each assumptions, the experts gave their 
assessments first of the degree of uncertainty over 7-10 years, and secondly, 
of the impact of uncertainty on the project's viability.  They were asked to  
assess these two questions independently: as far as possible, keeping the 
impact independent of the degree of uncertainty when assessing the 
assumptions. 
The experts used a scale of 1 (low) to 10 (high), and were invited to provide 
comments for each assumption in the space provided, and nearly all did so.  
Additionally, the experts were invited to add assumptions they believe are 
important, and subject to uncertainty.  The range of individual assessments 
are provided in the form of radar charts in Appendix E.  These charts reveal 
that there is substantial variety of opinions regarding fleet planning 
uncertainties, more or less depending on the specific assumption analysed.    
The overall results for the panel (using average responses) are presented in a 
classic ‘risk map’ framework in Figure 5.12.  In this framework, the lower left 
quadrant is considered inconsequential, the top-left and bottom-right 
quadrants are of moderate risk, while items in the top-right quadrant are 
considered to be the focus for risk management measures, as the present 
above-normal probabilities and impacts on the project. 
To get a sense of the overall results from the nine fleet planning experts, five 
assumptions areas are further divided into 12 individual categories, and 
plotted on an X-Y chart.  The degree of uncertainty is plotted on the X axis, 
and the impact on project profitability on the Y axis. 
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Figure 5.12: Expert panel on fleet planning uncertainties: risk map 
Corporate strategy and crew costs are largely internal to the company, and 
with fees (handling, landing, ATC), are considered of only moderate 
uncertainty and impact on fleet planning projects.  These two categories are 
considered by the experts to be in the “safe” area where assumptions are 
ranked less than 5.0 for both uncertainty and impact.  Comments reveal that 
crew and fee costs are largely predictable, and some considering them non-
issues in fleet planning, as they are outputs of other planning exercises such 
as medium-term budgeting.  In any case, the uncertainty and impact of these 
cost items are deemed low. 
Network evolution is similarly to a great extent a question of airline choice, 
particularly in the increasingly open Europe/North Atlantic service areas: the 
experts rank it just above the impact-neutral 5.00 line, with low uncertainty, 
not of overriding concern to fleet planners. 
On the other hand, there was a major divergence regarding potential 
uncertainty in the strategic and governance areas between the airline 
managers and the advisors.  The assumptions questioned were: 
• Company governance and senior management 
• Evolution of shareholder objectives 
• Political involvement in aircraft selection process  
As befits a panel survey approach without large numbers of respondents, this 
research analyses the overall tendencies and divergence of opinions among 
the experts, rather than seeking statistical validity.  Clear differences were 
   
Chapter 5: Fleet planning and investment appraisal 193 
discovered between the airline planners and the advisors, and these form part 
of the analysis in this section, depicted in graphic form.  The vertical lines in 
the figures below show the overall divergence between the minimum and 
maximum uncertainties and impacts estimated among the expert panel, 
irrespective of whether they be advisors or airline planners.  The column in the 
middle of each line indicates the range of simple average opinions of airline 
planners and advisors.  The size of each column shows the degree of 
divergence between the two groups, while the colour shows its direction: red 
columns indicate that the advisors believed uncertainty or impact to be greater, 
while black columns indicate the reverse, that is, that the airline executives 
believe the uncertainties to be greater.      
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Figure 5.13: Range of expert opinions regarding strategic uncertainty: O = Low, 10 = High 
There was a small divergence regarding changes in governance and senior 
management directions over the fleet planning period.  The range of opinions 
was larger concerning shareholder objectives, with the airlines assessing the 
uncertainty as low, and the advisors uniformly higher.  The greatest 
divergence between the groups concerned political interference in fleet 
planning: the European legacy carriers queried are wholly privatized, which 
tends to preclude direct government interference in company strategy.  The 
advisors’ wealth of experience in other regions of the world points up the well-
known fact that mixed missions and political winds can have a very powerful 
influence on fleet plans and aircraft acquisition decisions.  This highlights the 
importance of airline ownership to its planning and valuation practices, as 
discussed in Chapter Four. 
The range of opinions regarding the impact of strategic assumptions shows a 
similar pattern between airline managers’ and advisors’ opinions, with the 
Columns: difference of 
opinion between advisors 
and airlines as a group 
Lines: overall 
divergence of opinion 
among the experts 
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differences that impact assessments are higher than uncertainty for all the 
experts, and that the impact of political interference on profitability is deemed 
to be seven on a scale of ten by the group of six advisors. 
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Figure 5.14: Range of expert opinions regarding strategic impacts 
Two experts spontaneously mentioned the importance of airline alliances on 
fleet plans over a 10-15 year horizon, with major impacts cited by one airline 
expert.  
All nine additional assumption categories all lie within the high-uncertainty + 
high-impact zone of Figure 5.12.  The detail of expert assessment of 
assumptions within each category of risk is discussed below, from most 
critical to least. 
There is little disagreement that jet fuel price is the greatest uncertainty facing 
fleet planners today.  Assessments of the uncertainty surrounding fuel price 
evolution over 10-15 years ranged from moderate (five to seven), to a more 
frequent eight-to-ten range, while none of the impact assessments was less 
than eight on the scale of ten.  The panel recognize that the fleet planning 
horizon stretches substantially beyond any potential to keep the long-term 
price down through fuel hedging, whatever the condition of the derivatives 
markets in coming years.  Advisors cited the “crystal ball” or casino nature of 
fuel markets, and one expert estimating low uncertainty stated “the only way is 
up.”  This view reflects recent trends in fuel prices.   
Average daily FOB jet fuel prices increased 92% from 2000 to 2009, from 
88US¢ per US Gallon to $1.6819.  Over the same period, the volatility of fuel 
                                                 
19 The analysis in this section is derived from historic data from the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration of the Department of Energy, and its web site eia.doe.gov.  Much of the 
Advisor assesments 
higher than airlines’
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has more than doubled, from a standard deviation (SD) of 11.6¢in 2000 to 
26.2¢ in 2009.  These changes are driving in turn an increase of the 
coefficient of variability (SD / mean) from 13% of the average price to 16%, a 
small numeric difference which, when measured in absolute dollar terms 
implies that the potential upward variation in fuel prices (3SD above the mean 
given a normal distribution) is nearly the same dollar amount as the fuel price 
was ten years earlier.  In addition to the underlying commodity fluctuations, 
uncertainty resides in the crack spread premium of jet fuel prices over crude 
oil, which reached a maximum of 28% in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 
2005, subsiding amid the financial crisis in 2009 to an annual average of 13%.  
This market turbulence adds up to a fuel price distribution that still bears its 
traditional resemblance to a lognormal distribution with its positively skewed 
shape, but with the central tendency higher than previously, and an extremely 
long tail of values on the high side of the distribution, with 24% of all observed 
values 2000-2009 were over US$2.00 per gallon, a percentage that rises to 
64% in the period from 2007 to 2009. 
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Figure 5.14: Distribution of jet fuel prices 2007-2009 in US¢, courtesy of Claude Pluzanski, Airbus 
In addition to the price valuations in U.S.$, there has been a very strong 
correlation between fuel prices and the declining international value of the U.S. 
dollar, in the context of deficit spending of successive U.S. administrations 
since 2001, continuing well into 2010.  Figure 5.15, courtesy of Mr. Pluzanski, 
shows a correlation coefficient of +0.839 between crude oil prices and the 
value of the euro, from the euro’s creation in 1999 through October 2009, an 
R2 that rises to 0.905 when considering the period from 2007 – 2009.  
                                                                                                                                            
analysis has resulted from discussions with and prior work done by Claude Pluzanski, Head 
of Economic Analysis in Airbus Marketing.  
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Correlation between crude oil prices & Euro to US$ rates - Monthly averages - 1999-2009
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  Figure 5.15: Correlation of crude oil prices with the euro:$ rate, courtesy of Claude Pluzanski, Airbus 
Oil has become ‘two prices’ for international airlines, the base price of the 
commodity, and the exchange rate of an unstable U.S. dollar.  Its movements 
are statistically, though not necessarily causally, related to movements in 
other world reserve currencies such as the euro.   Amid all this recent history, 
it is no surprise that the expert panel put fuel price very near the maximum 
levels of risk for fleet planners. 
The economic cycle was the next most critical uncertainty cited by the expert 
panel, particularly strong in terms of impact on profitability.  The airline expert 
assessments averaged higher values than the advisor group regarding both 
the uncertainty and the impact on projects: this is indicated in the Figures 
throughout this section by the black colour of the column, as opposed to red 
when the advisors’ assessments are higher on average.  The two groups 
substantially concur that the impact of the cycle is profound, while opinions 
vary as to its predictability. 
0.905Correlation =
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Figure 5.16: expert assessments of the economic cycle risks 
.   
The cycle for aircraft was superimposed on the large airline profit cycle in 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 of this research.  The market has moved on from the 
traditional logic practiced in the 1990s.  In this model, the relationship between 
airline profits and orders was fairly clear.  Orders bottomed out near zero in 
1993 after the then-worst profit performance on record during 1992, in the 
wake of the first Gulf War and attendant drops in traffic.  As profits began to 
recover, so did orders.  This relationship between profits and orders has 
become less pronounced over the last ten years.  From 2001-2004, 
unprecedented low-cost airline orders (e.g. 140 for Ryanair in 2002, 120 for 
easyJet), the incipient air travel boom in the Middle East, and legacy carrier 
“bottom-feeding” (strategic ordering during the downturn to extract maximum 
manufacturer concessions), kept orders at the 500-unit level during the entire 
period including the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, and the initial SARS 
epidemic in 2003.   
Since 2005 aircraft ordering has exceeded all historical records, fuelled by 
enthusiasm for the B787, a major replacement wave for the 1980s era jets 
such as the B767, B747 and A300/310, the continuing booms in the Middle 
East and China, and the more fragile boom in India.  Aside from the 
continuing low-fare airline boom with its proposal of truly new service 
proposition generating new demand, ordering took an unprecedented 
strategic and geopolitical turn in the mid-2000s, with B787 delivery dates 
stretching out through 2019 (and given the delays, potentially further), and 
large orders for current-generation twins (B777 and A330) continuing very 
strong in the so-called emerging markets cited above. 
Airlines’ assesments 
higher than advisors’
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Aircraft deliveries are traditionally out of sync with airline profits due to 
manufacturer lead times and the difficulty of reducing production rates, which 
tend to bottom out between 400 and 500 jets at the bottom of the cycle.  
Again, the 1990s cycle was more “classical,” with production increases 
lagging the airline profit cycle, while in the current cycle production rose even 
as major airline profits remained low in the early years of this decade.  In the 
most recent downturn, the manufacturers managed to deliver 800-1,000 jets 
in spite of the new-record losses in 2008 and continuing airline losses in 2009, 
and expect to continue doing so in 2010.  Again, the experts’ opinions 
regarding the cycle are borne out by medium and short-term historical 
experience in the aircraft market, and as they indicated, the amplitude of 
cyclical patterns has increased, even if the cycle’s frequency is more or less 
consistent at eight-ten years. 
The third major risky assumption concerning the reliability of announced 
manufacturer entry into service (EIS) dates for new aircraft hardly needs 
comment.  Clearly, this problem is strictly related to new aircraft types, as 
several of the experts pointed out that delivery date uncertainty for in-service 
aircraft is very low.  The A380’s scheduled EIS of March 2006 slipped to 
December 2008, while the B787 is two years behind schedule as the 
manufacturer struggles with supply chain and engineering problems linked to 
the choice to dramatically increase composite use in primary structures, 
notably the wing.  The expert panel placed this risk high on their lists, with the 
airline executives somewhat more confident than the advisors that such risks 
can be mitigated using contractual provisions in aircraft contracts, short-term 
capacity compensations such as operating leases, or a combination of these 
two. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Uncertainty of aircraft delivery dates Impact  of aircraft delivery dates
 
Figure 5.17: expert assessments of aircraft manufacturer EIS and delivery date reliability 
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Thus, the top three risks faced by airline fleet planners – fuel price, economic 
cycle, and EIS dates for new aircraft types – are largely outside the airlines’ 
control, and they have very few ways to mitigate these risks over the fleet 
planning horizon. 
The next highest risk fleet planning assumption according to the expert panel 
regards competition.  They were asked to assess the risk of competitive 
response to fleet plans from existing competitors, and separately to evaluate 
the risks from new entrants to their markets.  The two groups had differing 
views of this issue, with the airline executives more assessing the uncertainty 
and the impact of existing competitors higher than the threat of new entrants, 
and advisors the opposite.  
 
Figure 5.18: expert panel assessments of competitive uncertainties 
The airline group placed the uncertainty surrounding existing competitors 
between five to seven, and the impact between seven and nine.  The 
European legacy carriers have borne new and continuing assaults on both 
long-haul and short/medium-haul markets over the last ten years.  On the 
long-haul markets between Europe and Asia, the emergence of Emirates and 
other sixth-freedom Gulf carriers has created a new set of traffic flows 
between Europe and Asia through high-capacity hubs in the United Arab 
Emirates and Qatar.  The 23% compound annual ATK growth rate of Emirates 
in particular placed the airline slightly above BA in terms of Available Tonne 
Kilometres (ATK) in 2008/2009, and very near equal in terms of overall 
Revenue Tonne Kilometres (including both passengers and freight), as shown 
in Figures 5.19 and 5.20.  The spectacular rise of these carriers is a major 
long-term threat to European airline development, but also, the extent to 
which they can continue to grow in one of the world’s geopolitically volatile 
region is a substantial source of uncertainty for planners.   
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Figure 5.19: British Airways (BA), Emirates (EK), Lufthansa (LH) total capacity 2001 – 2009.  Source: 
company reports 
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Figure 5.20: British Airways (BA), Emirates (EK), Lufthansa (LH) total traffic, 2001 – 2009.  Source: 
company reports 
In European markets, low-fare airlines led by Ryanair and easyJet have had 
the created new potential for travel by air.  As Figure 5.21 shows, the early 
part of the 2000s saw these carriers increasing overall traffic between the 
London and Barcelona catchment areas over fourfold, with fairly limited 
impact on such incumbents as BA and Iberia (IB).  As the low-fare carriers 
continue to expand fleet and services at a rapid rate, the potential impact on 
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the legacy carriers’ hub-based strategies remains to be seen.  At least one, 
Iberia, has followed a strategy of investing in arms-length low-fare carriers of 
its own, while reducing the mainline airline’s capacity on competing routes and 
focusing on feeding the Madrid hub: the creation of Clickair in Barcelona, and 
its subsequent merger with Vueling, a major component of the network 
restructuring underway at IB.    
 
Figure 5.21: traffic between London and Barcelona catchment areas: Source: Prof. Rigas Doganis 
The advisors consistently rated the impact of new entrants the same as or 
higher than that of existing competitors, as the new business models continue 
to spread around the globe.  Concerning the uncertainty of the twin threats, 
there was no consensus among the experts, whose assessments ranged from 
two to nine.  This again reflects the geographical diversity of their experience, 
since there remain many markets where entrance and competition are strictly 
controlled, for example, India and mainland China.  The European airlines 
have in many ways led the way toward privatization, financial transparency 
and accompanying valuation techniques, and most recently, consolidation, 
just as their markets become increasingly deregulated.  
The next category of assumptions queried concerns prospective demand for 
air travel on individual airlines.  The expert panel was asked to assess these 
risks in four areas:  
• Pure origin-destination (O-D) demand 
• Behind/beyond demand feeding the airlines’ trunk routes 
• Demand mix: First, Business, Economy  
• Trends and evolution in yields  
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The responses are summarized in Figure 5.22. 
 
Figure 5.22: expert assessments of demand evolutions over the fleet planning horizon 
As the black columns indicate, the uncertainty of overall demand levels is 
considered substantially higher by the group of airline fleet planning 
executives than by the advisors, giving rise to a wide range of responses on 
these two items.  Regarding uncertainty, advisors stated that such 
considerations can be estimated reliably in their experience and lie within the 
airline’s overall business plan.  One advisor drew a sharp distinction between 
behind (feeding) and beyond (de-feeding) traffic, with the latter being far more 
uncertain than the former.   
On the other hand, the groups agreed regarding the high impact of these 
assumptions on the viability of fleet plans, with responses centring around 7.5 
for the core O-D demand, and 6.0 for behind/beyond traffic demand.  When 
the two dimensions are combined in a risk map framework, the airline 
executives see demand levels as substantially more risky that the advisors, 
mostly on the uncertainty dimension.  Once again, the broader geographical 
range of the advisors’ experience can partially explain this divergence, with 
many of the world’s more highly-regulated aviation regions offering more 
stability than today’s volatile European/North- and South-Atlantic service 
areas.  Many of the state-owned carriers soliciting professional advice on fleet 
plans have a stronger grip on their markets than Northern European carriers.   
The assumptions regarding demand by cabin class and yield trends reveal 
greater uncertainty and impact across the board, with a strong consensus 
around 6.0-6.5 on the uncertainty dimension for both groups overall, and a 
near-complete consensus around 8.5 for their impacts.  Several experts 
pointed out that the two assumptions are deeply intertwined and difficult to 
separate by analysis.  The divergence of opinion regarding yields arises from 
the frequently-stated notion - held by the advisors - that yield trends across 
the industry are well-known to be decreasing year on year, with greater 
prospective uncertainty regarding air service and cabin class propositions and 
pricing, in the wake of the advent of new business models (including e.g., low-
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fare carriers and the rapid-growing 6th-freedom airlines in the Persian Gulf).  
The overall result of the expert opinions places demand-related risks firmly in 
the high-risk quadrant of the map, with the impact substantially higher than the 
perceived uncertainty. 
In the section on the reliability of manufacturers’ aircraft performance data, the 
experts as a group assessed fuel burn in the high-risk quadrant of the risk 
map: however, there was an extraordinary diversity of opinions regarding the 
fleet planning risks of such data. 
 
Figure 5.23: expert assessments of aircraft performance uncertainties over the fleet planning horizon 
In general, the advisors’ group expressed more scepticism about the 
manufacturers’ data, with the airline managers frequently stating that such 
uncertainties can be mitigated by contractual means such as manufacturer 
guarantees.  The exception to this rule was uncertainties on announced seat 
counts, which one airline executive considered “pure marketing,” while 
another stated that they use their own layout tools to establish seat counts, 
disregarding manufacturer layouts entirely.  The airline managers considered 
the much-discussed dispatch reliability data to be of slightly higher impact 
than the advisors, again stating that guarantees can minimize the impact on 
the project.  The fuel burn risk present in the high-risk section of the risk map 
is considered more critical in its impact than the uncertainty. 
The operating cost assumptions were considered to be relatively low 
uncertainty and impact, although certain assumptions were considered quite a 
bit more risky than others.  
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Figure 5.24: Expert panel assessment of aircraft operating cost uncertainties: risk map 
Two significant risky assumptions emerge: airframe and particularly engine 
maintenance.  Risk mitigation of these two items has followed three distinct 
trends in recent years.  Following the engine manufacturers’ lead, aircraft 
OEMs have begun to offer flight-hour based ‘total care’ packages covering 
scheduled maintenance events, smoothing the stream of maintenance cash 
flows and rendering them quite a bit more certain.  When such packages are 
not available, airlines have sought manufacturer guarantees but often find 
them very difficult and costly to administer operationally.  The third trend 
developed by the low-fare airlines has been to outsource maintenance to third 
parties, reducing variability of maintenance costs over the contract period.  
This approach tends to dramatically reduce the direct maintenance costs, but 
also contributes to low-fare emphasis on reducing overhead costs by 
rendering extensive tooling, training, engineering and management staff 
superfluous.    
The experience of the airline and advisor experts lead them to assess the 
other cash operating costs of aircraft operation to be relatively low risk from a 
fleet planning perspective. 
The final risky assumptions analyzed in this section concern present and 
future emissions charges levied by airports and governments.  Several 
experts stated that this area is rather predictable in the near term, but far less 
so – with strong political influence – in the longer term. 
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Figure 5.25: expert assessments of environmental cost uncertainties over the fleet planning horizon 
There is a reasonably strong consensus on the airport charge question, with 
the near-term impacts well-known following imposition of such charges at 
Heathrow, as well as in Switzerland and Sweden early in this decade.  Still the 
divergence regarding both uncertainty and impacts of airport charges among 
experts working in different regions of the world is substantial, running from 
one to eight on the scale of ten.  The perceived threat to aviation from 
international emissions scheme such as the E.U.’s Emissions Trading 
Scheme (ETS) is greatest among the airline practitioners, who assess both 
dimensions at higher levels than the advisors.  On airline executive considers 
international emissions charges “the greatest threat to airline growth.”  
5.5. Conclusions 
The fleet planning process and its attendant uncertainties are strategic for the 
world’s airlines.  Fleet development decisions require airlines to make 
fundamental choices regarding network shape, and carefully arbitrate 
between aircraft size vs. frequency.  Frequency has been shown by the 
literature and practice to be a key competitive feature to gain market share in 
deregulated environments. 
The deep relationship with and influence of aircraft manufacturers and their 
choice of aircraft programmes gives the manufacturers’ market analysis 
strong influence in the fleet development decisions at the strategic level.  
Argumentation and rhetoric by today’s two large manufacturers inevitably add 
to the uncertainties faced by fleet planners, particularly since the airframers’ 
choices of aircraft programmes define the range of choices available to fleet 
planners.  Today, aircraft manufacturers have dramatically different views of 
the potential for fleet development in the future, particularly in the “21st 
Century” markets of Asia-Pacific and the recently-developed sixth-freedom 
hubs of the Middle East. 
Airline fleet planning processes tend to place the investment valuation at the 
end of an iterative loop, as a justification and arbiter of the fleet plans’ validity.  
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This is particularly pronounced in the neo-classical paradigm of fleet 
development, which is entirely consistent with classical financial theory.  The 
fleet planning methodology typical in this paradigm seeks to align the airline’s 
development with expected evolutions in the economic environment and 
competitive arenas.     
The expert panel assessed nine out of 12 broad assumption areas in neo-
classical fleet planning in the high-uncertainty / high-risk quadrant of the risk 
map. The divergence of opinions among the experts suggests that the 
methods and uncertainties faced in fleet planning vary depending on the 
region of the world, and the airline’s ownership, governance, and fleet 
planning process definition. 
The positioning of the investment valuation as arbiter at the end of the fleet 
development process, and the high level of uncertainty regarding economic 
assumptions identified in this research, lend particular weight to the valuation 
policy and risk assessment methods discussed in the next chapter.  In light of 
the risks, the neo-classical approach has been found to be complemented by 
newer and distinctly different approaches to managing risks in aircraft 
investment planning and project valuation.  
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6. Airline practices in risk valuation and management 
This chapter examines how airlines estimate and value the risks in the 
investment appraisal process, in light of available techniques and research in 
risk valuation methodologies. In the purest interpretation of classical financial 
theory, adjustments to project valuations are not necessary, as all relevant 
company-specific risks are captured in the company’s beta and hence in its 
cost of capital.  Chapter Four of this research revealed that in the airline 
business classical, market-based financial valuation techniques are 
problematic, given the difficulties of estimating cost of capital parameters, as 
well as the variety of airline ownership and governance patterns around the 
world.   
As this research discovered to be the case concerning estimates of cost of 
capital, the literature review and field research shows a variety of objective 
and subjective methods in use to estimate the level of risk in a project’s 
assumptions.  Once the risks are estimated, there are essentially two methods 
to adjust the valuation for risk.  The first is to vary the assumptions or inputs to 
the investment valuation to determine whether the project is robust under 
adverse conditions: a more sophisticated variant of this approach is to weight 
various parameter values with a priori probabilities, an expected-value 
approach familiar in OR.  Alternatively, risk is dealt with by ‘raising the bar’ for 
investment approval by requiring a higher forecast rate of return, a shorter 
payback period, or both.  In this chapter the literature and airline practice are 
compared, using both the airline CFO survey and the executive interviews 
performed as part of this research. 
Secondly, this chapter seeks to ascertain the degree of interaction between 
fleet decisions and financing alternatives available.  While classical theory 
holds that these decisions should be held strictly separate, our field research 
reveals significant interactions, notably in the evaluation of operating leasing 
as an alternative to purchasing the aircraft.  The theory and practice of lease 
evaluation is reviewed, and practice from the airline survey and executive 
interviews performed is identified and discussed.  The potential use of 
operating leases to mitigate airline risks is then discussed in a real options 
framework in Chapter Seven. 
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6.1. Risk valuation field research 
6.1.1. Evolution of risk valuation methods in the general business community 
In the general business community20, risk estimation is found to be largely 
subjective, though more sophisticated statistical techniques have increased in 
popularity in recent years.  Surprisingly, a relatively small number of 
executives surveyed report performing ‘best/most likely/worst case’ sensitivity 
analysis.  The most popular method for adjusting the valuation for risk in the 
financial community is to raise the required rate of return for investment 
approval.  In spite of the ready availability of modern risk management 
techniques such as Monte Carlo simulation and Real Options Analysis, these 
appear to be marginally applied in practice. 
Schall et al. found that in 1978, a clear majority of the 189 firms responding to 
their survey assess risk “only subjectively.”  A slight weakness of their survey 
design is that the authors do not clearly distinguish between methods to 
estimate risk and methods to adjust the valuation for risk. 
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Figure 6.1: methods of estimating and adjusting for risk in Schall et al. (1978) 
Estimating probability distributions for cash flows was found to be used by a 
significant number of firms to adjust the valuation, while sensitivity analysis 
and the portfolio approach were far less used.  Another clear majority of 78% 
‘raised the bar’ by shortening PBK period, raising the required ARR, or raising 
the discount rate in NPV, to account for risk in the project.  The authors found 
that one tenth of all firms shorten the PBK period to compensate for risk, while 
a full 31% of respondents combine shortened PBK with raising the cost of 
                                                 
20 Given the preponderance of field research performed by academics in the United States, it 
is important to keep in mind that the “general” business community largely reflects practice in 
that country. 
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capital or the required ARR. Twenty-three percent of firms were found to use 
different techniques for different risk classes. 
Oblak  and Helm (1980) queried executives on risk assessment in light of 
offshore operations, which present currency and sovereign political risks not 
present in domestic operations.  The authors found that only 7% of firms 
surveyed use sensitivity analysis to quantify the risks.  Instead, they tended to 
raise the cost of capital for the NPV calculation, based either on the local 
(offshore) cost of capital, or a subjective estimate similar to Schall et al. (1978).  
The nearly even split between these two methods is shown in Figure 6.2.  The 
article confirmed both the persistence of “seat-of-the-pants”, subjective 
estimates of risk, and the preference for raising the estimated WACC to adjust 
for this risk. 
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Other methods
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Figure 6.2: methods of adjusting for international project risk in Oblak and Helm. (1980) 
Two more recent and comprehensive surveys updated and completed the 
picture of risk assessment practice.  Trahan and Gitman (1995) treat the risk 
assessment question exhaustively, measuring both the extent to which the 
various risk assessment methods were understood, and the extent to which 
they were used.  The authors queried financial managers from a population of 
700 Fortune 500 and Forbes 200 U.S. companies, and received 84 responses, 
a 12% response rate.  The results regarding risk assessment are presented in 
Figure 6.3.  
 
Chapter 6: Airline practices in risk valuation and management 210 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100
%
Scenario Analysis 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Decision Tree Analysis 
Discount Rate Adjustments
Monte Carlo Simulation 
Management’s subjective estimates
Understand the technique Use the technique
 
Figure 6.3: Methods in adjusting valuations for project risk in Trahan and Gitman (1995) 
Responses revealed that sensitivity analysis was the most commonly used 
technique, with over 60% of managers using it.  By 1995 (in contrast to 1980), 
spreadsheet software had become ubiquitous, greatly facilitating such 
analysis.  The familiar subjective estimates and discount rate adjustments 
followed, with around 50% adoption each.  More advanced techniques such 
as Monte Carlo, and Decision Tree analysis lagged behind, but not because 
the managers didn’t understand them.  The Scenario analysis technique is a 
variant of sensitivity analysis, where assumptions are clustered into groups 
and used to stress test the project model: a simple airline example would be 
to grouping high fares and reduced load factors (or in today’s environment, a 
high US$ fuel price with a low US$ currency value) into comprehensive 
scenarios for analysis. The more quantitative techniques and the seeming 
stubborn resistance to their adoption are discussed below and in Chapter 7 of 
this research.  
Graham and Harvey (2001) went more into detail, proposing a set of 
potentially risky parameters and ask how companies account for them in the 
project valuation.  They found that in the of the 392 U.S. firms responding,  
71% make adjustments for the market risk (beta value) of a project, confirming 
heavy use of the CAPM methodology and the so-called “project Beta” 
approach to estimating cost of capital.  The project beta is derived by 
calculating a leveraged beta taking financing requirements into consideration, 
and/or adopting the betas of “pure-play” firms engaged in businesses with risk 
characteristics similar to those of the project in question as a proxy for the 
project beta.  Adjusting the beta upwards to reflect increased risk to 
shareholders goes beyond simple subjective increases of WACC in that it is 
derived objectively: that said, it remains a method for adjusting for risk by 
raising the required cost of capital. 
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Figure 6.4: adjusting for various types of risk in Graham and Harvey (2001) 
Graham and Harvey further queried their respondents about their treatment of 
specific risks in the project valuation, including both financial risks (interest 
rate, currency rates, inflation) and economic risks (business cycle, commodity 
prices, firm size).  Financial managers were found to be most likely to adjust 
cash flows (and somewhat less likely to adjust the discount rate) in assessing 
the risk of three parameters that are strongly relevant for the airline business:  
commodity prices (jet fuel), business cycle (due to traffic fluctuations), and 
foreign exchange (for international carriers).  The authors found that a relative 
majority of firms more commonly adjust the cash flows for these specific risks, 
rather than raising the discount rate. 
The field research performed recently in the general business community thus 
shows continuity and change: discount rate adjustments remain the favoured 
technique to adjust valuations, however, with an evolution from largely 
subjective adjustments toward more scientific approaches.  The Trahan and 
Gitman and Graham and Harvey surveys, the most comprehensive in the 
recent literature, produced slightly contradictory findings: the former revealed 
that sensitivity analysis for key uncertain parameters is more commonly used 
than raising the discount rate in the U.S. business community, while Graham 
and Harvey found a more “pure” CAPM approach, where firms tend to 
estimate project betas and thus adjust the discount rate in this way.     
6.1.2. Risk valuation methods in aircraft projects 
In the aviation literature, this research has found extensive use of stochastic 
methods in fleet assignment and scheduling problems: however, at least in 
the neo-classical approach to fleet planning, forecasting models are largely 
deterministic, producing “point estimates” of cash flows.  Two recent 
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approaches in the aviation literature suggest ways of using deterministic 
models to capture uncertainty. 
Morrell (2007) discusses a very practical method for looking at project risk, by 
calculating the project NPV against potential cost of capital of hurdle rates for 
investments.   
The techniques discussed in the remaining chapters of this research use the 
example of a single-aisle aircraft operating under typical European economic 
conditions, under the high aircraft utilization that characterizes low-fare 
airlines such as Ryanair and easyJet.  Throughout, the scenario concerns 
valuation in 2010 for prospective delivery of the aircraft at the beginning of 
2012, with a 15-year investment horizon.  The model inputs and results are 
presented in Appendix F.  For confidentiality reasons, the figures are 
somewhat stylized, but remain representative of typical data used in such an 
analysis.   
This research has shown that discount rate estimation is fraught with many 
uncertainties and methodological challenges, but has also revealed that 
discounted cash flow techniques are preferred by airline CFO respondents, 
largely representing European airlines.  Given this paradox, the approach 
discussed in Morrell (2007) is a method of estimating project risk, while 
implicitly capturing the revealed tendency of finance executives to increase 
estimated WACC for risky projects. 
The stylized example below compares investment in the smaller 156-seat 
aircraft with a 180-seat model from the same manufacturer, an aircraft sizing 
question is a common decision for fleet planners.  The method discussed in 
Morrell (2007) is applied to the risk assessment/discount-rate problem in 
Figure 6.5.  
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Figure 6.5: Project NPV as a function of Discount Rate 
As a larger plane, the 180-seater has more potential to allow for growth in 
demand for passenger and cargo transport.  On the other hand, the aircraft is 
more expensive, and traffic growth fills the airplane further out in the future 
than the 156-seater.  At low discount rates, the larger plane’s future benefits 
produce higher NPV than those of the smaller, while the reverse is true for 
higher discount rates.  At the “crossover” rate of just under 12% in the 
example, the projects produce equivalent NPVs, and the valuation is thus 
indifferent to the choice of aircraft.  If the firm’s WACC is over 14%, both the 
larger then the smaller aircraft projects become problematic from a valuation 
standpoint.  With its steeper curve of NPV against discount rate, the larger 
plane can be seen as a riskier project, and can allow managers to view 
preferences under a variety of discount rate scenarios: this is a pragmatic 
combination of risk assessment and sensitivity analysis. 
Of paramount concern to fleet planners today, fuel prices and related 
uncertainties will have a major impact on fleet evolutions in the 21st century.  
To measure possible impacts of fuel-price uncertainty on fleet choices, 
Hansen and Smirti (2009) propose a deterministic model that can be used to 
determine “contour” indifference curves between aircraft types operated over 
a variety of stage lengths, depending on fuel price.  The authors included crew 
and maintenance cost as variables, in addition to fuel consumption, for 
regional jets (RJ), turbo-props (PR) and narrow-body (NB) jets, derived 
-$20
-$10
$0
$10
$20
$30
$40
$50
5.0% 6.0% 7.0% 8.0% 9.0% 10.0% 11.0% 12.0% 13.0% 14.0% 15.0% 16.0% 17.0% 18.0% 19.0%
Discount rate for NPV calculation
N
PV
 in
 M
ill
io
ns
156-seater NPV 180-seater NPV
Crossover 
discount rate 
 
Chapter 6: Airline practices in risk valuation and management 214 
through regression analysis of U.S. DOT data.  By applying different fuel 
prices per U.S. Gallon to these equations, they establish the indifference point 
where each of the three aircraft types produce equivalent costs at various 
stage lengths.  The analysis was then extended to include a charge for 
passenger travel time ($47.75/hr) and turboprop disutility 
($29.17/passenger/flight).  Not surprisingly, RJs fare poorly when compared to 
turbo-props on a per-passenger basis even when travel time and turboprop 
disutility is taken into account, as shown in Figure 6.6.  The red curve 
represents the frontier where operating cost is the same between the two 
technologies. 
 
Figure 6.6: “Contour” indifference curves showing RJ cost compared to PR, from Smirti and Hansen 
(2009) 
At any fuel price above $3.50 per gallon, turbo-props present a lower cost per 
passenger than RJs, a state of affairs which certainly hasn’t escaped turbo-
prop manufacturers such as ATR, who have seen a dramatic revival of 
demand as fuel prices have climbed over recent years.   
On the other hand, narrow-body jets, with larger seat counts and lower 
maintenance and crew costs per seat, fare better in the comparison.  They 
remain cheaper to operate per passenger until fuel prices reach rather 
extreme levels, as shown in Figure 6.7. 
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Figure 6.7: “Contour” indifference curves showing NB cost compared to PR, from Smirti and Hansen 
(2009) 
Higher-capacity narrow-body aircraft are shown to be a more robust solution 
to rising fuel costs than either turboprops or RJs, in U.S. market.  These two 
recent examples from the literature demonstrate sensitivity analysis 
techniques available to airline planners in assessing project risks, within a 
deterministic modelling framework.    
6.2. Airline approaches to fleet investment risk  
6.2.1. Risk assessment methods in airlines 
The airline CFO survey performed for this research addressed separately the 
methods used for risk estimation (or assessment), and those used for the 
subsequent adjustment of the valuation to reflect project risks.  In terms of risk 
assessment, the survey revealed substantial consistency with prior research.  
Airline CFOs were asked to indicate one or more techniques used, among the 
following list: 
• Subjective estimate: a rough adjustment made based on prior 
experience  
• Monte Carlo: assigning probability distributions to variables and 
measuring the statistical range of project outcomes  
• Beta method: identifying a “project Beta” reflecting the project cash 
flow variances and market Betas of companies in similar businesses 
• Value at risk: a technique used in banking, which measures the 
potential loss at a very high level of certainty (typically, 95% or 99% 
probability.  This method is a rule for quantifying the results of Monte 
Carlo analysis  
 
Chapter 6: Airline practices in risk valuation and management 216 
• Sensitivity: varying sensitive parameters in a limited number of 
scenarios, similar to the approach in Smirti and Hansen (2009) 
• Don't analyse: self-explanatory 
Nearly half of the Airline CFOs responding indicated that they use a single 
technique to assess risk: of these, 12 CFOs use Subjective estimates only.  
The remaining respondents use more than one technique to assess risk, a 
similar approach to the use of more than one valuation technique identified in 
Chapter Three of this research.   
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Figure 6.8: Number of different valuation techniques used to evaluate airline investments 
 The full range of responses is presented in Figure 6.9.  A large majority of 
airline CFO respondents used subjective estimates to assess risk, while 
nearly one third use Monte Carlo analysis.  Use of this statistical technique by 
a prominent start-up low-fare airline in Europe was confirmed in the executive 
interviews discussed in the next section.  The other methods showed lower 
levels of use, and were found to be used along with other techniques.   
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Figure 6.9: Methods used to assess risk among Airline CFO respondents 
The survey also tested strength of preference among managers using the 
techniques, asking whether the CFOs used the techniques sometimes (1), or 
always (2), as shown in Figure 6.10. 
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Figure 6.10: Strength of preference for risk assessment methods among Airline CFO respondents 
CFOs using sensitivity analysis do so only sometimes, while preferences for 
all other methods showed that they are used more than anecdotally.   
Comparing the overall frequency of positive airline responses on the subject 
of risk methods to Schall et al. (1978) reveals similarities and evolutions, as 
shown in Figure 6.11.  Subjective estimate is still and more strongly the 
favourite method to capture risk.  Statistical methods such as Monte Carlo and 
cash flow covariance have gained ground, while the number of companies 
who use sensitivity analysis is stable: the executive interviews revealed that 
“simple” sensitivity analysis has given way to more comprehensive and 
sophisticated techniques in Europe.   
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Figure 6.11: frequency of use of risk estimation techniques “sometimes” or “all the time” 
Airline financial managers are clearly taking risk into account, and substantial 
numbers are using sophisticated techniques at least some of the time.  Still, 
though, management judgement is more common than quantitative 
techniques among airline respondents.    
This is in strong contrast to Graham and Harvey’s finding that 71% of U.S. 
financial managers use the quantitative “Beta” technique from classical 
finance to assess risk.  This technique is only applicable to firms with listed 
shares.  Since airline shares are very commonly unlisted, managers are in 
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any case unable to apply classical financial theory to risk assessment: 10 of 
the 12 Government-owned airlines responding to the CFO survey used 
subjective estimates to assess the risk of projects.     
6.2.2. Adjusting investment valuation for project risks 
Once the risk of a project is estimated, the valuation can be adjusted either by 
varying the cash flows, or by increasing the discount rate.  In the area of 
compensating or adjusting the analysis for risk there are clear tendencies 
among airline managers, as shown in Figure 6.12.  The common approaches 
of ‘raising the bar’ by increasing the discount rate, requiring earlier payback, 
or raising the acceptable IRR are clearly used by airlines. 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Raise required rate
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Shorten PBK
period
Raise the discount
rate for NPV
  
Figure 6.12: Airline methods to adjust investment valuations for project risk 
Keeping in mind that 81% of the CFOs interviewed – regardless of ownership 
– used the NPV technique to value investments, Table 6.1 shows the 
percentage of airline executives who both used the relevant technique (NPV 
or PBK) and ‘raised the bar’ to adjust the valuation.   In all cases the survey 
revealed a pronounced tendency to raise the bar for the CFOs who used the 
relevant technique.  The strongest tendency to increase the discount rate was 
found among the practitioners that always use NPV to value investments: 
64% responded that they raise the discount rate in the analysis to 
compensate for risk, compared to only 38% of “occasional” NPV users.  There 
was a less prominent tendency to tighten payback criteria in light of project 
risks. 
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Preference for the techniques 
                                                Raise the bar? 
Adjust discount 
rate 
Shorten 
payback period
Always use NPV/PBK to analyse investments 64% 47% 
Sometimes use NPV/PBK to analyse investments 38% 38% 
Table 6.1: Tendency of airline CFOs using NPV to adjust valuations by raising the bar 
This again stands in contrast to Graham and Harvey (2001), which revealed a 
more balanced approach between adjusting discount rates and  varying cash 
flows among U.S. CFOs.   
The survey shows that the most common way to account for risk in aircraft 
investment analysis is to “artificially” raise the discount rate, making 
investment projects more difficult to justify.  The adjustment is in turn often 
based on subjective estimates of the risk of projects.  The two practices add 
up to experience-based risk management, as opposed to objective and 
quantified valuation adjustments.  The popularity of “raising the bar” for 
valuation purposes begs the question of how much it should be raised, adding 
an additional dimension to the airline dilemma regarding cost of capital 
estimation discussed in Chapter Four.   
6.2.3. Risk quantification in the neo-classical paradigm 
In the neo-classical approach, sensitivity analysis of critical parameters such 
as yield, fuel price, and maintenance cost is performed.  The parameters are 
identified for sensitivity analysis by testing the impact each has on the result.  
The analysis is then subjected to two types of tests.  The first is “stress 
testing,” that is, application of worst-case values to the model, each parameter 
in turn.  The project will be rejected if the NPV does not hold up under worst 
case values for various parameters.  Second, in some cases, parameter 
“stress tests” are grouped into scenarios of concomitant parameter values, 
with the acceptance criterion remaining a positive NPV. 
The discount rate used for NPV in this paradigm is very much based on a 
classical WACC calculation, using a target (i.e., lower than current) debt ratio.  
In the highly-geared airline industry, this is one mechanical way of raising the 
project discount rate, as the higher cost of equity is substituted for the lower 
cost of debt, to avoid “cheap money from excessive debt.”  Managers stated 
that there was a margin then added over the WACC, about which they were 
“sworn to secrecy”, without knowing the source or nature of the margin over 
WACC.  This approach is largely consistent with the results of the airline CFO 
survey. 
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None of the managers interviewed took an explicit view of the impact of the 
economic cycle on traffic, nor modelled the cycle’s effect on cash flow or 
aircraft values.  Rather, they assume a mean-reverting cycle with a clear 
central tendency or average growth rate, and model such growth at a constant 
rate over the investment horizon.  This approach is very much at odds with 
current practices in the financial community (particularly among operating 
lessors), who have cyclical trends and market timing as a central aspect of 
their business models.   
When asked about the use of Monte Carlo analysis to quantify risk, managers 
expressed a clear preference for an approach which allowed them to build a 
“mental model” of the potential outcomes.  This is usually done by running the 
model with a number of intermediate data points between the extreme high 
and low values for the sensitive parameters, generate a scatter diagram or 
radar graph to represent the risk visually in a scatter plot to show the 
outcomes graphically.  No central tendency is used to create these charts, 
that is, each data point is considered equally probable.  Assumptions of 
positive or negative correlations are often used in the analysis, the most 
common being to consider demand as negatively correlated with fare or yield.   
The claim was consistently made that this type of sensitivity approach was 
less of a black box than Monte Carlo, and easier to explain and to grasp than 
such probabilistic techniques.  Several managers in various airlines expressed 
a pronounced hostility to Monte Carlo, saying that using it was akin to 
abdicating responsibility for the analysis and resulting recommendations.   
The neo-classical approach to modelling risk is thus a sort of intuitive 
statistical approach, where dispersion and correlations are applied to potential 
outcomes, which are used to capture visually the risks of the project, as 
opposed to a quantitative, Monte Carlo-type approach. 
Real Options Analysis is similarly only used in a limited and intuitive way 
under this paradigm.  These managers often use decision trees, for example, 
to value aircraft family conversion options under different market growth and 
traffic scenarios.  Each market scenario is weighted with probabilities and 
matched with various aircraft choices: the result is an expected NPV for each 
aircraft choice, used to guide the process of final aircraft type selection among 
narrow body aircraft families.  This approach is certainly close to valuing 
flexibility using real options, although flexibility is valued implicitly by 
comparing expected NPV under various fleet scenarios, rather than assigning 
a specific dollar figure as in real options analysis, which is discussed in 
Chapter Seven of this research.    
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Consensus among the executives in various airlines is that risk analysis is 
primarily used to build understanding and the dynamics and “get a mental 
sense of the trade-offs” a benefit many find absent in statistical and options 
pricing approaches.  The intensive quantification of the market analysis phase 
is absent in the valuation.  One manager made the comment that simplicity of 
analysis can be an advantage “in a world of imponderables” that characterizes 
today’s airline business. 
6.3. New perspectives on risk management in aircraft projects 
6.3.1. Risk quantification as a negotiating strategy 
The second paradigm identified is dramatically different from the neo-classical 
approach in three ways.  First, there is a far higher level of information-sharing 
between the airline and its potential suppliers regarding the valuation.  
Second, there is no detailed market analysis or route-by-route build-up of 
revenue and cost.  Rather, an assumed average stage length is used 
throughout the cash flow model.  Finally, statistical risk modelling is placed at 
the centre of the analysis.  This paradigm is often associated with start-up 
airlines, whose initial operating strategy is based on a business plan rather 
than historical data and previous company experience.  It is noted in passing 
that airlines of this sort in every region of the world form an important part of 
new orders for jet aircraft every year, particularly in the booming market for 
short to medium-range aircraft of 125-175 seats. 
Positioning of the economic evaluation 
In this paradigm, the fleet plan and valuation is one aspect of the company’s 
business plan, which follows the steps outlined in Chapter Five of this 
research.  The fleet plan is an element of the overall business plan, and 
economic performance of the fleet is reflected in the company financial 
forecast, rather than being a separate analysis as in the neo-classical 
paradigm.   
Many recent airline start-ups have applied a rigorous “commoditization” of the 
airline product, offering dramatically simpler services and unbundled pricing, 
charging all ancillary services to those who are willing to pay for them.  This 
type of business model is best suited to an aircraft which is also a 
“commodity,” well-proven and available in large quantities in relatively 
standardised configurations.  The selection of potential aircraft to suit the 
strategy is often one of the first steps for these airlines, with a narrow range of 
potential aircraft and specific configurations identified (maximum seat count, 
no hot galley for example) forming part of the business model itself.   
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Europe’s low fare airlines can be seen as  applying an analytical logic directly 
opposite to mainline carriers: rather than develop a model of the company’s 
network and then find a set of aircraft which “optimally” serves the demand 
through OR techniques and iterations, these carriers start by analysing aircraft 
types and their capabilities, and build the projected network around these 
capabilities, with the overall objective of maximizing utilization of the aircraft 
on a daily basis. 
In this type of operation, the evaluation of the aircraft (resulting in an NPV) is 
not used primarily for financial justification of the acquisition inside the airline.  
Rather, its essential use as a bargaining tool to obtain the lowest possible 
investment needed to fulfil the business model requirements.  The risk 
assessment is used to demonstrate the variability of project returns to the 
manufacturers, and to extract concessions (in price and performance 
guarantees) aimed at limiting the downside risk for the airline investors.  
Managers adopting the risk quantification paradigm emphasise the need to 
level the playing field between different aircraft, that is, to get to operational 
figures at a sufficient level of detail to correctly assess the risks.  To prepare 
the negotiation, these managers work closely with manufacturers in order to 
gain agreement (more or less grudging) on the fundamental parameters 
driving the cash flow, and establish a base case NPV for the project, as well 
as a set of “sensitivity NPVs”, which are used as bargaining chips with the 
manufacturers.   
A stochastic sensitivity analysis is at the heart of this paradigm.  One manager 
cited an example where 11 risk factors were identified and quantified one by 
one, with the impact and probability of each high and low scenario estimated 
by the airline’s management.  In analysing the potential switch from an single-
type fleet to a mixed-fleet operation, the airline quantified the risk impacts of 
11 parameters, containing both traditional and innovative items, as well as 
some that are only appropriate to the specific situation.  The list can be 
divided into three categories of items.  The first six concern revenue and 
operating cost, to which are added two specific management costs, and three 
macro effects: 
• Maintenance cost 
• Fuel burn and cost 
• Operational resilience (lack of scheduling flexibility given a mixed fleet) 
• Possible decision to reduce growth rate 
• Technical dispatch guarantee 
• Fare for the last available seat in the (larger) aircraft 
• Management time 
• Implementation and complexity costs 
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• Potential financial community reaction to fleet decision 
• Dollar exchange rates 
• European product benefits 
Revenue and cost items 
In addition to analysing classic cost items such as fuel cost, maintenance cost, 
this approach quantifies the value of a technical dispatch guarantee in cash 
flow terms.  The list also includes quantification of revenue items such as the 
value of the last available seat in the aircraft.  The author’s experience with 
clients shows that planners often concentrate primarily on cost comparisons 
between aircraft to establish valuation differences.   Marginal revenue from 
the last sold seat on the aircraft is often either ignored because an assumed 
maximum load factor or spill calculation precludes a full aircraft, or assumed 
to be very low, since traditional airlines often sell “excess” capacity at a low 
cost to “bucket shop” agencies which sell the seats on at bargain rates.  On 
the other hand, most of today’s airlines, and certainly the point-to-point low-
fare carriers, are strong revenue managers in the sense that their reservation 
systems tend to increase the fare as the date of travel approaches, leading to 
the opposite outcome: the last seats sold can be the most profitable.  The 
sensitivity NPV for the last seat in the aircraft generates two NPVs, one 
assuming that the seat is sold at a relatively high fare under revenue 
management principles, and a second assuming that this seat is sold at a 
lower average fare.   
Each risk factor is quantified with probabilities, yielding an expected NPV 
benefit or penalty to the manufacturer’s aircraft. This is used to obtain price 
concessions, based on the fact that NPV is perfectly comparable to aircraft 
price.  This kind of sensitivity analysis is practiced by many airlines:  the 
unique feature of the risk quantification paradigm is that the valuation 
implications are openly discussed with the manufacturers, another major 
difference from the neo-classical paradigm with its strong information 
asymmetries between airlines and manufacturers.  The final assessment 
(amount of NPV benefit or penalty) is a matter of judgement of the airline 
management, and discussed with the manufacturer to justify the bargaining 
position.      
Management costs 
To keep costs low and the service level consistent, many point-to-point 
carriers operate a single aircraft type when possible.  A manufacturer who 
wishes to penetrate one of these carriers is often subject to a ‘penalty’ in the 
valuation, in the form of an explicit switching cost.  In addition, the example 
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cited here quantified a fleet complexity cost, as well as management time 
required for the shift. 
Macro effects 
These effects – exchange rates, potential financial analyst reaction to the 
decision, and potential benefits from using a European product – are the most 
difficult to capture quantitatively, because they are very far from the 
“operational detail” sought by the airline throughout the analysis.  They serve 
for discussion points, but can only be captured in figures by making huge 
assumptions.  
Thus, the discussion with the manufacturers has two pillars: the base case 
NPV difference and the individual and collective sensitivity NPV differences 
including operating, switching, and macro effects all form the basis for 
discussion and negotiation. 
Estimation of valuation parameters 
While there is a high level of information sharing with suppliers for the 
purposes of validating aircraft performance and cost assumptions, the primary 
sources for aircraft operational cost data are not the manufacturers 
themselves, in spite of the fact that the airlines frequently have no operational 
experience of the various aircraft under consideration.  Rather, offers are 
sought directly from suppliers of inputs such as line and heavy maintenance, 
based on on-going negotiations with these suppliers.  Internal operating costs 
and revenue, and the associated risk probabilities and impacts, are derived 
from management experience and brainstorming.  Finally, aircraft residual 
value estimates are sought from appraisers and/or official aircraft trading 
organisations.  Parameter estimation is thus similar to the neo-classical 
approach, but without the benefit of extensive operating experience to validate 
the figures.  Room for error is presumably larger, and the risk quantification all 
the more relevant for these airlines. 
Managers using the risk-quantitative paradigm declined to comment on the 
cost of capital and investment horizon used for the study: even in this 
transparent approach, certain parameters are not discussed outside the 
company. 
Decision-making & treatment of risk 
After reaching a consensus with the vendors regarding risk parameters, an 
internal analysis is performed and presented to the board.  Based on the high, 
low and most likely parameter values, a Monte Carlo analysis is performed 
putting all the variables and associated probability distribution estimates 
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together.  Application of Monte Carlo to investment analysis was first 
proposed in Hertz (1964 and 1968), and roundly criticized in Lewellen and 
Long (1972) and Bower and Lessard (1973), in which the authors found that 
the failure of businesses to adopt this approach was primarily due to the 
analysts’ “inability to translate results into simple measures executives could 
reconcile with their intuition and experience and use.”  This research found a 
counter-example to this statement:  adoption of the technique today may be a 
result of the increasing availability of MC analytical tools, often available as 
add-ins to popular spreadsheet programmes.      
In the risk quantification paradigm, the key output of the MC analysis is a 
reverse cumulative probability chart, with project value (NPV) charted against 
cumulative probability.  An example of this type of output is given in Figure 
6.13. 
 
Figure 6.13: Example of reverse cumulative distribution of Net Present Value under Monte Carlo 
analysis 
This analysis has two purposes.  Internally, the project with its uncertainties is 
presented to airline’s board, which is thereby queried regarding its appetite for 
risk.  Using the example shown in Figure 6.13, two questions emerge: is a 
72% probability of success acceptable?  Is £24.2m sufficient shareholder 
value creation with an even chance of success?  The criterion for acceptance 
or rejection of the project is fundamentally different here from the neo-
classical model, in which the project’s risk characteristics are “captured” in the 
discount rate, an estimate of the companies WACC inflated with a risk 
premium estimated more or less scientifically.  In the risk-quantitative 
paradigm, the analytical output is a probability of success given the risk 
assessment.  It is no surprise that this method is typically used in start-up 
operations where there is a paucity of hard data underlying the analysis, 
particularly in the crucial areas of growth potential and revenue (yields).  
Probability of a successful project: 72% 
50th percentile: NPV of £24.2m 
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Depending on the board’s decision based on its appetite for risk, the airline’s 
managers may return to the bargaining table, demanding compensation (in 
the form of price reduction or guarantees to limit downside risk), until a 
satisfactory balance is achieved.  
As in the neo-classical model, the value of options provided by manufacturers 
are not specifically quantified, according to the managers interviewed; 
however, comparing the options proposed under different offers is a 
significant qualitative input to the selection process.  Among the options 
compared are:  
 Aircraft price protection (for any new orders) through a specified date 
 Ability to switch aircraft type (family conversion) 
 Ability to increase order size (purchase options) 
 Ability to defer deliveries 
 Ability to accelerate deliveries 
 Price escalation cap 
This intuitive and qualitative comparison of options offered was mentioned by 
many executives during the interviews, but its use in the risk-quantification 
was the most extensive encountered in the field research. 
The risk-quantification paradigm makes extensive use of statistical techniques, 
and fully integrates both the technique and the managerial logic of Monte 
Carlo analysis.  Its use in start-up carriers with limited operating experience 
suggests a paradox in which the managers least equipped to measure historic 
distributions around revenue and cost assumptions use a technique which 
requires such inputs.   
The power of this approach is two-fold.  The creation of the “sensitivity NPVs” 
is a very powerful tool used to negotiate purchase terms and conditions, but 
requires a degree of openness in sharing information with manufacturers that 
is rare in aviation: neo-classical airline practitioners interviewed frequently 
mentioned firewalls used to keep valuation information from flowing to the 
manufacturers.  
The second powerful innovation concerns the way the valuation is presented 
to the airline’s Board.  Rather than inflate the discount rate to cover downside 
risk and present a “stress-tested” NPV, risk-quantifiers use the uncertainty of 
the project itself as the key decision points for the Board, querying Board 
members on their taste for risk, and the expected return required to 
compensate for this risk.  The author’s consulting experience with airlines, 
lessors and manufacturers suggest that few airline Board’s are willing to take 
an analysis in this form, preferring a unitary valuation (NPV) that has been 
stress-tested by management.  
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6.3.2. Aircraft financier views of investment valuation & risk assessment 
Aircraft financiers analyse the business plans and fleet development 
strategies of airline customers seeking financing, using information provided 
by the airlines themselves as well as data provided by trade associations, 
ratings agencies, and regulatory bodies.  These financiers are today invited to 
provide funding for both new entrants and established carriers who often 
operate in riskier, emerging markets.  Executive interviews with providers of 
finance revealed recognition of the merits of the three aircraft valuation 
paradigms identified within airlines, but also a pronounced scepticism about 
the rigour of analysis within airlines.   
The managers interviewed made a clear distinction between replacement 
aircraft and expansion fleet analysis.  Replacements tend to be carefully 
analysed in terms of operating costs per seat, as opposed to a more global 
analysis including new prospects for revenue generation.  Expansion fleet 
tends to be viewed and valued more comprehensively (i.e., including cabin 
product, fare class marketing, and related revenue opportunities).  The 
strategic goals examined by financiers centre around market position, 
potential first-mover benefits and QSI-type analysis, as in the neo-classical 
model. 
A second distinction is made based on the size of the aircraft.  The financiers 
interviewed recognise that the market for narrow body aircraft has become 
commoditized, with unit costs and aircraft price being the primary analytical 
focus.  Wide-body aircraft analysis tends to be more sophisticated, taking 
seat-class and fare-class (revenue management) and cargo potential into 
account.  The analytical focus of aircraft financiers can be summarised along 
two axes, with comments in parentheses. 
 
Replacement 
(lower-risk) 
Expansion 
(higher-risk) 
Narrow-body 
(lower-risk) 
Operating cost 
(commoditisation of the 
airline product) 
Cost (deemed essential due to 
low-fare entrants) 
Wide-body 
(higher-risk) Cost (revenue continuity assumed) 
Revenue and cost (in a 
comprehensive strategic 
framework 
Table 6.2: Types of fleet investment, perceived risk, and focus of analysis among aircraft financiers 
Several interviewees suggested that operating cost, with revenue continuity 
either assumed or ignored, when airlines analyse replacement wide-body 
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aircraft.  The managers noted that cost data is more reliable than revenue 
projections, raising the risk level for airlines forecasting high levels of growth 
and/or “exotic” revenue generation models. 
The financiers stated that there is extensive interaction between airline 
business plans and fleet plans, as was discovered with the risk-quantitative 
and aircraft as commodity paradigms.  New business models and start-up 
airlines, a major source of aircraft orders today, are often dealing with highly 
risky assumptions in their business plans.  The financiers often have to push 
potential customers to provide more than a very short-term view of the 
financial impacts of fleet investments.  They stated as well that the depth of 
research they observe in aviation is far less than for other types of project 
finance.  The managers also stated that cash-flow analysis in general is 
“narrow” in scope, and emphasized that “the answer is not in the 
spreadsheet.”  The primary use of cash flow analyses they have observed is 
evaluating the different aircraft prior to ordering, rather than justifying the 
investment to shareholders or financiers.   
The up-front financial evaluation performed by the financiers is thus placed in 
a strategic and political context: a qualitative view of the strategic vision of the 
airline managers is paramount in the credit risk analysis.  For the financiers, 
the approach to strategic questions of market coverage (network structure) 
and QSI (notably the frequency parameter) is paramount.  The managers 
noted that barriers to entry have been dramatically lowered in recent years by 
the availability of operating leased aircraft and state that a lack of long-term 
capital in the market “forces a more intuitive approach to planning” and 
consequent short-term bias among airlines.  Finally, “extraneous” influences 
such as domestic and international political considerations often form part of 
this qualitative and strategic view of the airline’s prospects.  The analytics 
frequently are secondary in this approach, leading to a situation where the 
most extensive financial analysis often takes place in the case of an airline 
default, when the financiers seek to establish the potential for a potential 
restructuring of loan terms to achieve a successful conclusion to the 
transaction. 
In terms of the risk evaluation, the financiers use, and recommend, statistical 
risk estimation measures proper to the financial community, such as Value at 
Risk (VaR), a near-universal risk metric in banking which is based on Monte 
Carlo analysis, which uses using historical asset volatilities to estimate future 
risks.  One financier suggested that airlines should raise equity to cover the 
value at risk for an aircraft investment at a 99% confidence level.  This view is 
in stark contrast to the approach of the neo-classical and aircraft as 
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commodity paradigms, which do not use such statistical measures in the 
valuation.  Managers in these airlines expressed four reservations about this 
type of metric.  First is the assumption that historical trends remain constant in 
a volatile industry.  The second critique, that VaR analysis does not take 
catastrophic events into account, is not strictly true: input distributions of 
economic parameters can encompass these types of events, even if they 
rarely are in fact included in VaR analyses.  Third, the airline managers view a 
statistical approach as “abdicating responsibility” for managing the risks of the 
business.  Finally, there is a pronounced reluctance to present and explain 
these methods to boards of directors: risk is to be captured in the discount 
rate and sensitivity analysis for the neo-classicists, and individual risks must 
be carefully divided up and actively managed by the entities most able to do 
so, in the aircraft as commodity paradigm. 
Regarding Real Options Analysis, the financiers expressed the view that such 
sophisticated analysis is taking place, if at all, at lower management levels of 
the airlines, and are used to “guide” the risk assessment, a view strikingly 
similar to that expressed by practitioners of the neo-classical approach.  The 
financiers suggested that the operating lessors are the most appropriate users 
of such techniques to manage residual value risk.  
The debate on the use of statistical risk estimation techniques Monte Carlo 
was striking.  It seems impossible to remain indifferent to this technique, which 
while reviled by many airline managers, is at the heart of the risk quantification 
paradigm.  This paradigm tends to be practiced in companies who are either 
new entrants, have double-digit growth forecasts, or both: their emerging 
presence in a dynamic airline world is “filled with imponderables,” obliging 
responsible managers and boards to explicitly recognise that success is only 
probable, not certain.   The managers using this paradigm have a sharp focus 
on the usefulness of the analysis, that is, as a way to enhance the quality of 
dialogue with aircraft manufacturers, and to bargain for concessions in price 
and aircraft performance guarantees. 
Equally sharp is the focus of the third paradigm, which breaks down and 
assigns risk in a way very much like recent financial derivative instruments, 
separating credit risk from ownership risk to reduce the unit cost of operating 
the aircraft.  A careful analysis of the risk-management competences in the 
value chain is exploited as the best way to decrease the costs, and risks, of 
airline operations.  Arbitrage opportunities deriving from the perceived under-
pricing of risk are fully exploited.  This risk pricing takes place in a clear 
segmentation of aircraft types by liquidity class, and is driven forward in light 
of expected near and medium term evolutions in the market for new capacity. 
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The financiers revealed substantial scepticism about the valuation processes 
within airlines and manufacturers.  They suggested that operating cost is in 
many cases the metric most frequently used to evaluate aircraft, and that 
valuation is mostly used to compare aircraft types, rather than as a project 
justification method. Senior management intuition and experience, market-
leadership strategy objectives and extraneous influences are seen as more 
important than valuation techniques and quantitative rigour.  While the 
financiers both use and recommend statistical risk metrics, they confirmed the 
view that, most of the airlines they work with are not in fact using these 
techniques at the highest management levels. 
6.4. Investment-financing interactions and risk management 
In neo-classical aircraft investment valuation, companies evaluate strategic 
investments using a theoretical cost of financing, and separately optimise the 
financing.   This is consistent with classical finance theory, in which 
investments are analysed using forecasted operating and investing cash flows, 
and the overall cost of financing is captured in the WACC.  This has led to an 
orthodox view in which investment and financing decisions should be kept 
separate. The classic Modigliani and Miller Propositions I & II discussed in 
Chapter Three of this research have been the object of many re-examinations 
over the years, notably by Joseph Stiglitz (1970), who strongly defended the 
Modigliani and Miller propositions, while finding that investor expectations, 
differentials in corporate vs. individual borrowing costs, and the threat 
bankruptcy may temper their universal application. 
The risk quantification approach begins with the classical notion that the 
investment project should be analyzed without taking financing into account, 
but goes beyond classical finance’s assumption that all risks should be 
captured in the project discount rate, applying Monte Carlo analysis to 
quantify the projects’ prospects and, not incidentally, to build a case for 
manufacturer concessions in the aircraft purchase negotiations. 
The last section in this chapter examines the interactions of investment and 
financing decisions and associated valuation issues for airlines, in light of their 
extensive use of operating leasing.  It identifies a third valuation paradigm 
which rejects classical financing tenants by viewing aircraft capacity as a cost 
which may be commoditized, while simultaneously arbitraging aircraft residual 
values in light of prospective changes to aircraft product developments.   
In the 1970s and 1980s, a large body of literature debating potential 
interactions between investment and financing decisions arose, centring on 
the valuation of investments given the possibility to acquire an asset under an 
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operating lease and return it to the lessor after a pre-determined period of 
usage, as opposed to an outright purchase.  Managers are faced with three 
options in acquiring assets.  Firstly, they may purchase the aircraft out of 
existing resources, that is, without recourse to financing.  Due to cash 
constraints in the low-margin airline business, the overwhelming majority of 
aircraft are acquired either under a finance lease (or loan), or operating lease.   
Certain typical characteristics of the two financing vehicles in the aircraft 
market are presented in Table 6.3.  
 Finance lease Operating lease 
 
Typical term of the lease 
 
12 - 18 years 3 – 7 years 
 
Advance payments by the 
airline prior to delivery 
 
Manufacturer pre-delivery 
payments (PDP): 20-30% 
of aircraft price 
3-6 months rentals as a 
deposit 
 
Repayment structure 
 
Pincipal+Interest Rental 
 
Tax treatment of lease 
payments 
 
Interest deductible in most 
jurisdictions, capital is a 
balance sheet item, not 
deductible 
Total rental deductible in 
most jurisdictions 
 
Frequency of payments 
 
Every six months, in 
arrears Every month, in advance 
 
Asset value exposure 
 
Aircraft transfers to lessee 
after last payment made 
Aircraft returned to lessor 
at lease expiry 
 
 
Balance sheet treatment 
 
 
 
On balance sheet under 
International Financial 
Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) 
Off balance sheet 
 
Lead time to delivery 
 
Based on manufacturer 
lead times 
Can be shorter than 
manufacturer lead times 
Table 6.3: typical characteristics of finance and operating leases for aircraft 
In this section the different methods of valuing operating leases in comparison 
with purchasing (with or without a finance lease attached) are examined, 
airline practice is established, and a recommended approach to lease vs. 
purchase analysis is recommended. 
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6.4.1. Valuation of operating leases 
A carefully considered approach to lease valuation using DCF is important, for 
two reasons.  First, both investing costs (the asset’s loss of value over the 
lease period, captured in accounts by a non-cash depreciation charge), and 
financing costs (the lessors implicitly provide financing to the lessee, thereby 
‘displacing’ debt) are embedded in operating lease payments from airlines.  
The inability to disaggregate these two items in the cash flow, and the non-
cash nature of the implicit depreciation charge, make DCF-based comparison 
between leasing and purchasing problematic using a single discount rate such 
as WACC.  Second, the tax treatment of operating leases is distinct from 
borrowing or finance leases in most jurisdictions: operating lease payments 
are fully deductible from corporate profits, where only the interest portion of 
borrowing repayments is deductible.   
The question managers face in lease vs. purchase analysis concern which 
cash flows to discount, at which rate (cost of debt, cost of equity, other), and 
the treatment of tax.  The initial debate about valuation of leases in light of 
these complexities was comprehensively framed in Bower (1973), who 
summarized the approaches recommended by 13 different authors on the 
subject.  Bower analysed the debate, and narrows methodological 
divergences to seven different approaches, which vary on both choice of 
discount rates and treatment of tax in the analysis.   A variety of discount rates 
was found to be recommended for the cash flows in Table 6.4. 
Cash flow category Potential discount rates identified in the literature 
Bower recommended 
discount rate 
Lease rental i, i(1-t), r, r(1-t), k r 
Tax shelters from 
 Rental 
 Depreciation 
 Interest expense 
i, i(1-t), r(1-t), k 
 
 
k 
Additional ownership 
cash flows (not incurred 
in leasing) 
i, i(1-t), r(1-t), k 
k 
Residual value of 
owned equipment 
i, i(1-t), r(1-t), k k 
Table 6.4: Cash flows categories and discount rates in lease vs. purchase analysis in Bower (1973) 
Where: 
• r = cost of debt 
• r(1-t) = after-tax cost of debt 
• i = implicit interest rate on lease (an output of the calculation, or IRR)  
• i(1-t) = after-tax implicit interest rate 
 
Chapter 6: Airline practices in risk valuation and management 233 
• k = Corporation after-tax cost of capital 
Looking at the table, a practitioner could be excused for gathering that 
depending on the academic asked, any possible discount rate could be used 
for any given parameter.  Bower himself promoted a Net Advantage of 
Leasing (NAL) concept common to several authors, which in his formulation 
calls for discounting the lease rental at the cost of borrowing, and all other 
cash flows at the “company cost of capital” (presumably, the WACC).  In the 
conclusion, Bower states that the different approaches “disagree substantively 
on very few points.”  This paper helped frame the issues for the ongoing 
debate which, like many theoretical innovations in finance, has taken a long 
time to filter into the work of practitioners. 
In succeeding years, the debate and its underlying definitions were more 
sharply defined, not least by clearly distinguishing operating and financing 
leases, and re-qualifying ‘lease vs. purchase’ as the more accurate ‘lease vs. 
borrow’.  Merton Miller and Charles Upton (1976) reached the twin 
conclusions that lease valuation is fundamentally different from purchase due 
to tax treatment of leases, and that many operators of equipment may be 
unable to take advantage of tax benefits due to low underlying profitability.  
This state of affairs leads to the creation of leasing companies who are 
specialized in finding and exploiting such tax benefits, a defining feature of the 
aircraft leasing industry today. 
Schall (1973) emphasized that each distinct cash flow stream arising from the 
lease or borrow decision should be discounted at a different rate.  Stuart 
Myers developed his concept of Adjusted Present Value (APV) in a theoretical 
framework in Myers (1974), applied it specifically to leasing in Myers, Dill, 
Bautista (1976), and laid out the practitioners’ approach in the widely-used 
finance textbook Principles of Corporate Finance, currently in its sixth edition.  
Under Myers’ version of APV, the NPV of a project is first calculated by 
discounting the after-tax operating cash flows using the firm’s cost of equity.  
To this is added the ‘side-effects’ of the project, notably, the tax shelter on 
depreciation and interest.  The primary insight is that these ‘side-effect’ cash 
flows may be discounted at the firm’s cost of debt, because they are low risk. 
When applied to leasing, the “value” or advantage of leasing is calculated by 
comparing the present value of the lease payment tax shields with the (lost) 
tax shields on interest and depreciation.  When applied to aircraft leasing, 
Miller and Upton’s point that tax shields depend on airline profits comes to the 
fore.  Aircraft operating lessors are either structurally set up under parent 
companies who can absorb tax losses – as is the case with GECAS parent 
company General Electric, and was the case with ILFC parent AIG), or are 
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adept at finding third-party investors with tax capacity, as is the case with 
Babcock and Brown’s extensive network of medium-sized Japanese 
companies. 
6.4.2. Extending APV to aircraft operating lease vs. purchase analysis 
The airline CFO survey shows that there are clear interactions between the 
investment analysis and the financing preferences in responding airlines.  This 
is confirmed by the extensive preference for using cash flow analysis to 
evaluate the critical lease vs. purchase (or lease vs. borrow) decision in 
aircraft financing.  Airline CFOs overwhelmingly use discounted cash flow 
analysis to help decide between operating lease and purchase options for 
acquiring aircraft. 
Use of DCF to analyse lease vs. purchase
Sometimes use
49%
Always use
49%
No response
2%  
Figure 6.14: Airline CFO use of DCF analysis for lease vs. purchase decisions 
 At the same time, only 24% of the airline respondents use APV to analyse 
such decisions in a strategic context.  One executive interviewed as part of 
this research emphasized that the lease/purchase decision was purely tactical 
and under the purview of the Finance function, not part of the fleet planning 
process itself.  Similarly, the risk-quantification approach does not include 
analysis of aircraft acquisition and financing, focusing instead on the project 
itself.  The discount rate used under such tactical analysis is invariably the 
airline’s cost of debt: as financing structures have grown more complex over 
the years and tax implications have become paramount, such discounting of 
financier ‘term sheets’ (commercial offers) is done on an after-tax basis.  As 
discussed above and in Gibson and Morrell (2004), improper (higher, WACC) 
discount rates used to evaluate leases could encourage companies to take on 
more aircraft than they need under lease, and such relative advantages are 
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certainly a “selling point” for operating lessors working with less sophisticated 
airlines. 
Operating leasing has undeniable benefits for operators of aircraft, offering a 
level of fleet flexibility and residual value risk reduction unobtainable when 
purchasing.  Growing far beyond their origins as a “cheap” – or more 
accurately, low cash-out - solution to aircraft finance, operating leases are the 
financing vehicle of choice for around one quarter of all new large civil aircraft 
delivered today, and are extensively used by the world’s largest and 
wealthiest airlines.  Companies can use operating leases for flexibility when 
adopting a new aircraft type, or as part of an aircraft type exit strategy, as 
shown in the figure below, taken from Gibson (2003). 
Singapore Airlines operates 15 
B747-400 on operating lease
• 4-10 years, fixed-payment
• 2-year extension OPTIONS
• Full sub-leasing rights
38x 737 classics
15x 319/320, 10x extendible leases
1,194 Operating 
leased jets in service in 
North America
39%
61%
Operating lease On-balance sheetSource: company reports, Airclaims CASE database
British Airways
 
Figure 6.15: examples of operating lease use in U.S., Europe, Asia, from Gibson (2003) 
The large number of aircraft under lease in North America reflect both the 
overall size of the world’s largest aviation market, and the fact that many 
airlines in the region have been through Chapter 11 bankruptcy (Continental, 
United, Delta, Northwest, U.S. Airways, to name only survivors).   
Operating leasing is no longer a solution of expediency for cash-strapped 
airlines, but has become a strategic means to facilitate either abandonment, 
or adoption of aircraft types.  SIA’s sale and leaseback of 15 747-400s reflects 
a strategy to move out of the type in preparation for the A380.  BA’s lease of 
two thirds of its initial A319/A320 fleet reflected both the post-9/11 financing 
environment and a low cash-out approach to its partial re-fleeting with the 
Airbus types, of which 10 were acquired under flexible, extendible operating 
leases.  
In order to analyse the impacts of investment and financing interactions on 
fleet investment decisions, this research uses a valuation model developed by 
the author.  The model is in active use for both instructional purposes and in 
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consulting practice with airline fleet planners and financial managers.  The 
model accepts a complete set of inputs regarding the financial and economic 
environment, aircraft acquisition, financing and disposal, and operation of the 
aircraft over a horizon that may be varied by the user.  The model outputs a 
set of project financial statements – Profit and Loss and Balance Sheet – as 
well as its analytical focus on project cash flow.  This model allows the 
evaluation of acquisition and financing alternatives as well as a classical NPV 
analysis, and is suited to the lease vs. purchase analysis discussed below.  
The model’s use is extended in Chapter Seven to include Real Options 
Analysis.   
A correct NPV analysis of leasing vs. purchasing should estimate and include 
the cost of the flexibility benefits, when compared to debt financing.  
Consulting and teaching experience shows that among airlines, project NPVs 
are often calculated including comparing operating lease cash flows against 
purchase cash flows.  Viewed graphically, the differences are apparent.  
Purchase vs. operating lease cash flows
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 Figure 6.16: cash flows for purchase and resale, compared to operating lease flows 
When each set of cash flows are discounted at the firm’s WACC, the result is 
inevitably favourable to leasing, with its lower and progressive payments 
compared with the initial purchase cash outlay.  In addition, this approach 
places undue emphasis on residual values, particularly when a short project 
horizon is used.     
This is conceptually incorrect under classical finance theory and practice, for 
two reasons: 
• Lease payments include both investing and financing cash flows, as 
well as a risk premium for the lessor 
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• The cost of purchasing or leasing an aircraft should be compared to the 
benefits of operating the aircraft, not to one another 
Leasing is fundamentally a financing vehicle, and should be compared with 
the costs of borrowing or taking on a finance lease (also known as a capital 
lease). 
To correctly estimate the cost of leasing, this research recommends using a 
variant of Myers’ Adjusted Present Value concept.  Under APV, cash flows of 
different risk classes are discounted at the discount rates that reflect the risk 
class of the cash flows.  Implementing the method is straightforward, as 
summarised in Table 6.5. 
Discount rate Purchase scenario Operating lease scenario 
Cost of debt 
Financing cash flows: 
Loan or finance lease 
advances 
Repayments of interest 
and principle 
Tax shield on interest and 
depreciation 
Lease payments 
Cost of equity 
Operating cash flows 
Purchase and re-sale of 
the aircraft 
Operating cash flows 
 
 Table 6.5: Cash flow categories and discount rates for lease vs. purchase analysis 
All cash flows are discounted after any appropriate taxes have been deducted.  
WACC is not used for the discounting calculations, in order to isolate and 
properly compare the financing costs under leasing and purchasing. 
This approach has two major advantages: 
• clarifying that the risks of owning & operating aircraft are borne by the 
equity investors 
• directly comparing the financing alternatives, and showing the cost of 
the flexibility inherent in leasing 
When it comes time to finance deliveries, airline financial managers discount 
the term sheets offered by different financiers to determine the best offer, 
using the airline’s cost of debt to discount the different flows. The 
recommended approach to investment analysis using APV simply extends this 
tactical approach to investment valuation.  In this sense it is a 
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recommendation to change the process, in recognition of the risk pricing 
inherent in leasing arrangements.   
The results of NPV and APV are compared in a static valuation (i.e., under a 
common set of inputs regarding the economic and operating environment) in 
Figure 6.17 below.  The only difference between the two scenarios is whether 
the aircraft are acquired under operating lease, or purchased outright and sold 
at the end of the 15-year project horizon.  As the static case depicted in Figure 
6.17 shows, the differences in valuation are clearly significant. 
36.3
39.7
26.4
22.2
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
A320 purchase
A320 lease
NPV in Millions of US$
NPV APV
 
 Figure 6.17: Valuation differences between NPV and APV for a single-aisle aircraft 
APV results in a lower overall project valuation, because the operating cash 
flows are discounted using the higher equity rate: these operating cash flows 
are identical between the lease and purchase scenarios, and discounting at 
the higher equity cost reduces the overall project valuation, which is  not 
particularly popular among managers in a low-margin business.  Second, the 
lease scenario APV is $4.2m lower than the purchase, reflecting the financial 
cost of replacing the cash investment by lease payments, transferring the 
residual value risk transfer to the lessor, as well as the lessor’s profit margin.  
In this technique, the financial cost of flexibility is made explicit. 
In the example above, lease rates are $350,000 per month, a typical rental for 
a new singe-aisle type such as the A320 in an up market.  Lease rates are 
highly cyclical, reflecting the demand for relatively short-capacity in aviation 
markets worldwide. Operating leases are generally less than ten years in 
length, and are often three, five, or seven years, with or without options to 
extend.  To properly compare leasing and purchasing over a longer term, it is 
necessary to assume that a lease is renewed over the investment horizon.  
Methods used to re-price the lease after the primary period range from simply 
assuming that the lease rate will remain fixed, to modelling the variation in 
lease rates as a function of aircraft values.   
Monthly lease rate : $350,000 
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Sensitivity analysis can reveal the sensitivity of valuations to lease rates under 
NPV, and can help managers establish a maximum acceptable lease rate.  In 
the singe-aisle example, a lease rate of $290,000  
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 Figure 6.18: APV sensitivity to aircraft lease rate and lease value advantage over purchase  
In a classical NPV analysis using WACC to compare leasing and purchasing, 
it is similarly possible to use sensitivity analysis to determine an aircraft 
residual value that yields an NPV equal to the leasing scenario, as in Figure 
6.19.   
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 Figure 6.19: NPV sensitivity to aircraft residual value and purchase value advantage over lease  
A prospective aircraft purchaser would have to take an extremely bullish view 
of aircraft market values using NPV/WACC to compare the options.  The 
crossover residual value is 68% of purchase price, implying that aircraft must 
only have lost 32% of value 15 years from the date of acquisition, slightly over 
2% loss of value per year, in order to justify a purchase under classical NPV.   
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One of the key advantages of leasing is precisely laying off the risks of 
residual values (RV) to lessors willing to manage such risks.  The lessors 
manage the RV risk by virtue of a core competence in aircraft remarketing.  
The leasing business has concentrated in recent years, with the dominant 
players (GECAS and ILFC) actively managing and trading fleets which 
number many hundreds aircraft at a given time.  The use of our extended 
definition of APV can give airline fleet planners a means of establishing the 
cost of such risk transfer.  The technique is consistent with established lease 
valuation theory and with lease evaluation practice: the innovation is to move 
the locus of such analysis from the tactical to the strategic realm.     
Summarising this section, we can see that airline managers tend to see 
significant interactions between analysing investments and they way they are 
financed.  The clearest indication is the use of investment analysis techniques 
to evaluate the lease vs. purchase financing decision. Unfortunately, the 
survey’s responses and the author’s experience in the field (primarily with 
emerging-market airlines) show that they often do not do so in a way that 
allows crisp comparison of the options.   
Three fundamental reasons have been found to cause this problem in 
practice: 
• Ownership and governance issues: airline managers may not be aware of 
shareholder return expectations, particularly among state-owned airlines.  
State-owned airlines were found in Chapter Four to have majority shares 
in airline capacity in Africa, Asia-Pacific, and the middle east 
• Organizational issues: questions of aircraft financing are often placed in 
the tactical and financial realm, rather than viewing financing options at a 
strategic level, as part of the fleet planning process  
• Theory-practice gap: airline fleet planners tend to be quite familiar with and 
use DCF, but do not thoroughly understand the nature or the components 
of the discount rates they are using 
• Palatability of NPV vs. APV: APV valuations are consistently lower than 
NPV because of the higher Equity costs used to value the operating cash 
flows: because the NPV is the arbiter of the decision and the conclusion of 
the ‘Board paper’ used to justify the project, there is substantial resistance 
to using such lower valuations at the project level 
• Discount rate estimation issues, as discussed in Chapter Four 
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In the remaining paradigm investigated as part of this research, these 
problems are to a great extent obviated by a strictly non-classical view of 
aircraft acquisition.    
6.4.3. Aircraft as commodity: integration of investment and financing 
The aircraft as commodity paradigm is an extreme example of the use of 
operating leases to reduce aircraft residual value risk and increase flexibility.  
This third paradigm identified in the interviews is a revolutionary and 
integrated approach, in which aircraft are not viewed as investments in the 
traditional “buy-fly-sell” approach, nor indeed as equipment to be leased over 
a specified period.  In this paradigm, the aircraft investment cycle is broken 
down into its components: managers then seek to locate each function – 
aircraft selection, buying, financing, operating, and selling – in the type of 
entity which can perform the function most efficiently.  Rather than evaluating 
cash flow and NPV for the fleet alternatives, the objective is to operate the 
aircraft flexibly - with a minimum of ownership commitments - and to minimise 
the overall unit operating cost by integrating and comparing all ownership and 
financing costs of the various alternatives.   
The valuation is based on optimising the capital cost per unit of capacity, 
comparing lease rentals (for operating leases), principal and interest (for 
finance leases) + depreciation (for on balance-sheet aircraft) for various 
acquisition and financing combinations.  This approach cuts across classical 
distinctions among the different cost categories, treating cash and non-cash 
items equally.  It is fundamentally different from either the neo-classical or 
risk-quantification paradigms, which are based on a cash-flow analysis and 
NPV.  Among the advantages stated by executives is that the traditional 
distinction between cash flow and Profit and Loss items which bedevils users 
of NPV is erased: the earnings forecasts are the primary output of the analysis. 
One precedent for this paradigm is the extensive use of operating leases to 
increase fleet flexibility, a practice which is an integral part of fleet 
management among all the managers interviewed (particularly but not only 
the financial managers).  In traditional operating leasing, this flexibility 
objective is in contradiction to the objective of minimising capital costs, 
because operating leases have traditionally been an expensive way to acquire 
capacity, compared to purchasing and obtaining long-term financing.  By 
breaking the ownership-operating-financing value chain into its component 
parts, the aircraft as commodity paradigm seeks to reconcile these 
contradictory goals.    
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The managers interviewed suggested that straight operating leases are 
expensive because lessors justifiably seek financial compensation for both 
airline credit risk and aircraft residual value risk, building risk premiums for 
both into the operating lease rate.  This paradigm seeks to separate these two 
risks and place each with the most appropriate (or willing) counter-party, an 
approach analogous to recent financial innovations such as securitisation and 
credit default swaps, where financial risks are compartmentalised and sold 
down to counterparties.  In the airline case, credit risk is sold to financial 
market investors, while residual value risk is sold to “insurers.”   
The first step in this paradigm is to assign each activity and risk – evaluating, 
ordering, operating, financing, selling - to the most efficient player for that 
particular activity.  Each is discussed in turn. 
Evaluating and ordering: airlines are quite logically the best equipped to 
evaluate the fit of aircraft types into their network, from operational, revenue 
and cost standpoints.  The firm best equipped to order aircraft will be the one 
with the best bargaining power with the manufacturers, both in terms of pricing 
and obtaining performance guarantees, often not transferable from one 
aircraft owner to another.   
In the post 9/11 aircraft market, many operating lessors reduced their former 
leadership role in placing large, speculative orders for aircraft, preferring to 
offer financing capacity for aircraft originally ordered by airlines to reduce their 
risk of not placing the aircraft profitable.  Lead by large orders placed by low 
cost carriers during the recent downturn, airlines have shown an increased 
willingness to place large aircraft orders in recent years, garnering both 
volume discounts and pricing based on competition among manufacturers, 
which are eager to maintain order books and market share in a difficult market.   
Because of the expertise in evaluating the equipment and these new ordering 
trends, airlines are the most efficient entities to evaluate, order, and of course 
operate the aircraft in this paradigm.  The fleet planning process itself very 
much follows the classic lines discussed in Chapter Five.  On the other hand, 
managers emphasised that airlines are not the best entity to sell the 
equipment at the end of the investment horizon, being relatively small players 
with limited visibility on the complex world of used aircraft trading.   To this 
difficulty are added conflicts within the airline, where entrenched interests -  
pilot unions and aircraft maintenance units, for example - can conspire to 
prevent efficient and timely disposal of aircraft types.  
Financing and selling: operating lessors are better equipped than airlines to 
place used aircraft into second operators; this is after all their business.  
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However, the residual value risk leads them to charge high lease rates.  
Further, many smaller operating lessors do not have the lowest-cost access to 
financing for the aircraft, and the larger lessors offer very handsome equity 
returns to their own shareholders: in both cases, they pass on the additional 
funding costs to the lessee.   Resolving this dilemma is at the heart of the 
aircraft as commodity paradigm.   
The ownership and financing structures used in this paradigm are akin to 
financial derivatives, as they seek to separate the credit risk from the residual 
value risk, assigning the former to investors with relatively low funding costs, 
and the latter to providers of residual value insurance.  The airlines thus 
optimise the cost of borrowing by isolating the credit risk, and by seeking tax-
efficient structures with their financing partners and “tax investors”, typically 
Japanese companies facing a high marginal tax rate, and which are willing to 
share benefits from income tax reductions (based on depreciation and 
financing tax deductions) with the operators.  In the tax area, banks, lessors 
and private investors have varying capabilities to achieve benefits, and offers 
from multiple sources can be compared to achieve the lowest overall cost.   
The residual value risk is laid off on insurers, who may be third parties to the 
transaction explicitly providing the coverage, or manufacturers offering return 
options at the end of the lease term.  Concretely, the residual value 
arrangements tend to be structured in two parts: as purchase options at fair 
market value for the airline, thus allowing operating lease treatment for 
accounting purposes; as return options, or outright residual value insurance, 
offered to the nominal owners of the aircraft, i.e., the financing entities.  This 
type of structure has become known as a “synthetic operating lease,” as it is a 
hybrid between financing and operating leases: in plain terms, it is a finance 
lease with return options.  Tax treatment of such leases varies from one 
country to the next, with some allowing the return options to qualify the 
structure as an operating lease, allowing full deduction of lease payments for 
tax purposes. 
The value chain is thus broken down, and risk distributed to those most 
capable of mitigating them, as shown in Table 6.2. 
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Activity Entity Associated risk Risk mitigation 
Evaluating Airline Performance 
Reliability 
Guarantees from 
manufacturers 
Ordering Airline or 
lessor 
Availability of aircraft Order during 
downturn 
Large, multi-year 
orders 
Operating Airline Cycle in demand for 
transport 
 
Catastrophic events 
 
Competition/new 
entrants 
Return options 
 
 
Wet leases, 
subcontracting 
 
As in neo-classical 
paradigm 
 
Owning & 
Financing 
Financial 
institutions 
Tax investors 
Credit risk Evaluation and 
monitoring of airline 
financial health 
 
Selling/placing 
with second 
operator 
Residual 
Value  
Insurer or 
lessor 
Asset value risk Aircraft return 
conditions 
Internal capacity to 
place aircraft 
Table 6.5: Distribution of roles and risks in the aircraft as commodity paradigm 
Managing the first four activities, and mitigating the associated risks, lies well 
within the competences of the entities involved.  On the other hand, various 
managers interviewed pointed out that the most problematic risk in the table is 
aircraft residual value.  In the synthetic operating lease structure, this risk is 
explicitly stripped away from ownership and financing, to lower the cost of 
financing to the airline.  Is this residual value risk correctly priced in today’s 
market?  There are several factors which lead one to doubt this: 
 Liquidity of the market for residual value risk:  the market for this risk is 
highly illiquid, as no viable market for the risk has as yet evolved; 
 Data points for analysis: there are a limited numbers of buyers and sellers 
of used aircraft at any one time, creating inefficiencies in pricing.   In 
addition, the aircraft covered by residual value insurance tend to be larger, 
lower-volume products with even fewer transactions; 
 Information availability:  sales prices for used aircraft are confidential 
between buyer and seller, so that pricing information is not widely available 
for analysis;  
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 Lease valuation: often used aircraft are placed with second operators upon 
return, making comparison of outright sales and re-leases difficult; 
 Organisational inefficiencies: given the current high level of competition 
among the manufacturers of civil aircraft, the organisational expediency of 
“kicking the ball (the risk) forward” in time, to be dealt with by another area 
of the insuring company, in the more or less distant future. 
 Valuation methods: techniques such as real options have yet to be 
adopted in many companies. Although substantial research and valuation 
techniques are available (see Gibson and Morrell (2004), Otero (2006), the 
lack of reliable data points regarding actual transactions make them 
difficult to apply in practice. 
For all these reasons, residual value risk can easily be either overpriced (by 
operating lessors seeking excess returns, as discussed above), or 
underpriced (as a sweetener placed in an aircraft deal by manufacturers), in 
the aircraft market.  The managers interviewed suggest that the latter 
condition reflects the current competitive situation in the market for large civil 
aircraft.   
As a final strategic input to evaluating fleet alternatives and residual values, 
the managers interviewed take an explicit and long-term view of aircraft value 
potential in light of expected new product introductions in the civil aircraft 
market.  Residual value insurance could be deemed appropriate in two 
specific cases: first for large, illiquid aircraft, and second, for aircraft which are 
expected to be superseded by new products during the investment horizon.  
In the case of small current-generation (and hence liquid) aircraft, the 
managers suggest that explicit residual value insurance may not be necessary, 
as financing entities appear to accept the residual value risk without building 
price premiums into the aircraft lease rates.   
This is strategic arbitrage, building on the intuition that the residual value risk 
for current aircraft types may be underpriced by financiers in the market, given 
expected evolutions in aircraft product offerings.  A good example of this is the 
current speculation about the dates for replacement types for current narrow-
body aircraft (A320 and B737 families).  An airline looking 15 years into the 
future may see that a replacement aircraft knocking down current-generation 
aircraft residual values.  One executive stated the view that operating lessors 
may currently be under-pricing this risk in lease rates, offering an arbitrage 
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opportunity to current acquirers of aircraft.  On the other hand, taking such a 
view on aircraft market conditions in the future exposes these companies to a 
potential shortage of inexpensive capacity as leases on existing aircraft expire.   
A second weakness of this paradigm is its dependence on efficient markets in 
all phases of the aircraft investment cycle.  Specifically, three problems have 
arisen.  The market for asset securitization has largely disappeared in the 
wake of the crisis.  Second, investors willing to take cross-boarder credit risk, 
even when offered tax savings, are hard to come by in the post-crisis 
environment.  Third, the market for aircraft residual value insurance offered by 
third-party insurers never really developed over the last boom, remaining thin 
and problematic: in the current environment, mega-insurers willing to take 
exotic risks are few and far between.  The viability and extensibility of this 
paradigm in the post-crisis environment is thus highly questionable. 
A second potential weakness is one of aircraft availability during an upturn.  
With the majority of aircraft on synthetic operating leases requiring refinancing 
at regular intervals and expiring at fixed moments in time, with no certainty 
that the aircraft will remain available on favourable terms.  The aircraft-as-
commodity paradigm offers many insights and potential flexibility benefits to 
planners, but its dependence on liquidity renders the purest version of the 
paradigm fragile: downside risks are well covered, but substantial 
counterparty and availability risks also characterize this approach. 
Finally, the current financial crisis has undermined confidence in the efficient-
markets logic underlying the financial aspects of the paradigm.  The notion of 
compartmentalizing credit and residual value risk has become suspect at a 
time when the role and power of comprehensive risk management techniques 
(e.g. “fat tail” analysis, increasing counterparty risk analysis in derivative 
trading, and consolidating asset/credit risk management departments) is being 
augmented in the financial community.  That said, the ingenious approach of 
assigning distinct and clear roles to different counterparties in an investment 
plan holds many useful lessons for airline planners who have in the past used 
the more traditional, buy-fly-sell approach to investment planning.    
6.5. Conclusions 
The interviews of European practitioners of fleet planning and investment 
valuation revealed a vibrant debate about the proper way to value investments 
and capture risk in airlines.  In the most traditional neo-classical paradigm, the 
energy and effort of quantification is placed in analysing the airline’s 
competitive position and optimising the operation to capture the most 
desirable passengers.  The financial valuation in this paradigm is an 
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investment, buy-fly-sell view extremely close to that recommended by 
academic writers since the sixties.   
Risk quantification takes the place of classic sensitivity analysis, where results 
are subjected to stress tests to demonstrate project viability.  The only major 
deviation from classical valuation theory is the “padding” of the discount rate 
by adding a more or less intuitively estimated risk premium, a practice which 
has been revealed as a common approach in aircraft valuation. 
This research finds extensive use of classical financial valuation techniques to 
analyzing the lease vs. borrow decision, revealing significant interactions 
between investment and financing decisions in airlines.  The field research 
and the author’s experience with aviation professionals points up the real 
danger that managers may not be careful enough in deciding which discount 
rates to use for such analysis.  With operating lessors firmly established as 
providers of aircraft today, a clear distinction between equity and debt costs 
allows airlines to place the lease vs. borrow decision within the strategic 
valuation process, to explicitly price the risk transfer to the lessor, and to 
establish acceptable lease rates, just as they establish acceptable aircraft 
prices in purchase projects using NPV.   
The aircraft as commodity paradigm takes investment-financing interactions to 
a logical conclusion, calling into question the very notion of investment in 
aircraft.  It is complementary to other two and shares many of their 
characteristics, particularly in the area of evaluating the aircraft and its 
operation using discounted cash flow.  As in the risk-quantification paradigm, 
the analysis of the aircraft costs is fully embedded in the airline business plan.  
Risks beyond the business plan horizon are “insured away” with third parties.  
The competitive analysis underlying the business plan presumably borrows 
substantially from the neo-classical model.  However, this approach is in stark 
contrast to classical valuation techniques common to the other two paradigms.  
Aircraft capacity is viewed very nearly as a commodity to be acquired and 
used with the greatest possible contractual flexibility, and the lowest unit cost, 
rather than as an asset with an intrinsic value to be exploited by the airline.  
This research argues that this strategy, while extraordinarily powerful, has its 
weaknesses as does any strategy.  The strategy relies extensively on the 
continuity of financial markets willing to refinance used aircraft, the availability 
of aircraft capacity as leases expire during an upturn, and the existence of 
markets willing to dissociate credit risk and aircraft value risk, and price each 
efficiently from the airline’s standpoint.  
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7. Advanced financial theory, investment & uncertainty 
Since the firm establishment of classical valuation in practice, many theories 
and methods have been advanced to guide managers in the area of strategic 
fleet investment.  This chapter completes the examination of financial theory 
and its application in the airline sector by investigating the relevance of these 
innovations to explain and potentially guide investment analysis practice.  This 
research has revealed very large uncertainties in key fleet planning 
assumptions, linked to strategy and geopolitics, demand and yields, fuel cost 
and emissions charges.  The last chapter established that as of today, the 
majority of managers – whether in airlines or the general business community 
- use subjective assessments and intuitive adjustments to project discount 
rates, rather than quantitative methods, for capturing project uncertainty in 
investment valuations. 
The first two sections in this chapter analyse the potential for implementation 
of the primary advanced techniques available to practitioners in recent years, 
game theory and real options analysis (ROA), in aircraft investment analysis 
processes.  A brief third section discusses recent advances in environmental 
cost modelling, addressing a major emerging uncertainty facing planners, 
identified in the fleet planning expert panel.  The fourth section returns to the 
key question of investment-financing interactions, comparing the results of the 
airline CFO survey on financing preferences with research in the area of 
information asymmetries.  This leads to the final and related section 
investigating the role of signalling to investors, as practiced in today’s listed 
airlines. 
7.1. Game theory application to fleet strategy 
Game theory and ROA are analytical techniques that have the highest 
academic credentials, as economic theories underlying both have won 
multiple Nobel Memorial Prizes in Economics.  These techniques are 
periodically reviewed and advanced in the theoretical literature, and promoted 
in management journals – most notably, the Harvard Business Review.   
Game theory is one of the tremendous advances in economics that has 
difficulty finding a central place in practitioners’ playbooks: managers often 
consider it abstruse and difficult to relate to real-world problems.  In this 
respect, game theory has had a quite similar track record to attempts to use 
real options to value the benefits of delaying choice under uncertainty, 
discussed in the next section.  These two theoretical frameworks seem to 
remain stuck in the domain of academics and consultants, who never tire of 
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pointing out their potential benefits for managers and planners.  A brief review 
of recent research by Mark Hanson and Wenbei Wei at the University of 
California Berkeley suggests that in today’s world of increased input volatility 
and market uncertainty, game theory may yield useful insights for investment 
planners.  At the same time, their research reveals the substantial limiting 
assumptions necessary to apply game theory to complex market situations.       
Wei and Hansen (2007) is the recent culmination of prior game-theoretic 
studies of both authors, notably Hansen (1990), in which an n-player game is 
devised between two types of operators, hub-and-spoke and point-to-point, 
and Wei’s 2001 doctoral dissertation.  The games defined by in the 2007 
article were crisply defined and limited to two-player games (such as the 
duopolists in Wei and Hansen (2005)), facilitating both the finding of 
equilibrium solutions and the applicability of the framework and its 
implications: the mathematics of two-player games are far less arcane than 
those of n-player games.  They sought to provide insight into the central 
question of determining the relative merits of aircraft size and service 
frequency by applying game theory.   
The profit function used to evaluate strategic options was based on the 
empirical airline studies in the authors’ 2003 and 2005 articles discussed in 
this research, lending a greater degree of real-world credibility than many 
academic expositions of game theory.  The authors emphasised the proper 
positioning of a game-theoretic approach at a strategic and more abstract 
level than aircraft evaluation or fleet assignment.  The authors restricted the 
game-theoretic choice to aircraft size and frequency, eliminating fare as a 
decision variable: this helped to frame the size vs. frequency trade-offs in a 
clear way. 
The authors find game-theoretic equilibria for three games in this article: 
1. a one-shot game where each competitor chooses both size and frequency 
simultaneously 
2. a leader-follower game where the first airline analyses the competitors’ 
responses to her possible size-frequency choices, and selects the best 
option based on this analysis by backward induction 
3. a two-level hierarchical game where the airlines first choose aircraft size 
simultaneously, then make frequency decisions based on their own choice 
and their knowledge of the competitors’ aircraft size. 
The third game is the closest to airline management practice, since fleet 
decisions are inherently long-term, while frequency can be adjusted at a 
tactical level as the “game” evolves. 
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For the demand functions, the authors used the Albuquerque-Phoenix (ABQ-
PHX) city-pair market dimensions, one of those used in the 2005 article.  
Fares are identical between the airlines, who choose size and frequencies for 
each of two routes, one of 400 statute miles and another of 2,400, under 
profit-maximizing objectives. 
The authors found the same game-theoretic equilibria for each of the three 
games, with each airline operating 13 daily frequencies of 100-seaters in the 
400mi market, and 7 frequencies using 200-seaters in the 2,400 mile market.  
Because the fares are fixed and distance-related in the model, the absolute 
profit levels achieved are less interesting than the combination of size-
frequency choices made.  One implication of these identical solutions is that 
the leader in the leader-follower game should not have a first-mover 
advantage (or disadvantage) from analyzing the competitor’s responses in 
deciding size or frequency and moving first.  Frequency gains in a game-
theoretical framework are relative to market preferences, not to innovation in 
service provision.  This tends to support the common view toward the 
increasing commoditisation of air transport, where frequency is one of the rare 
differentiating factors in many short-haul markets.   
The advantage presented by the third game is that aircraft size and frequency 
are analysed separately, allowing the choices of each “sub-game” model to be 
used independently.  The authors illustrated this with a stylized example 
showing that a competitor to a single aircraft-type operator such as Southwest 
can estimate an optimal frequency based on various sizes of aircraft: 13 for a 
100-seater, 7 for a 200-seater, 4 for a 300-seater.  The second and third 
solutions yield lower profits than the 100-seater solution for the hypothetical 
competitor, but since the size of aircraft selected will be based as well on 
other considerations than competing in this particular market, the additional 
information on larger planes can be useful. 
The authors then performed a sensitivity analysis to growth in demand, 
demonstrating that under game-theory assumptions, profit-maximising airlines 
should meet increases in demand by increasing frequency, whether in the 
one-shot or leader-follower scenario.  This result confirmed their earlier 
findings that airlines will offer frequency rather than upsize the fleet, assuming 
airport slots and airspace permit.    
One fundamental problem in applying game theory is that models such as this 
cannot readily be scaled (to include, for example, more city-pairs or more 
competitors).  In this simple two-market model, with four aircraft sizes and 10 
daily frequency options, the airlines have 1,600 possible combination 
strategies: application to a network would clearly be impractical.  A second 
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and more fundamental problem is that airline owners may have differing 
strategic objectives, such as market share or growth, whereas game theory 
requires a single objective function for all players: due to the various 
ownership patterns identified in this research, the profit objective in the Wei 
and Hansen formulation may not be sought by all players in the international 
airline arena. 
The methods developed in Wei and Hansen (2005 and 2007) can yield 
substantial insights into the size vs. frequency problem facing airlines in 
competitive markets.  In particular, the third game analyzed by the authors 
can be useful to planners examining specific city-pairs in the fleet assignment 
process, particularly in hubs dominated by one or two airlines.   
Some of the methods used by the authors, particularly the QSI approach to 
estimating market share in Wei and Hansen (2005), are used in fleet sizing 
and investment appraisal exercises in network airlines.  By focusing these 
methods on specific competitive markets where the dominant players seek to 
maximize profits, airline managers can gain insight into the competitive 
dynamics in both the strategic (fleet) and tactical (assignment/scheduling) 
areas.  Viewed together, the recent Wei and Hansen articles contributed both 
calibrated models and a consistent set of findings to the tools available to fleet 
planners.  Game theory occupies an area of strategic thinking intimately linked 
to fleet investment decisions, but carries a level of abstraction and requires 
simplifying assumptions that make it impractical to decision-makers seeking 
concrete valuations of the uncertainties of fleet planning  
7.2. Real Options Analysis 
Real options analysis has made a more direct impact on aircraft investment 
analysis than game theory.  The method is derived from financial options 
valuation, which has earned a central place in securities’ valuation and trading 
since introduced in the early 1970s.  
Certain elements of ROA are present in each of the three fleet investment 
paradigms identified in this research: the neo-classicists use decision trees 
with associated probabilities to evaluate larger or smaller alternatives within 
aircraft families: this is the basis of binomial options pricing, the preferred 
method for valuing real options.  The risk quantification practitioners use 
Monte Carlo analysis – a fundamental building block for real options pricing - 
to estimate the risks and the probability of project success for the airline Board.  
The aircraft as commodity group goes furthest in the application of options to 
aircraft residual value, arbitraging the pricing of residual value guarantees in 
aircraft selection and financing structures.  And yet, the survey of the broader 
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airline CFO community has found that the technique is not commonly used.  
This section reviews the evolution of the methodology, its pitfalls and its 
specific applications to aircraft investment analysis.   
7.2.1. Foundation and early applications of options pricing 
The foundations of options pricing were established in Black and Scholes 
(1973), which posited the value of financials options as a function of the 
underlying asset prices, the option exercise or strike price, the time to 
exercise date, the risk-free borrowing rate, and the underlying asset volatility 
over time.  The mathematics underpinning options pricing has been shown to 
be entirely consistent with classical valuation theory, and the model was 
shown to be robust in practice throughout the 1970s, as outlined in Copeland 
and Weston (1983 and succeeding editions).  In this framework, asset prices 
follow the familiar random walk of efficient markets theory, which can be 
represented by a normal distribution.   
The Black-Scholes model is a continuous-time solution in which options are 
continuously traded, which reflects the liquidity of securities markets.  Cox, 
Ross and Rubinstein (1979) developed a binomial pricing model for options, 
using risk-adjusted decision trees.  This model, which converges to a 
continuous-time solution as the number of decision points is increased - has 
proven more useful than Black-Scholes for pricing real options, which are 
certainly not continuously traded, and indeed may not be traded at all. 
The purpose in this section is not to review the vast literature on options 
pricing, but rather, to identify and analyse the potential applications of the 
theory to the valuation of aircraft investments 21 .  Asset volatilities for 
exchange-traded securities are readily estimated from historical data, a 
fundamental difference from assets such as aircraft, which are traded “over 
the counter,” that is, between individual counterparties.  The model developed 
for share options uses both binomial and continuous-time stochastic modelling 
techniques to derive the option’s value.  This method is easily applicable to 
securities’ pricing, with public, liquid markets for trading both the options and 
the underlying securities: this liquidity is completely absent in aircraft trading 
markets, a pitfall also typical in valuation of other types of capital investment.  
This absence of data points and organized markets is the greatest pitfall to 
using ROA. 
                                                 
21 A comprehensive list of sources on the topic of options valuation and applications to 
aviation finance and risk management may be found in Otero (2006).  Section 7.2.2 of this 
research discusses Dr. Otero’s application to aircraft residual value insurance.  
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This pitfall has not prevented extensive research and development of ROA 
valuation methods.  An early application to cancellable operating leases on 
computer equipment is found in Copeland and Weston (1982), which 
proposes using the “standard deviation of asset returns” as a proxy for 
variation in the asset’s value, to value the put option embedded in such 
contracts.  The authors suggest that the appropriate exercise price (return fee) 
for such a contract should decline in time “at the same rate of the expected 
decline in the market value of the leased asset.”  In the absence of organized 
exchanges, variability of project returns are used a proxy for market value 
volatility required, an approach further developed in Copeland and Antikarov 
(2003) and labelled the “Marketed Asset Disclaimer” or MAD, perhaps an 
unfortunate acronym for the leap of faith needed to apply securities valuation 
theory to physical assets.   
The literature on real options has grown tremendously over the years, led by 
academics and consultants such as Copeland, Stewart Myers, Lenos 
Trigeorgis, Han Smit, Robert McDonald and a host of others.  At the same 
time, a “practitioners’ literature” of techniques and methods has developed, 
among which the clearest is the work of Johnathan Mun, whose 2002 book 
and accompanying software suite clarified the issues with a practical bent.  All 
the methods begin with DCF, use Monte Carlo analysis to establish volatility, 
and transform the volatility into binomial lattices in order to value projects 
under various states of nature in the future.  Implicitly, these methods 
embrace Tom Copeland’s Marketed Asset Disclaimer, using management’s 
valuation of the project (NPV) as the best unbiased estimate of a project’s 
underlying value.   
Current practice of ROA entails using MC analysis to establish the volatility of 
investment projects, given uncertainty in their underlying assumptions, as will 
be demonstrated in the example in section 7.2.3.  MC was proposed as an aid 
to project valuation in Hertz (1964), a very complete description still frequently 
cited as a definitive guide to applying MC to a classical investment valuation.  
The interviews performed for this research show that there is a large range of 
opinion regarding the usefulness of MC analysis for aircraft investment 
valuation.  The proponents its use (notably the start-up airline risk quantifiers) 
point up the value of explicitly considering the range of possible values given 
to key economic assumptions, as well as the learning and the insight 
managers gain from the iterative process of assessing the uncertainties, 
valuing the project, and negotiating with manufacturers to reduce the 
uncertainties.  Those against application of MC in this research cited an 
“abdication” of management judgement during the investment analysis 
process. 
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7.2.2. Recent aviation applications of real options 
The basic taxonomy of options available to airlines includes the right, but not 
the obligation, to: 
• increase fleet capacity: purchase options and purchase rights: (call option) 
• alter fleet mix: aircraft family conversion options (switching option) 
• delay fleet increases by deferring delivery (deferral option) 
• decrease fleet capacity: return options (put option) 
In all cases, airlines are given additional flexibility in managing fleet changes, 
by being allowed to defer decisions (the first two options) or reduce contracted 
capacity (the latter two).   These options have been embedded in certain 
aircraft deals for many years.  Intuition as well as options pricing theory 
suggests that these options will increase in value with many of the 
uncertainties assessed by the expert panel surveyed in Chapter Five of this 
research: 
• volatility in the economic cycle  
• change in the competitive environment 
• uncertainty in input prices: fuel, labour, financing, currencies… 
• time to delivery of the aircraft 
• the interest cost of borrowing 
On the other hand, the value of such flexibility to the airline will decrease as 
the price paid to the counterparty for the option increases, and as well as the 
cost of its implementation.  One executive practitioner of the aircraft-as-
commodity paradigm stated flatly that his counterparties were substantially 
under-pricing the real options in aircraft deals, opening the door to risk 
arbitrage based on the low cost of options on offer. 
Two recent practitioners have applied ROA to aircraft investment, bringing 
various insights and extensions of options pricing theory to fit the specifics of 
aviation. 
John Stonier (1999) followed a step-by-step approach from DCF analysis, 
through decision trees, to binomial real options valuation.  Under the decision 
tree methodology, the option can be roughly valued using the expected of the 
decision tree NPVs.  The upside NPV is weighted by the probability of a 
successful project, while the downside has a weighting of 0.0%, because the 
airline will not exercise the option to invest in adverse conditions.  This use of 
decision trees is consistent with neo-classical practice identified in this 
research. 
Stonier’s additional contribution was integrating the aircraft option decision 
with both manufacturing lead-times and the cyclicality of the airline business.  
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Based on the insight that airlines can always defer the decision to purchase (a 
“natural option”), the author drew a distinction between the airline holding a 
contracted option and the other which does not.  Upon exercise, the option-
holder has to wait to receive the aircraft only during the manufacturer’s lead 
time, while the “natural option” holder faces both lead time and a queue length 
based on the manufacturer’s delivery slot availability at the time of the order, 
as well as uncertainty regarding the aircraft price at the time of the future 
order.  Stonier showed that because of this price uncertainty for the natural-
option holder, the option purchased from the manufacturer will always have 
greater value for the holder than the “natural” option to defer firm orders.  In 
Stonier’s work, the primary driver for the option value was traffic demand over 
the economic cycle.  He found values for A320 delivery options ranging up to 
$4m per aircraft, conditioned by the volatility of demand.  Using an annual 
project volatility (standard deviation, σ) of 21% estimated based on an 
unidentified U.S. transcontinental sector, the A320 purchase option value 
would centre around $3m. 
The purchase option increases in value still further as the manufacturer’s 
lead-time is reduced: Stonier suggested that nearly $1m/aircraft in option 
value is created by reducing single-aisle aircraft manufacturing times from 
three years to 18 months.  Finally, Stonier proposed an approach to valuing 
the option to convert orders between different types of aircraft prior to delivery.  
Because he uses a model whose NPVs are driven primarily by traffic demand, 
smaller aircraft generated higher annual σ than larger ones: the authors finds 
σ of PVs for Airbus single-aisle family of: 
• A319: 27.7% 
• A320: 23.3% 
• A321: 18.6% 
Today’s aviation environment has evolved substantially since Stonier’s 
research.  This research develops and applies a model to value aircraft 
conversion options, updated from Stonier (1999) to take into account two 
features of today’s aviation environment: the recent dramatic increase in fuel 
price and related volatility, and the increasing amplitude of the cycle in airline 
profit performance, which has gained pace over the most recent decade (see 
Figure 5.17).   This model is discussed in section 7.2.3.    
The most advanced research in options pricing in aviation was completed by 
Dr. Jorge Otero in 2006.  This 485-page doctoral thesis covers the full range 
of airline financial risk management, applying both classical and options 
financial models to the airline business model.  Relevant for this research is 
Otero’s discussion of aircraft Residual Value Guarantees (RVG) at the end of 
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a specified period of operation by an airline.  The focus thus lies at the 
opposite end of the aircraft investment cycle to Stonier’s analysis, which is 
focussed on acquisition phase.  In options jargon, Otero discusses the nature 
and valuation of put options purchased by the operator or lessor from the 
provider of the guarantee. 
Dr. Otero’s research benefitted from his experience working under the 
direction of Ignacio de Torres Zabalá, Finance Director of Iberia.  Thanks to 
this unique collaboration, Otero’s descriptions of RVGs and related financial 
instruments are precise in terms of business practice and implications for 
investment valuation.  Under de Torres’ leadership, Iberia revolutionized the 
field of aircraft financing over the last ten years, initiating the first aircraft 
securitizations in Europe, and stretching the possibilities of synthetic operating 
leases to reduce the airline’s cost of capital and its exposure to a myriad of 
financial and asset-value risks.  The valuation methods examined below are 
thus informed by direct experience in the field. 
RVGs are purchased from manufacturers, leasing companies, or insurance 
companies.  If the RVG forms part of a purchase agreement with a 
manufacturer, its pricing is embedded in the overall terms and conditions 
negotiated with a manufacturer.  Because of the bundled pricing model 
practiced in the aircraft market, quantification of individual elements can be 
fuzzy, particularly if discounts are offered in the heat of the negotiation: 
attributing such discounts to individual elements of the pricing package is 
largely arbitrary22.   Dr. Otero’s research used real options to quantify the 
appropriate premium for such guarantees. 
RVGs take two forms, both of which resemble European put options, in that 
the exercise dates are fixed at signature.  Full RVGs offer the purchaser the 
right to return the aircraft to the guarantor for a price for the aircraft which is 
fixed at contract signature, on a specific date or dates (“return windows”).  The 
costs to the purchaser include the option premium (price), the payment of a 
negotiated remarketing fee in case of return, and potentially, a profit-sharing 
agreement with the guarantor in case the aircraft is sold for a price above the 
guaranteed level. 
Full RVGs are rare in the market, as guarantors usually negotiate a lower limit 
to the guarantee (Partial RVG):  if the aircraft’s value is below this limit, the 
guarantor will only pay the difference between the guaranteed value and the 
lower limit.  This value “slice” approach limits the downside risk for the 
                                                 
22 A third-party observation of the pricing and gamesmanship of a recent long-range aircraft 
transaction was published in the 10 March 2003 Wall Street Journal, available on the WSJ 
Factiva web site 
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guarantor, and gives the operator of the aircraft an incentive to maintain the 
residual value of the aircraft to the best of its ability.   
Otero also reviewed two other forms of residual value guarantees, as well as 
combinations and extensions thereof.  An early form of guarantee in the 
market was the First Loss Deficiency Guarantee, which is an American put 
option – i.e., it can be exercised during the contracted period - with an 
exercise price that decreases over time (reflecting the aircraft’s market value 
depreciation).  Lastly, Otero discussed the combination European put and call 
options typical in Japanese or Spanish operating lease structures (JOL or 
SOL), akin to abandonment and extension options in real options terms.   
The evolving value of the underlying asset is obviously critical to determining 
the value of an option on the asset.  Otero modelled the future residual value 
states of nature using historical data, specifically 185 observations of nine 
different aircraft types over the 1992-2002 period, as published in the AvMark 
Aviation Economist.  A certain paucity of observations (21 data points on 
average per aircraft type) due to the illiquidity and confidentiality of the aircraft 
market is a perfect example of the difficulty of applying options pricing to real 
assets.  Otero’s analysis revealed nominal annual base value depreciation 
rates between 3.08% for single-aisle aircraft and 4.42% for wide-bodies, 
intuitively consistent with the long-lived nature of such assets.  Price volatility 
was calculated as the standard deviation of such values (difficult with such a 
small sample), and ranged from 4.10% to 4.15% (the higher figure is for 
single-aisle). 
In addition to using base (average) asset value and volatility figures, Otero’s 
analysis estimated the cyclical impact on lease rates and aircraft values and 
the tendency of market values to revert to base values, an approach similar to 
that in Stonier (1999).  The development of the methodology used is sketchy 
in Otero (2006), which leaves the reader with some doubt as to how the 
author actually derived the mean-reverting velocities, which ranged from 
4.22% to 6.54%.    
A more clear methodology for estimating the cyclical effects on aircraft values 
has been developed by aircraft financier PK AirFinance under its president, 
Nils Hallerström.  The first published article on this topic were Hallerström and 
Melgard (1997), followed by a series of discussion papers published by PK 
AirFinance.  Much of this work has been embodied in PK’s much-imitated 
Statistical Aircraft Financing Evaluation (SAFE) model, which is used to 
evaluate secured loans and leases.  The most recent publication is 
Hallerström 2010, a compendium of insights into drivers of aircraft and loan 
values.  Hallerström and Melgard’s methodology for estimating cyclical values 
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is intuitive and highly transparent, as it is driven by fundamental and widely 
available market data.  The approach is in contrast to the more theoretical 
methods of Stonier and Otero.  Aircraft value swings are modelled by 
accumulating the gap between traffic growth and capacity growth to generate 
“pent-up relative capacity shortage,” or PURCS.  Positive PURCS will drive 
cyclical upswings in aircraft values, and negative values the reverse.  To 
forecast the cycle, the relatively reliable forecasts for near-term aircraft 
deliveries are used as a proxy for capacity growth, and the cycle for air 
transport demand is modelled separating amplitude and duration (wavelength), 
which can then be calibrated using the wealth of data PK has collected since 
the mid-nineties.  Hallerström (2010) tests the methodology against actual 
PURCS since 1995.  The results show that the model tends to forecast 
downturns before they actually occur, while the timing of cyclical upswings 
forecasted show no clear relationship to actual data.  On the other hand, the 
methodology is strikingly accurate at predicting the amplitude of the PURCS 
cycle, which has oscillated around ±8% since the mid-nineties.  Given the 
large forecasting error in the PURCS forecasting (50% standard error against 
initial estimate in this test), Hallerström proposes a MC simulation approach 
using historical forecasting errors to replicate the volatility input to the model.  
In Hallerström (2010), the cyclical effect is combined with aircraft-specific 
drivers such as maintenance status and aircraft model obsolescence, 
resulting in aircraft-specific forecasts taking the cycle into account.  This 
precision is obviously needed in order to use the model to evaluate specific 
financing transactions.    
Common to Otero and Hallerström’s approaches is underlying asset value is 
thus a function of aging and the economic cycle, with volatility around the 
base value measured by standard deviation, an elegant and transparent 
analysis that contrasts sharply with the abstruse formulations often found in 
real options literature   
Using age (drift rate), volatility around base value and mean reversion velocity 
variables as inputs, Otero’s valuation of the RVG for a $100m wide-body 
aircraft was based on a Monte Carlo simulation and binomial options pricing 
model.  The value of options for a full RVG found by the author vary are under 
3% of the residual value covered, compared with the 4%-7% market prices 
cited by Otero.  With market prices over twice the calculated amounts, Otero 
speculates that the difference can derive from one or more causes.  The 
oligopolistic nature of offering entities, which are few and far between, may 
lead to excess returns for guarantors.  Second, volatility estimates used by the 
guarantors may be higher: indeed, the PURCS amplitudes identified in 
Hallerström (2010) are substantially higher than Otero’s 4% (although direct 
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comparison is hazardous).  Otero’s aircraft value volatilities represent only a 
single standard deviation from the mean, whereas financier value at risk 
(VaR) methodologies tend to cover much higher levels of certainty, often up to 
99%.  The third reason for “overpricing” cited by Otero is his observation that 
many methodologies use Black-Scholes options pricing model with no 
obsolescence or drift rate to value aircraft.  Use of Black-Scholes to model 
future values is clearly inappropriate, as the value of an option on future value 
reflects only current pricing and volatility information.  Finally, Otero allows 
that guarantor assessments of counterparty credit risk may be integrated into 
prices.  These arguments are all sound, and reflect the financial world where 
the efficient markets hypothesis rules financier thinking, including VaR and its 
implicit reliance on MC modelling.   
The next section of this research presents a valuation model for aircraft 
conversion options based on the valuation of the investment project itself as 
the “underlying asset”, an approach that is fundamental to real options 
valuation.   
7.2.3. Aircraft family conversion option value in today’s environment 
The two arguments underlying this section are managerial rather than 
methodological in nature, and stand in direct relation to the practices identified 
in this research.  The methodology proposed uses a model constructed by the 
author, to which conventional binomial options pricing is applied using the 
Mun (2002) methodology, which is clear and well documented.  The first 
problem which should be tackled is current practice in discount rate estimation, 
which has been revealed in this research to be often subjective and rough.  
Experience in the field and the results of both airline surveys and executive 
interviews has revealed that aircraft valuation models are most commonly 
deterministic in nature, and that airline financial managers use subjective 
assessments and discount rate adjustments to adjust valuations for risk.  This 
fact, and the positioning of the investment appraisal as an arbiter of the 
project, places the financial function in the position of adding a sort of 
insurance premium to the discount rate, without the benefit of sound actuarial 
data to back it up.  Several fleet planning executives spoke of the “black box” 
of the discount rate, and very few managers interviewed were aware of the 
specific components of this rate, which among other problems makes lease vs. 
purchase analysis using APV impossible for fleet planners23.    The addition of 
a subjectively-estimated “insurance premium” to the discount rate used to 
                                                 
23 This managerial problem of information-sharing in the context of investment analysis has 
been resolved most notably by Lufthansa, which communicates the components of its cost of 
capital broadly to investors and managers. 
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value investments captures risk in an obscure and unscientific way.  With all 
its assumptions and methodological pitfalls, ROA can add valuable 
information for the decision-making process, by capturing risk in the cash 
flows and valuing them over the project’s decision horizon.  
The second argument advanced is that the highest value of the options 
approach to investment analysis is that planners are obliged to think of the 
future as uncertain, and to make explicit estimates of the uncertainty of 
specific parameters, enhancing their ability to prioritize these risks in 
managing the company’s investments.  Rather than “insuring the problem 
away” with a high discount rate, the project’s uncertainties are estimated at 
the outset.  This argument amounts to a defence of the risk-quantification 
investment valuation paradigm identified in this research. 
The two most common reasons given for non-adoption of options pricing tend 
to be problems of explaining the methods to non-financial managers and 
Boards, and problems of data availability.  The first can be overcome by 
taking a pedagogical and graphical approach to explaining the method and its 
results.  In this respect, the proponents of options pricing are the guilty party.  
In their search for theoretical-mathematical correctness, most authors 
propounding real options often seem intent on describing their methods as 
beyond the understanding of mere mortals, a classic ivory-tower mentality 
which helps restrain adoption in the business community.   
The unavailability of market data for valuing future aircraft options is more 
concrete and serious, and is without doubt valid in the highly non-transparent 
world of aircraft trading.  However, refusing the method as applied to project 
valuation for this reason reveals a deep misunderstanding of real options.  
These options are valued as a function of the present value of the investment 
project itself, which the majority of airline respondents calculate and use as a 
matter of course.  This project NPV, and managements’ assessments of the 
uncertainty of the model’s inputs, are the only requirements of real options.  
Far from the “abdication of management judgement” view of such modelling 
techniques expressed by some managers, real options forces planners to 
refine their thinking of project uncertainties, and is in fact complementary to 
standard approaches such as sensitivity and scenario analysis. 
The recommendation of this research are that the steps toward a real options 
valuation are more important the results themselves.  The airline CFO survey 
performed in this research reveals that only 22% of the respondents use ROA 
in evaluating investments.  Further, the interviews with airline executives 
confirm that ROA is often viewed as a technique wholly distinct from DCF, and 
is perceived as an analytical black box, with obscure inner workings, where in 
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fact the path to ROA leads from “plain vanilla” NPV (or APV), through Monte 
Carlo analysis, to a decision-tree-like structure, the obscure-sounding 
binomial lattice.   
Management distaste for ROA has been found true in the general financial 
literature as well.  Authors such as van Putten and MacMillan (2004) writing in 
the Harvard Business Review take pains to show that ROA is an extension of 
discounted cash flow analysis.  Favato (2008) confirms that “real options are 
still unpopular among business practitioners,” and proposes using a video 
game metaphor to make the technique more user-friendly and 
comprehensible.  Without oversimplifying the problem using video games, this 
research recommends a number of methods which can provide more insight 
into project uncertainties. 
Step One: establish a transparent cash flow model 
First, simplify the model initially, and generate base case NPVs under a clear 
set of assumptions.  If managers don’t understand the model’s structure and 
workings clearly, the insights of ROA will be sabotaged by a “black box” 
suspicion.  This model can and should be very like the cash flow projection 
method outlined in the neo-classical model.  It is important to remember what 
decisions & questions the model is intended to inform.   
The cash-flow model used in the research was developed by the author.  The 
model is in current use with aviation professionals performing fleet 
development studies for airlines.  The model is capable of simulating a 
complex fleet build-up with multiple aircraft types.  In the ROA example, below, 
an acquisition of a single aircraft – either an A319 or an A320 – is used.  By 
looking at the dynamics of a single aircraft, the relevant decision parameters 
are clearly identified, without ‘clouding the picture’ by building up an entire 
fleet in the model.   
The model is based on Excel and Visual Basic.  The statistical routines used 
are from Oracle’s Crystal Ball Monte Carlo analysis add-in to Excel, one of 
many such packages available as add-ins to spreadsheet programmes.  The 
specific ROA valuation routines were written by the author, using standard 
spreadsheet functions.  The workings of the model are thus – with the 
exception of Crystal Ball – fully documented in the Excel model itself. 
In the example modelled here, the decision point is valuing the family 
conversion option between a high-density 156-seat A319 and a 180-seat 
A320.  The modelling choices were intended to reflect realistic assumptions, 
while not biasing the results by overstating the uncertainty of a single 
parameter such as residual value.  Single-aisle aircraft were chosen in order 
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to minimize any potential impact of residual value estimation uncertainty: 
these aircraft are more frequently traded than wide bodies and therefore 
residual value is more reliably predicted.  Authors such as Hallerström and 
Melgaard (1997 and 2000) and Otero (2006) have discussed the greater 
uncertainty of wide-body RV forecasts relative to single-aisle.   Clearly, the 
use of a wide-body operation would yield different results, with greater 
variability in valuation due to the greater dispersion of RV forecasts. 
High-density layouts were chosen in order to reflect the rapid growth of this 
type of operation in Europe, where revenue and cost data is reliable and 
relatively easy to come by.  Finally, the operation was selected because such 
MC analysis reflects the risk quantification approach discussed in this 
research, which can be extended to a ROA framework.  While the attempt is 
made to be “realistic” by using typical European operation cost and revenue 
figures, the model and its results are necessarily stylized, and are used 
primarily to illustrate the nature of the output, rather than modelling a specific 
transaction or situations.  Detail of all modelling assumptions and output is 
provided in Appendix E 
The decision point is 2010, and the aircraft are to be delivered in 2015.  The 
deterministic base case reveals NPVs of $12.7m for the acquisition of a single 
A319, and $13.6 million for the A320.  The A320 is valued $0.9m higher than 
the A319, reflecting its potential to more fully accommodate traffic growth of 
4% annually.  The deterministic model fuel price is $2 per US Gallon.  
Step Two: estimate the potential distributions in key assumptions 
The next step is to identify the assumptions subject to uncertainty, very much 
along the lines of the management interview methods used in the risk-
quantification paradigm.  The degree of uncertainty in each parameter is used 
as an input to the Monte Carlo simulation, the second step in ROA valuation. 
The uncertain parameters illustrated in this example were clearly identified by 
the fleet planning expert panel as critical: fuel price and growth of passenger 
and cargo demand for the airline in question, in the presence of both 
underlying demand fluctuations and competition from other carriers.  In 
addition, the impact of the business cycle is modelled (again, consistent with 
the results of the expert panel).  
To model fuel price, historical data is used the international fuel prices 2009-
2009, as reported by the U.S. Energy Information Administration24.  The fuel 
prices are represented in Figure 7.1 as a histogram, with price per gallon on 
the X axis, probability and frequency on the dual Y axes. 
                                                 
24 Complete historic data sets for major jet fuel markets are available on the EIA.gov web site 
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Figure 7.1: Distribution of international Jet Fuel prices, 2005-2009 used for MC simulation 
This method is of course fully guilty of the past vs. future pitfall present as well 
in estimating the beta and cost of equity.  The best defence for this approach 
is that the most recent period is being used, rather than a long-term average.  
Clearly in the last ten years, fuel demand has growth sharply in emerging 
markets, creating a rising trend in world fuel prices.  
Demand growth is modelled as changing over the cycle, as opposed to the 
deterministic 4% average growth used in the base case, depicted by the black 
line in Figure 7.2. 
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Figure 7.2: Demand growth modelled over the cycle 
For the Monte Carlo analysis, the base case value of 4% is replaced by a 
cyclical growth pattern applied in each year of the study.  Again, simplicity is 
the rule in selecting the distributions used to model demand uncertainty.  A 
simple best-most likely-worst case triangular distribution is assigned to each 
year of the investment horizon.  The green line in Figure 7.2 shows the upside 
for each year, and reflects the growth prospects for a European low-cost 
carrier such as Ryanair or easyJet, with top growth rate of 10% at the top of 
the cycle, achieved in 2012 and again in 2022.  The red line shows the worst 
case for all years, with demand shrinking by 2% each year of the study.  The 
blue line depicts the simple average of the high and low values: while not 
used in the simulation, this line does show the overall conservatism of the 
estimates.  This modelling approach is in contrast to the use of mean 
reversion functions used by Otero and Stonier, which “force” the overall 
patterns of values to revert to an underlying trend line.  The pattern of demand 
over the cycle is entirely determined by high-medium-low (HML) estimates for 
each period.  This specific pattern used seeks merely to simulate the 
undeniable demand cycle, without pretending to any sort of exactitude. 
Step Three: run the MC simulation 
With these two uncertain inputs, a Monte Carlo simulation was run 2,000 
times, requiring about an hour to run each time.  During each iteration, the MC 
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routine assigns a value to each uncertain variable, recalculates the NPV, and 
constructs a data set for statistical analysis of the output.  In the method used, 
fuel price is considered as a random variable, and its value for the entire study 
reflects recent fuel price history.  On the other hand, the demand growth 
parameter is selected by the software independently for each year, based on 
the H-M-L distribution for each year.  This approach again reflects the risk-
quantification approach of interviewing managers to establish expected 
distribution: assessing project uncertainty is placed in the hands of those most 
capable to do so, the firm’s managers.   
The first-level output of the simulation is depicted in Figure 7.3a and b., with 
the outputs of the simulation under 255 individual iterations (the maximum 
displayable with Microsoft Graph) on the Y axis.  The red line on each graph 
shows the average operating cash flow over the 2,000 iterations, while the 
blue line shows the standard deviation.  
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Figure 7.3a: annual operating cash flows from A319 investment 
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Figure 7.3b: annual operating cash flows from A320 investment 
The spread of simulated operating cash flow estimates reflect uncertainty in 
both fuel and demand estimates.  All operating cash flows were found to be 
positive, even given the variation in fuel price and demand, in itself an 
interesting piece of information for management: the basic operating 
economics of this investment are robust under the given assumptions of 
uncertainty.   The different potential for operating cash flow upside is apparent 
in the A320 graph, which shows continued passenger growth potential due to 
its larger size, whereas the A319 tops out just after the 2022 cycle peak, and 
declines thereafter, due to the ‘drag’ of potentially higher fuel price, as well as 
the aircraft aging factor on both fuel and maintenance cost that begins as the 
aircraft enters mid-life.  These factors are routinely used in assessing aircraft 
performance over time.  In this model, both fuel burn and maintenance costs 
are marked up 2% after year 12 of operation (2027 in this study).   
The A320 upside is accompanied by a higher spread of potential outcomes as 
reflected by the blue standard deviation line, as the uncertainties in market 
growth over the cycle have a greater impact on the higher-capacity and higher 
cost aircraft.  This higher volatility will be captured in the ROA valuation.  
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Based on these insights, the NPV simulation is performed very much along 
the lines of the risk-quantification paradigm.  In Figure 7.4a and b, the 
discounted cash flows are accumulated over the investment horizon, and 
include the impact of the aircraft price.  The thin lines show the potential NPV 
paths, while the dark red line shows the expected or mean NPV over the 
entire set of 2,000 iterations.  The small number of widely-dispersed downside 
lines reflects the fuel price distribution, with its fat tail of fuel prices reaching 
$4.00 per USG at the extreme.  
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Figure 7.4a: A319 cumulative and expected NPV over MC iterations 
   
Chapter 7: Applications of current theory to investment valuation 268 
Cumulative NPV - A320
-$40
-$30
-$20
-$10
$0
$10
$20
$30
20
15
20
16
20
17
20
18
20
19
20
20
20
21
20
22
20
23
20
24
20
25
20
26
20
27
20
28
20
29
20
30
U
SD
m
 
Figure 7.4b: A320 cumulative and expected NPV over MC iterations 
 
 
The picture revealed here is strikingly different from the base-case, 
deterministic NPVs, which showed slightly higher value from acquiring the 
larger aircraft.  The A320 scenario under uncertainty only reaches a positive 
expected NPV in the final year of the study, and then only due to the shift 
upward in 2030 reflecting the aircraft residual value25 .   Simple statistics 
comparing these deterministic results with the MC simulation are presented in 
Table 7.1. 
                                                 
25 To provide contrast to Otero’s study, the RV assumption for both aircraft is deterministic, 
estimated based on 4% decline in market value per year. 
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 A319 forecasts A320 forecasts 
NPV with deterministic model $12.7m $13.6m 
Monte Carlo simulation statistics  
Trials 2,000 2,000 
Expected NPV under uncertainty $8.77m $5.75m 
Standard Deviation $7.1m $8.2 
Coefficient of Variability (σ/mean) 0.81 1.42 
Kurtosis 4.45 3.38 
Minimum -$19.2m -$26.3m 
Maximum $21.5m $23.8m 
Range Width $40.7m $50.0m 
Table 7.1: NPV under certainty and MC simulation results 
The expected NPV (E(NPV)) is lower in both cases, due to effects of 
uncertainty, and the A320 project carries a substantially lower value than the 
A319, contrary to the deterministic case.  As observed in the operating cash 
flow simulation, the higher operating cost of the A320 produces more widely-
dispersed cash flows under uncertain market growth, and a lower E(NPV) 
than the A319.  The risk-reward equation is represented by the Coefficient of 
Variability (σ/average, known as the K-Factor in demand spill modelling) is 
nearly twice as high for the A320.  Still, the greater statistical dispersion of 
results is not by itself the driver of the lower valuation.   
The absolute range of simulation outcomes given in Table 7.1 begins to 
explain the difference: with only limited maximum upside advantage $2.3m 
over the A319, the A320 has a minimum value $6.1m below that of the A319.   
The full picture becomes clearer when looking at the NPV distributions in 
order to establish the causes of the lower valuation, as in Figure 7.5.   
 
Figure 7.5: distribution of NPVs for the A310 and A320 investments. 
It is easy enough to see that A319 NPV distribution is peakier, confirming the 
kurtosis measures of each distribution.  There is less spread in the outcomes 
and less skew to the left, showing clearly the downside present in the A320 
scenario.  The overall shapes of the outcomes suggest that the “fat tail” of 
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recent fuel prices overcomes the potential upside of the A320 investment, a 
fact which will be confirmed in the sensitivity analysis below.  
To view the analysis in terms of project acceptability, the histograms are 
structured in the form used by the risk-quantifiers.  The pink columns of the 
histogram in Figure 7.5 show the frequency of NPVs less than $0.0 (i.e., 
unacceptable projects), and the blue, those greater.  At the centre of each 
chart, the percentage of positive NPV outcomes under the simulation: 88% for 
the A319, and 79% for the larger aircraft.    
Crystal Ball combines the probability distribution and the model sensitivity 
(uncertainty and impact) of assumptions in “Sensitivity charts,” displayed 
below.  
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Figure 7.6: Crystal Ball “Sensitivity chart” for the A320 simulation 
The traffic effects over the cycle are pictured in the upper part of the chart 
(labelled B96-B113).  The small downside of lower growth during the down 
cycle is clearly offset by the potential upside offered by traffic growth, 
particularly in the lower-numbered early years of the project.  However, this 
upside is completely overwhelmed by the downside risk of recent fuel prices, 
held to explain 56% of the simulation’s variability. 
Under reasonable fuel price and demand cycle uncertainty assumptions, the 
A319 project is clearly preferable to the larger aircraft, yielding a higher 
E(NPV) with less downside.  Still, has the fleet planner learned anything from 
this analysis?  Any fleet planning professional realises that a larger, higher-
cost aircraft bears more financial risk than a smaller one.  However, the MC 
analysis reveals that in spite of its greater revenue-earning potential, the A320 
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E(NPV) under uncertainty is dominated by the wide spread of recent fuel 
prices.  As stated above, the greatest benefits of using these proven and in-
use methods are managerial rather than methodological: 
• The cash-flow analysis is tied to the fleet planning risk assessment, rather 
than being an after-the-fact, arbitrary assignment of a discount rate 
premium to account for risk.  The cash flow ‘arbiter’ of project approval is 
explicitly adjusted for risk 
• Key uncertain assumptions are identified, and explicit uncertainty 
estimates are made by management, helping them to discuss and assess 
the impacts of market uncertainties.   
• Operating cash flows may observed under a precise combination of 
uncertain assumptions, combining the effects of different scenarios in 
readily identifiable patterns 
• The NPV model uncertainties are documented and quantified (in the case 
of fuel from most recent available data), making later follow-up on the 
project more transparent.  
The probability-of-success output of this approach often makes managers 
nervous.  Boards of Directors of established companies are not readily 
amenable to requests for funding that require them to explicitly place bets on 
investments (even if this is precisely what project approval entails).  This type 
of probability output is the one most often cited by the risk quantifiers, who 
share this type of results with manufacturers, inviting them to make improved 
offers to raise the probabilities to acceptable levels. 
Practice of MC analysis clearly identified among risk-quantifying practitioners 
ends with this step.  MC has been seen to be rarely used among the general 
airline community, while having been declared by the risk-quantifiers to be 
very effective in project assessment and manufacturer negotiations.  Given 
the complexity of the fleet planning models used by the neo-classical 
practitioners, one can easily imagine the difficulty of adding an MC dimension 
on top: it is easy enough to develop a 1 megabyte spreadsheet model and 
apply MC, quite another to modify highly sophisticated network demand and 
fleet assignment models.  These planners stated in interviews that they use 
the output of the fleet planning models to generate cash flow inputs: the 
answer in this case would be to add a middle layer of quantitative analysis 
within the cash-flow (doubtless done with spreadsheets), allowing the financial 
evaluation to capture the effect of certain key uncertainties, while using the 
main outputs of the fleet planning models.  
In any case, the conversion option problem at the base of this question is not 
yet solved.  Aircraft manufacturers offer aircraft family conversion options that 
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may be exercised up to 12 months prior to aircraft delivery, allowing managers 
to observe events leading up to the exercise date before confirming or 
dropping the conversion from the base aircraft type ordered.  A final question 
is the value of this option.   
Step 4: Family conversion option valuation 
It is important to note at the outset that ROA valuation is distinct from the MC 
analysis, in that it begins with the base case (deterministic NPVs), $13.6m for 
the A320 and $12.7m for the A319 in our case.  This is why authors take pain 
to point out that it is complementary to traditional NPV analysis.   
The simplicity of the model developed thus far is in this particular case 
sharpens the analysis of this specific issue.  Because a single operation and 
aircraft is modelled, the value of the option can be estimated on a unitary 
basis.  The methodology used is binomial options pricing, using the Mun 
(2002) methodology26. 
The valuation of a real option relies in the insight that in the absence of 
obligation to exercise, the value of an option at any point in its life will be the 
maximum of 0 and the underlying asset value less the cost of implementation. 
In real options terms, the “asset value” is the NPV of the project itself.  For a 
switching option, the value is the greater of the A319 project value, and the 
A320 value minus the cost of implementing the A320 (such as additional 
training and spares provisioning).  Because the airline can exercise at any 
point up to a date 12 months before delivery, these are American-style options, 
and will be valued as such.  The goal of the valuation is to determine an 
appropriate price for the option.  As discussed in Chapter Six, the price of 
such embedded options within aircraft contracts can be elusive: our goal here 
is to establish its value to the airline. 
To estimate potential values for the project during the years preceding 
delivery of the aircraft, a “binomial lattice” (or decision tree) of potential project 
values is established.  Establishing these project values over time requires an 
estimate of potential upside and downside at each node in the tree, and for 
this a secondary output of the MC is used.  In Mun (2002) and Copeland 
(2003), the logarithm of year one returns (PVYear 1/ PVYear 0) is used to convert 
dollar returns into the percentage volatilities needed for the lattice construction.   
This approach leads to a methodological problem, as the logarithm of a 
negative number is undefined (and clearly, aircraft projects can yield negative 
returns).  In the present implementation, undefined log returns are set to zero, 
                                                 
26 Extensive expositions of real options theory and methodology are in Schwartz and 
Trigeorgis (2001), Mun (2002), and Copeland and Antikarov (2003  
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resulting in the distribution with 350 to 500 of the iterations yielding undefined 
returns, as depicted in Figure 7.7. 
 
Figure 7.7: distribution of LN(PVYear 1/ PVYear 0) for MC simulation, large number of undefined returns 
This methodological problem is not discussed in the various exegeses of ROA.  
The method is clearly far from perfect, if certainly no more so than CAPM. The 
volatilities thus established are 65.35% for the smaller plane, and 75.81% for 
the higher-risk A320, substantially higher than the 23%-28% volatilities 
calculated by Stonier.  Applying these volatilities to the MC simulation results 
(following an assumption-strewn path), the potential project returns are 
calculated moving forward in time from each node, beginning with the initial 
project valuations for each aircraft.  On the upside, the A319 expected NPV of 
$12.7m could nearly double to $24.0m, or nearly halve to $6.8m, and so on 
until the 2014 last exercise date.   
2009 actual 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Potential passengers on each flight 110 114 119 124 129 134
A319 NPV $12.7m $24.0m $45.2m $85.1m $160.3m $302.1m
$6.8m $12.7m $24.0m $45.2m $85.1m
$3.6m $6.8m $12.7m $24.0m
$1.9m $3.6m $6.8m
$1.0m $1.9m
$0.5m
A320 NPV $13.6m $28.9m $61.7m $131.7m $281.1m $600.0m
$6.3m $13.6m $28.9m $61.7m $131.7m
$3.0m $6.3m $13.6m $28.9m
$1.4m $3.0m $6.3m
$0.7m $1.4m
$0.3m
Varying market conditions may produce different project values: the 
upside and downside are quantified using the volatility of the 
project's returns under MC simulation
Today's expectation: 
deterministic NPV 
estimate
Project values under uncertainty
 
Table 7.2 project values under volatility estimates from MC simulation 
In Table 7.2, the rows represent the upward and downward movements in 
NPV, driven by project volatility.  These are purely theoretical valuations, 
needed only the actuarial calculation of the option’s value, presented below.  
Options reasoning begins with potential states of nature at options exercise 
date, and reasons backward, using backward induction.   
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At the exercise deadline, the potential value of the A320 project is compared 
with the A319, and the final exercise-or-drop decision made.  As Table 7.3 
shows, in the top three cases the conversion option will be exercised at the 
deadline, because trading conditions are favourable to the larger plane (even 
with the $500,000 cost of adopting the A320), whereas in the bottom three, 
the option will be dropped. 
2009 conditions 2010 2011 2012 2013
Exercise 
deadline
Value of the option to convert to A320 $13.7m $29.0m $61.5m $131.3m $280.6m $599.5m
$6.6m $13.7m $28.8m $61.2m $131.2m
$3.3m $6.7m $13.6m $28.4m
$1.7m $3.4m $6.8m
$1.0m $1.9m
$0.5m
2009 conditions 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Decisions based on different trading conditions A320 A320 A320 A320 A320 A320
A319 A320 A320 A320 A320
A319 A319 A320 A320
A319 A319 A319
A319 A319
A319
If favourable conditions warrant the larger plane, the 
A320 option will be exercised.  If not, the A319 is 
retained
  
Table 7.3 binomial lattice of A320 family conversion option gross values under varying states of nature 
 
At each “step” or decision node before this date, the option’s value is the 
maximum of the current state of nature between the projects (from Table 7.2) 
and the actuarial value of the following nodes, discounted one period at the 
risk-free rate.  In the output in Table 7.3, the highest upside value in 2013 
($280.6m) is favourable to the A320, and so the option has the A320 project 
value (minus the switching cost).  Two nodes below, under adverse trading 
conditions, the discounted expected value of waiting another period is higher 
than the A320 project value, and this value is carried.   
This backward-induction process is continued at each node until the contract 
signature date, where a present-time value for the option is available: 
$13.723m in the present A319/A320 model.  The excess of this value over the 
A320 project value under the deterministic scenario is the calculated value of 
flexibility.  In Table 7.4 below, the conversion option value is calculated as 
$673,000 per aircraft.  This is the amount the airline should be willing to pay 
for the option.  
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Valuing the flexibility of the family conversion option: final step
1. NPV of the A320 project, after switching costs
A320 forecast NPV (deterministic) $13.550m
less the implementation cost of switching to the A320 $0.500m
 = Net value of the A320 project $13.050m
2. calculation of the value of the flexibility to switch
A320 project value under uncertainty $13.723m
Less the net A320 project value $13.050m
= Option valuation at date of contract signature $673k
   
Table 7.4: calculation of the net option value (premium) at contract signature 
This example has gone through the process of model development, NPV 
calculation, MC analysis, and finally the ROA valuation.  The first two steps 
are commonly used by more advanced practitioners, but what is the use of 
this last step?  The calculations are arduous, difficult to explain and justify, 
and the results are non-intuitive, demanding many theoretical and 
methodological leaps of faith, particularly concerning the volatility estimation 
methods and the extraordinary project values calculated in the binomial lattice. 
This step could easily be dismissed if it were not for the undeniable fact that 
this type of option is routinely sought by airlines in single-aisle aircraft markets, 
and has become a fundamental feature of B737 and A320 family aircraft 
contracts.  Clearly the flexibility has a value for airlines: in such a volatile 
market as today’s, this value cannot be trivial.  One would assume that 
manufacturers carefully value the options granted to customers, and that any 
such premiums paid are fully non-refundable against aircraft purchases later 
confirmed or converted: if not, the airline is paying for flexibility only in the 
case the option is not exercised, an additional financial benefit to the buyer.  
ROA analysis responds in a complex way to the dictum, “if you can’t measure 
it, you can’t manage it.” 
In this section the two most common types of options in the aircraft market 
have been reviewed.  Values for return options or residual value guarantees 
were established in Otero (2006) at between 4 and 7% of insured value 
(higher than the 3% he calculated using ROA).  A model demonstrating the 
process of moving from NPV practiced by a great majority of airline CFO 
respondents was implemented, the process steps demonstrated, and a ROA 
valuation for a family conversion option calculated using established 
methodologies.  The modelling clearly requires effort acceptance of 
methodological imperfections, in just the same way as establishing and 
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applying WACC to project valuation does.  The differences are that the path to 
results is rather longer than under CAPM, the convenient workarounds for 
methods more numerous, and finally, the undeniable fact that the underlying 
math appears abstruse to non-statistically oriented managers. 
7.3. Environmental cost modelling 
One of the key sources of uncertainty identified in the fleet planning expert 
panel was that of environmental costs, particularly at the international level.  
Morrell and Lu (2007) analysed this problem in the context of network strategy 
and fleet selection, illustrating the broad range of environmental cost 
uncertainties facing fleet planners, who must clearly capture and model what 
are for the moment more often than not externalities, such as noise during 
landing and take-off (LTO) and emissions.  Their 2007 article follows a body of 
aviation-specific research into environmental costs, including Alamdari and 
Brewer (1994), IPPC (1999), Pearce and Pearce (2000), Sentance and 
Kershaw (2005), as well as a series of articles by the authors themselves 
(Morrell and Lu 2000, 2001, and 2006).  Morrell and Lu (2007) summarized 
their earlier research and the methods that can be used to estimate 
environmental costs, used as a basis for this article’s focus on estimating 
environmental costs arising from an airline’s choice to feed a hub or to offer 
hub-bypass direct service. 
The authors identified four distinct cost categories.  Noise cost was estimated 
based on hedonic estimation, that is, as a function of certified aircraft noise 
contour (emissions), and housing costs in the airport area.  Emissions costs 
were divided into three categories (LTO, 30-minute cruise in the vicinity of the 
airport, and cruise), and estimated separately based on certified aircraft 
emissions and environmental cost estimates from a variety of expert sources. 
The resulting estimated environmental costs from Morrell and Lu (2001) are 
presented below, in Euros per landing.  Using the representative seat counts 
for the aircraft common between the article and this research, the last column 
shows the cost per seat. 
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 Airport -level costs     
Aircraft type Noise 
LTO 
emissions
30-minute 
cruise 
emissions
Cruise 
cost
Total 
cost Seats Cost/seat
B737-300  308 168 366 1020 1862 107 €17
A310-203  503 393 897 4096 5889 240 €25
DC10-30  1384 700 2453 20485 25022 250 €100
B747-100 
/200/300/SP  1852 936 3375 33343 39506 374 €106
B747-400  1206 950 4562 48934 55652 429 €130
MD11  727 795 1919 12585 16026 285 €56
Table 7.5: social costs by category and total cost per seat from Morrell and Lu (2007) 
Assuming that airlines passed the cost on to passengers in an operation 
averaging 70% load factor, the per-ticket surcharge would range from €25 for 
a 737 classic flight, to €185 for a 747-400: they would be very significant 
additions to airline unit costs.  Each of the authors’ recent articles applied 
these methodologies to specific cases, including a specific application to 
Amsterdam Schipol (Morrell and Lu 2000) and a broader study including 
Heathrow, Gatwick and Stansted as well as Schipol and Maastricht.  Using 
the costs calculated in Morrell and Lu (2001), airport-level cost and resultant 
charges would range from €7 to €18 per seat. 
In Morrell and Lu (2007), this methodology is applied to the consolidation-
fragmentation question.  In the scenarios analysed by the authors, airlines can 
either add direct service, or add upsize the aircraft used in the hub-and-spoke 
operation, substituting larger and more-polluting aircraft for smaller ones, 
which are assumed to be pre-existing in the airline’s operation.  In this way, 
the costs estimated are truly analysed as accommodating growth in pre-
existing services.  The costs are closely related to concrete aircraft types, 
improving calculation precision while bringing the analysis closer to the real-
world tools and methods of fleet planners.  
The authors found that the environmental diseconomies of hubbing with 
current-generation aircraft range from 25% to 71% per passenger, relative to 
bypass operations: environmental costs strongly support the fragmentation 
view of long-haul network growth. 
      Costs per passenger  
 Bypass Hub Increase of cost of hubbing 
Glasgow-Chicago €59 €101 71% 
Glasgow-Dallas €69 €113 64% 
Heathrow-San Diego €84 €105 25% 
Hamburg-Tokyo Narita €82 €124 51% 
Hamburg-Dallas €75 €112 49% 
Table 7.6 Environmental cost per seat for Bypass / Hub-and Spoke service, from Morrell and Lu (2007) 
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The authors then perform a sensitivity analysis to look at announced 
performance characteristics of the 787-8 and A380-800, finding that the 
Airbus aircraft does substantially reduce hubbing costs compared with the 
747-400 or the 747-8, if the aircraft is not delayed idling on the runway due to 
airport congestion.   
Environmental cost research is relatively new, and as such there are many 
questions to be resolved.  Noise impacts are the best-known, several 
European airports charge based on aircraft type already, and the hedonic cost 
estimation method is well-established and can readily be calibrated from 
public-domain data.  Estimates from research into the environmental costs of 
emissions show enormous variation, as the authors found in 2001.  In 2006, 
they add that “the impacts from these emissions are still subject to wide 
ranges of possible damage, both because of the lack of knowledge of the 
physical processes and the different discount rates used to determine present 
value marginal cost.”    Finally, as a purely O-D study of long-haul markets, 
this analysis does leave out the potential negative impact of not 
accommodating local traffic growth in the short-haul network with either 
greater size or increased frequency. 
This sort of forward-looking study is important for this research first for the 
contribution to the consolidation-fragmentation debate facing fleet planners, 
and second for the crisp categorization of environmental cost categories and 
drivers, all of which add to the uncertainties of any investment appraisal in the 
21st century.  
7.4. Agency, information, and signalling in aviation markets 
7.4.1. Asymmetries of information and financing choices 
A large body of research has evolved attempting to address the effect of 
potential divergences of interest between a firm’s shareholders and its 
managers on investment and financing choices.  This theory has evolved from 
the seminal writings of Myers (1977 and 1984), the latter complemented in a 
more formal way in Myers and Majluf (1984).  In this first strain of thinking the 
firm’s managers are assumed to act in the interest of shareholders, but to 
have superior information about the prospects for investment profitability, 
when compared to shareholders, a phenomenon dubbed asymmetric 
information.   
In order to explain financing decisions, Myers develops two possible 
explanations.  First is the notion of the costs of financial distress which lead to 
an optimal amount of debt in a firm’s capital structure, as discussed in 
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Chapter Two of this research.  This approach is quite close to the traditional 
value-investing view of investors’ tolerance for a “reasonable amount of debt,” 
though updated taking the Modigliani and Miller propositions into account, 
allowing a stylized pseudo-quantification of this optimum, as presented in 
Figure 2.1.  Myers’ second strain of reasoning follows the field research 
including Donaldson (1961), who found that “management strongly favoured 
internal generation as a source of new funds even to the exclusion of external 
funds.”    
To capture this phenomenon Myers coined the term the Pecking Order Theory, 
and formalized with Majluf a model to explain the observed preference for 
internal funds, then “safe” debt securities, and only finally for equity in the 
context of information asymmetries.   The intuition behind this is that in the 
absence of full management information regarding projects which 
management approves after ‘proving’ internally that they will generate returns 
at least earning the cost of capital during the investment appraisal process, 
external lenders and shareholders without such detailed proof will require 
excessive returns to justify the risks of investments. 
Starting with the basic assumption that management acts in the interests of its 
shareholders, Myers’ and Majluf proposed a model that suggested a two-level 
pecking order. Quoting from Myers and Majluf (1984): 
“(1) It is generally better to issue safe securities than risky ones. Firms should 
go to bond markets for external capital, but raise equity by retention if possible. 
That is, external financing using debt is better than financing by equity. 
(2) Firms whose investment opportunities outstrip [current] operating cash 
flows, and which have used up their ability to issue low-risk debt, may forego 
good investments rather than issue risky securities to finance them. This is 
done in the existing stockholders’ interest. However, stockholders are better 
off ex ante - i.e., on average - when the firm carries sufficient financial slack to 
undertake good investment opportunities as they arise.” 
The airline CFOs surveyed for this research ranked their preferences for 
sources of financing.  To reflect the importance of operating leasing, the 
survey added a fourth financing possibility, the use of operating leases.  The 
respondents tended to indicate the following ranking: 
1. Use internally-generated funds 
2. Minimise cash out (for example, through operating leases) 
3. Debt financing 
4. Equity financing 
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These preferences were not unanimous among the respondents.  The 
average ranks for each for each financing options are presented in Figure 7.8. 
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4
Rank: 1 is first choice,  4 is last choice
Use internally-generated
funds
Minimize cash out
(operating leasing)
Debt financing
Equity financing
 
Figure 7.8: Airline CFO ranking of preferences for project financing 
These preferences confirm the moderate support for the Pecking Order theory 
of financing choices also found by Graham and Harvey (2001), particularly in 
the aversion to equity financing, ranked fourth by 73% of those stating a rank 
for equity financing.  The close proximity of the first two ranked preferences 
also suggests the attractiveness of operating leasing as a source of aircraft 
capacity. 
To address the overall capital structure question, airlines CFOs were asked 
about their overall preferences for debt vs. equity financing for the airline as a 
whole, a question more related to corporate financial policy than to investment 
analysis.  59% of the respondents were found to have flexible target capital 
structure, consistent with the view advanced by Myers that there is an optimal 
capital structure – however difficult to quantify - for companies.  The 
remainder of the responses were split equally between a strict target capital 
structure and no target at all.   
Finally, the airline CFOs were proposed a number of criteria which may be 
used to determine the appropriate amount of debt to issue in financing the 
airline’s activity, using the never (1) sometimes (2) always (3) preference 
scale.   
   
Chapter 7: Applications of current theory to investment valuation 281 
0.50
0.91
1.32 1.441.19
0.68
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Leverage
benefits
Industry
norms
Tax shield Availability of
debt
Financial
flexibility
Bank
covenants
Pr
ef
er
en
ce
 
 
Figure 7.9: Airline CFO preferences in selecting appropriate debt levels 
Leverage benefits propounded by traditional financial theory ranked lowest of 
all, followed closely by levels set along industry norms.  Assuming the industry 
uses a “reasonable amount of debt” (even if many would argue that the 
industry uses too much debt), the respondents showed little taste for 
traditional logic in capital structure.  The tax shield benefit formalized by 
Modigliani and Miller also showed a preference less than “sometimes” among 
the respondents.   
The airline CFOs revealed themselves to be more pragmatic than theoretically 
correct, with the basic availability of debt, desire to retain financial flexibility in 
a cyclical business, and above all, existing bank covenants setting the limits to 
debt issuance.  The airline industry’s low and erratic profitability means that 
most financing will be secured by assets, and aircraft financing agreements 
routinely stipulate both maximum subsequent debt levels and “cross-default” 
conditions, whereby a default on one debt agreement can be held in court to 
be a default on another such agreement.  Financing choices among the airline 
respondents take classical financial precepts into account, but are more 
rooted in problems of information asymmetries and debt capacity than seeking 
optimal debt and equity levels through tax arbitrage, as developed in classical 
theory. 
7.4.2. Lufthansa & British Airways investor information and signalling 
In finance theory, the traditional signals cited as having powerful impacts on 
investor perceptions include dividend policy and announcements, changes to 
capital structure, stock splits, share repurchases and new equity issues.  As 
the focus of this research is investment valuation rather than financial policy, 
these types of signalling are not addressed.  However, financial market 
signalling is very much present in the current era of information availability.  
To alleviate potential undervaluation due to information asymmetries, listed 
airlines in Europe have adopted active investor communication practices.   
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Lufthansa (LH) introduced value-based management concepts in the 
company in 1999.  Its application to investment valuation was discussed in 
Chapter Four.  In this section the focus is on the nature of the signals sent by 
the company regarding such valuation techniques.  Reading the company's 
annual reports over time, it is quite apparent that LH seeks not just to practice 
Value Based Management (VBM), but to communicate the results under this 
rigorous methodology to investors, as a signal of its commitment to 
shareholder value.  British Airways’ communication has been more muted but 
at the same time more informative, particularly regarding issues related to 
cost of capital.  This section reviews the two approaches. 
The company's annual report of that year announced the introduction: "In the 
current year every business segment of the Lufthansa Group will once again 
be put under the spotlight. Their strategic position, expected profit 
contributions to the Group and potential to create value for our shareholders 
on a sustained basis, will be subjected to critical scrutiny.  In this connection 
the financial ratios Cash Flow Return on Investment (CFROI) and Cash Value 
Added (CVA), on the basis of capital costs calculated individually for each 
business segment, will be employed as a new gauge for measuring 
entrepreneurial performance, starting with the next planning period. It is our 
expectation that using these ratios will enable us to optimise our investment 
decisions." 
In its 2000 Annual Report, LH only made one explicit reference to the cost of 
capital, stating on page 4 of the 148-page report that "Our aim is to increase 
the value of the company and exceed our cost of capital of 9.6 per cent.  We 
can do it."  On the other hand, the goal of shareholder value through value-
based management was mentioned 27 times in report.  The company was 
clearly proud of the implementation of VBM across the segments, and was 
satisfied to report an increase in the company's market value from €4bn in 
1996, to €10.5bn in 2000.  In something of a revolution for the airline industry 
(and unusual in any business), LH went further in 2001, publishing the details 
underlying its cost of capital calculation, entirely consistent with classical 
financial theory. 
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Figure 7.10: Lufthansa estimate of WACC, from 2001 annual report 
In the years leading up to its most recent report of 2009, the airline increased 
the volume of financial communication regarding VBM, and now publishes  
estimates of cost of capital for each of its business segments, without 
however revealing how the individual Divisions’ WACCs are estimated.   
 
 
Figure 7.11: Lufthansa estimate of WACC for each business unit.  Source: 2009 LH Annual Report 
Lufthansa continues to use a 5.7% risk premium for equity, consistent with the 
“forward-looking” estimates from Dimson et al. (2002).  Its estimated WACC at 
7.9% is consistent with the 7.73% WACC estimate from Bloomberg cited in 
Table 4.2.  Bloomberg estimated 9% as LH’s cost of equity and 3.65% for cost 
of debt, but used much lower 24% debt ratio based on the market 
capitalization at the time, whereas LH uses (correctly from a theoretical 
standpoint) a target debt ratio of 50%.  
British Airways was the other airline whose WACC estimates were analyzed in 
Chapter Four of this research, where it was argued that the revealed 
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approach showed up inevitable pitfalls in classical valuation precepts.  In 
terms of signalling to investors the airline has been quite a bit more muted 
than LH, while however communicating their estimate of the company’s 
WACC at different debt levels during “investors’ days.” 
 
Figure 7.12: BA WACC estimates at various levels of debt  Source: 2008 Investors Day presentation 
The pattern follows the static “cost of distress” view discussed in Myers 
(1984),27 where cost of capital will increase if the company goes beyond 70% 
level of debt (figure derived from BA’s graph).  These two companies are the 
most transparent in discussing their consistent application of classical 
valuation concepts and VBM, and form part of the group of airlines whose 
performance will be tested against European peers and overall airline 
performance in the concluding chapter of this research. 
7.5. Conclusions 
This chapter has examined alternatives and extensions to classical financial 
valuation theory proposed by academics and consultants today.  Game theory 
has recently been applied to strategic decision of aircraft size vs. frequency.  
The theory can clearly provide insight into competitive dynamics in duopoly 
markets.  However, the theory is unwieldy in dealing with more complex 
market situations, and is best-suited to two-player games.  Game theory has 
not been shown to be practically scalable to an entire airline’s network, or to 
markets with multiple competitors and/or potential new entrants with attendant 
                                                 
27 To be fair, Myers was not the first proponent of this approach, but his exposition is the 
clearest and most widely cited 
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innovative strategies such as the low-fare airlines have demonstrated over 
recent years. 
Monte Carlo and ROA, on the other hand, can readily be applied to fleet 
investment valuation.  These techniques are extensions of classical valuation 
theory and can be used to apply well-established statistical methods to the 
valuation question.  The results of the stylized example carried out in this 
chapter are strikingly different from the deterministic models found in this 
research to be the most commonly used in investment valuation.  Expected 
NPVs under fuel price and market growth uncertainty are substantially lower 
for both aircraft, and the expected NPVs found to be lower for the larger 
aircraft.  The common wisdom is that larger aircraft carry more risk due to 
market demand and a higher cost structure, but that the potential returns are 
greater as well.  The MC analysis reveals that the risks are indeed greater for 
the larger aircraft.  In addition, however, the addition of cyclical impacts and a 
wide random distribution of fuel prices over the investment horizon 
substantially reduce the expectation that the larger aircraft will prove the more 
profitable investment for shareholders. 
The fundamental “pecking-order” theory of financing vehicle selection under 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders was found to 
hold true among our airline respondents.  Financing choices were further 
found to be conditioned rather by questions of debt availability, flexibility, and 
restrictions under existing covenants than of tax considerations or the choice 
of an “optimal” capital structure among the airline CFOs. 
Information signalling to investors regarding airline implementation of classical 
valuation techniques and the derivative VBM has been found to be actively 
practiced in two of the largest airlines in the world, BA and Lufthansa.  This 
active communication of managers’ assessments of company cost of capital 
and use of classical valuation techniques to the investor community shows a 
remarkable transparency, and a willingness to signal shareholder value as the 
primary driver of investment selection and company management.  However 
(of course), such examples are few and far between in the world’s airlines, 
and are clearly the exception rather than the rule.  The conclusions of this 
research will examine possible relations between practicing classical financial 
rigour and airline profitability over the most recent 5-year period.       
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8. Conclusions and further research 
8.1. Research findings and conclusions 
8.1.1. Review of research motivations 
The initial motivation for this research arose from many experiences working 
with aviation finance and fleet planning professionals as a lecturer and advisor 
on the topic of investment valuation.  Perhaps the clearest statement of the 
problem came from Mr. Nils Hallerström, President of PK AirFinance, who 
remarked during a seminar his surprise that in an industry where all technical 
features of the equipment are subjected to the most rigorous scientific 
analysis and field testing before certification and acquisition, the process of 
financial evaluation by airline customers often appeared to be cursory and 
superficial, singularly lacking in the rigour applied to questions of economic 
performance of investments. 
Indeed, observations of several practices among aviation managers suggest 
this lack of rigour.  The first is the common practice of indiscriminately 
discounting all project cash flows at WACC, whereas discounting financing 
cash flows calculated using the firm’s borrowing rate at (a higher) WACC 
produces a positive NPV from financing, which is patently absurd in a service 
industry such as aviation. 
A second common observation has been use of “magic” numbers as discount 
rates, the most common for some reason being 12%, with no particular 
interest or understanding as to why a given number was being used.  While it 
is true that when comparing aircraft types it is sufficient to use a consistent 
discount rate, a more rigorous approach is certainly appropriate when 
evaluating investments.  This distinction often seems lost on clients, who are 
bent on finding the right aircraft type, seemingly ignoring the essential 
question of whether the investment makes financial sense in the first place. 
A third common observation with clients based in emerging market countries 
has been the statement that because banks often drive the requirements for 
business cases and financial evaluations, it is acceptable and sufficient to 
discount all project cash flows at the borrowing rate to calculate the project 
Net Present Value.  This practice is often observed among airlines without 
majority ownership and active governance by private shareholders, which as 
this research has revealed is the case in many of the world’s regions and 
airlines.   
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In order to establish the state of airline practice, the aim from the beginning 
has been to seek insight from industry practitioners, as opposed to observing 
or measuring results from an outside perspective.  That is, the aim has been 
to elucidate financial analysis practice in light of theory, rather than test 
financial theory empirically.  In this section, the findings regarding the three 
research aims announced in Chapter 1 are discussed in turn.   
8.1.2. Is modern financial theory coherent, usable, and used? 
This research has reviewed in some detail two distinct schools in investment 
valuation, labelled traditional and classical.  Traditional theory (aka “value 
investing”) is firmly rooted in the analysis of firms’ reported financial 
statements by arms-length analysts and shareholders.  As such, it has proved 
to be very useful for corporate valuation, while saying little about how 
managers should evaluate specific investments in order to maximize profits 
and shareholder returns.  This firm-wide approach is consistent with traditional 
investment analysis metrics like ARR, which are similarly based on accounting 
rules (notably depreciation rules), and ignore the time value of money. 
Classical valuation theory has its foundations in the monumental work of 
Modigliani and Miller and of Markowitz.  While its origins lie in mathematical 
modelling of rational investor behaviour and share price movements in a 
Gaussian distribution framework, these theories have proven over time to be 
more normative canon than scientific fact.  They are not fully borne out by 
empirical tests, and fully apply only to countries with broad and deep 
securities markets that offer investors substantial opportunities to diversify and 
to invest in risk-free securities (or to borrow at the risk-free rate).  Aside from 
recommendations regarding management behaviour, these theories allowed 
valuation to move from financial-statement based corporate valuation, to 
cash-flow based project valuation. 
This research has reviewed the serious methodological pitfalls in cost of 
capital estimation.  Aside from the inevitable difficulty of using historical data 
to forecast future expected returns, nearly the only cost of capital parameters 
than can be estimated reliably relate to the cost of borrowing, whether it be 
the risk-free rate or the firm’s own cost of debt.  The appropriate share market 
risk premium for CAPM is a matter of substantial debate, and the beta 
coefficient needed for cost of equity varies widely depending on the horizon 
and calculation method used for its estimation. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, classical evaluation techniques are clearly 
in use for project valuation among the airline CFO survey respondents, of 
which the largest group is European airlines.  NPV is the preferred technique 
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followed by IRR, though these are not used to the exclusion of the more 
traditional ARR and basic PBK: indeed, these last are more commonly used in 
airlines than in the U.S. business community.  These findings are borne out by 
experience in the field, where the use of accounting-based return on assets 
metrics is common in, for example, the People’s Republic of China. 
The research has shown that airlines – like other firms – routinely make 
subjective and/or sensitivity analysis-based upward adjustments to the 
discount rates in order to capture and value project risk.  This is equivalent to 
adding an actuarial “insurance premium” to the discount rate, which would be 
perfectly rational, were it not for the non-actuarial, subjective basis for such 
adjustments.  The executive interviews and review of practice in listed airlines 
revealed that the rate is also in some cases raised to compensate for the 
difficulty of estimating cost of capital with some degree of assurance. 
Classical financial theory is mathematically rigorous and coherent, but fraught 
with substantial “heroic assumptions,” making scientific validation and 
application difficult using real-world data.  These difficulties do not prevent 
airline managers from using it to value projects today, with “seat-of-the-pants” 
adjustments for risk. 
8.1.3. Financial performance of classical valuation practitioners 
European listed carriers have led the industry in application of classical 
financial evaluation techniques over the past ten years, and practice a 
transparency regarding fleet development and investment valuation unknown 
in most of the world’s regions.  Many of these listed carriers participated in the 
CFO survey, the executive interviews and the expert panel performed for this 
research.  Classical valuation theory was developed for practice among listed 
companies, and calculations of the valuation inputs tend to use listed share 
performance as a proxy for investor expectations of future returns.   
This tendency to use classical valuation techniques has followed the 
successive airline privatizations in Europe, beginning with BA and culminating 
(for the moment) in the 2001 full listing of Iberia (minus 1 “golden share” 
initially held by the government).  Newly-listed companies are forced to 
perform corporate valuations when privatized28, setting the stage for the use of 
such valuation techniques in the post-privatization period.  Have these 
practices enhance the firms’ profitability over the recent cycle? 
                                                 
28 It is interesting to note that corporate valuations are often done using earnings-based 
traditional methods, increasingly complemented by cash-flow based measures. 
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Figure 8.1 shows the net profit margins of European carriers with the largest 
shareholding listed on organized exchanges as reported in Table 4.9, and the 
profit margins of all other European carriers analyzed in Chapter 4.  Net profit 
(as opposed to operating profit) is used because it captures financing costs, 
and is the earnings figure that most interests shareholders. 
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Figure 8.1: net profit margins of listed and other European airlines, 2004-2008 
Listed carriers reported increasing net profit margins from 2004 to 2007, 
reaching a maximum of 5.1% of revenue in 2007, amid the mid-decade 
recovery hampered by steadily increasing fuel prices, before plunging into a 
net loss position as fuel prices first peaked and then the North Atlantic market 
collapsed during the onset of the current financial crisis.  Over the period as a 
whole, the listed carriers produced 2.7% profit margin, while Europe’s non-
listed airlines seesawed between very slight profitability and net losses over 
the period, producing only 0.2% profits over the five years. 
Figure 8.2 shows the listed airlines’ share of the European region’s profits 
produced in US$ terms.  While these companies produced 93% of the 
region’s losses in the whipsaw year of 2008, they produced 96% of the 
region’s profits from 2004-2008. 
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Figure 8.2: Listed European airlines share of net profits in the region, 2004-2008 
The listing model has proven more successful than other ownership structures 
over the last cycle in Europe, but there are far too many factors in this 
success to attribute profitability to listing and its attendant use of classical 
financial evaluation methods.  Aside from industry-leading strategies and 
relative peace in terms of labour relations, the Western European airlines 
operated with European-currency revenues providing a natural hedge against 
the weakness of the U.S. dollar over the period.  This macro-economic 
variable contributed substantially to Western European airlines’ recent 
profitability. 
The most active airline in signalling and promoting use of classically-derived 
valuation techniques is Lufthansa.  The airline’s Lufthansa Consulting 
subsidiary performed a survey of the use of VBM in 2004 (Homburg et al. 
(2004)).  Working with a sample size of 18 airlines, LH consulting found that 
the level of airline VBM implementation was lower than in other industries, and 
that even airlines practicing VBM do not transparently communicate 
performance to shareholders.  The authors somewhat bravely asset that 
“continuing global deregulation [and] competition for both capital and 
passengers will most likely enhance the distribution and depth of VBM 
concepts” in the airline industry. 
Lufthansa itself has increased its VBM signals to investors by reporting Cash 
Value Added (CVA) – its preferred metric29 - for each of the segments and for 
                                                 
29 The choice of CVA over P&L-based Economic Value Added (EVA) shows the classical bent 
of Lufthansa. 
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the company as a whole, over the 10 years since implementing VBM and 
reporting WACC in 2000.   
 
Figure 8.3: Cash Value Added for Lufthansa Group companies, 2000-2009 (Group) and 2005-2009 
business units  Source: 2009 LH Annual Report 
This information reveals the dominance of the passenger airline and the deep 
trough of the cargo (“Logistics”) business in 2009, but also points up the far 
smoother performance of Lufthansa’s industry-leading global MRO business, 
which produced positive CVA in both 2008 and 2009.   
Lufthansa’s VBM communication has built in intensity from its beginnings in 
2000 to today, and is clearly intended to send a clear message to the 
company’s shareholders about the firm’s rigour in managing in the interest of 
the shareholders.  The company’s reported share market value history (left 
scale) is compared with CVA (right scale). 
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Figure 8.4: Lufthansa share market value and CVA 
In the post-9/11 period to 2003, the company’s CVA gyrated wildly, while the 
share held somewhat steadier.  The 2004-2006 period saw growing share 
value and CVA growing in tandem, while the share market anticipated the 
current miasma as early as 2007, beginning to discount the share’s value at 
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the peak of the cycle.  One can see a certain relationship in this anecdotal 
data, but this does not show that CVA is a superior metric than the traditional 
EPS.  Value movements of the company’s share over the nine years since 
introduction of classically-inspired VBM seem to have more to do with cyclical 
swings than with its VBM performance. 
The LH example does demonstrate the company’s management focus on 
cash flow and cost of capital.  All of the European airline and financial 
executives that participated in the field research for this thesis were 
completely convinced of the usefulness of classical valuation techniques, and 
clearly privatization and listing has been beneficial to airline financial 
performance.  The contribution of the financial valuation techniques is only 
one piece in the gigantic puzzle of airline management and performance. 
8.1.4. Do global equity ownership patterns foster rigorous financial analysis? 
This research has revealed strikingly different dominant governance patterns 
among the world’s regions.  Table 8.1 compared production with profits over 
the five-year period, 2004-2008, and reveals a very mixed picture. 
 Largest shareholder RPK 
distribution, 2004-2008
Africa Asia-Pacific Europe Middle East North America
South 
America Totals
Listed 20% 30% 65% 0% 87% 18% 57%
Government 80% 48% 15% 94% 0% 0% 24%
Other airline 0% 2% 1% 0% 4% 0% 2%
Closely held 0% 20% 17% 0% 9% 82% 15%
Institutionals 0% 0% 1% 6% 1% 0% 1%
Management 0% 0% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Totals 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Largest shareholder Net Profit 
distribution, 2004-2008
Africa Asia-Pacific Europe Middle East North America**
South 
America Totals
Listed 32% 69% 96% 0% 101% -7% n.a.
Government 68% -9% -10% 99% 0% 0% n.a.
Other airline 0% 1% 0% 0% 2% 0% n.a.
Closely held 0% 38% 12% 0% -3% 107% n.a.
Institutionals 0% 0% 2% 1% 0% 0% n.a.
Management 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% n.a.
Totals 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% n.a.
** Listed carriers in N.A lost 101% of the total US$56.5b losses over the 5 year period, greater than ROW profits  
Table 8.1: Shares of RPK and net profits by region and ownership, 2004-2008 
While European listed carriers show profits far outstripping their share of 
production, North American listed carriers produced a spectacular 101% of 
the losses over the period, led by United Airlines’ three years under 
bankruptcy protection and emergence in early 2006.  Even allowing that some 
of the losses were one-off items, this region, the most commonly surveyed 
and the most steadfastly classical in valuation, has clearly not benefitted from 
using the techniques in recent history.  Asian production is nearly half 
produced by government-controlled carriers, while the profits were over 2/3 
generated by listed carriers. The region’s closely-held airlines are also 
profitable out of proportion to production, while the state-owned carriers 
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dragged the entire region’s performance down.  Privatization and listing seem 
to be healthy antidotes to poor profit performance, just as has been found to 
be the case in Europe since the 1980s.  The Middle East and very small 
African sample show production and profits strongly dominated by 
government-owned carriers over the five years.  The government-owned 
airlines responding to the CFO survey were far and away the most likely to 
adjust discount rates subjectively: of the 12 CFOs responding that they adjust 
the rate subjectively, 10 were government-owned.  Notwithstanding, the 
growth and profit performance of Emirates in particular shows that 
government ownership does not preclude profitability.  Finally, Closely-held 
equity has proven to be the preferred ownership structure in Latin America, 
producing 82% of RPKs and all of the region’s profits.  Not a single Latin 
American carrier CFO responded to the survey in this research, reflecting the 
secretive financial culture of the region, often associated with family 
ownership.  There is clearly not a single governance pattern that leads all of 
the world’s regions in profitability, which gives rise to questions regarding the 
universality of classical valuation methods. 
8.1.5. Does advanced theory offer solutions to valuing project uncertainties? 
A quote from Trahan and Gitman (1995) sums up practitioner issues with 
advanced theory in the business community (recalling their finding that 
understanding of the techniques was not a barrier to their use): “the most 
important barrier [to adoption] is that the underlying assumptions are 
unrealistic; second most important is the difficulty of explaining the technique 
to top management; and third most important is a tie between difficulty of 
application and that the required inputs cannot be obtained.” 
Game Theory and environmental-cost fleet modelling have been revealed as 
useful in strategic and policy-making settings, while practical implementation 
at the company level is doubtful given the complexity of fleet and networks. 
An application of the Adjusted Present Value extension to classical theory to 
the omnipresent question of lease vs. purchase has been developed and 
explained.  Neo-classical and risk-quantification practitioners clearly continue 
to separate the investment and financing decisions at the planning level, while 
the aircraft as commodity paradigm fully integrated financing cost as an input 
to be managed on a unit per ASK basis, flouting classical prescriptions and 
methods.  In this sense, this third paradigm goes ‘beyond’ classical financial 
theory, implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) integrating options valuation logic 
into the entire fleet acquisition and disposal process. 
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The intuitive adoption of real options valuation logic in aircraft acquisition and 
negotiation has been found to be rare but far from absent in the field.  Models 
for real options valuation have been proposed by aviation practitioners over 
recent years, while the concrete adoption of these quantitative methods has 
been found to be elusive among fleet planners and financiers.  The 
speculation in McDonald (1998) and Alesii (2003) that heuristic measures 
such as PBK may in fact approximate the conclusions of valuations using 
more sophisticated techniques such as ROA is consistent with the non-
quantitative use of options logic found in the aviation field during this research. 
8.2. Contributions to the field 
This research has attempted to help airline managers place financial analysis 
in the strategic realm of the fleet planning process, by clarifying the body of 
theory available, and suggesting methods to move finance from the tactical 
search for funds, to a strategic view of fleet investment and financing.  This 
thesis’ emphasis on identifying the state of practice in valuation was in some 
ways intended to provide a valuation “manual” for the use of classical 
techniques, carefully reviewing the relevant financial theory, exploring its 
pitfalls, and establishing the state of practice among the world’s large airlines. 
The research has shown that cash-based measures such as Internal Rate of 
Return (IRR) and Net Present Value (NPV) are preferred techniques among 
respondents, and particularly among European airline CFOs.  Each technique 
has been examined for methodological flaws, a comprehensive search for 
best practice in the literature performed, and recommended valuation 
methods applied to the specifics of the airline industry with a model build by 
the author.  Each of these techniques has advantages and disadvantages for 
practitioners, as summarized in Table 8.2. 
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Table 8.2: Summary of classical techniques used to value investments, pros, and cons 
In addition to the inherent pros and cons of the techniques, each has a more 
ready applicability in practice, depending on the airline’s capital structure and 
sources of equity finance.  NPV is most easily adapted to companies with 
listed shares, even if the cost of equity estimation methods discussed in this 
research are fraught with methodological pitfalls.  In a closely held company 
with diverse shareholder blocks,  a form present in all regions and dominant in 
Latin America, a consensus view of cost of equity may be difficult to achieve, 
with individual shareholders unwilling to disclose their particular expected 
returns.  Even greater difficulties are present when government shareholders 
are mixed with non-governmental shareholders holding large blocks, and/or 
with listed shares (the hallmark of the Chinese “big three” majors).  
Governments may not have requirements for investment returns, unlike 
private investors.  One could imagine a sort of “weighted average cost of 
equity” for these firms, but again, private shareholders may not be willing to 
share such information with airline management, creating a major asymmetry 
of information which precludes the use of NPV.   
This research recommends the use of Adjusted Present Value (APV) in order 
to compare leasing and purchasing, a change which would allow managers to 
move financing questions to the strategic level.  Historically, the leasing 
decision was largely a question of necessity and tactics.  This is no longer the 
case at a time when major – and relatively wealthy - carriers have significant 
percentages of capacity on operating lease as a strategic risk mitigation tool.  
When looking at specific financing transactions, managers routinely discount 
leasing term sheets at the cost of debt, in order to determine the best deal in a 
manner very similar to APV: this research has demonstrated how classical 
valuation accommodates the shift to a strategic view of leasing, with very few 
additional assumptions.  This use is of course limited to companies who 
 Does not show investor returns for the project: cost 
of capital assumed to be zero
 The simplest method of all, 
very intuitive
 Complementary to the other 
methods: shows breakeven as a 
function of time, seen as a 
measure of risk
Date on which cash inflows first 
equal cash outflowsPBK
 Can give two results if cash-flows change direction 
twice
 Doesn’t account for project size
 Result is a percentage return, 
simple to explain and compare 
to any investment return
 No need to estimate cost of 
capital ex ante
Discount rate where NPV=0IRR
 Detailed cost of equity and debt estimation 
necessary
 Usually gives lower valuations in absolute terms, 
because investing and operating cash flows 
discounted at relatively high cost of equity
 Allows useful comparison of 
the valuation impacts of leasing 
vs.  purchasing and borrowing
Similar to NPV, but discount low-
risk financing flows at lower rate, 
higher risk flows at equity rate
APV
 Must estimate the company’s cost of capital, the 
discount rate
 Result is a monetary amount, 
so can be used to compare 
different sizes of projects
Well-documented and 
recommended by financial 
scholars
Discount operating and investing
cash flows at company cost of 
capital
NPV
ConsProsCalculationMethod
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separately estimate cost of equity and cost of debt, which are used separately 
as discount rates for more and less risky cash flows.  One additional 
“inconvenience” is that the overall valuation is substantially lower than that 
under NPV.  This, added to the “complexity” of the calculation and customized 
discounting of different cash flows, is presumably off-putting for top-level 
management discussion: hopefully this research has made it less so. 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) avoids cost of capital estimation difficulties, and 
has the additional advantage of producing a percentage return which is 
comparable to any other type of investment, including simple interest-bearing 
bank account.  This is a major advantage that should not be underestimated, 
particularly given the variety of airlines ownership patterns identified in this 
research.  On the other hand, IRR as a applied to fleet planning projects has a 
major – even insurmountable – methodological problem:  when solving for 
IRR by iteration, the calculation gives two distinct and inconsistent results 
when the cash flows change direction twice (-/+/- or +/-/+).  Given delivery 
streams of aircraft over many years, the total cash flow can often change 
directions twice or frequently more, as intermittent deliveries of aircraft occur.  
In this case, management has no option but to use NPV: a solution to this is 
discount rate sensitivity analysis discussed in Chapter 6, where NPVs are 
calculated with varying discount rates to determine the impact of discount rate 
estimates on project profitability.  In any case, management must form a view 
of its cost of capital – however approximate and subjective - in order to apply 
either of the techniques usefully. 
Finally, the oldest and most familiar cash-based measure is Payback (PBK), 
found in this research to be preferred nearly on a par with NPV and IRR.  The 
output of the payback is different from the other measures, being a time 
required to recover one’s investment.  In this sense it is highly complementary 
to the others, and provides useful perspective on the risk of a project, given 
the increasing uncertainties of economic situation as the time horizon 
lengthens.  This research recommends both simple and discounted payback 
(time required for NPV to reach zero) as providing complementary information, 
particularly since the field research has shown that managers clearly prefer to 
use a range of metrics to evaluation investments.  
An ownership typology of world airlines has been detailed for 249 of the 
world’s large airlines, and airline production and financial performance 
aggregated by ICAO region.  The relationship between ownership, production 
and profitability has been identified for each region, and ownership patterns 
have been associated with the specific and emerging business models found 
in the various region.  The analysis has shown that dominant shareholding 
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patterns vary considerably from one region to the next.  Somewhat stylized 
estimates of the relationship between airline equity ownership and the 
application of classical theory in each region have been measured and 
discussed, an objective hampered by the confidentiality of financial policy in 
many of the world’s aviation regions and an accompanying paucity of 
responses from airline CFOs.  A key finding is that profitability does not follow 
a particular ownership structure, debunking a commonly-held belief in 
financial circles that private companies are always the most profitable.  This is 
most strikingly illustrated by comparing results in Europe, where most profits 
come from listed companies, with the U.S., where listed companies lost more 
money than the rest of the world’s combined profits over the 2004 – 2008 
cycle.   
A second key finding has been the existence of strongly dominant ownership 
patterns in the world’s regions both in terms of production and profits.  The 
dominance of family-owned airlines in Latin America, and Government owned 
airlines in the Middle East, for example, impact both the competitive 
landscape for their own and neighbouring regions, and must influence the 
investment analysis methods adopted. 
The airline ownership analysis has led to recommendations for the application 
of primary valuation metrics, depending on the current and projected 
shareholding structure of the airline.  Although a primary technique is 
recommended, in most cases either NPV or IRR can be used to advantage. 
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Equity
ownership
Primary
technique Reasoning and recommendations
Closely held IRR
• Estimated project returns to be discussed validated
with shareholders
• NPV sensitivity analysis to be used if fleet
introductions change cash flow direction
Other airline
held
IRR
NPV
• Budgetary approach using IRR with returns defined
by the parent company
• NPV in the case of mixed shareholding or expected
IPO, using cost of capital set by the parent
Government NPV 
• Lack of return requirement distorts airline competition
• Should adopt NPV as a means to attract private
shareholders (eg., the Chinese big three airlines)
• Cost of capital benchmarking with peer airlines
Institutionals NPV • Cost of capital can be the institutions’ own WACC if listed: otherwise, IRR as with closely held firms
Listed NPV • Classical technique developed for this ownershipstructure, ‘perfect fit’ methodologically.  
Table 8.3: Airline ownership and recommended primary valuation metric 
The confidentiality that characterizes closely held firms to a great extent limits 
the available valuation metrics.  Closely-held airlines such as IndiGo , Jet and 
Skymark in Asia, TACA and LAN in Latin America, and Virgin Atlantic in 
Europe, are controlled by very active individual/family shareholders. With the 
exception of the listed LAN, they do not generally practice financial 
transparency, and certainly do not disclose cost of capital.  This and the 
absence of listed shares makes objective cost of capital-setting difficult, 
leading to the recommendation of this research to use IRR as the proper 
metric.  Project returns expressed as a percentage can easily be discussed 
and sensitivity analysis performed with a  variety of discount rates to 
determine project viability. 
Similarly, airline subsidiaries such as Régional, JetStar, Silkair or American 
Eagle do not benefit from market-based cost of capital estimates, and further, 
often have revenue arrangements with parent companies which both secure 
the business and constrain revenue upside in the event of booming demand 
from passengers.  The best approach for such airlines is a “budgetary” one, 
using IRR with target returns set by the corporate parent.  NPV can be used in 
a similar way with a target cost of capital established by the parent airline, and 
becomes particularly interesting for airlines looking forward to IPOs, or ones 
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with mixed shareholding (such as, for example, ClickAir and Vueling in 
Europe).  As a monetary metric rather than a return percentage, NPV can be 
particularly useful in establishing target amounts for share offerings, giving 
financiers a clear amount of expected value creation to be divided into shares 
and sold on the market.  One very specific case of private shareholder control 
is ownership by a tourism group, including such companies as Thomas Cook, 
XL Airways and Air Europa in Europe, as well as Hainan Airlines and Spring 
Airlines in China.  Because much of the revenue to the airline is part of 
package tour package price, valuations based on revenue and costs are 
subject to arbitrary revenue allocations within the corporate parent, and hence, 
carry the same recommendations as the other-airline owned group. 
The research has demonstrated that majority government ownership is not 
inconsistent with producing profits, and indeed, this ownership model 
dominates both production and profits in the Middle East region.  
Government-owned airlines around the world have widely divergent objectives, 
even if very few these days live a life where profit is not at least one of the 
airline’s objectives.  Even the Chinese “big three” airlines (Air China, China 
Eastern, and China Southern), which benefit from strong government support 
unconstrained by binding limits on equity subsidies such as those in the EU, 
have listed shares and are thus accountable for financial results.  Many are 
100% government owned, such as Emirates, Etihad, Air Madagascar and 
EgyptAir, and still have clear profit objectives, albeit within the overall 
economic development objectives of their home governments.  These will 
benefit from a quasi-closely-held approach using NPV with benchmark cost of 
capital, allowing the government to best understand cost of capital 
requirements practiced in the industry.  Governments seeking to privatize 
airlines such as Air India (perennially), Garuda (recent IPO), Aerolineas 
Argentinas and Biman, (periodically), will also benefit from establishing 
benchmark cost of capital and adopting NPV to demonstrate the viability of 
investment projects to current and prospective shareholders. 
Institutional investors are relatively rare in the airline business, no surprise 
given the complexity of the business, its cyclicality and low returns: airlines 
such as Astraeus and Air Nostrum are the exception rather than the rule.  
Institutionals are driven by returns, and should have no trouble agreeing 
acceptable rates of return, allowing the use of either IRR or NPV. 
The classical techniques were developed for the use of listed companies, 
which dominate airline production in North America and Europe.  For many of 
these carriers, valuation with classical methods is a given: it is more a 
question of the way the techniques are applied and their position in the fleet 
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planning process.  This research has identified specific patterns of use and 
extensions of classical theory, grouped in this research as “paradigms.” 
Three distinct aircraft investment analysis paradigms have been delineated 
through field research, and described in detail.  The three paradigms reveal 
new ways of looking at investment among today’s airlines, and the resultant 
investment management practices, each with its strengths and weaknesses, 
have been discussed.  The aircraft-as-commodity paradigm has been shown 
to go beyond classical valuation theory, with the goal of maximizing airline 
cash and market value, as opposed to the investment project value 
maximization of classical finance. 
This research recommends use of each paradigm depending on the 
company’s state of maturity and its current, and perspective, ownership 
structure.  Classical theory was developed for large, listed companies such as 
the European and U.S. majors.  These companies are by definition mature 
and have access to capital markets with a wealth of financial products – 
shares, bonds, commercial paper – with which to finance the company’s 
growth.  Mature listed airlines will thus benefit most from the neo-classical 
paradigm.  The research recommends that unlisted major carriers should also 
(and often do) use this paradigm to evaluate projects.  The non-listed (private 
or government-owned) airline has a wealth of market return benchmark 
information (discussed in detail in Chapter 4) available to assist with cost of 
capital estimation.  The rigour of the neo-classical paradigm has several 
advantages for the owners of companies whose largest share block is not 
listed, airlines such as TACA, TAM, LAN and the Chinese big three.  The 
paradigm forces management to carefully quantify the economics of investing 
in the airline business in a well-documented framework, and helps to establish 
performance metrics that can be used to evaluate on-going success within the 
airline.  Thirdly, the use of neo-classical valuation helps the managers 
companies seeking private financing – such as EgyptAir and Air India, or most 
recently Garuda – to understand and adopt the financial metrics that financial 
markets use to make investment decisions. 
The weakness of the neo-classical paradigm as practiced in European majors 
such as British Airways and Lufthansa is the lack of an objective method for 
adjusting valuations for risk.  Subjective estimates and sensitivity analysis are 
hit-or-miss methods, whose efficacy depends on the experience and rigours of 
the practitioners.  Compounding this problem are potential information 
asymmetries between fleet planners and financial analysts.  As in any large 
company, departmental segmentation and rivalry (a phenomenon known as 
“silo” thinking and behaviour), can lead to excessive escalation of the required 
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rate of return by financial managers seeking to compensate for the “unknown-
unknown” risks of a project (i.e., to compensate for their lack of clear 
understanding of the fleet planning models). 
This research recommends two measures to deal with this organizational 
dilemma.  The first is the creation of multi-disciplinary groups to do the fleet 
financial evaluation, improving the understanding on both sides of the network 
and fleet methodology, with accompanying assumptions, risks and sensitivity 
analysis.  This measure will improve the quality of the sensitivity analysis 
performed at the fleet level, which then feeds into the financial evaluation. 
The second measure is the judicious application of Monte Carlo analysis to 
capture risk.  This well-known method – central to the risk-quantification 
paradigm - should be applied at a relatively high level, i.e., after the detailed 
network and fleet build-up is performed.  Fleet modelling is complex enough, 
and the risk that Monte Carlo at this stage will reduce the clarity of the 
analytical results sought from a fleet build-up.  The financial model takes the 
outputs of the fleet study and uses them as inputs in order to project the cash 
flows generated: all practitioners interviewed use such a separate financial 
model.  Due to the nature of the method, based on iterating the projections 
under uncertainty, applying Monte Carlo analysis to the relatively simple and 
transparent financial model can reveal the magnitude of the project 
sensitivities to assumptions in a more systematic and clearly quantified way 
than sensitivity analysis.   It is thus best seen as a replacement for the 
unfortunate tendency to inflate discount rates used in analysis, and is best 
placed in the financial model to counter this tendency.   
The risk quantification paradigm is best suited to companies having little 
knowledge of the potential market economics, either because of lack of 
experience or because of very rapid growth prospects (or both).  This situation 
characterizes start-up LCCs including Air Asia X, the Gulf carriers and notably 
Emirates, and certain Indian carriers such as IndiGo, which are opening new 
markets with little a priori knowledge of the markets’ potential. The emphasis 
in this paradigm on quantifying uncertainty has the distinct advantage of 
minimizing the need to undertake an exhaustive cost of capital estimate: the 
goal is not estimating returns, but grasping the variability of returns. 
The aircraft as commodity paradigm is of greatest use for airlines approaching 
IPO/merger, or on the other hand in a situation of strategic endgame, head-to-
head competition with new carriers with perceived and/or real structural 
advantages and momentum, such as the non-union low-cost airlines in 
Europe or the Gulf carriers, with their ideal geographical position for long-haul 
operations and low home landing fees.   The paradigm places the highest 
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value on cash itself, in a nearly “virtual airline” approach where – at the 
extreme – the company would hold no fixed assets at all, having sold all of its 
aircraft into the financial markets.  Cash generated and held is a primary focus 
in any merger discussions or the preparation of an IPO, as potential investors 
comb the balance sheet for potential hidden or explicit value, with cash at the 
top of the second category.  This paradigm would – again at the extreme – be 
the best solution for any airline that saw its own liquidation to shareholders as 
the logical final step in its evolution. 
These recommendations suggest a life-cycle approach to the paradigms, with 
risk-quantification predominant in the early phases, shifting to neo-classical as 
listing is envisaged and achieved after which the company matures, and then 
to aircraft as commodity paradigm as the company begins to perceive an 
endgame, which could in a happy scenario end in the company’s merger with 
another airline.  Given the current and on-going wave of consolidation in North 
and South America and Europe, this paradigm deserves careful study and 
consideration by airline managers in these regions.  
The research investigated the uncertainties facing today’s fleet planners 
through an expert panel, establishing an up-to-date risk map for practitioners, 
with separate assessments of likelihood and impact of the uncertainties.  In 
addition to identifying the overall assessments of uncertainty among the panel, 
differences between planners working in individual airlines and advisors 
working with a variety of different clients has been analysed. 
Several key uncertainties identified in the panel have been used to model an 
aircraft family conversion option, using a Monte Carlo analysis and Real 
Options framework.  The model developed has been applied to capture 
investment-financing interactions, as well as providing a concrete and 
hopefully clear description of the steps in application of ROA.  This research 
has argued that the process proposed for using this succession of techniques 
builds upon the classical foundation and carries distinct benefits at each step, 
enriching the NPV-based valuation at its base.  This thesis holds that the 
process is potentially more useful in managing investment uncertainties than 
the ultimate valuation of the conversion option itself.  The recommended 
analytical process can aid practitioners in developing the “mental model” of 
the project dynamics cited by neo-classical practitioners. 
The thesis research and has revealed many concrete issues faced by today’s 
airline practitioners.  Critical questions such as whether the cost of debt 
should be adjusted based on financing conditions for specific aircraft, and 
whether such evaluation techniques are useful in such cyclical industries were 
posed.  To the first question the answer is no, because the airline is 
   
Chapter 8: Conclusions and further research  303 
 
evaluating alternative projects, not financing alternatives.  The exception 
would be if the alternative project would have a material impact on the 
company’s corporate risk (not impossible, but unlikely).  To the second, the 
author has been surprised throughout the field research at the lack of cyclical 
assumptions built into market, network and fleet forecasts: nothing is 
preventing managers from modelling the demand and economic cycle, and 
indeed, such modelling is fundamental to the operating leasing business 
which supplies a huge amount of capital to airlines each year.  Explicit 
modelling of the cycle for air transport demand is recommended. 
The experience of this research shows that financial theory by itself holds no 
answers to critical questions such as these.  The tools and methods proposed 
are indeed loaded with methodological gaps and require highly sensitive 
assumptions.  Long-range fleet forecasts are filled with uncertainties, some 
known, many more unknown.  The main benefit of applying financial theory 
rigorously to investment analysis is the management process of building a 
consensus within the company of the stakes, and the potential rewards and 
risks, of investment projects, to be presented and discussed with shareholder 
representatives at Board level.  This research and its recommendations have 
been intended to facilitate such processes. 
8.3. Opportunities for further research  
8.3.1. Airline governance and agency problems  
The most recent strain of research on agency and information asymmetries in 
finance removes the assumption that managers are acting in the interest of 
shareholders, developing a theory of contract design for financial managers.  
A definitive text on this area of corporate finance is Tirole (2006), based on 
the author’s teachings at the Toulouse School of Economics and MIT. 
The present research has been performed to capture the global scope of 
airline ownership and its immediate implications, rather than delving into one 
specific ownership typology, i.e., widely-held corporations.  Implicitly, we have 
assumed that the firm’s managers are acting in the owners’ interest in 
applying financial theory (or not), as is the case in classical finance.   
However, given the geo-political and strategic importance of the airline 
industry, one cannot assume that the profit motive is the primary objective of 
government shareholders.  Neither can one assume that individual airline 
profitability as a stand-alone entity is the objective of private shareholders, 
most notably in the case of captive airline subsidiaries and airlines owned by 
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travel groups, who may be seeking strategic benefits to the group, rather than 
the airline specifically.   
Additional research into implications of the regional ownership patterns 
identified for contract design and management incentives would be useful.  
The first step in any such research would be to investigate the shareholder 
objectives that underlie each regional/ownership type developed in Chapter 
Four, and pictured in Table 4.2. 
8.3.2. Potential applications of behavioural finance 
The present research has been similarly “classical” in that it implicitly assumes 
the rationality of investors: that is, they prefer more terminal wealth to less, 
weigh losses and gains in equal measures, and can assign a priori 
probabilities to potential outcomes.  A recent strain of financial economics 
relaxes or eliminates these assumptions, developing a theory of investor 
behaviour based on heuristics, which may in turn be based on fallacious 
notions of the nature of statistics, “irrational” mental mathematics valuing 
losses more heavily than equally probable gains, biases toward available and 
recent information, and the fallible memories of managers, as well as agency 
problems.   
This strain of research has not been included in the present research, 
primarily because the theory primarily examines individual behaviour and 
investment decisions, rather than the complex organizational decision-making 
that characterizes investment appraisal.  Secondly, the constructs are highly 
theoretical and based on controlled experimental design, while this research 
has been “biased” toward identification of practice in organizations. 
However, the executive interviews performed for this research do indeed 
reveal certain of the mental constructs proposed and discussed by leading 
behavioural finance theoreticians such as Daniel Kahneman, Amos Tversky, 
and Hersh Shefrin.  Subsequent research building on these findings should 
entail experimental design that can test the hypotheses of prospect theory in 
an organizational context. 
8.3.3. Database refinement and updates 
To support the continued development of understanding in the area of airline 
governance and investment valuation, a time-series database has been 
developed and used to analyse performance by region and governance type.  
This database is now indexed by ICAO code, and can be developed in two 
directions, the first being following the evolution of airline ownership and 
governance.  Today’s airline industry is characterized by extensive 
   
Chapter 8: Conclusions and further research  305 
 
consolidation among major airlines, continuing state dominance combined 
with partial privatizations in several regions, and a multiplicity of privately-
owned start-up carriers in all parts of the world.  The database will track the 
evolutions in ownership of airlines in the world’s regions.  Secondly, the 
database will be enriched by updating data provided by airlines in succeeding 
years.  The combined tracking of governance evolution and succeeding years’ 
production and financial performance should yield additional insights into the 
relationship between airline ownership and economic performance. 
Finally, this research should permit continuing improvement in application of 
valuation theory in the aeronautics field, particularly in certain growing 
markets where financial expertise remains to be fully developed. 
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 Appendix A – Airline CFO Survey questionnaire & results 
Survey of investment analysis in the global airline business
Please complete the questionnaire below and fax to +33 562 121 120 before 31 October 2004.
All responses are anonymous and confidential.  Survey results will be presented in aggregate only.  
I. Analyzing and appraising major investment projects (Capital Budgeting)
Questions 1 - 4: how does your company analyze major investment projects?
1. How frequently does  does your company use the following capital budgeting techniques?
Payback period of the investment Adjusted Present Value (APV)
Accounting Rate of Return Real Options Analysis (ROA)
 (Return on Investment)
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) Economic Value Added (EVA)
Net Present Value (NPV) Other technique_________________
2. For which investments does your company prepare a capital budget?
All investments For investments over (USD) ___________________
Investments that are risky enough to justify it We do not use capital budgeting techniques
3. How frequently does your company compare actual results of investment projects with the original forecast?
More than once a year during the project At the end of the project life
Every year during the project Other period__________ years
Between two and ten years after starting the project We do not perform such comparisons
4. Does your company use capital budgeting techniques to compare different financing alternatives?
Operating Lease vs. Purchase Internal vs. External financing
Debt vs. Equity issuance Other alternatives__________________
II. Cash-flow estimation and the discount rate
Questions 5 - 10: How does your company estimate the various parameters and account for risk?
5. How does your company calculate the cash-flow used to analyse your investments?
Please choose the appropriate method from each column
Start with net income and add back depreciation Analysis done before income tax (pre-tax)
   (indirect method)
Calculate cash flows directly (direct method) Analysis done before income tax (after-tax)
6. What does your company use as the cost of capital (discount rate)?
Cost of debt
Cost of equity capital
A measure based on experience
Weighted average cost of capital 
(WACC)
A financing cost based on the intended 
financing of the investment
Always Sometimes Never
A measure based on the riskiness of the 
project
A measure based on expected growth and 
dividend payouts
Other method ____________________
Always Sometimes Never
Always Sometimes Never
Always Sometimes Never
Never
Never
Always Sometimes
Always Sometimes
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Survey of investment analysis in the global airline business
Please complete the questionnaire below and fax to +33 562 121 120 before 31 October 2004.
All responses are anonymous and confidential.  Survey results will be presented in aggregate only.  
7. Does your company use the following techniques to estimate the cost of equity capital?
Government regulations or directives
Dividend discount model
8. Does your company use different types of capital budgeting techniques for different levels of risk?
Yes
No
9. What does your company use to measure the level of risk in a project?
10. Which of the following does your company use to take risk into account in capital budgets?
Shorten the required payback period Raise the discount rate used to calculate present values
Raise the required rate of return Other technique_____________________________
Always Sometimes Never
The Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM, the "beta" approach)
Average historical returns on 
common stock listed on the market
Inquire as to our investors' required 
returns
Always Sometimes Never
We do not take the level of risk into account
Measure the risk of the cash flows 
using probability distributions
Other 
assessment_______________________
Measure the covariance of a 
project's cash flow with cash flows 
of other projects
Use management's subjective 
evaluation of the level of risk
Measure the probability of monetary loss 
(Value at Risk)
Always SometimesAlways Sometimes Never Never
A measure based on experience and industry 
norms
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Survey of investment analysis in the global airline business
Please complete the questionnaire below and fax to +33 562 121 120 before 31 October 2004.
All responses are anonymous and confidential.  Survey results will be presented in aggregate only.  
III. Corporate finance and project finance
Questions 11 - 14: are there interactions between investment and financing decisions?
11. Does your company have a preference for project financing?
 Assuming all sources were available to your company, please rank your preferences, 1 to 4 or choose, "no preference"
Prefer to use internally-generated funds
Prefer to issue equity
Prefer to minimise initial outlays, for example through operating leases
Prefer to issue debt
No preference
12. Does your company have a target for the ratio of debt to equity capital?
No target
Flexible target
Strict target
13. What factors does your company use to evaluate the appropriate amount of debt for the firm?
Availability of debt compared to equity
14. Company dimensions, growth and ownership
Please fill in one square in each catetory that best describes your company
ICAO Region of your airline
Asia and Pacific North America, Central America, Caribean
Eastern and Southern Africa South America
Europe and North Atlantic Western and Central Africa
Middle East
Aircraft currently in operation
10-29 aircraft 50-74 aircraft
30-49 aircraft Over 75 aircaft
Number of aircraft types currently in operation
1-2 aircraft types 6-10 aircraft types
3-5 aircraft types Over 10 aircraft types
Approximate annual revenue in US$
Less than $50 million $100-250 million
$51-99 million Over $250 million
Historical annual revenue growth rate
Less than 3% 6-15% annual growth
3  - 5% annual growth Over 15% annual growth
Largest shareholder in the company
Majority of shares trade on the stock market (bourse) Private investors
Government or government agency Another airline
Restrictive covenants in financing 
contracts
Always Sometimes Never Always
The debt levels of other firms in our 
industry
The volatility of our profits and cash flows
Restrict debt so that profits can be fully 
captured by our shareholders
Sometimes Never
The tax-deductibility of interest 
payments
Financial flexibility from using 
internally-generated funds
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Airline CFO Survey results 
 
Respondent Region Largest shareholder Preference (avg) Frequency (count) Frequency (count) Preference (avg)
No. only 
(anonymous) 14.Bourse 14.Govt 14.Private 14.Airline 1.PBK 1.ARR 1.IRR 1.NPV 1.APV 1.ROA 1.EVA 2.All 2.Risk 2.Size 2.Dont_use
3.Under
_1YR 3.1YR 3.2_10YR 3.End 3.Other 3.Dont 4.Lease_purchase 4.Debt_equity 4.Int_ext
1 Middle East 1 2 2 2 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 2
2 Europe 1 2 0 2 2 1 0 0 1 1 2
3 Middle East 1 2 1 1 1 1 1
4 North America 2 2 1 1 1 2
5 Middle East 1 2 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 2
6 Africa 1 2 1 1 2 1 2
7 Africa 1 2 2 1 1 1
8 Europe 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
9 Europe 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
10 Europe 1 2 0 0 2 2 1 0 1 1 2 0 2
11 Europe 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
12 Asia Pacific 1 2 2 2 2 1 0 0 1 1 2 1 1
13 Europe 1 2 2 2 2 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
14 Europe 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
15 Europe 1 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
16 Europe 1 2 1 2 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 1
17 North America 1 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 2 2
18 Europe 1 2 2 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 2
19 North America 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
20 North America 1 2 1 2 2 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
21 Europe 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
22 Europe 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 2
23 Europe 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 1 1 2 2 2
24 Europe 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
25 Europe 1 1 2 1 1 2 1
26 Europe 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 1
27 Europe 1 2 1 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 1
28 Middle East 1 1 2 2 2 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 2
29 Africa 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 2 0 0
30 Asia Pacific 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
31 Europe 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1
32 Africa 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 2
33 Europe 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1
34 North America 1 1 0 0 1 1 2 0 1
35 Asia Pacific 1 2 2 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 2
36 Asia Pacific 1 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 1
37 Europe 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 12 13 6 1.543 1.129 1.161 1.625 0.444 0.357 0.414 22 3 11 1 14 10 2 5 3 7 1.500 0.793 1.367
14% 32% 35% 16% 59% 8% 30% 3% 38% 27% 5% 14% 8% 19%  
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Respondent Region Frequency Preference (avg) Preference (avg)
No. only 
(anonymous)
5a.Indir
ect 5a.Direct 5b.Pretax 5b.Aftertax 6.Kd 6.ke 6.WACC 6.Experience 6.Financing 6.Riskiness 6.Growth_Div 6.Other 7.ShareReturns 7.CAPM 7.Investors 7.GovtRegs 7.DivDiscount 7.Experience
1 Middle East 1 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
2 Europe 1 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 2
3 Middle East 1 1 1
4 North America 1 1
5 Middle East 1 1 2 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2
6 Africa 1 2 2
7 Africa 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
8 Europe 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 1
9 Europe 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
10 Europe 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0
11 Europe 1 2 2
12 Asia Pacific 1 2 2 1
13 Europe 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0
14 Europe 1 1 2 2 2 2
15 Europe 1 1 2 2
16 Europe 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
17 North America 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1
18 Europe 1 1 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
19 North America 1 1 1
20 North America 1 1 1 2 1 2 2
21 Europe 1 1 2 1
22 Europe 1 1 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
23 Europe 1 1 2 2 2 2
24 Europe 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
25 Europe 1 1 1 2
26 Europe 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 1 2 0 1 2 1 0 0 1
27 Europe 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
28 Middle East 1 2
29 Africa 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
30 Asia Pacific 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
31 Europe 1 2 1 2
32 Africa 1 1 1 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0
33 Europe 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
34 North America 1 1 1 2 1 1 1
35 Asia Pacific 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0
36 Asia Pacific 1 0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
37 Europe 1 1 1 1 1
11 25 12 13 1.000 0.350 1.300 0.571 0.739 0.708 0.158 0.571 0.455 0.885 0.455 0.111 0.158 0.909
30% 68% 32% 35%  
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Respondent Region Frequency Preference (average) Frequency (count)
No. only 
(anonymous)
8.Technique
_Risk 9.Subjective 9.ProbDist 9.CFCovar 9.VAR 9.Other 9.Dont
9.Subjective 
estimate only
9.Subjective & 
Govt owned
9. Number of 
techniques used 10.ShortenPBK 10.RaiseIRR 10.RaiseNPV 10.Other
10. Use PBK and 
Shorten PBK
10. Use NPV and 
raise rate
1 Middle East 1 1 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 2 2
2 Europe 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 2
3 Middle East 0 2 0 0 1 1 2
4 North America 0 2 1 0 1 1 1 2
5 Middle East 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 2
6 Africa 1 2 1 1 1 1 2
7 Africa 0 1 1 0 1 2
8 Europe 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 4 1 2
9 Europe 0 1 1 0 0 2 1
10 Europe 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 1 2 2
11 Europe 0 2 1 0 1 1 1 2
12 Asia Pacific 1 1 2 0 0 2 1
13 Europe 1 2 1 2 0 1 3 1 2
14 Europe 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 1 1
15 Europe 0 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
16 Europe 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
17 North America 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 2
18 Europe 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 2
19 North America 0 2 1 0 1 1
20 North America 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 1 1 2 2
21 Europe 0 1 0 0 1 2
22 Europe 1 1 1 2 0 0 3 1 1 2 2
23 Europe 2 1 0 0 2 1 1
24 Europe 1 2 0 0 1
25 Europe 1 1 0 1 1
26 Europe 1 1 1 1 0 0 3 1 2
27 Europe 1 2 1 0 0 2 1 2
28 Middle East 1 2 1 1 1 1 2
29 Africa 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 4 1 1 1 1 1
30 Asia Pacific 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 4 1 1
31 Europe 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 1
32 Africa 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 4 1 1
33 Europe 0 1 1 0 0 2 1
34 North America 0 2 1 0 1 1
35 Asia Pacific 1 1 2 1 1 0 1 4
36 Asia Pacific 0 1 2 0 0 2 1 2
37 Europe 1 1 0 0 1 1
18 1.387 1.250 1.143 1.222 1.000 1.429 12 10 16 12 19 6 47% 64%  
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Respondent Region Ranking of preferences Frequency Preference (avg)
No. only 
(anonymous) 11.Internal 11.Equity 11.MinCashOut 11.Debt 11.None 12.NoTarget 12.FlexibleTarget 12.StrictTarget 13.Tax 13.InternalFlex 13.OtherFirms 13.BankCovenants 13.OpLev 13.ShareVal 13.DebtAvailability
1 Middle East 1 1 1 2 2 0 2
2 Europe 3 4 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 2
3 Middle East 1 2 1 1
4 North America 1 1 2
5 Middle East 1 2 3 4 1 0 2 0 2 2 0 1
6 Africa 2 1 1 2 2 2 2
7 Africa 1 4 2 3 1 1 1 0 1 1
8 Europe 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2
9 Europe 1 2 3 1 1 1 0 2 1 0 1
10 Europe 1 2 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
11 Europe 1 4 2 3 1 2 2
12 Asia Pacific 1 1 1 2
13 Europe 1 1
14 Europe 3 4 2 1 1 1 1 1
15 Europe 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
16 Europe 1 4 2 3 1 1 2 0 1 1 0 1
17 North America 3 4 1 2 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 2
18 Europe 2 3 1 4 1 2 1 0 2 2 0 1
19 North America 1 1 1
20 North America 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 0 2
21 Europe 1 1
22 Europe 1 1 0 1 0 1 2 2 1
23 Europe 1 1 2 2
24 Europe 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
25 Europe 1 1 1 1
26 Europe 1 2 4 3 1 1 1 0 0 2 0 1
27 Europe 1 4 2 3 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
28 Middle East 1 4 3 2 1 2
29 Africa 1 4 2 3 1 0 2 1 2 2 1 1
30 Asia Pacific 4 3 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
31 Europe 1 1 2 2
32 Africa 1 4 3 2 1 0 2 2 2 2 0 1
33 Europe 2 4 1 3 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
34 North America 1 1 1 1 2 2
35 Asia Pacific 1 1 0 1 1 2 0 1
36 Asia Pacific 1 1 0 2 0 0 0
37 Europe 1 1 1 1
1.500 3.600 1.760 2.227 2.000 8.000 22.000 7.000 0.909 1.321 0.680 1.435 1.414 0.500 1.192
1 4 2 3 22% 59% 19%  
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Appendix B – Airline ownership, production, revenue and profits, 2004-2008 
 
Airline operation Country Region Gov’t  Listed  
Institutio
nal  
Closely 
held  
Emplo
yees  
Other 
airline  
Other/
Not 
stated 
5-year 
RPK 
5-year 
Revenue 
5-year 
Op. 
Profit 
5-year 
Net Profit 
Ethiopian Airlines Ethiopia Africa 
100.00
%           0.00% 30,553 2,615 141 130 
Kenya Airways Kenya Africa 22.00% 32.50% 4.36%     26.00% 
15.14
% 35,524 3,958 444 149 
South African Airways 
South 
Africa Africa 98.20%       1.80%   0.00% 120,161 14,626 133 183 
Air Austral Reunion 
Asia-
Pacific     26.30% 37.72%     
35.98
% 14,929 1,331 46 37 
Air Calédonie 
International 
New 
Caledonia 
Asia-
Pacific 50.28%   43.31% 4.32%   2.09% 0.00% 5,606 0 0 0 
Air China China 
Asia-
Pacific 55.80% 24.20%       20.00% 0.00% 292,374 28,788 1,538 145 
Air Do Japan 
Asia-
Pacific     96.07% 3.93%     0.00% 5,060 0 0 0 
Air India India 
Asia-
Pacific 
100.00
%           0.00% 93,900 10,787 -16 -1,073 
Air Macau China 
Asia-
Pacific 5.00%   5.00% 90.00%     0.00% 13,242 0 0 0 
Air Madagascar 
Madagasca
r 
Asia-
Pacific 90.60%         3.10% 6.30% 4,668 0 0 0 
Air Mauritius Mauritius 
Asia-
Pacific 52.87%     15.50%   31.64% 
-
0.01% 25,897 2,786 76 -73 
Air New Zealand 
New 
Zealand 
Asia-
Pacific 76.50% 12.90%   4.20%   6.30% 0.10% 131,694 13,796 865 609 
Air Pacific Fiji 
Asia-
Pacific 50.00%         49.97% 0.03% 16,925 0 0 0 
Air Tahiti Nui 
Fr 
Polynesia 
Asia-
Pacific 64.42%   8.61% 19.92%   7.05% 0.00% 15,689 0 0 0 
AirAsia Malaysia 
Asia-
Pacific   43.50% 21.60% 30.90% 4.00%   0.00% 37,702 1,241 340 -2 
ANA Group Japan 
Asia-
Pacific   80.02% 19.98%       0.00% 295,484 63,831 3,114 1,289 
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Airline operation Country Region Gov’t  Listed  
Institutio
nal  
Closely 
held  
Emplo
yees  
Other 
airline  
Other/
Not 
stated 
5-year 
RPK 
5-year 
Revenue 
5-year 
Op. 
Profit 
5-year 
Net Profit 
Asiana Airlines 
South 
Korea 
Asia-
Pacific     9.63% 90.37%     0.00% 111,006 17,056 452 312 
Bangkok Airways Thailand 
Asia-
Pacific       100.00%     0.00% 5,670 894 28 -8 
Biman Bangladesh 
Airlines Bangladesh 
Asia-
Pacific 
100.00
%           0.00% 22,518 0 0 0 
Cathay Pacific China 
Asia-
Pacific   25.00% 24.84% 40.00%   10.16% 0.00% 366,340 40,173 1,912 1,342 
Cebu Pacific Air Philippines 
Asia-
Pacific       100.00%     0.00% 16,167 813 39 6 
China Airlines Taiwan 
Asia-
Pacific 70.05%           
29.95
% 159,991 17,731 73 -936 
China Eastern Airlines China 
Asia-
Pacific 50.30% 38.38%   11.32%     0.00% 225,139 22,299 -2,386 -2,584 
China Eastern Airlines 
Wuhan China 
Asia-
Pacific           100.00% 0.00% 16,201 0 0 0 
China Southern 
Airlines China 
Asia-
Pacific 50.30% 49.70%         0.00% 333,050 28,558 -741 -630 
China Xinhua Airlines China 
Asia-
Pacific       40.00%   60.00% 0.00% 26,066 0 0 0 
Continental Micronesia Guam 
Asia-
Pacific           100.00% 0.00% 22,462 0 0 0 
Deccan India 
Asia-
Pacific           100.00% 0.00% 6,283 0 0 0 
Dragon Air China 
Asia-
Pacific           100.00% 0.00% 0 0 0 0 
EVA Air Taiwan 
Asia-
Pacific   28.00%   72.00%     0.00% 116,302 13,828 -291 -506 
Garuda Indonesia Indonesia 
Asia-
Pacific 
100.00
%           0.00% 75,117 6,846 -82 -61 
GoAir India 
Asia-
Pacific       100.00%     0.00% 2,795 0 0 0 
Hainan Airlines China 
Asia-
Pacific     12.72% 78.36%     8.92% 96,762 7,500 -113 -135 
IndiGo Airlines India 
Asia-
Pacific       100.00%     0.00% 8,051 0 0 0 
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Airline operation Country Region Gov’t  Listed  
Institutio
nal  
Closely 
held  
Emplo
yees  
Other 
airline  
Other/
Not 
stated 
5-year 
RPK 
5-year 
Revenue 
5-year 
Op. 
Profit 
5-year 
Net Profit 
Japan Airlines 
Corporation Japan 
Asia-
Pacific   100.00%         0.00% 467,859 98,004 769 -756 
Japan TransOcean Air Japan 
Asia-
Pacific 12.90%     17.00%   70.10% 0.00% 7,874 0 0 0 
Jet Airways India 
Asia-
Pacific   20.00%   80.00%     0.00% 67,163 9,262 -124 -19 
JetLite India 
Asia-
Pacific           100.00% 0.00% 8,124 0 0 0 
Jetstar Australia 
Asia-
Pacific           100.00% 0.00% 37,154 0 0 0 
Juneyao Airlines China 
Asia-
Pacific       100.00%     0.00% 3,213 0 0 0 
Kingfisher Airlines India 
Asia-
Pacific       100.00%     0.00% 13,962 1,677 -395 -286 
Korean Air 
South 
Korea 
Asia-
Pacific   61.14% 21.49% 12.13% 5.24%   0.00% 257,511 40,987 1,880 -759 
Lion Airlines Indonesia 
Asia-
Pacific       100.00%     0.00% 14,239 0 0 0 
Malaysia Airlines Malaysia 
Asia-
Pacific 72.05%   5.69%   
10.72
%   
11.54
% 207,412 18,201 -104 -56 
Nippon Cargo Airlines Japan 
Asia-
Pacific       100.00%     0.00% 0 5,056 -197 1 
Pakistan International 
Airlines Pakistan 
Asia-
Pacific 87.00%     13.00%     0.00% 70,878 5,649 -641 -997 
Philippine Airlines Philippines 
Asia-
Pacific 4.26%     88.87% 2.75%   4.12% 81,107 6,278 87 150 
Qantas Australia 
Asia-
Pacific   100.00%         0.00% 462,735 54,389 5,169 3,022 
QantasLink Australia 
Asia-
Pacific           100.00% 0.00% 11,313 0 0 0 
Royal Brunei Airlines Brunei 
Asia-
Pacific 
100.00
%           0.00% 18,037 0 0 0 
Shandong Airlines China 
Asia-
Pacific   77.20%       22.80% 0.00% 24,798 2,436 98 -7 
Shanghai Airlines China 
Asia-
Pacific 40.66% 44.69% 14.65%       0.00% 49,667 6,486 45 -196 
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Airline operation Country Region Gov’t  Listed  
Institutio
nal  
Closely 
held  
Emplo
yees  
Other 
airline  
Other/
Not 
stated 
5-year 
RPK 
5-year 
Revenue 
5-year 
Op. 
Profit 
5-year 
Net Profit 
Shenzhen Airlines China 
Asia-
Pacific       75.00%   25.00% 0.00% 48,283 3,196 0 88 
Sichuan Airlines China 
Asia-
Pacific       41.00%   59.00% 0.00% 34,499 0 0 0 
SilkAir Singapore 
Asia-
Pacific           100.00% 0.00% 12,668 0 0 0 
Singapore Airlines 
Group Singapore 
Asia-
Pacific 54.70%   45.30%       0.00% 431,098 46,640 4,475 5,093 
Skymark Airlines Japan 
Asia-
Pacific       100.00%     0.00% 13,693 1,206 -16 -39 
Skynet Asia Airways Japan 
Asia-
Pacific 3.30% 24.20%   57.60%   14.90% 0.00% 2,899 0 0 0 
spiceJet India 
Asia-
Pacific   44.00% 17.72% 35.00%     3.28% 10,507 0 0 0 
SriLankan Airlines Sri Lanka 
Asia-
Pacific 51.05%       5.32% 43.63% 0.00% 44,979 3,134 -26 -20 
Thai Airways Thailand 
Asia-
Pacific 53.76%   46.24%       0.00% 275,420 24,353 1,162 171 
Vietnam Airlines Vietnam 
Asia-
Pacific 
100.00
%           0.00% 58,404 5,543 39 92 
Virgin Blue Australia 
Asia-
Pacific       74.74%   25.26% 0.00% 83,534 7,453 768 505 
Xiamen Airlines China 
Asia-
Pacific 40.00%         60.00% 0.00% 45,989 3,237 126 49 
Adria Airways Slovenia Europe 76.00%   8.00% 13.00% 3.00%   0.00% 4,449 0 0 0 
Aegean Airlines Greece Europe   23.60%   76.00%     0.40% 14,236 2,833 211 161 
Aer Lingus Ireland Europe 28.82% 28.29%     
16.76
% 25.22% 0.91% 68,301 7,391 368 -32 
Aeroflot Russian 
Airlines Russia Europe 51.17%     27.00% 
19.00
%   2.83% 115,727 14,302 1,334 1,135 
AeroSvit Airlines Ukraine Europe 22.00%     78.00%     0.00% 17,055 0 0 0 
Air Astana Kazakhstan Europe 51.00%           
49.00
% 16,683 1,529 74 60 
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Airline operation Country Region Gov’t  Listed  
Institutio
nal  
Closely 
held  
Emplo
yees  
Other 
airline  
Other/
Not 
stated 
5-year 
RPK 
5-year 
Revenue 
5-year 
Op. 
Profit 
5-year 
Net Profit 
Air Berlin Germany Europe   44.62% 44.00% 11.42%     
-
0.04% 152,631 13,630 124 -161 
Air Europa Spain Europe       100.00%     0.00% 71,117 6,827 116 71 
Air France-KLM Group France Europe 18.70% 81.30%         0.00% 973,826 148,038 5,181 2,623 
Air Malta Malta Europe 98.00%     2.00%     0.00% 11,813 1,701 -18 -19 
Air Nostrum (Iberia 
Regional) Spain Europe     97.50%     3.00% 
-
0.50% 13,309 3,980 101 103 
Air One Italy Europe       99.00%     1.00% 18,136 3,036 97 35 
airBaltic Latvia Europe 52.80%       
47.20
%   0.00% 5,015 0 0 0 
Alitalia Italy Europe 49.90%   12.41% 35.69%   2.00% 0.00% 177,887 23,638 -1,585 -2,688 
Astraeus UK Europe     51.00%   
49.00
%   0.00% 11,688 0 0 0 
Austrian Airlines Austria Europe   58.50%       41.46% 0.04% 106,483 16,605 -561 -911 
Austrian Arrows Austria Europe           100.00% 0.00% 14,316 0 0 0 
Azerbaijan Airlines Azerbaijan Europe 
100.00
%           0.00% 1,770 0 0 0 
Blue Panorama 
Airlines Italy Europe     66.60% 33.40%     0.00% 15,138 0 0 0 
Blue1 Finland Europe           100.00% 0.00% 5,904 0 0 0 
bmi UK Europe       50.01%   49.99% 0.00% 29,600 8,705 37 -96 
bmibaby UK Europe           100.00% 0.00% 13,405 0 0 0 
Brit Air France Europe           100.00% 0.00% 10,704 0 0 0 
British Airways UK Europe   100.00%         0.00% 559,849 78,303 4,786 2,612 
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nal  
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held  
Emplo
yees  
Other 
airline  
Other/
Not 
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Net Profit 
Brussels Airlines Belgium Europe       55.00%   45.00% 0.00% 28,400 5,501 40 30 
Cargolux Airlines 
International 
Luxembour
g Europe   34.00% 31.10%     34.90% 0.00% 0 7,818 171 147 
CityJet Ireland Europe           100.00% 0.00% 4,616 0 0 0 
Clickair Spain Europe       80.00%   20.00% 0.00% 10,501 0 0 0 
Condor Flugdienst Germany Europe           100.00% 0.00% 111,137 0 0 0 
Corsairfly France Europe       100.00%     0.00% 58,379 0 0 0 
Croatia Airlines Croatia Europe 96.30%   2.20% 1.50%     0.00% 5,034 0 0 0 
CSA Czech Airlines 
Czech 
Republic Europe 61.08%   4.33% 34.59%     0.00% 37,620 5,175 88 34 
Cyprus Airways Cyprus Europe 69.62%     30.38%     0.00% 16,575 2,073 -163 -146 
easyJet UK Europe   49.90%   50.10%     0.00% 155,745 15,550 912 786 
Edelweiss Air Switzerland Europe           100.00% 0.00% 8,321 0 0 0 
Eurofly Italy Europe     15.74% 38.16%   46.10% 0.00% 0 1,387 -88 -94 
Eurowings Germany Europe       51.00%   49.00% 0.00% 13,019 4,767 59 51 
Finnair Finland Europe 57.04% 22.83% 20.13%       0.00% 92,463 13,300 227 185 
flybe UK Europe       50.00%   15.00% 
35.00
% 13,479 3,053 77 10 
FlyGlobespan.com UK Europe   100.00%         0.00% 15,722 1,189 7 3 
Futura International 
Airways Spain Europe       100.00%     0.00% 20,624 1,397 32 25 
GB Airways UK Europe           100.00% 0.00% 19,804 0 0 0 
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germanwings Germany Europe           100.00% 0.00% 19,841 0 0 0 
Hamburg International Germany Europe     50.01%   
49.99
%   0.00% 3,619 0 0 0 
Hello Switzerland Europe       100.00%     0.00% 1,624 0 0 0 
Iberia Spain Europe   72.40% 17.60%     10.00% 0.00% 254,591 34,231 937 1,434 
Iberworld Airlines Spain Europe       100.00%     0.00% 17,032 1,423 101 67 
Icelandair Iceland Europe   100.00%         0.00% 20,406 3,664 137 -44 
Jat Airways Serbia Europe 
100.00
%           0.00% 4,983 0 0 0 
KrasAir Russia Europe 51.00%     49.00%     0.00% 21,891 1,291 0 0 
Livingston Italy Europe       100.00%     0.00% 10,578 837 -3 -8 
LOT Polish Airlines Poland Europe 67.97%     25.10% 6.93%   0.00% 33,824 4,685 61 265 
Lufthansa Group Germany Europe   89.44% 10.56%       0.00% 566,249 135,832 7,243 5,234 
Luxair 
Luxembour
g Europe 23.10%   38.60%     13.00% 
25.30
% 4,920 2,404 24 82 
Malév Hungary Europe     49.00% 51.00%     0.00% 20,480 3,266 -12 3 
Martinair Netherlands Europe           100.00% 0.00% 40,207 6,632 -92 -83 
Meridiana Italy Europe       84.00% 
16.00
%   0.00% 14,470 2,670 22 27 
Monarch Airlines UK Europe       100.00%     0.00% 71,743 3,879 51 27 
Monarch Scheduled UK Europe           100.00% 0.00% 14,041 0 0 0 
MyTravel Airways UK Europe       100.00%     0.00% 57,795 0 0 0 
   
 Appendix B - 327 
 
Airline operation Country Region Gov’t  Listed  
Institutio
nal  
Closely 
held  
Emplo
yees  
Other 
airline  
Other/
Not 
stated 
5-year 
RPK 
5-year 
Revenue 
5-year 
Op. 
Profit 
5-year 
Net Profit 
Norwegian Norway Europe   100.00%         0.00% 21,346 2,594 -38 14 
Novair Sweden Europe       100.00%     0.00% 14,478 0 0 0 
Olympic Airlines Greece Europe 
100.00
%           0.00% 35,098 4,143 0 0 
Onur Air Turkey Europe       100.00%     0.00% 16,864 0 0 0 
Régional France Europe           100.00% 0.00% 11,627 0 0 0 
Rossiya Airlines Russia Europe 
100.00
%           0.00% 0 0 0 0 
Ryanair Ireland Europe   81.24% 14.26% 4.50%     0.00% 204,220 14,684 2,379 2,069 
S7 Airlines Russia Europe 25.50%     74.50%     0.00% 62,069 5,063 104 7 
SAS Group Denmark Europe 49.99% 50.01%         0.00% 53,747 40,537 367 -627 
SATA International Portugal Europe 
100.00
%           0.00% 7,457 0 0 0 
Silverjet UK Europe       100.00%     0.00% 1,190 0 0 0 
SkyEurope Airlines Slovakia Europe   71.90% 28.10%       0.00% 12,197 0 0 0 
Spanair Spain Europe       5.10%   94.90% 0.00% 39,476 0 0 0 
Sterling Airlines Denmark Europe       100.00%     0.00% 0 2,309 -35 -64 
SunExpress Turkey Europe           100.00% 0.00% 21,148 0 0 0 
Swiss Switzerland Europe           100.00% 0.00% 117,857 0 0 0 
Swiss European Air 
Lines Switzerland Europe           100.00% 0.00% 3,156 0 0 0 
TAP Portugal Portugal Europe 
100.00
%           0.00% 85,954 11,204 -102 -237 
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TAROM Romania Europe 
100.00
%           0.00% 8,957 1,765 77 94 
Thomas Cook Airlines 
(UK) UK Europe       100.00%     0.00% 86,919 3,356 258 172 
Thomas Cook Airlines 
Belgium Belgium Europe           100.00% 0.00% 10,414 0 0 0 
Thomsonfly UK Europe       100.00%     0.00% 104,072 0 0 0 
THY Turkish Airlines Turkey Europe 48.25% 51.75%         0.00% 128,531 15,459 1,013 1,373 
Transaero Russia Europe       20.00% 
80.00
%   0.00% 42,387 3,152 13 15 
Transavia Airlines Netherlands Europe           100.00% 0.00% 41,970 0 0 0 
Travel Service Airlines 
Czech 
Republic Europe       34.00%   66.00% 0.00% 10,593 0 0 0 
TUIfly Germany Europe       80.10%   19.90% 0.00% 39,667 0 0 0 
Ukraine International 
Airlines Ukraine Europe 61.60%   15.90%     22.50% 0.00% 10,192 0 0 0 
Ural Airlines Russia Europe   19.50% 14.50% 66.00%     0.00% 10,630 0 0 0 
UTair Aviation Russia Europe   24.31% 75.69%       0.00% 16,216 1,771 0 17 
Uzbekistan Airways Uzbekistan Europe 
100.00
%           0.00% 21,169 0 0 0 
VIM Airlines Russia Europe   25.00% 75.00%       0.00% 14,326 0 0 0 
Virgin Atlantic Airways UK Europe       51.00%   49.00% 0.00% 179,343 19,711 158 316 
Volga-Dnepr Airlines Russia Europe     84.00%     16.00% 0.00% 0 2,222 0 50 
Vueling Airlines Spain Europe   50.90% 37.80%   
11.30
%   0.00% 16,436 1,441 -156 -88 
XL Airways France France Europe       100.00%     0.00% 10,591 0 0 0 
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XL Airways UK UK Europe       100.00%     0.00% 20,806 0 0 0 
Air Algérie Algeria 
Middle 
East 
100.00
%           0.00% 17,511 3,353 32 120 
Air Arabia UAE 
Middle 
East 51.00%   49.00%       0.00% 12,125 0 0 0 
Atlas Blue Morocco 
Middle 
East 
100.00
%           0.00% 2,682 0 0 0 
Egyptair Egypt 
Middle 
East 
100.00
%           0.00% 58,365 5,654 33 72 
El Al Israel 
Middle 
East 21.97% 31.36% 39.50%     8.12% 
-
0.95% 81,490 8,736 128 46 
Emirates UAE 
Middle 
East 
100.00
%           0.00% 387,713 43,122 4,715 4,096 
Etihad Airways UAE 
Middle 
East 
100.00
%           0.00% 55,533 4,813 0 0 
Gulf Air Bahrain 
Middle 
East 
100.00
%           0.00% 76,387 6,349 -321 -293 
Iran Air Iran 
Middle 
East 
100.00
%           0.00% 45,912 2,779 -64 -42 
Iran Aseman Airlines Iran 
Middle 
East 
100.00
%           0.00% 8,934 0 0 0 
Israir Israel 
Middle 
East       100.00%     0.00% 1,803 0 0 0 
Jazeera Kuwait 
Middle 
East   70.00%   30.00%     0.00% 0 0 0 0 
Kuwait Airways Kuwait 
Middle 
East 
100.00
%           0.00% 36,490 4,279 -123 -452 
Middle East Airlines 
(MEA) Lebanon 
Middle 
East 99.37%           0.63% 11,332 2,042 297 248 
Oman Air Oman 
Middle 
East 80.00%   20.00%       0.00% 10,829 0 0 0 
Qatar Airways Qatar 
Middle 
East 50.01%     49.99%     0.00% 122,757 9,787 0 0 
Royal Air Maroc Morocco 
Middle 
East 95.39%         3.82% 0.79% 42,374 5,950 285 150 
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Royal Jordanian 
Airlines Jordan 
Middle 
East 
100.00
%           0.00% 30,424 3,642 95 67 
Saudi Arabian Airlines 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Middle 
East 
100.00
%           0.00% 144,051 20,783 124 -104 
Tunisair Tunisia 
Middle 
East 74.42% 20.00%       5.58% 0.00% 27,165 3,596 39 95 
ABX Air USA 
North 
America   100.00%         0.00% 0 6,372 217 179 
Aeroméxico Mexico 
North 
America       100.00%     0.00% 74,744 12,038 162 137 
Air Canada Canada 
North 
America   25.00%   75.00%     0.00% 373,615 45,152 1,062 1,247 
Air Canada Jazz Canada 
North 
America           100.00% 0.00% 26,049 2,936 283 268 
Air Caraibes 
Guadeloup
e 
North 
America       85.00%     
15.00
% 15,040 0 0 0 
Air Jamaica Jamaica 
North 
America 
100.00
%           0.00% 19,836 2,040 0 0 
Air Transat Canada 
North 
America       100.00%     0.00% 58,640 4,354 0 59 
Air Wisconsin USA 
North 
America       100.00%     0.00% 18,234 3,166 311 194 
AirTran Airways USA 
North 
America   100.00%         0.00% 112,422 9,246 152 -199 
Alaska Airlines USA 
North 
America   100.00%         0.00% 141,808 16,202 -135 -85 
Allegiant Air USA 
North 
America   100.00%         0.00% 16,333 0 0 0 
Aloha Airlines USA 
North 
America   100.00%         0.00% 11,805 1,679 -113 -170 
American Eagle 
Airlines USA 
North 
America           100.00% 0.00% 60,284 0 0 0 
AMR Corporation USA 
North 
America   100.00%         0.00% 1,090,637 108,621 -101 -2,958 
ATA Airlines USA 
North 
America           100.00% 0.00% 48,126 4,073 -573 -1,249 
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Atlantic Southeast 
Airlines USA 
North 
America           100.00% 0.00% 37,412 0 0 0 
Atlas Air USA 
North 
America   100.00%         0.00% 0 4,647 299 256 
Aviacsa Mexico 
North 
America       100.00%     0.00% 10,046 0 0 0 
Chautauqua Airlines USA 
North 
America           100.00% 0.00% 25,297 0 0 0 
Click Mexicana Mexico 
North 
America           100.00% 0.00% 1,612 0 0 0 
Comair USA 
North 
America           100.00% 0.00% 42,480 0 0 0 
Continental Airlines USA 
North 
America   100.00%         0.00% 632,626 63,553 573 -214 
Delta Air Lines USA 
North 
America   89.30%     
10.70
%   0.00% 956,620 90,215 -12,469 -22,531 
Evergreen 
International Airlines USA 
North 
America       100.00%     0.00% 0 1,939 172 28 
ExpressJet USA 
North 
America   100.00%         0.00% 74,476 6,246 74 32 
FedEx USA 
North 
America   100.00%         0.00% 0 110,397 7,431 0 
Freedom Airlines USA 
North 
America           100.00% 0.00% 2,850 0 0 0 
Frontier Airlines USA 
North 
America   100.00%         0.00% 66,756 5,687 -96 -366 
GoJet USA 
North 
America       100.00%     0.00% 2,994 0 0 0 
Hawaiian Airlines USA 
North 
America   100.00%         0.00% 57,374 4,671 202 -76 
Horizon Air USA 
North 
America           100.00% 0.00% 20,716 0 0 0 
JetBlue Airways USA 
North 
America   49.00% 15.00% 17.00%   19.00% 0.00% 178,692 11,560 566 44 
Kalitta Air USA 
North 
America       100.00%     0.00% 0 1,554 7 6 
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Mesa Airlines USA 
North 
America   100.00%         0.00% 49,970 5,994 234 6 
Mexicana Mexico 
North 
America       100.00%     0.00% 74,799 4,100 0 0 
Midwest Airlines USA 
North 
America           100.00% 0.00% 26,693 2,929 -570 -572 
North American 
Airlines USA 
North 
America     100.00%       0.00% 13,559 0 0 0 
Northwest Airlines USA 
North 
America   100.00%         0.00% 601,551 48,661 420 -4,123 
Omni Air International USA 
North 
America       100.00%     0.00% 8,344 959 72 82 
Pinnacle Airlines USA 
North 
America   100.00%         0.00% 33,883 3,954 319 174 
Polar Air Cargo USA 
North 
America   51.00%       49.00% 0.00% 0 1,263 -36 -31 
Republic Airlines USA 
North 
America   60.85% 39.15%       0.00% 11,583 5,361 957 273 
Shuttle America USA 
North 
America           100.00% 0.00% 20,331 0 0 0 
SkyWest Airlines USA 
North 
America           100.00% 0.00% 106,031 13,105 1,304 612 
Southwest Airlines USA 
North 
America   100.00%         0.00% 526,373 44,084 3,453 2,119 
Spirit Airlines USA 
North 
America     51.00% 49.00%     0.00% 44,033 3,063 -74 -165 
Sun Country Airlines USA 
North 
America     100.00%       0.00% 16,018 0 0 0 
Trans States Airlines USA 
North 
America       100.00%     0.00% 9,153 0 0 0 
United Airlines USA 
North 
America   100.00%         0.00% 921,727 93,447 -3,950 -27,742 
United Parcel Service 
(UPS) USA 
North 
America   100.00%         0.00% 0 22,118 1,530 88 
US Airways Express USA 
North 
America           100.00% 0.00% 17,011 0 0 0 
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US Airways Group USA 
North 
America   100.00%         0.00% 382,648 53,102 -1,421 -2,327 
USA 3000 Airlines USA 
North 
America       100.00%     0.00% 5,195 0 0 0 
WestJet Airlines Canada 
North 
America   100.00%         0.00% 79,641 7,947 776 456 
World Airways USA 
North 
America           100.00% 0.00% 17,385 3,533 98 34 
Aerolíneas Argentinas Argentina 
South 
America 20.00%     77.00% 3.00%   0.00% 49,172 4,114 45 -68 
AeroRepública Colombia 
South 
America           99.90% 0.10% 12,360 0 0 0 
Austral Lineas Aereas Argentina 
South 
America 5.00%         95.00% 0.00% 14,665 0 0 0 
Avianca Colombia 
South 
America       100.00%     0.00% 38,692 5,873 267 215 
BRA Transportes 
Aéreos Brazil 
South 
America     20.00% 80.00%     0.00% 5,702 0 0 0 
Copa Airlines Panama 
South 
America       51.00%   10.00% 
39.00
% 33,314 3,394 598 453 
GOL Transportes 
Aéreos Brazil 
South 
America   100.00%         0.00% 75,860 9,586 717 -100 
Grupo TACA El Salvador 
South 
America       100.00%     0.00% 31,300 3,546 0 0 
LAN Airlines Chile 
South 
America   26.80%   73.20%     0.00% 103,064 15,692 1,566 1,196 
OceanAir Brazil 
South 
America       100.00%     0.00% 2,877 0 0 0 
SAM Colombia Colombia 
South 
America       6.00%   94.00% 0.00% 2,546 0 0 0 
TAM Linhas Aéreas Brazil 
South 
America       100.00%     0.00% 132,956 17,446 777 -227 
Varig Brazil 
South 
America           100.00% 0.00% 79,369 0 0 0 
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Appendix C – Airbus and Boeing delivery forecast comparison 
 
Airbus and Boeing delivery forecasts 2009-2028 by airplane size and region
Airbus GMF Single-aisle Twin-aisle VLA Total Deliveries
Twin+VLA 
seats
Asia Pacific 4,558 2,403 711 14,338 1,161,000
North America 4,564 823 64 14,463 316,850
Europe 4,581 1,206 281 13,683 548,550
Middle East 561 668 189 2,137 318,850
Latin America 1,340 299 19 3,862 113,200
Russia and Central Asia 733 154 14 2,496 60,200
Africa 640 249 40 2,251 105,150
Totals 16,977 5,802 1,318 30,175 2,623,800
Boeing CMO Single-aisle Twin-aisle VLA Total Deliveries
Twin+VLA 
seats
Asia Pacific 5,600 2,590 330 8,960 1,055,000
North America 5,630 1,130 40 7,690 413,500
Europe 5,310 1,480 200 7,330 608,000
Middle East 680 850 130 1,710 356,000
Latin America 1,260 290 10 1,640 106,000
Russia and Central Asia 610 170 20 1,050 68,500
Africa 370 190 10 620 71,000
World 19,460 6,700 740 29,000 2,678,000
Delta: GMF cf. CMO -13% -13% 78% 4% -2%
Forecast deltas
Airbus higher/lower (-) 
than Boeing
Single-aisle Twin-aisle VLA Total Twin+VLA Total Deliveries
Asia Pacific -1,042 -187 381 194 -848
North America -1,066 -307 24 -283 -1,349
Europe -729 -274 81 -193 -922
Middle East -119 -182 59 -123 -242
Latin America 80 9 9 18 98
Russia and Central Asia 123 -16 -6 -22 101
Africa 270 59 30 89 359
Totals -2,483 -898 578 -320 -2,803  
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Appendix D – Large civil aircraft delivery history 
COMMERCIAL JET AIRCRAFT DELIVERIES
1974-2009
Total Total
before 1974 Grand
1974 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2008 total
TOTAL AIRBUS 0 5 9 13 16 16 25 37 37 46 36 48 42 29 32 61 105 95 163 157 138 123 124 126 182 229 294 311 325 303 305 320 378 434 453 483 320 5,820 5,820
TOTAL BOEING 2427 189 170 139 120 203 286 299 257 176 204 146 203 242 270 290 284 385 435 446 330 272 207 219 321 509 561 450 476 361 269 273 274 393 441 375 307 10,782 13,209
TOTAL DOUGLAS 1387 95 85 69 36 40 75 63 103 54 63 54 82 102 104 130 118 142 170 127 79 40 50 51 54 54 59 39 51 20 12 12 13 5 0 0 0 2,251 3,638
3,814 289 264 221 172 259 386 399 397 276 303 248 327 373 406 481 507 622 768 730 547 435 381 396 557 792 914 800 852 684 586 605 665 832 894 858 627 18,853 22,667
AIRBUS share 0.0% 1.7% 3.4% 5.9% 9.3% 6.2% 6.5% 9.3% 9.3% 16.7% 11.9% 19.4% 12.8% 7.8% 7.9% 12.7% 20.7% 15.3% 21.2% 21.5% 25.2% 28.3% 32.5% 31.8% 32.7% 28.9% 32.2% 38.9% 38.1% 44.3% 52.0% 52.9% 56.8% 52.2% 50.7% 56.3% 51.0% 30.9% 25.7%
BOEING share 63.6% 65.4% 64.4% 62.9% 69.8% 78.4% 74.1% 74.9% 64.7% 63.8% 67.3% 58.9% 62.1% 64.9% 66.5% 60.3% 56.0% 61.9% 56.6% 61.1% 60.3% 62.5% 54.3% 55.3% 57.6% 64.3% 61.4% 56.3% 55.9% 52.8% 45.9% 45.1% 41.2% 47.2% 49.3% 43.7% 49.0% 57.2% 58.3%
DOUGLAS share 36.4% 32.9% 32.2% 31.2% 20.9% 15.4% 19.4% 15.8% 25.9% 19.6% 20.8% 21.8% 25.1% 27.3% 25.6% 27.0% 23.3% 22.8% 22.1% 17.4% 14.4% 9.2% 13.1% 12.9% 9.7% 6.8% 6.5% 4.9% 6.0% 2.9% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 11.9% 16.0%
A300B1/2/4 5 9 13 16 16 25 37 37 46 19 5 11 7 2 1 249 249
A300-600 14 5 3 9 1 3 2 1 1 39 39
A300-600R/F 16 21 17 24 21 22 23 17 13 6 13 8 8 11 9 8 12 9 9 6 273 273
A310-200 17 29 24 9 5 1 85 85
A310-300 2 10 21 23 22 18 19 24 22 2 2 2 2 1 170 170
A318-100 9 10 9 8 17 13 3 69 69
A319-100 18 47 53 88 112 89 85 72 87 142 137 105 98 62 1,195 1,195
A320-100/200 16 58 58 119 111 71 48 34 38 58 80 101 101 119 116 119 101 121 164 194 209 142 2,178 2,178
A321-100/200 16 22 16 22 35 33 28 49 35 33 35 17 30 51 66 55 543 543
A330-200 12 40 27 16 36 19 25 29 39 42 49 22 356 356
A330-300 1 9 30 10 14 11 4 16 19 6 12 22 27 23 26 23 24 277 277
A340-200 12 5 5 3 2 1 28 28
A340-300 10 20 14 25 31 23 20 19 22 8 10 5 4 2 2 3 218 218
A340-500 7 9 5 4 1 2 1 29 29
A340-600 8 16 14 15 18 8 8 6 93 93
A38-800 1 12 5 18 18
707/720 872 21 7 9 8 13 6 3 2 8 8 8 3 4 9 5 4 14 5 1 138 1,010
727-100/200 996 91 91 62 67 118 136 131 94 26 11 8 835 1,831
737-100/200 334 55 51 41 25 40 77 92 108 95 82 60 32 21 24 7 810 1,144
737-300 7 83 120 137 141 89 67 69 57 54 54 52 37 65 52 29 1,113 1,113
737-400 17 57 63 56 82 68 32 13 21 33 33 9 2 486 486
737-500 44 90 79 30 35 24 18 34 31 4 389 389
737-600 8 24 6 4 5 6 3 3 10 69 69
737-700 3 92 121 88 101 82 84 115 98 118 107 66 33 1,108 1,108
737-800 65 133 185 173 128 72 78 104 174 214 193 183 1,702 1,702
737-900/ER 21 8 11 6 4 9 31 21 111 111
747-100/200 225 22 21 27 20 32 67 73 53 25 8 9 8 16 14 10 4 7 2 418 643
747-300 15 7 16 19 9 14 1 81 81
747-400/400F/ERF 41 62 62 61 56 40 25 26 39 53 47 25 31 27 19 15 13 14 16 14 6 692 692
757-200 2 25 18 36 35 40 48 51 77 80 99 71 69 43 42 46 54 60 37 36 14 3 6 2 994 994
757-300 7 8 9 15 11 5 55 55
767-200/ER 20 55 29 25 19 24 14 8 15 5 1 5 5 1 2 1 3 7 1 2 1 2 1 2 248 248
767-300/ER/F 8 13 39 29 45 57 62 46 36 36 41 41 47 44 25 25 21 22 9 13 10 11 8 7 695 695
767-400ER 16 8 13 1 38 38
777-200/ER/LR/F 13 32 59 60 66 51 58 41 30 24 17 25 30 14 25 545 545
777-300/ER 14 17 4 3 6 9 12 19 40 53 47 31 255 255
DC-8 556 0 556
DC-9 709 48 42 50 22 22 39 18 16 10 267 976
DC-10-10 74 13 14 1 1 5 9 9 9 1 2 64 138
DC-10-30 33 27 29 12 13 12 24 25 8 3 1 2 5 3 8 1 173 206
DC-10-40 15 7 6 1 3 6 2 1 1 27 42
KC-10 6 6 8 8 11 12 7 2 60 60
MD-11 3 31 42 36 17 18 15 12 12 8 4 2 200 200
MD-81/82/83/88 5 62 33 51 44 71 85 91 106 102 115 125 80 43 23 18 12 16 8 26 1,116 1,116
MD-87 3 14 15 24 14 5 75 75
MD-90 14 24 26 34 13 3 114 114
717-200 12 32 49 20 12 12 13 5 155 155
TOTAL 3,814 289 264 221 172 259 386 399 397 276 303 248 327 373 406 481 507 622 768 730 547 435 381 396 557 792 914 800 852 684 586 605 665 832 894 858 627 18,853 22,667 
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Appendix E – Aircraft Investment model input and output 
 
Family conversion option: A319 -> A320
Base cases A319 A320
Most likely project NPV ($m) 12.72 13.55
Switching cost ($m) 0.5
Market uncertainty
Fuel price ($/USG) $2.00
Project volatility (Standard Deviation) 63.35% 75.81%
Risk free interest rate 4%
Option value - thousands of USD $673  
 
Fuel price distribution for MC analysis
2005-2009
Fuel Price Range Midpoint Freq. %
<120 $1.20 0.8%
<130 $1.25 2.0%
<140 $1.35 4.4%
<150 $1.45 4.4%
<160 $1.55 3.8%
<170 $1.65 7.8%
<180 $1.75 12.9%
<190 $1.85 11.9%
<200 $1.95 7.4%
<210 $2.05 11.7%
<220 $2.15 9.5%
<230 $2.25 3.0%
<240 $2.35 1.0%
<250 $2.45 0.6%
<260 $2.55 2.4%
<270 $2.65 2.4%
<280 $2.75 1.5%
<290 $2.85 0.7%
<300 $2.95 0.5%
<310 $3.05 0.9%
<320 $3.15 1.6%
<330 $3.25 1.3%
<340 $3.35 0.9%
<350 $3.45 1.2%
<360 $3.55 0.6%
<370 $3.65 0.3%
<380 $3.75 0.6%
<390 $3.85 1.1%
<400 $3.95 0.9%
>=400 $4.05 1.7%
Total: 100.0%  
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Aircraft Investment Model
Study parameters
                          Study name and scenarios
Study name Real options analysis for WEG Ph.D Thesis
Scenarios Scenario name New aircraft name
Disposed 
aircraft name NPV (USD m) PV at Year 1 PV at Year 0 Year 1 return
First A319 Purchase A319 12.7 13.9 12.7 8.58%
Second A320 purchase A320 13.6 14.8 13.6 8.76%
Reference years Units used in the study
Start year for study 2010 Weight unit t
Project horizon in years 20 Distance unit nm
Last year of operations 2030 Pax yield or revenue unit Units per RPK
Base year for aircraft pricing 2008 Cargo yield or revenue unit Units per RTK
Base year for revenues 2010 Cost units Thousands pe
Base year for costs 2010 Rounding decimals for output calculations 2
Economic environment Financial environment
Passenger traffic growth rate per year 4.00% Debt to total capital ratio 50%
Cargo growth rate per year 0.00% Cost of debt (Kd) 6.00%
Aircraft price escalation rate 3.0% Cost of equity (Ke) 12.00%
Default yield growth rate -1.0% Discount rate: WACC or hurdle rate 9.00%
Default revenue inflation rate 3.0%
Default cost inflation rate 3.0%
Default fuel price in US$ per USg $2.00 Tax environment
Study currency (unit for all study results) USD Effective Income tax rate 35%
Aircraft pricing currency USD Capital gains tax rate
Aircraft pricing currency per Study currency 1.000 Investment tax credit rate
Revenue & cost currency USD
Revenue & cost currency per Study currency 1.000
US$ per Revenue & cost currency (for fuel) 1.000
Depreciation policy
Salvage value as a percentage of sales price 20%
Depreciation period in years 20
Depreciation method ST
Book values table Market value estimates and operating lease period
Lease period (years) 5
Average market 
value loss per 
year
4%
Year from 
delivery Percent depreciated Aircraft book value
Year from 
delivery
Pct. Loss in 
market value
Aircraft market 
value
Excess of 
market over 
book value
Market value 
for lease rate 
calculation
0 0.000% 100.000% 0 0.000% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0%
1 4.000% 96.000% 1 4.000% 96.0% 0.0% 100.0%
2 4.000% 92.000% 2 4.000% 92.0% 0.0% 100.0%
3 4.000% 88.000% 3 4.000% 88.0% 0.0% 100.0%
4 4.000% 84.000% 4 4.000% 84.0% 0.0% 100.0%
5 4.000% 80.000% 5 4.000% 80.0% 0.0% 80.0%
6 4.000% 76.000% 6 4.000% 76.0% 0.0% 80.0%
7 4.000% 72.000% 7 4.000% 72.0% 0.0% 80.0%
8 4.000% 68.000% 8 4.000% 68.0% 0.0% 80.0%
9 4.000% 64.000% 9 4.000% 64.0% 0.0% 80.0%
10 4.000% 60.000% 10 4.000% 60.0% 0.0% 60.0%
11 4.000% 56.000% 11 4.000% 56.0% 0.0% 60.0%
12 4.000% 52.000% 12 4.000% 52.0% 0.0% 60.0%
13 4.000% 48.000% 13 4.000% 48.0% 0.0% 60.0%
14 4.000% 44.000% 14 4.000% 44.0% 0.0% 60.0%
15 4.000% 40.000% 15 4.000% 40.0% 0.0% 40.0%
16 4.000% 36.000% 16 4.000% 36.0% 0.0% 40.0%
17 4.000% 32.000% 17 4.000% 32.0% 0.0% 40.0%
18 4.000% 28.000% 18 4.000% 28.0% 0.0% 40.0%
19 4.000% 24.000% 19 4.000% 24.0% 0.0% 40.0%
20 4.000% 20.000% 20 4.000% 20.0% 0.0% 20.0%
21 0.000% 20.000% 21 4.000% 16.0% -4.0% 20.0%
22 0.000% 20.000% 22 4.000% 12.0% -8.0% 20.0%
23 0.000% 20.000% 23 4.000% 8.0% -12.0% 20.0%
24 0.000% 20.000% 24 4.000% 4.0% -16.0% 20.0%
25 0.000% 20.000% 25 4.000% 0.0% -20.0% 0.0%
Total 80% Total 100%
Nautica
Tonn
USD pe
USD pe
Thousand  of U
2
20
Straightline
5
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Aircraft Investment Model
Operating assumptions
Study name Real options analysis for WEG Ph.D Thesis
Study horizon 2010 to 2030
Indicative NPV (USD m)  12.7  13.6
Scenario A319 Purchase A320 purchase
New fleet Existing fleet New fleet Existing fleet
A319 0 A320 0
No. of seats 156 0 180 0
Cargo capacity (t) 0 0 0 0
Sector
Sector length (nm) 500 500
Number of sectors per year 2115 2115
Block fuel consumption (t) per trip 3.201 3.24
Fuel density (kg/litre) 0.803 0.803 0.803
Fuel price $ per USG - default is $2 $2.00 $2.00
Fuel cost in thousands of USD per sector, base year 201 $2.106 $0.000 $2.132 $0.000
Passengers and cargo carried per aircraft in base year 2010
Passengers carried per trip 110.0 110.0
Passenger load factor 71% 0% 61% 0%
Maximum pax load factor (spill LF) 98% 85% 98% 85%
Cargo load factor in base year
Maximum cargo load factor 90% 90% 90% 90%
Cargo carried (t) in base year 2010 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Revenue in base year 2010 USD
Revenue 
inflation + 
yield growth 
rate
USD (Units per 
RPK)
Annual revenue 
per aircraft in 
USD m
USD (Units per 
RPK)
Annual revenue 
per aircraft in 
USD m
USD (Units 
per RPK)
Annual revenue 
per aircraft in 
USD m
USD (Units 
per RPK)
Annual revenue 
per aircraft in 
USD m
0.09 19.392 0.000 0.09 19.392 0.000
USD (Units per 
RTK)
USD (Units per 
RTK)
USD (Units 
per RTK)
USD (Units 
per RTK)
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pct. of 
passenger 
revenue
Pct. of 
passenger 
revenue
Pct. of 
passenger 
revenue
Pct. of 
passenger 
revenue
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Costs in base year 2010 USD
Cost inflation 
rate
USD 
(Thousands 
per sector)
Annual cost per 
aircraft in USD m
USD 
(Thousands 
per sector)
Annual cost per 
aircraft in USD m
USD 
(Thousands 
per sector)
Annual cost per 
aircraft in USD m
USD 
(Thousands 
per sector)
Annual cost per 
aircraft in USD m
 Fuel 3.00% 2.106  4.454 0.000  0.000 2.132  4.509 0.000  0.000
 Maintenance : mature cost 3.00% 0.864  1.827  0.000 0.920  1.946  0.000
 Cockpit crew 3.00% 0.802  1.696  0.000 0.53467 $ 0.802  1.696  0.000
 Cabin crew 3.00% 0.544  1.151  0.000 cabin cre 85 0.544  1.151  0.000
 Passenger services (110 pax) 3.00% 0.362  0.766  0.000 250.625 0.417  0.882  0.000
 Landing fees 3.00% 0.619  1.309  0.000 0.631  1.335  0.000
 Navigation fees 3.00% 0.517  1.093  0.000 0.522  1.104  0.000
 Handling fees 3.00% 2.555  5.404  0.000 2.793  5.907  0.000
 Other operating costs 3.00%  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000
   Total Cash Operating Costs 17.701 0.000 18.529 0.000
     Flying Contribution (pct. of revenue) 9% 0% 4% 0%
Fuel degradation mark-up parameters
Age of aircraft for mark-up 12 12 12 12
One-time cost mark-up 2% 3% 2% 3%
Ageing curve for fuel and maintenance costs Fuel Maintenance Fuel Maintenance Fuel Maintenance Fuel Maintenance
Age of the 
aircraft in years
Percent of base 
cost
Percent of mature 
cost
Percent of base 
cost
Percent of mature 
cost
Age of 
the 
aircraft in 
years
Percent of base 
cost
Percent of 
mature cost
Percent of base 
cost
Percent of 
mature cost
0 100% 33% 100% 100% 0 100% 33% 100% 100%
1 100% 51% 100% 100% 1 100% 51% 100% 100%
2 100% 69% 100% 100% 2 100% 69% 100% 100%
3 100% 83% 100% 100% 3 100% 83% 100% 100%
4 100% 93% 100% 100% 4 100% 93% 100% 100%
5 100% 96% 100% 100% 5 100% 96% 100% 100%
6 100% 97% 100% 100% 6 100% 97% 100% 100%
7 100% 98% 100% 100% 7 100% 98% 100% 100%
8 100% 99% 100% 100% 8 100% 99% 100% 100%
9 100% 100% 100% 100% 9 100% 100% 100% 100%
10 100% 100% 100% 100% 10 100% 100% 100% 100%
11 100% 100% 100% 100% 11 100% 100% 100% 100%
12 100% 100% 100% 100% 12 100% 100% 100% 100%
13 102% 100% 103% 100% 13 102% 100% 103% 100%
14 102% 102% 103% 100% 14 102% 102% 103% 100%
15 102% 102% 103% 100% 15 102% 102% 103% 100%
16 102% 102% 103% 100% 16 102% 102% 103% 100%
17 102% 102% 103% 100% 17 102% 102% 103% 100%
18 102% 102% 103% 100% 18 102% 102% 103% 100%
19 102% 102% 103% 100% 19 102% 102% 103% 100%
20 102% 102% 103% 100% 20 102% 102% 103% 100%
21 102% 102% 103% 100% 21 102% 102% 103% 100%
22 102% 102% 103% 100% 22 102% 102% 103% 100%
23 102% 102% 103% 100% 23 102% 102% 103% 100%
24 102% 102% 103% 100% 24 102% 102% 103% 100%
25 102% 102% 103% 100% 25 102% 102% 103% 100%
26 102% 100% 103% 100% 26 102% 102% 103% 100%
27 102% 100% 103% 100% 27 102% 102% 103% 100%
28 102% 100% 103% 100% 28 102% 100% 103% 100%
29 102% 100% 103% 100% 29 102% 100% 103% 100%
30 102% 100% 103% 100% 30 102% 100% 103% 100%
31 102% 100% 103% 100% 31 102% 100% 103% 100%
32 102% 100% 103% 100% 32 102% 100% 103% 100%
33 102% 100% 103% 100% 33 102% 100% 103% 100%
34 102% 100% 103% 100% 34 102% 100% 103% 100%
35 102% 100% 103% 100% 35 102% 100% 103% 100%
Traffic / passenger growth trend
Year Traffic 
Growth rate
Passengers 
per trip
Annual 
Revenue
Passengers 
per trip
Annual 
Revenue
Year
Traffic 
Growth 
rate
Passengers 
per trip
Annual 
Revenue
Passengers 
per trip
Annual 
Revenue
2010 110.0 19.392 0.0 0.000 2010 110.0 19.392 0.0 0.000
2011 4.00% 114.4 20.168 0.0 0.000 2011 4.00% 114.4 20.168 0.0 0.000
2012 4.00% 119.0 20.975 0.0 0.000 2012 4.00% 119.0 20.975 0.0 0.000
2013 4.00% 123.7 21.814 0.0 0.000 2013 4.00% 123.7 21.814 0.0 0.000
2014 4.00% 128.7 22.686 0.0 0.000 2014 4.00% 128.7 22.686 0.0 0.000
2015 4.00% 133.8 23.594 0.0 0.000 2015 4.00% 133.8 23.594 0.0 0.000
2016 4.00% 139.2 24.538 0.0 0.000 2016 4.00% 139.2 24.538 0.0 0.000
2017 4.00% 144.8 25.519 0.0 0.000 2017 4.00% 144.8 25.519 0.0 0.000
2018 4.00% 150.5 26.540 0.0 0.000 2018 4.00% 150.5 26.540 0.0 0.000
2019 4.00% 152.9 26.952 0.0 0.000 2019 4.00% 156.6 27.601 0.0 0.000
2020 4.00% 152.9 26.952 0.0 0.000 2020 4.00% 162.8 28.705 0.0 0.000
2021 4.00% 152.9 26.952 0.0 0.000 2021 4.00% 169.3 29.854 0.0 0.000
2022 4.00% 152.9 26.952 0.0 0.000 2022 4.00% 176.1 31.048 0.0 0.000
2023 4.00% 152.9 26.952 0.0 0.000 2023 4.00% 176.4 31.098 0.0 0.000
2024 4.00% 152.9 26.952 0.0 0.000 2024 4.00% 176.4 31.098 0.0 0.000
2025 4.00% 152.9 26.952 0.0 0.000 2025 4.00% 176.4 31.098 0.0 0.000
2026 4.00% 152.9 26.952 0.0 0.000 2026 4.00% 176.4 31.098 0.0 0.000
2027 4.00% 152.9 26.952 0.0 0.000 2027 4.00% 176.4 31.098 0.0 0.000
2028 4.00% 152.9 26.952 0.0 0.000 2028 4.00% 176.4 31.098 0.0 0.000
2029 4.00% 152.9 26.952 0.0 0.000 2029 4.00% 176.4 31.098 0.0 0.000
Aircraft
Other revenue 2.0%
Passenger revenue 2.0%
Cargo revenue 2.0%
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Aircraft Investment Model Study name Real options analysis for WEG Ph.D Thesis
Operating Cash Flows Study horizon 2010 to 2030
All monetary amounts in millions of USD
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Scenario: A319 Purchase
Number of aircraft in operation
A319 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
  Total aircraft in operation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Profit and loss statement
Revenue
 Passenger  27.6  29.3  31.1  32.2  32.9  33.5  34.2  34.9  35.6  36.3  37.0  37.7  38.5  39.3  40.0
 Cargo
 Other
  Total revenue  27.6  29.3  31.1  32.2  32.9  33.5  34.2  34.9  35.6  36.3  37.0  37.7  38.5  39.3  40.0
Cash operating costs
 Fuel  5.3  5.5  5.6  5.8  6.0  6.2  6.4  6.5  6.7  6.9  7.1  7.4  7.6  8.0  8.2
 Maintenance  0.7  1.1  1.6  2.0  2.3  2.4  2.5  2.6  2.7  2.8  2.9  3.0  3.1  3.2  3.4
 Cockpit crew  2.0  2.1  2.1  2.2  2.3  2.3  2.4  2.5  2.6  2.6  2.7  2.8  2.9  3.0  3.1
 Cabin crew  1.4  1.4  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.6  1.6  1.7  1.7  1.8  1.8  1.9  2.0  2.0  2.1
 Pax services  1.2  1.2  1.3  1.4  1.4  1.5  1.5  1.6  1.6  1.7  1.7  1.8  1.8  1.9  1.9
 Landing fees  1.6  1.6  1.7  1.7  1.8  1.8  1.9  1.9  2.0  2.0  2.1  2.2  2.2  2.3  2.4
 Navigation fees  1.3  1.3  1.4  1.4  1.5  1.5  1.6  1.6  1.7  1.7  1.8  1.8  1.9  1.9  2.0
 Handling fees  6.5  6.6  6.8  7.1  7.3  7.5  7.7  7.9  8.2  8.4  8.7  8.9  9.2  9.5  9.8
 Other cash operating costs
  Total COC  19.9  21.0  22.1  23.1  24.0  24.8  25.6  26.4  27.2  28.0  28.9  29.7  30.6  31.7  32.7
   Flying contribution  7.7  8.3  9.0  9.1  8.8  8.7  8.6  8.5  8.4  8.2  8.1  8.0  7.9  7.5  7.3
Fixed fleet costs
 Depreciation  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5
 Lease payments
 Interest expense  1.9  1.8  1.8  1.7  1.7  1.6  1.5  1.5  1.4  1.3  1.2  1.1  1.0  0.9  0.8
 Other fixed fleet costs
  Total fixed fleet costs  3.4  3.3  3.3  3.2  3.1  3.1  3.0  2.9  2.9  2.8  2.7  2.6  2.5  2.4  2.3
   Operating Contribution  4.4  5.0  5.8  5.9  5.7  5.6  5.6  5.6  5.5  5.5  5.4  5.4  5.4  5.2  5.0
Overhead (input in USDm per year)
   Operating profit/loss  4.4  5.0  5.8  5.9  5.7  5.6  5.6  5.6  5.5  5.5  5.4  5.4  5.4  5.2  5.0
Gain/(loss) on sale of aircraft
Income tax   1.5  1.8  2.0  2.1  2.0  2.0  2.0  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.8  1.8
   Net profit  2.8  3.3  3.8  3.9  3.7  3.7  3.6  3.6  3.6  3.6  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.4  3.3
Net profit margin 10% 11% 12% 12% 11% 11% 11% 10% 10% 10% 10% 9% 9% 9% 8%
Scenario: A319 Purchase
Operating cash flow
  Flying contribution  7.7  8.3  9.0  9.1  8.8  8.7  8.6  8.5  8.4  8.2  8.1  8.0  7.9  7.5  7.3
  - Cash fixed fleet costs
  - Overhead
  - Income tax ( 2.7) ( 2.9) ( 3.2) ( 3.2) ( 3.1) ( 3.0) ( 3.0) ( 3.0) ( 2.9) ( 2.9) ( 2.8) ( 2.8) ( 2.7) ( 2.6) ( 2.6)
  + Increase in current liabilities
   - Increase in current assets
    Total Operating cash flow  5.0  5.4  5.9  5.9  5.7  5.7  5.6  5.5  5.4  5.4  5.3  5.2  5.1  4.9  4.8  
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Aircraft Investment Model Study name Real options analysis for WEG Ph.D Thesis
Operating Cash Flows Study horizon 2010 to 2030
All monetary amounts in millions of USD
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Scenario: A320 purchase
Number of aircraft in operation
A320 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
  Total aircraft in operation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Profit and loss statement
Revenue
 Passenger  27.6  29.3  31.1  33.0  35.0  37.1  39.4  40.2  41.0  41.9  42.7  43.5  44.4  45.3  46.2
 Cargo
 Other
  Total revenue  27.6  29.3  31.1  33.0  35.0  37.1  39.4  40.2  41.0  41.9  42.7  43.5  44.4  45.3  46.2
Cash operating costs
 Fuel  5.4  5.5  5.7  5.9  6.1  6.2  6.4  6.6  6.8  7.0  7.2  7.5  7.7  8.1  8.3
 Maintenance  0.8  1.2  1.7  2.1  2.4  2.6  2.7  2.8  2.9  3.0  3.1  3.2  3.3  3.4  3.6
 Cockpit crew  2.0  2.1  2.1  2.2  2.3  2.3  2.4  2.5  2.6  2.6  2.7  2.8  2.9  3.0  3.1
 Cabin crew  1.4  1.4  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.6  1.6  1.7  1.7  1.8  1.8  1.9  2.0  2.0  2.1
 Pax services  1.3  1.4  1.5  1.6  1.6  1.7  1.7  1.8  1.9  1.9  2.0  2.0  2.1  2.1  2.2
 Landing fees  1.6  1.6  1.7  1.7  1.8  1.8  1.9  2.0  2.0  2.1  2.1  2.2  2.3  2.3  2.4
 Navigation fees  1.3  1.4  1.4  1.4  1.5  1.5  1.6  1.6  1.7  1.7  1.8  1.8  1.9  1.9  2.0
 Handling fees  7.1  7.3  7.5  7.7  7.9  8.2  8.4  8.7  8.9  9.2  9.5  9.8  10.1  10.4  10.7
 Other cash operating costs
  Total COC  20.8  22.0  23.1  24.2  25.2  26.0  26.8  27.7  28.5  29.4  30.3  31.2  32.1  33.3  34.3
   Flying contribution  6.8  7.4  8.0  8.8  9.8  11.1  12.6  12.6  12.5  12.5  12.4  12.4  12.3  12.1  11.9
Fixed fleet costs
 Depreciation  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0  2.0
 Lease expense
 Interest expense  2.5  2.4  2.4  2.3  2.2  2.1  2.0  1.9  1.8  1.7  1.6  1.5  1.4  1.2  1.1
 Other fixed fleet costs
  Total fixed fleet costs  4.5  4.4  4.3  4.3  4.2  4.1  4.0  3.9  3.8  3.7  3.6  3.5  3.3  3.2  3.0
   Operating Contribution  2.3  2.9  3.6  4.5  5.6  7.0  8.6  8.7  8.7  8.8  8.8  8.9  9.0  8.9  8.8
Overhead (input in USDm per year)
   Operating profit/loss  2.3  2.9  3.6  4.5  5.6  7.0  8.6  8.7  8.7  8.8  8.8  8.9  9.0  8.9  8.8
Gain/(loss) on sale of aircraft
Income tax   0.8  1.0  1.3  1.6  2.0  2.5  3.0  3.0  3.1  3.1  3.1  3.1  3.1  3.1  3.1
   Net profit  1.5  1.9  2.4  2.9  3.7  4.6  5.6  5.6  5.7  5.7  5.7  5.8  5.8  5.8  5.8
Net profit margin 5% 7% 8% 9% 10% 12% 14% 14% 14% 14% 13% 13% 13% 13% 12%
Scenario: A320 purchase
Operating cash flow
  Flying contribution  6.8  7.4  8.0  8.8  9.8  11.1  12.6  12.6  12.5  12.5  12.4  12.4  12.3  12.1  11.9
  - Cash fixed fleet costs
  - Overhead
  - Income tax ( 2.4) ( 2.6) ( 2.8) ( 3.1) ( 3.4) ( 3.9) ( 4.4) ( 4.4) ( 4.4) ( 4.4) ( 4.3) ( 4.3) ( 4.3) ( 4.2) ( 4.2)
  + Increase in current liabilities
   - Increase in current assets
    Total Operating cash flow  4.4  4.8  5.2  5.7  6.4  7.2  8.2  8.2  8.1  8.1  8.1  8.0  8.0  7.8  7.7  
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Aircraft Investment Model Study name Real options analysis for WEG Ph.D Thesis
Cash Flow Summary Study horizon 2010 to 2030
All monetary amounts in millions of USD
Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Scenario: A319 Purchase
Economic cash flow and NPV
 Operating cash flow 5.0 5.4 5.9 5.9  5.7 5.7 5.6 5.5 5.4 5.4 5.3 5.2 5.1 4.9  4.8
 Investing cash flow ( 36.9)  14.8
 Tax impact of investing and financing 1.2 1.2 1.1 1.1  1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.8  0.8
   Economic cash flow ( 36.9) 6.2 6.6 7.0 7.1  6.8 6.7 6.6 6.5 6.4 6.3 6.2 6.1 6.0 5.8  20.3
Verify no more than 1 sign change for IRR: 1.0
Net Present Value (NPV) at year-end 2010  12.7 A319 CF 2015 A319 CF 2016 A319 CF 2017 A319 CF 2018 A319 CF 2019 A319 CF 2020 A319 CF 2021 A319 CF 2022 A319 CF 2023 A319 CF 2024 A319 CF 2025 A319 CF 2026 A319 CF 2027 A319 CF 2028 A319 CF 2029 A319 CF 2030
Profitability index (NPV/Investment)  0.4
Internal Rate of Return 16.68%
Breakeven NPV analysis PV at T1 ( 26.1)  4.0  3.9  3.8  3.5  3.2  2.8  2.6  2.3  2.1  1.9  1.7  1.5  1.4  1.2  4.0
 Annual PV's during the project PV at T0 ( 24.0) 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.3  2.9 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.1  3.6
 Cumulative NPV ( 24.0) ( 20.3) ( 16.7) ( 13.2) ( 9.9) ( 7.0) ( 4.4) ( 2.1) 0.1 2.0 3.7 5.3 6.7 8.0 9.1  12.7
A319 NPV 2015A319 NPV 201A319 NPV 201A319 NPV 201A319 NPV 201A319 NPV 202A319 NPV 202A319 NPV 202A319 NPV 202A319 NPV 202A319 NPV 202A319 NPV 202A319 NPV 202A319 NPV 202A319 NPV 202A319 NPV 203
Scenario: A320 purchase
Economic cash flow and NPV
 Operating cash flow 4.4 4.8 5.2 5.7  6.4 7.2 8.2 8.2 8.1 8.1 8.1 8.0 8.0 7.8  7.7
 Investing cash flow ( 49.2)  19.7
 Tax impact on investing and financing 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5  1.5 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.1  1.1
   Economic cash flow ( 49.2) 6.0 6.3 6.7 7.2  7.8 8.7 9.6 9.5 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.2 9.2 9.0  28.5
Net Present Value (NPV) at year-end 2010  13.6 A320 CF 2015 A320 CF 2016 A320 CF 2017 A320 CF 2018 A320 CF 2019 A320 CF 2020 A320 CF 2021 A320 CF 2022 A320 CF 2023 A320 CF 2024 A320 CF 2025 A320 CF 2026 A320 CF 2027 A320 CF 2028 A320 CF 2029 A320 CF 2030
Profitability index (NPV/Investment)  0.3
Internal Rate of Return 14.52%
Breakeven NPV analysis PV at T1 ( 34.9)  3.9  3.8  3.7  3.6  3.6  3.7  3.7  3.4  3.1  2.8  2.6  2.3  2.1  1.9  5.5
 Annual PV's during the project PV at T0 ( 32.0) 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.3  3.3 3.4 3.4 3.1 2.8 2.6 2.3 2.1 1.9 1.7  5.1
 Cumulative NPV ( 32.0) ( 28.4) ( 25.0) ( 21.6) ( 18.3) ( 15.0) ( 11.6) ( 8.2) ( 5.1) ( 2.3) 0.3 2.7 4.8 6.7 8.5  13.6
A320 NPV 2015A320 NPV 201A320 NPV 201A320 NPV 201A320 NPV 201A320 NPV 202A320 NPV 202A320 NPV 202A320 NPV 202A320 NPV 202A320 NPV 202A320 NPV 202A320 NPV 202A320 NPV 202A320 NPV 202A320 NPV 203 
 
  
 
